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1 Introduction
Why develop a new theoretical framework for syntax? As I see it, there are two
big problems with current approaches. One is the problem of atemporality: con-
ventional syntactic representations obscure temporal information. They depict a
structure of relations that is supposedly non-temporal. For example, the repre-
sentation in Figure 1.1(A) does not necessarily imply a temporal dimension as in
(B):
Figure 1.1: Problems with time in syntactic representations.
If the time dimension in (B) made sense, we could draw inferences from hori-
zontal distances between units: two horizontally equidistant units as in (C) would
be equidistant in time. This is never the intent of such representations, and in
many uses, the horizontal dimension does not even represent order, i.e. discret-
ized time. Hence (D) is equivalent to (E). Because syntactic representations lack
an explicit conception of time, a separate mechanism, “linearization”, is needed
to map words to a linear order. However, a close analysis of linearization reveals
that temporal information is indeed present in syntactic structures, hidden in
connection patterns and orientation. Syntactic structures do provide temporal
information, but do so indirectly.
In the oscillators and energy levels framework (henceforth o/el), we bring time
into the picture, but not by imposing a temporal dimension on a space which
contains objects. Instead, the o/el picture evokes two conceptions of time, both
of which differ from our usual, linear conception. One of these is periodic time.
Periodic time is useful because we hypothesize that a fundamental property of
syntactic and conceptual systems is a capability to transiently oscillate. The tran-
sience implies that the oscillation occurs for a brief period of time, as shown in
Figure 1.2(A).
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Figure 1.2: Oscillations can be described with a periodic conception of
time.
For an oscillating system, we can picture a circular axis of time as in Fig-
ure 1.2(B). A specific time is a particular phase angle, θ, defined relative to a
reference phase angle. The choices of the reference phase and angular units are
arbitrary: 0°, 0 radians, or 3:00 are just as useful as 90°, π/2 radians, or 12:00. Phase
angle is periodic by definition, so a phase of 360° maps to 0°. Though we are fa-
miliar with the angular mapping of time because of circular clocks, some aspects
of this conception do not gel with our commonsense intuitions. For instance, pe-
riodic time has local notions of past and future, but no global or absolute past or
future. There is also an implied frequency parameter, which describes how peri-
odic time maps to linear time: the period of an oscillation (T) is the reciprocal of
the frequency (f).
Periodic time provides a useful description of a temporal relation between a
pair of oscillating systems: relative phase, ϕ. Relative phase is the difference be-
tween the phase angles of two systems, as illustrated in Figure 1.3. For a pair of
systems i and j, ϕij = θi − θj. Patterns of ϕ are of fundamental importance in the
o/el framework: a central proposal is that transiently stable ϕ configurations give
rise to the experience of relational meaning.
Figure 1.3: Relative phase as the difference between phase angles.
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The other conception of time in the o/el framework is discontinuous, piece-
wise-linear time. Why is this useful? Let us imagine a system in which some
quantity normally changes slowly or stays constant, but certain processes occa-
sionally cause the quantity to change very abruptly. As shown in Figure 1.4, a
continuous but highly nonlinear change of this sort can be approximated as a
discontinuity when viewed on a larger scale.
Figure 1.4: Abrupt changes in a quantity can be viewed as discontinu-
ities on a larger scale.
Temporal discontinuities are useful because the timescale of processes which
govern the ordering of motor behaviors is smaller than the timescale on which
relational meaning experiences (i.e. ϕ patterns) remain stable. Moreover, we hy-
pothesize a mechanism for rapid organization and reorganization of syntactic
systems into hierarchically related levels of excitation, as shown in Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5: Systems are organized in a hierarchy of relative excitation.
The production mechanism operates via iterated reorganization of the excita-
tion hierarchy, as illustrated in Figure 1.6. In epoch (e1), the most highly excited
system is selected and correspondingmotor actions are performed. Subsequently,
the selected system is demoted while other systems are promoted – a reorgani-
zation occurs, resulting in a new stable epoch, (e2). As shown in Figure 1.6, the
3
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reorganization process is iterated, resulting in the production of a sequence of
words.
Figure 1.6: Temporal order arises from iterated reorganization of the
excitation hierarchy.
Instead of obscuring time, o/el representations are designed to facilitate rea-
soning about temporal patterns. The blend of temporal conceptions which is
evoked by the o/el framework highlights a tension between continuity and dis-
continuity that underlies nearly all of our reasoning about language. Bringing
this tension to the foreground helps us better understand a wide variety of syn-
tactic phenomena in the production and interpretation of language.
The other big problem with conventional theories is the problem of multiplic-
ity. In syntactic trees (and many alternative representational schemas), a given
type of syntactic object (e.g. N, V, VP, S, etc.) can be present in an arbitrary num-
ber of positions in a structure, as in Figure 1.7. Conventional frameworks impose
no limit on the number of instantiations of a given type of object. No adverse
consequences of multiplicity are expected in such approaches, even when mul-
tiplicitous objects are associated with the same word, e.g. the verb knows in the
utterance Al knows that Bo knows that Cam knows…
Figure 1.7: The multiplicity problem: the same type of object can occur
in multiple places in a structure.
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The acceptance of multiplicity is so deeply ingrained (perhaps due to written
language) that most theories fail to recognize the problem.The crux of the issue is
that if we believe syntactic patterns can be understood in relation to macroscopic
brain states, then we must accept a finite capacity for distinct states. A theory
that allows for a multiplicitous conception of structure can provide no intrinsic
mechanisms for understanding the nature of limitations on this capacity. Such
limitations must be imposed extrinsically, in a manner that does not derive from
the conception of structure which underlies the theory.
Any syntactic theory must either ignore or resolve the multiplicity problem.
We should prefer a theory in which the resolution derives from the same concep-
tual model that provides a basis for a general understanding of linguistic phenom-
ena – a comprehensive theory. Many current approaches fall short of this because
their solution is to distinguish between competence and performance, in effect
stipulating that mechanisms of syntactic organization can be isolated from other
cognitive mechanisms. The o/el framework addresses the multiplicity problem
by developing a mechanism for systems (construed microscopically as neural
populations) to differentiate into subsystems (overlapping subpopulations). Be-
cause differentiated subsystems interfere with one another, differentiation leads
to interference that can destabilize those systems. Stability has important conse-
quences for what speakers produce and what is coherent for an interpreter.
This book is organized into several chapters. The first chapter, Overview of
the oscillators/energy levels framework, introduces the basic microscopic
and macroscopic conceptual models which provide a basis for reasoning about
syntactic phenomena. Deconstructing syntactic theory discusses how con-
ventional syntactic theories are based on a small set of fundamental metaphors
and image schemas, and contrasts these with the metaphors used in the oscil-
lators/energy levels framework. Reconstructing syntactic theory provides
a detailed presentation of the o/el model. The focus is on phrase structure, but
somemorphosyntactic and morphophonological phenomena are covered as well.
Most importantly, the concept of interference is developed in detail, and this mo-
tivates analyses in subsequent chapters. Infinity and recursion argues that
viewing language as a discrete infinity generated by recursive merge operations
is misguided. Grammaticality intuitions argues for reconceptualizing gram-
maticality intuitions as the result of an experience of the coherence of a system
state trajectory; common neurophysiological patterns are interpreted in relation
to coherence. Syntactic phenomena applies the o/el framework to three phe-
nomena: ellipsis, anaphora, and movement islands. Finally, The physical lin-
guistics program describes the philosophical underpinnings of the approach
taken in this book, and sets the stage for future research.
5
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There is a small amount of mathematical formalization in this book, which
will be of varying degrees of difficulty for readers, depending on their familiar-
ity with dynamical systems. In most of the cases where equations are presented, I
have provided illustrations which facilitate a visual conceptualization. It is my be-
lief that a sufficient understanding of the mathematical concepts can be obtained
from the visual/geometric illustrations alone, without a need for interpreting the
symbolic math.The equations are merely a convenient shortcut for describing ge-
ometric patterns. For readers who would like to become more familiar with the
relevant math, including how it can be related to behavior, I recommend two
introductory texts: Dynamic Patterns: The self-organization of brain and behavior,
by J. A. Scott Kelso (Kelso 1997), and Nonlinear dynamics and chaos, by Steven H.
Strogatz (Strogatz 2018). Familiarity with these texts is not a prerequisite for un-
derstanding the current approach, but will undoubtedly enrich the interpretation.
For more technical texts which address dynamics from biological, neurological,
and physical perspectives, it is suggested that the reader consult The Geometry of
Biological Time by Arthur T. Winfree (Winfree 2001), Dynamical Systems in Neu-
roscience by Eugene M. Izhikevich (Izhikevich 2007), and Advanced Synergetics:
Instability Hierarchies of Self-Organizing Systems and Devices by Hermann Haken
(Haken 1983a).
Some portions of this book present critiques of “conventional” syntactic theo-
ries, especially in the second chapter, Deconstructing syntactic theory, and
in the fourth chapter, Infinity and recursion. These critiques are related to the
problems of atemporality and multiplicity discussed above. A warning is neces-
sary regarding the targets of the critiques. There are numerous syntactic theo-
ries/frameworks: Minimalism (Chomsky 1995), Categorial Grammars (Steedman
1993; Wood 2014), Tree Adjunction Grammars (Joshi 1987), Lexical Functional
Grammar (Bresnan & Kaplan 1982), Dependency Grammar (Hudson 1977; Tes-
nière 2018), Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (Gazdar et al. 1985), Func-
tional Grammar (Dik 1981), Role and reference grammar (Van Valin Jr 2014),
Construction Grammar (Goldberg 1995), Radical Construction Grammar (Croft
2001), Sign-Based Construction Grammar (Sag 2012), Semiotic Grammar (Mcgre-
gor 1997), Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 2008), and others. It is beyond the
scope of this book – perhaps any single book – to critique all of these frame-
works.
Rather than being general, the critiques herein specifically target Minimalism
and its precursors, Transformational Grammar (Chomsky 1965) and Government
and Binding Theory (Chomsky 1982), which fall under the label of generative
grammar. These frameworks are the ones that we subsequently refer to as “con-
ventional theories,” although this label is not intended to imply that these par-
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ticular frameworks are more standard or widely accepted than others. Instead,
“conventional” implicates a set of foundational metaphors which by convention
constitute a basis for reasoning about syntactic phenomena. However, narrowing
the target of my critiques in this way raises the question of whether the critiques
apply to other theories/frameworks. Certainly not all aspects of the critiques nec-
essarily apply to all extant theories. It is left as a project for readers – many of
whom are better versed in some of the particular approaches listed above – to
consider whether the atemporality andmultiplicity problems (and the collections
of critiques they encompass) apply to a given syntactic framework. Nonetheless,
it is my impression as an outsider that the foundational metaphors discussed
herein are very general, and I bring attention to the metaphors in order to pro-
voke a re-examination of their usefulness.
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2 Overview of the oscillators/energy
levels framework
The o/el framework and conventional frameworks offer very different concep-
tualizations of “syntax”. In conventional approaches, a syntax “module” builds
“structures” of “objects” which map both to speech motor output and to a mean-
ing representation. This modular approach separates syntax from the phenom-
ena that are most directly important for communication: movements/sensory
experiences (a.k.a. the sensorimotor interface, phonological form) and meaning
experiences (a.k.a. the conceptual-intentional interface, logical form). The modu-
lar interface view encourages us to see syntax as independent frommeaning and
independent from movement/sensation. We should reject this way of thinking.
Syntax should not be understood as a module, but as a generic term for mech-
anisms which organize meaning and sensorimotor experience. Experiences are
highly ordered states, and syntax is a mechanism for creating order.
The o/el framework rejects modules and instead embraces the notion of a sys-
tem. A system is a portion of the universe associated with some partially pre-
dictablemapping from an initial state to a subsequent state. In the o/el conception
there are many systems, of two fundamental types: concept systems and syntac-
tic systems. Unlike the weak, unidirectional interfaces of modules, o/el systems
may have strong, bidirectional interactions. Even more importantly, o/el systems
do not operate on structures of “objects”. Instead, concept systems and syntactic
systems have states and exert forces on each other. Below we develop a detailed
picture of these systems and their interactions.
Another important way in which the current approach differs from conven-
tional ones is that we attempt to motivate the framework with inferences based
on knowledge of neural population dynamics. The o/el framework is derived
from a microscopic conceptualization in which population coding and interpop-
ulation connectivity play major roles in determining behavioral patterns. There
aremanyways inwhich our derivation of amacroscopic analysis relies on incom-
plete information and unsubstantiated assumptions regarding the microscale; I
accept the possibility that invalidation of the microscale assumptions may com-
promise the framework. However, it is also possible that revisions to the mi-
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croscale assumptions may lead to modest revisions or elaborations, without nec-
essarily invalidating the framework.
2.1 Concept systems
How do complex patterns of thought arise in the brain? For example, consider
the sentence Al drinks coffee. In the conventional metaphor, a phrase is a “struc-
ture of objects” that arises from the merger of smaller objects. These objects –
words and phrases, i.e. “linguistic units” – are also the sort of objects that can
be “containers”. Thus words contain meanings and phrases contain words. Con-
nected object representations as below use vertical orientation and connection
schemas to encode these containment relations, of the sort shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Linguistic units as connected objects.
Are schemas of this sort useful? Imagine a scenario in which you engage two
thought patterns in succession. First, you engage the pattern Al drinks coffee.
Next, you engage an alternative pattern, Bo drinks tea. Then, you return your
attention to Al drinks coffee. Then, back again to Bo drinks tea. And so on… What
would we expect to observe in the brain in this scenario?
The connected objects schema is not well suited for addressing this question.
Because the sentences are conceptualized as structures of objects, we can ask:
“where do the objects come from?”, “how do they become connected or com-
bined?”, and “what happens to them when we switch to a different pattern?” Do
the objects get destroyed? Do they move somewhere? Do they vanish, are they
hidden? Do the objects ever change over time? Where are these objects located
in space? Etc.
The essence of the problem is that conventional approaches force us to think
of linguistic units as objects. To construct abstract understandings of phenom-
ena, we often use the abstractions-are-objects metaphor (e.g. put your feel-
ings aside, tear an argument into pieces, build a new life). But regardless of how
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familiar it is and how intuitive it seems, the units-are-objects metaphor is not
necessarily a useful conceptualization of language.
In the o/el framework, linguistic units are not objects. They are not the sorts
of things that contain meaning, and are not the sorts of things that can be con-
nected. They do not occupy space, they do not have orientational relations. The
o/el framework rejects all entailments of the units-are-objects metaphor. In-
stead, we adopt an alternative in which meanings are experiences, experiences
are trajectories of system states in a state space, and various forces influence
those trajectories. Our task then becomes construction of a state space, analysis
of state trajectories, and determination of forces. Because meaning experiences
are trajectories, meanings are inherently temporal.
2.1.1 Concept-specific populations of neurons
To develop an intuition for the meanings-are-trajectories metaphor we con-
sider a simple utterance, Al drinks coffee. We pose the following question: phys-
ically, in space and in time, what happens when a speaker produces this utter-
ance? Let’s suppose that in some brief period of time preceding the utterance,
in the brain of the speaker, there is a population of excitatory cortical neurons
which in a statistical sense1 is associated with concepts that contribute to the
relevant experience of meaning. For exposition, we identify those concepts as
[Al], [drinks], and [coffee]. Furthermore, suppose that we can differentiate the
population into an [Al] subpopulation, a [drinks] subpopulation, and a [coffee]
subpopulation. Thus each concept is associated with a population of many neu-
rons. No strong assumptions are necessary regarding the temporal permanence,
spatial distributions, sizes, or independence of these concept populations.
The picture in Figure 2.2 shows populations that are distributed: concept popu-
lations are associated with neurons in multiple areas of the brain, rather than just
a single area. Moreover, the “meanings” of concepts are qualia which we assume
to be determined by patterns of synaptic projection to and from sensory systems,
motor systems, and other concept populations. For example, our experience of
1To assess this empirically, we would want fine spatial and temporal resolution of electrochem-
ical gradients, neurotransmitter concentrations, and synaptic connectivities, along with infor-
mation regarding articulatory movements, vocal tract geometry, and acoustic signals. Whether
this can be accomplished with current technology is beside the point: we can imagine associ-
ating populations of neurons with concepts in this way. Note that we require no assumptions
about the uniqueness or overlap of the populations at this point. The idea that spiking in dis-
tributed populations of neurons (or assemblies, ensembles, etc.) may correspond to things like
concepts or words is a fairly old one; see for example (Abeles 2012; Braitenberg 1978; Hebb
1949; Pulvermüller 1999).
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Figure 2.2: Conceptual systems as distributed populations of neurons.
Conceptual systems differ in their projections to and from sensory sys-
tems, motor systems, and other systems.
coffeeness is a consequence of signals to and from the peripheral sensory sys-
tems which provide information regarding taste, odor, appearance, temperature,
etc. of coffee, as well as the motor systems used to pour coffee, drink it, brew it,
and also other concepts which relate to coffee: beans, mugs, caffeine, etc. There is
no essential meaning of coffee because the pattern of projection varies over time
within an individual and varies in space, i.e. between individuals.
2.1.2 Phase transitions to collective oscillation
Before a speaker experiences a meaning associated with [Al], [drink], and [cof-
fee], the neurons of each of these concept populations must undergo a phase
transition from an inactive regime, in which action potentials are sparse in time
and relatively uncorrelated, to an active regime, in which action potentials are
frequent and highly correlated. We conjecture that integrating action potentials
for each population on an appropriate timescale results in an oscillatory spike-
rate,2 as shown in Figure 2.3. We conceptualize this phenomenon as the emer-
gence of a macroscopic collective oscillation (Acebrón et al. 2005; Breakspear et
al. 2010; Hong & Strogatz 2011; Kelso 1997; Schoner & Kelso 1988; Strogatz 2000;
Winfree 2001). There are many possible causes of these phase transitions, but let
us imagine for concreteness that the speaker sees a man named Al and a dark
liquid falling into his mouth from a cup he holds. We infer that this peripheral
2There is plenty of evidence that oscillation plays an important role in the nervous system, and
that neural populations exhibit oscillatory patterns of spiking (Averbeck et al. 2003; Buzsaki
2006; Buzsáki & Draguhn 2004; Canolty & Knight 2010; Engel et al. 2001; Fuster 2001; Gerstner
& Kistler 2002; Izhikevich 2006; 2007; Izhikevich & Edelman 2008; Klimesch 1999). However,




sensory information, through a chain of interactions, causes the relevant concept
populations to undergo transitions to the collective oscillation regime.
Figure 2.3: Spike raster and short-time integration of spike rate as con-
cept populations transition to a regime of collective oscillation.
The transition to collective oscillation is a localized emergence of a state that is
highly ordered in space and time. The microscopic state space has many dimen-
sions. There are numerous degrees of freedom: membrane voltages, ion channel
states, neurotransmitter concentrations, etc., of all of the neurons in the relevant
populations. In contrast, the macroscopic pattern of oscillation, which we obtain
by integrating strategically over the microscopic variables, represents a drastic
reduction in the volume of this state space, and is far more practical as an ana-
lytic tool. The transient oscillations have only several degrees of freedom: phase
angle (θ), angular velocity (θ̇, i.e. instantaneous frequency), and radial amplitude
(r).
2.1.3 Concept populations as systems with surroundings
To be explicit, we model each concept population as a concept systemwith a time-
varying state vector. Interactions between systems are forces, which depend on
system states. Moreover, each system has a surroundings. These constructs –
systems, states, forces, and surroundings – are derived from our microscopic pop-
ulation model. Systems are macro-scale models of populations. System states
derive from integrating over population microstates. Forces between systems de-
rive from integrating over the influences of synaptic projections from neurons in
one population to another.The surroundings derives from integratingmicroscale
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influences, the origins of which we do not differentiate as systems.3 These con-
structs are illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4:The universe is partitioned into systems and a surroundings.
2.1.4 System state variables: Excitation and phase
To construct a change rule for system states, wemust define the state space. To do
this, we reconceptualize the spike-rate of each population, i.e. a time-integration
of action potentials, as a macroscopic order parameter, A. The order parameter
A is the deviation of the spike rate from a reference value associated with the
inactive regime. Furthermore, we conjecture that when a system activates, varia-
tion in the order parameter has two components: an oscillation component xosc,
and an excitation component xexc, whose sum is the order parameter, i.e. A =
xexc + xosc. We then approximate the oscillation component as a harmonic oscil-
lation with time-varying amplitude and phase angle, i.e. xosc = r(t) cos θ(t).The
phase variable θ of a system is taken to be 2π-periodic, evolves according to an
intrinsic system frequency f0, and is influenced by forces from other systems
and the surroundings. The radial amplitude of xosc is assumed to be proportional
to the excitation component of the system, i.e. r ∝ xexc. This analysis of A is
schematized in Figure 2.5.
For exposition, we rename the excitation component xexc as “e” and refer
to phase angle (θ) simply as phase. We make a heuristic simplification by as-
suming the dynamics of e and θ are separable due to differences in relevant
timescales. This stipulated separation entails that there is a fast timescale τe such
3The surroundings is where we locate our ignorance in a given analysis.We can always improve
our analyses by constructing new systems from the surroundings, but so doing, the analyses
become more complex. We often refer to the influence of the surroundings, and this should be
viewed as a strategy of simplification.
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Figure 2.5: The system order parameter has two components: an oscil-
lation component: xosc, and an excitation component: xexc.
that changes in e occur over intervals τe, and that τe is much smaller than τθ = 1/f,
the period of the oscillation. Hence in our analyses of the dynamics of e and
θ, intermittent abrupt changes in e are assumed not to interact directly with θ.
Furthermore, the intrinsic frequency f0 is considered to be slowly-varying on
utterance timescales, and for many purposes can be conceptualized as a fixed
parameter.
Given the above construction, the state space for one concept system is the
union of subspaces for e and θ. We do not attempt to provide a more detailed
derivation of these variables and their separation from amicroscopic, population-
scale model. Nonetheless, we speculate that oscillation arises from intra-popu-
lation synaptic interactions, intrinsic neuronal dynamics, cortical microcircuit
structure, and coupling between neurons and the extracellular medium; excita-
tion relates more directly to the number of neurons which participate in a popu-
lation oscillation.
2.1.5 Meaning experiences are trajectories in state space
The utterance Al drinks coffee does not “have” a meaning. An utterance can only
have a meaning if we presuppose that meanings are objects contained in words.
We reject these object and containment metaphors. Instead, meanings are expe-
riences which correspond to trajectories in concept system e,θ space. The con-
ventional object and o/el trajectory metaphors are contrasted in Figure 2.6. In
o/el terms, a meaning experience associated with a single concept arises when
two conditions are met: (i) a stable periodic trajectory occurs in the θ subspace
associated with a concept system, for an interval of time on the order of τθ, and
(ii) the excitation of the concept system exceeds a threshold value λe. When e >
λe we refer to the system as excited; when 0 < e < λe, we refer to the system
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as active; when e = 0 we refer to the system as inactive. The phase θ of an inac-
tive system is undefined, because the inactive state does not exhibit a collective
oscillation.
Figure 2.6: The conventional metaphor in which meanings are con-
nected objects vs. an alternative metaphor in which meanings are tra-
jectories in a state space.
The e,θ state space is 2-dimensional for one concept system, and 2n-dimen-
sional for n concept systems. Moreover, when n concept systems are excited, a
relational meaning experience associated with those systems is a stable periodic
orbit in the n-dimensional θ subspace. Typically we are interested in meaning
experiences associated with systems whose e > λe, i.e. excited systems. We will
sometimes refer to these as attended meanings, because we imagine that the rel-
evant concept systems have e values which are sufficient to support conscious
attention to a meaning experience. In contrast, subconscious experience of mean-
ing occurs via active, unexcited systems.
Note that e and θ state variables are analytical constructs which we can at-
tempt to derive from a higher-dimensional microscale state space. This deriva-
tion procedure uses methods of projection and integration in order to reduce
dimensionality. Accordingly, the state space is always constructed ad hoc to ac-
commodate the systems which we consider relevant for a given analysis.4 The
state space construction procedure is (i) stipulate a set of concept systems; (ii)
construct a space with e and θ dimensions for each system; (iii) construct the
union of these spaces by combining them orthogonally. The picture to have in
mind is shown in Figure 2.7.
4For example, we are currently ignoring the fact that drinks is associated with concept systems
which are grammatical in nature, such as person, number, and tense. In later analyses we ex-
plicitly construct such systems, but for the current purpose of introducing the o/el framework,
we keep things simple.
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Figure 2.7: Projection and integration operations can be applied to a mi-
croscale state space in order to derive a macroscale state space, which
consists of excitation and phase subspaces.
The state space is neither permanent nor a physical space. It is a heuristic tool
that we construct strategically to meet the needs of a given analysis. Describing
[Al], [drinks], and [coffee] with orthogonal excitation and phase variables is use-
ful because it provides a coarse model of the much higher-dimensional states of
neural populations. Conceptualizing meaning experiences as trajectories in e,θ
space opens up a new approach to reasoning about linguistic phenomena.
2.1.6 Relational meaning experiences are relative
phase-configurations
Individual concept meaning experiences rarely occur in isolation. The produc-
tion of Al drinks coffee is associated with simultaneous excitation of concepts
[Al], [drinks], and [coffee]. Yet simultaneity of excitation is not sufficient for
understanding the relational character of meaning experiences. This is obvious
from consideration of utterances such as Al likes Bo and Bo likes Al, where the
same concepts are excited and yet different relational meanings are experienced.
Since we do not experience both of these relational meanings simultaneously,
there must be a mechanism which distinguishes system states in which [Al] and
[Bo] have different relations to [likes]. Moreover, this mechanism should also
govern the relations of [Al] and [coffee] to [drinks] in Al drinks coffee, as well as
any arbitrary relations of this sort.
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To that end we propose a principle of relational meaning: relational meaning
experiences are stable relative phase-configurations. Recall that relative phase
ϕ is defined as the antisymmetric difference of phases, i.e. ϕij = θi − θj = −ϕji.
For exposition we often refer to ϕ without indices and interpret this as the abso-
lute value of relative phase, i.e. |ϕ| = |θi – θj|. Furthermore, we pursue a strong
hypothesis that all relational meaning experiences are associated with a stable
state in which ϕ ≈ 0 or π, which we call in-phase and anti-phase, or +ϕ and −ϕ-
configurations, respectively. More precisely, for any pair of concept systems i and
j, a relational meaning experience occurs when both systems are excited {ei, ej} >
λe and have a stable relative phase such that |ϕij| ≈ {0 or π} and dϕij/dt ≈ 0. Specif-
ically, we hypothesize that in-phase-configurations (ϕ ≈ 0) are associated with
agent-action relations, e.g. [Al][drinks], and that anti-phase-configurations (ϕ ≈
π) are associated with patient-action relations, e.g. [drinks][coffee]. These basic
hypotheses are summarized in Table 2.1. Many additional ϕ-relation hypotheses
are developed subsequently.
Table 2.1: Hypothesized relative phase-configurations for agent and pa-
tient semantic relations.
conceptual systems semantic relations ϕ configurations
[Al] [drink] agent-action in-phase: ϕ ≈ 0
[coffee] [drink] patient-action anti-phase: ϕ ≈ π
The ϕ-configurational basis for differences in relational meaning between [Al]
[drinks] and [coffee][drinks] is illustrated in Figure 2.8. Crucially, [Al][drinks]
and [coffee][drinks] ϕ-configurations remain constant despite the fact that all
three θ variables are changing. Constant ϕ, when stable over time periods on the
order of τθ, gives rise to the experience of relational meaning between systems,
as long as those systems are excited. Note that ϕ-configurations are periodic
trajectories in θ space, but we can also construct a ϕ space in which a stable ϕ-
configuration is a point. Moreover, because θ dimensions are circular, wrapping
around the interval [0, 2π], ϕ patterns can also be represented as a static phase
difference on a unit circle, as in Figure 2.8. In such representations we choose
some system as a reference, and the phase angles of all other systems are shown
relative to the phase of the reference system. For visual clarity, we depict systems
with a +ϕ configuration as having a small ϕ separation, as with [Al] and [drinks]
in Figure 2.8.
The principle of relational meaning requires relational meaning experiences to
be stable ϕ-configurations. Here stable means that ϕ, when perturbed, returns to
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Figure 2.8: The agent-action relation corresponds to ϕ = 0. The patient-
action relation corresponds to ϕ = π.
an equilibrium value (0 or π) on a timescale which is substantially smaller than
τθ. Fluctuations constantly perturb θ variables of systems and hence perturb ϕ.
A stabilizing mechanism is thus required to force ϕ back an equilibrium value.
What is the stabilizing mechanism? Our microscopic model suggests that syn-
aptic projections between concept systems and other systems could accomplish
this stabilization. By integrating over interpopulation synaptic projections we
can derive macroscopic coupling forces, which serve to stabilize ϕ. However, if
these forces act directly between concept systems, there is a problem.
2.1.7 Direct interactions between conceptual systems are unlearnable
and inflexible
Let’s imagine that a direct interaction between [Al] and [drinks] concept systems
were indeed responsible for stabilizing their ϕ-configuration. On the basis of our
microscale conception, such interactionsmust be learned: macroscopic forces are
derived from synaptic weights (i.e. efficacy of neurotransmitter release/uptake),
connectivity patterns, etc. between populations. Learning is an evolution of these
variables on supra-utterance timescales. Moreover, the interaction, if a stabilizing
one, would need to be fairly strong, otherwise moderate perturbations would
overcome the equilibration forces.
There are two problems with the direct coupling scenario. The first involves
learnability. Two different types of interactions between [Al] and [drinks] would
need to be learned: in-phase and anti-phase interactions for the agent and patient
roles, respectively. Moreover, these two types of interaction would need to be
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learned for all pairs of concepts: for n concept systems there are 2n2 interactions.
The second problem involves flexibility. If the learned stabilizing interactions are
too strong, then there is a danger that excitation of one concept system will al-
ways cause other concept systems that it interacts with to become excited. For
example, imagine that when [Al] becomes excited, direct interaction forces ex-
cite [drinks] and [coffee] as well. This is a problem if one wants to experience the
meaning of Al eats granola, for example. With direct interactions between con-
cept systems, system trajectories would be prone to seizures in which all concept
systems become excited.The solutions to the flexibility and learnability problems
are provided by syntactic systems.
2.2 Syntactic systems
Syntactic systems are the primary mechanism for stabilizing ϕ-configurations
of concept systems. There are two basic aspects of this mechanism. First, con-
cept systems resonate with syntactic systems through mutual positive feedback.
We refer to this as resonance because syntactic systems have strong, asymmet-
ric interactions with concept systems. Second, syntactic systems couple strongly
to other syntactic systems. Hence syntactic systems can organize and stabilize
ϕ-configurations between concept systems, without requiring strong direct cou-
pling between concept systems. Syntactic systems provide an indirect, flexible
mechanism for stabilizing relational meaning, one which does not rely on learn-
ing direct interactions between concepts. Henceforth we abbreviate concept sys-
tems as c-systems, and syntactic systems as s-systems.
2.2.1 Microscopic conception of syntactic and conceptual systems
Both c- and s-systems have e and θ state variables, and these are derived in the
same way from a microscale conceptualization of populations, as shown in Fig-
ure 2.9. But the microscopic pictures of c-systems and s-systems differ in some
important ways which help resolve the learnability and flexibility problems. First,
for concepts we imagine a large, distributed population of neurons. Each individ-
ual c-system is a subpopulation of this full population, and despite substantial
overlap of these subpopulations, c-systems can be distinguished from each other
on the basis of their interactions with other systems and the sensorimotor sur-
roundings. On themacroscale, the primarymechanism of learning is not “adding”
new c-systems, but rather differentiating and blending existing c-systems. On the
microscale this entails that new sub-populations are not “created”, but rather new
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patterns of interaction arise with the sensorimotor surroundings and other con-
ceptual systems. Interactions between c-systems are presumed to be relatively
weak: c-systems can activate other c-systems (this is often called priming), but
typically do not excite other c-systems.
Figure 2.9: Microscale conception of interactions between conceptual
system populations and syntactic system populations.
In contrast to the full population of c-systems, the full population of s-systems
is spatially localized, possibly in inferior frontal gyrus, or in basal ganglia-thala-
mocortical circuits. Individual s-systems, i.e. subpopulations of the full s-system
population, overlap to lesser degree with each other than c-systems do, and in-
teract more strongly because of their spatial localization.
The c- and s-system populations project to one another, and under certain con-
ditions c-system populationsmay resonatewith s-system populations, a phenom-
ena we refer to as cs-resonance. We assume that the capability for cs-resonance
is phylogenetic, but in development, different c-systems become preferentially
biased to resonate with different types of s-systems. Furthermore, we speculate
that the effects of general learningmechanisms (e.g. Hebbian spike-timing depen-
dent synaptic plasticity), when integrated on supra-utterance timescales, differ-
entiate the full syntactic population into various s-system subpopulations. Biases
for in-phase and anti-phase coupling interactions between s-system populations
are learned in this manner, giving rise to a grammar of ϕ-coupling.
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2.2.2 Conceptual systems resonate with syntactic systems
The cs-resonance mechanism can be understood as follows. First, forces from
the surroundings activate a c-system and a corresponding s-system. These sys-
tems begin to resonate weakly, via a positive mutual feedback interaction. Micro-
scopically, the positive feedback resonance mechanism derives from integrating
the effects of excitatory-to-excitatory interpopulation projections between an s-
system and c-system. Because these projections are excitatory, resonating c- and
s-systems always have an in-phase ϕ-relation.
Recall that activation implies a collective oscillation, but not stability of θ̇ and
not necessarily an e value sufficient for a meaning experience. In general many c-
systemsmay be active andmay compete for resonancewith a given s-system; sur-
roundings forces influence this competition as well. The competition from other
c-systems and surroundings forces can potentially destabilize a newly formed
resonance between c- and s-systems. We thus imagine a pre-stable phase of pro-
duction in which interaction between a c-system and s-system may or may not
lead to a strong cs-resonance. If positive feedback between the c- and s-system is
sufficiently strong relative to destabilizing forces, the c- and s- system abruptly
become excited, which entails that the s-system e value exceeds a threshold, as
shown below. The e value of the c-system also increases, but for reasons that
become clear we need make no specific assumptions about c-system e values rel-
ative to other c- or s-systems. We henceforth refer to a pair of resonating c- and
s-systems (whether excited or merely active) as a cs-system, or simply a system.
In the Figure 2.10, the c-system [coffee] resonates with the s-system {N}, and this
gives rise to a stable, excited cs-system.
Figure 2.10: Resonance between an s-system and a c-system results in
both systems transitioning to an excited state.
A key diagnostic of cs-system excitation is intrapopulation and interpopula-
tion spectral coherence, a concept which we develop in more detail later on.
22
2.2 Syntactic systems
Moreover, the stabilization of ϕ entails an augmentation of e. The excitation
threshold λe plays an important role in a variety of analyses we develop sub-
sequently. When a cs-system has below-threshold excitation (i.e. the system is
active but not excited), the system cannot participate in a stable ϕ-configuration
with other cs-systems and hence cannot evoke an attended relational meaning
experience. In general, we imagine that there are many active but unexcited cs-
systems, before and during production. Thus, in the production of an utterance
such as Al drinks coffee, the excitation of [Al], [drinks], and [coffee] is merely
the tip of an iceberg: a large amount of subthreshold activity occurs below the
surface.
2.2.3 Coupling force types and valence
To classify interactions between systems, we distinguish two types of coupling
and two valences of coupling. Relative phase coupling (ϕ-coupling) is an interac-
tion that depends on relative phase ϕ and influences θ̇. The Figure 2.11 shows the
phases of two systems on a phase circle, which is the space of possible phases.
The effects of the relative phase (ϕ) coupling force are shown by the arrows: an
attractive ϕ-force drives θ variables (which are also rotating counterclockwise)
toward one another, resulting in a decrease in ϕ; a repulsive ϕ-force drives θ
variables away from one another, resulting in an increase in ϕ. The coupling
force is associated with a periodic sinusoidal potential function V(ϕ), such that
F(ϕ) = −dV(ϕ)/dϕ. The effect of the force on ϕ is analogous to a ball rolling down
a hill while submerged in a viscous fluid: the force causes ϕ to change until it
reaches the stable equilibrium of 0 (attractive force, see Figure 2.11) or ±π (repul-
sive force, see Figure 2.12), where it stops. Because θ is a periodic variable, it is
convenient to map ϕ to the interval [−π,+π].
The other type of force is excitation coupling (e-coupling). Excitation coupling
is an interaction which depends on and influences e variables. An excitatory e-
coupling force results in each system increasing the e value of the other, and an
inhibitory e-coupling force results in the each system decreasing the e value of
the other, as shown in Figure 2.13. We do not specify a functional form for this
force, as its role in the current framework is not well developed and is generally
subsumed under other mechanisms.
Both ϕ-coupling and e-coupling forces can have positive [+] or negative [−]
valence, as schematized below. An attractive (+ϕ) force causes the θ of systems
to become more proximal and a repulsive (−ϕ) force causes θ to become more
distal. An excitatory (+e) force causes e values to increase, and an inhibitory (−e)
force causes e values to decrease.
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Figure 2.11: Attractive ϕ-coupling involves a force which drives a pair
of systems to have minimally different phases.
Figure 2.12: Repulsive ϕ-coupling involves a force which drives a pair
of systems to have maximally different phases.
Equations (1) and (2) below show the roles of ϕ and e forces in influencing how
θ and e variables change in time. The total ϕ and e forces a system experiences
are sums over forces from pairwise interactions with other systems, plus forces
from the surroundings, S. These forces have coupling strengths/susceptibilities
Φ and ε, respectively. The ϕ-force from S is assumed to be negligible, because the
surroundings are too large to exhibit a collective oscillation. However, the sur-
roundings can exert non-negligible e forces. The term fi is an intrinsic frequency
of the system (angular velocity ω = 2πf), representing population-internal forces
which promote collective oscillation. The operator Ê[⃖θ⃗, ⃖⃗e ] is a placeholder for
mechanisms of e-organization, and we develop these in detail later on.
(1) θ̇i = 2πfi + FϕS (S, θi) +∑
j
ΦijFϕ (ϕij, ei, ej)
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Figure 2.13: ϕ-coupling and e-coupling can have [+] or [−] valence.
(2) ėi = Ê [⃖θ⃗, ⃖⃗e ] + FeS (S, ei) +∑j
εijFe (ϕij, ei, ej)
Some properties of ϕ- and e-coupling can be derived from our microscale con-
ceptualization. For one, the valences of ϕ and e forces (i.e. the signs of elements
of matrices Φ and ε) are correlated: attractive and mutually excitatory coupling
tend to co-occur, and repulsive and mutually inhibitory coupling tend to co-
occur. The basis for this correlation is the association of [+] valence forces with
predominantly excitatory post-synaptic targets of interpopulation synapses, and
conversely the association of [−] valence forces with predominantly inhibitory
neurons as post-synaptic targets. These microscale patterns are illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.14. When the excitatory neurons in population A project primarily to exci-
tatory neurons in population B, the effect of spikes of neurons in A is to attract
θB to θA and augment eB; when excitatory neurons in B project primarily to
inhibitory neurons in B, their effect is to repel θB from θA and diminish eB.
The correlation of Φ and ε and valence implies that ϕ and e forces depend on
both ϕ and e values of systems. However, we offer no specific form for the ϕ-e
interaction here because it would be too speculative. Nonetheless, our hypothesis
that relational meaning experiences require the relevant cs-systems to be in an
excited state accords with the hypothesis that ϕ-coupling forces are modulated
by e values: the ϕ forces exerted by unexcited systems are too weak to stabilize
ϕ-configurations, while systems with above-threshold e values can exert ϕ forces
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Figure 2.14: Positive valence coupling derives from a predominance of
excitatory-to-excitatory projections between two populations. Nega-
tive valence coupling derives from a predominance of excitatory-to-
inhibitory projections.
on one another that are sufficiently strong to induce a high degree of cs-system
coherence.
The ϕ- and e-coupling force matrices Φ and ε are also sign-symmetric. The ba-
sis for this is the intuition that Hebbian learning between bidirectionally coupled
populations would be unstable on long timescales, if the valences of interactions
between those populations were asymmetric. For instance, imagine a population
A that is +ϕ coupled to population B, while B is −ϕ coupled to A. Spike-timing de-
pendent learning would strengthen synapses which promote attraction of θB to
θA, but also strengthen synapses which promote repulsion of θA from θB, leading
to an unstable interaction in which A chases B while B runs away. Thus valence-
symmetry is expected for any pair of coupled systems. In contrast, there is no
reason to expect a high degree of correlation in pairwise coupling strength for
either ϕ- or e-coupling forces. These strengths are derived from synaptic efficacy
and numbers of synapses (or synaptic density, i.e. average number of synapses
per neuron). To summarize, the elements of Φ are correlated in sign and magni-
tude with those of ε, and within each matrix there is sign symmetry but not a
high degree of correlation.
2.2.4 The syntactic mechanism for organizing relational meaning
With the conceptual tools outlined above we can construct a new understand-
ing of the flexible emergence of relational meaning experiences. The key idea
is that stable, invariant ϕ-configurations between c-systems are created indi-
rectly through their resonances with strongly coupled s-systems. The coupling
structure and phase circle representations for two example-configurations are
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schematized in Figure 2.15. The [Al][drinks] +ϕ-configuration obtains because
the c-system [Al] resonates with the s-system {+N}, the c-system [drinks] res-
onates with the s-system {V}, and the s-systems {+N} and {V} are strongly +ϕ
coupled. Likewise, [coffee] resonates with {−N}, and {V} and {−N} are strongly −ϕ
coupled.
Although ϕ-configurations can be decomposed into pairwise relations, multi-
ple ϕ-configurations which obtain simultaneously will often be shown by pro-
jecting them onto the same relative phase axis, as in Figure 2.15. Furthermore,
because the hypothesized mechanism for stabilizing ϕ-configurations is strong
ϕ-coupling between s-systems, the phase circle representation generally implies
coupling between s-systems only; ϕ-configurations between c-systems are an
indirect consequence of strong s-system coupling. We nonetheless sometimes
label c-systems on the phase circle for convenience. Because a ϕ-configuration
of c-systems entails the same-configuration between the s-systems which res-
onate with those c-systems, we think of a ϕ-configuration as a configuration of
a cs-system.
Figure 2.15: A phase circle representation in which multiple ϕ-
configurations are depicted.
Importantly, a ϕ pattern alone is not sufficient for a relational meaning expe-
rience. In addition, the pattern must be stationary in a local epoch of time. For
a pattern to be stationary, there must be a stabilizing mechanism, and s-systems
provide this mechanism. Recall the dynamic equation for θ. In general, the intrin-
sic frequencies fi of any two systems are not the same and fluctuations in sur-
roundings forces constantly perturb their phase velocities θ̇i. In the absence of
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coupling forces, intrinsic frequency differences and surroundings perturbations
cause ϕ to drift. In contrast, with the strong coupling of cs-resonances, c-system
and s-system phase velocities θ̇i equalize to a compromise θ̇i, the value of which
depends on the relative strengths of the forces and the intrinsic frequencies. This
will hold as long as the coupling forces – which act to equalize phase velocity
– are strong compared to the perturbing forces. Thus given sufficiently strong
coupling forces, a ϕ-configuration will remain stable.
2.2.5 Interference and differentiation
The preceding analyses distinguished between {+N} and {−N}. Why do we need
to make this distinction, and how can it be understood on the microscale? The
distinction between {+N} and {−N} systems (and on the microscale, {+N} and {−N}
populations) is necessary because of interference. Imagine that there is just a sin-
gle, undifferentiated {N} population. For an utterance like Al drinks coffee, both
[Al] and [coffee] resonate with {N}, and [drinks] resonates with {V}. According
to the relational meaning hypotheses presented earlier, [Al]{N} and [coffee]{N}
should obtain +ϕ and −ϕ-configurations with [drinks]{V}, respectively. These
conditions are incompatible: it is not stable for {N} to be simultaneously +ϕ and
−ϕ coupled to {V}.
How does the nervous system resolve this dilemma? A crucial constraint on
any solution is that populations cannot be created or added (without incurring
the multiplicity problem). We cannot simply posit that there is a second {N} pop-
ulation, independent of the original one. Instead, we imagine that there is one
single {N} population, and that speakers learn to differentiate that population
into {+N} and {−N} subpopulations, which are biased to +ϕ and −ϕ couple to {V},
respectively.
A consequence of differentiation is that subpopulations can interfere with one
another, and if the interference is too strong, the collective oscillations of those
subpopulations become unstable. This can happen for two reasons. First, when a
population is differentiated, the resulting subpopulations are smaller than the
original population. The interaction forces exerted by the subpopulations on
other systems become smaller, and the subpopulations themselves become more
susceptible to forces from other systems and the surroundings. This can result
in instability. Second, differentiated systems are not entirely independent: the
corresponding subpopulations will typically overlap. The repeated differentia-
tion of a finite population eventually results in instability, because the resulting
subpopulations have greater degrees of proportional overlap with one another.
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Proportional overlap is defined here as the ratio of neurons which are in both pop-
ulations to the total number of neurons. The {N} > {+N}/{−N} differentiation pro-
vides two {N} populations which are quite stable when simultaneously excited,
but when we differentiate one of these subpopulations further, stability may be
threatened.The loss of stability from differentiation has important consequences,
which we examine in later chapters.
2.3 Selection and quantal organization of excitation
Whereas the principle of relational meaning involves organization of relative
phase (ϕ), the principle of quantal excitation involves organization of excitation
(e). The movements associated with the production of speech arise from an orga-
nized, ordered selection of systems, determined by their relative excitation. Se-
lection is a mechanism in which supra-threshold excitation of systems induces
excitation of gestural/motor systems. Here we propose a principle of quantal ex-
citation: syntactic systems are organized and re-organized in a quantal relative
excitation potential. This organization results in the ordered selection of motor
behaviors associated with language.
2.3.1 The quantal relative excitation potential
The principle of quantal excitation is based on a conjecture that there exists
a mechanism which organizes the relative excitation of s-systems into quasi-
discrete, or quantal excitation levels. We identify this mechanism with a stabi-
lizing regime of the excitation operator Ê in the dynamical equation for e. The
stabilizing regime of Ê is one in which e states are mapped to themselves, and
thus relative e values remain constant. The stabilizing regime of Ê is associated
with a conservative excitation potential, V(e), as shown in Figure 2.16 for utter-
ances Al sleeps and Al drinks cold coffee.
Observe in the examples that there are large differences in potential energy
between excitation levels. The potential barriers between excitation levels entail
forces which stabilize s-system e, thereby preventing e values from increasing
to a higher level. The force that each system experiences is –dV(e)/de, i.e. the
opposite of the derivative of the potential. The conception of force and poten-
tial energy here derives from an analogy to conservative forces, but we do not
actually require a conserved quantity. Furthermore, we imagine these forces to
be stationary only for a local period of time, i.e. a single epoch of e-organization
during which Ê is in the stabilizing regime.
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Figure 2.16: Examples of quantal excitation potentials and associated
forces which prevent the increase of excitation.
Two levels of the potential representation have a special interpretation. The
lowest level of the potential is the ground level, and systems on this level are by
definition in an active, unexcited state. Ground state systems have at least the
minimal e value required for collective oscillation, but do not have sufficient e to
participate in a stable ϕ-configuration. There are no “systems” below the ground
level, because a system by definition is a population which exhibits collective os-
cillation. We distinguish ground level systems from excited systems, which have
sufficient excitation to participate in stable ϕ-configurations.The highest level of
the potential is called the selection level, and systems on this level have sufficient
excitation to induce the selection of gestural/motor systems which are associ-
ated with a c-system. The four main classes of excitation states are summarized
in Table 2.2.
We have not addressed the question of how the quantal character of the rel-
ative excitation potential can be derived from a microscale model. Presumably,
quantal e-organization manifests partly from e-coupling interactions between
s-systems, and we note that the effects of the potential are reminiscent of nor-
malizationmechanisms associatedwith on-center/off-surround fields (Grossberg
1978; 1987). However, a detailed understanding of this mechanism has not yet
been developed, and the quantal potential must currently be viewed as a phe-
nomenological approximation with primarily heuristic value. Because of this,
there is no reason to commit to a particular shape of the potential, and one can
imagine a number of alternatives, examples of which are shown in Figure 2.17.
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Table 2.2: Four classes of system excitation.
State Description
inactive system is undefined. no collective oscillation.
ground-level (active) system is active, but not in an excited state.
collective oscillation and minimal cs-resonance are
unstable.
above-ground (excited) system is excited but not selected.
stable, strong cs-resonance; can participate in
stable ϕ-configuration.
selection-level system is excited and selected.
gates open for simulation or execution of
associated gestural/motor systems.
Figure 2.17: Alternative representations of the excitation potential.
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Although the particular form of the potential function is not so important,
its quantal nature is paramount, because the effect of the potential must be to
stabilize a pattern of relative excitation which enforces mutual exclusivity of se-
lection. Hence, when [Al]{+N} is selected, [drink]{V} and [coffee]{−N} are not
selected, and so on.
There are several points to emphasize regarding the e-potential representa-
tions. First, as explained above, these representations are schematic and imply
transiently discretized patterns of relative excitation; they do not imply specific
values or specific relative magnitudes. Second, e-potentials govern the e values
of s-systems, not c-systems. In cs-resonances, c-system e values are correlated
with s-system e values, but the correlation is not exact. We nonetheless often
label c-systems in e-potentials, for convenience, and often refer to cs-systems in
this context.
Third, intermediate levels of an e-potential never exist independently of the sys-
tems which occupy them. The potential is conceptualized as an emergent phe-
nomenon associated with interactions between s-systems, and as such it is not
sensible to imagine an “unoccupied level”. (The ground and selection levels are
exceptions, for reasons we discuss later.) The potential levels are not locations in
space, and the systems are not objects which occupy locations. Instead, the quan-
tal potential is understood as a pattern of organization that is created by a com-
bination of local interactions between s-systems and a general purpose ordering
mechanism which operates on relative e values. Rather than saying that systems
occupy levels, it is more precise to say that interactions between s-systems bring
about the conditions for the stabilization of their relative excitation.
2.3.2 Canonical reorganization
While the stabilizing regime of Ê enforces an approximate temporal invariance
on e, a reorganization regime of Ê causes intermittent, abrupt changes in e.These
changes map e-configurations to e-configurations in predictable ways. Reorgani-
zation mappings cause changes in e-configuration which are discontinuities on
the ϕ-timescale. We refer to the stable periods of time between these discontinu-
ities as e-epochs. We are interested here in the various forms that reorganization
mappings can take, and in what aspects of the system state they might depend
on. In general, reorganization operations could depend on all θ and e variables of
all active and excited systems – i.e. the full system state. However, we can infer
that some information is typically not relevant to the mapping.
The default mechanism for ordering the selection of systems is the canoni-
cal reorganization mapping, Êcr. θ/ϕ information is irrelevant for canonical re-
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organization. The operation can be understood as follows, using the utterance
Al drinks coffee as an example. First, assume the initial condition in epoch (e1),
an e-configuration which is stabilized by the stabilization regime Ê. In epoch
(e1), [Al]{N} has selection-level excitation, and this drives the excitation of mo-
toric/gestural systems associated with [Al]. Feedback resulting directly or indi-
rectly from motoric/gestural excitation eventually causes a transition to the ca-
nonical reorganization regime. The canonical re-organization mapping Êcr
causes an abrupt change from epoch (e1) to epoch (e2), in which the selection-
level system is demoted to the lowest excited state, and all other excited systems
are promoted one level. Êcr applies to transitions from (e2) to (e3) and from (e3)
to (e4) as well. Note that Êcr produces a cycle when iterated: e1, e2, … en, e1…
Figure 2.18: The canonical reorganization operation demotes selected
systems and promotes non-selected systems.
In Figure 2.18 we show amore compact representation inwhich e-organization
state vectors, ẽ, are operated upon element-wise by reorganization vectors. In an
e-organization state vector, systems are assigned to vector dimensions in order
of their relative excitation. The figure above shows e-organization state vectors
from a series of epochs. Each ẽ is operated upon by the canonical reorganization
operator Êcr. The arrows in each element of Êcr indicate which basic operation
(promotion or demotion) applies to the corresponding element of ẽ. In this con-
text, canonical reorganization can be understood as demotion of the most highly
excited system to the lowest above-ground level, and promotion of all other sys-
tems by one level. For convenience, the excitation and selection thresholds are
shown by dashed and solid red lines, respectively.
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There are a couple alternative formal approaches to representing reorganiza-
tion mappings. One is to define a relative quantal excitation state vector ⃖⃗e, where
each dimension corresponds to a different excited cs-system. The value in a di-
mension is an integer from 1 to n, where n is the number of s-systems which
occupy distinct e-levels, and the value corresponds to excitation rank order of
the corresponding system.The canonical reorganization mapping in this scheme
is given in (3).
(3) Ê
cr (⃖e⃗ ) ∶ e → [e mod n] + 1
Another formalization uses a cyclic permutation matrix. In this case we define
the e-state as a binary matrix Ë, as shown in (4), where each column corresponds
to a level of the e-potential and each row to a system (so, a value of 1 in row n,
column m, entails that system n occupies excitation level m). Repeated action of















The e-state vector and matrix representations are somewhat less general than
the e-organization representation, for reasons that will become clear later. In
contrast, the e-organization representation has greater flexibility and we make
extensive use of it. The canonical reorganization is a useful construct because
many of the phenomena we are interested in can be analyzed in relation to the
canonical mapping.
Although we do not attempt to model the internal dynamics of the reorganiza-
tion process, we imagine promotion and demotion as brief periods of relatively
strong excitatory and inhibitory forces. The picture we have in mind is in Fig-
ure 2.19. In the stable epoch (e1), the augmentation forces on [drinks]{V} and
[coffee]{N} are not sufficient to promote these systems. But feedback regarding
the selection of [Al]{N} in (e1) induces a transition to the reorganization regime,
in which there is a strong suppressive force on [Al]{N}, along with strong forces
which augment the excitation of other systems. This may occur in combination
with a reduction of the sizes of barriers in the potential.
The overall effect of the reorganization is that the e value of the selected sys-
tem, [Al]{+N}, decreases and the e values of other excited systems, [drinks]{V}
and [coffee]{−N}, increase. We assume that Ê returns to the stabilization regime
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Figure 2.19: Canonical reorganization involves a rapid change of sys-
tem excitation states.
when a new system surpasses a selection threshold, i.e. when [drinks]{V} is se-
lected, resulting in the stable epoch (e2). It is important to emphasize that because
systems are not objects, there is no sense in which there is a collision between ob-
jects. We never worry about lines crossing or objects occupying the same space
in o/el representations.
2.3.3 The combined picture: Two conceptions of time
Theo/el framework provides two conceptual models of the temporality of speech,
one suited for reasoning about relational meaning experiences, the other suited
for reasoning about action ordering. As shown in Figure 2.20, a production tra-
jectory begins with the activation of cs-systems. A stable ϕ-configuration of ex-
cited systems then emerges in conjunction with an initial e-configuration, as a
result of an initial organization operator, Êio. (We examine mechanisms of ini-
tial organization in a subsequent chapter.) The e-configuration is then iteratively
reorganized, while the ϕ-configuration remains constant. Consequently, we see
that ϕ variables have a fixed point attractor throughout the trajectory (θ vari-
ables have a periodic attractor), while e variables exhibit intermittent discontinu-
ous changes.The steady state periods between reorganizations are e-epochs.The
conceptual models of time we have constructed help distinguish between the ϕ-
epoch timescale on which ϕ-configurations are stable (i.e. a relational meaning
experience is invariant) and the e-epoch timescale on which e-configurations are
stable.
In conventional approaches, there are diverse perspectives on how lineariza-
tion (selection/ordering) and structure building/variable binding (relational
meaning) interact, but these are generally understood to create and operate on
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Figure 2.20: The ϕ-configuration can be constant while the e-
configuration is reorganized.
structures of connected objects. The o/el model provides an alternative frame-
work for thinking about the interaction between relational meaning and tem-
poral order, one specific to ϕ-organization, the other specific to e-organization.
Because ϕ-epochs tend to span multiple e-epochs, it is not easy, nor even useful
to combine them into a single space for visualization. One approach would be
to map relative excitation to oscillator amplitude, in which case we can visualize
the temporal evolution as in Figure 2.21.
Figure 2.21: A corkscrew representation in which both excitation and
phase are represented over time is difficult to interpret.
This corkscrew visualization is too cluttered to be of much use, so instead we
often juxtapose e-potential and ϕ-circle representations. These representations
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are analytical tools which encourage us to think differently about speech. Word
order, instead of being a spatial arrangement of objects, is understood as a dis-
continuous trajectory in excitation space. Meaning relations, instead of being
connections between objects, are experiences of stable relative phases of system
oscillations.
2.4 Conventions and terminology
A order parameter of a system
S surroundings
θ, r phase, radial amplitude of oscillatory
component of order parameter
e excitation component of order parameter
ϕ relative phase
c-system concept system, written in square
brackets, e.g. [coffee], [drink]
s-system syntactic system, written in curly
brackets, e.g. {−N}, {V}
cs-system pair of resonating c- and s-systems, e.g.
[drink]{V}, [coffee]{−N}
cs-systems in a stable-configuration |drink coffee|
Utterances written italicized text, e.g. Al drinks
coffee
+ϕ-coupling/configuration in-phase (attractive, proximal)
coupling/configuration







3 Deconstructing syntactic theory
All theories have deep assumptions, i.e. unknown unknown knowns. These are
the sorts of assumptions which are not questioned, and often cannot be ques-
tioned, because they are fundamental to a way of thinking and make an entire
scientific program possible. Often we are not aware of such assumptions. Yet
by identifying and contesting these very well-hidden assumptions we can make
progress toward new, different theories. To do this, we deconstruct the conceptual
metaphors and image schemas1 that are used to construct conventional syntactic
theories.
A conceptual metaphor is a set of mappings from a more basic, experien-
tially grounded source domain to a more abstract, conceptual target domain
(Lakoff 1990; 1993; 2008; Lakoff & Johnson 1980a,b; 1999). An image schema is
a pattern generalized over sensory experience (mostly visual), and provides a
source domain for conceptual metaphor (Clausner & Croft 1999; Fauconnier &
Turner 1996; 2008; Gibbs & Colston 1995; Grady et al. 1999; Langacker 2002; Oak-
ley 2007; Talmy 1983; 1988). Theories are constructed by combining, or blend-
ing, conceptual metaphors and image schemas (Fauconnier & Turner 1996; 2008;
Grady et al. 1999; Lakoff & Núñez 2000). The art of theory construction (which
is to some extent a subconscious process) relies on intuitions regarding which
metaphors/schemas to blend and which mappings to make use of.
Many approaches to syntax2 – and in particular generative/minimalist ap-
proaches – are constructed from the following set of conceptual metaphors:
1. Linguistic units are objects.
2. Linguistic units are containers.
3. Relations between units are connections or containments.
4. Time is space.
1There is a substantial literature in cognitive linguistics which formalizes and attempts to regu-
larize notions of conceptual metaphor, image schemas, and blends.The deconstruction pursued
here uses these notions informally and in an ad-hoc manner.
2All approaches that I am aware of (present company excluded) are constructed from the delin-
eated metaphors, but there may be other approaches I am not familiar with which are not. I
am neither a historian nor a typologist of syntactic theories.
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Students of syntax are not taught these metaphors. They do not have to be,
because they already know them. Generic versions of these metaphors pervade
our conceptual models of abstract domains, and are learned at a fairly early age,
especially in literate cultures. Also, there is no point in teaching students these
metaphors (if we are even aware of them), because they are not on the table.
Teaching themwould allow them to be questioned, but they are for the most part
non-negotiable. Even being consciously aware of them can be counterproductive,
if one wants to participate in the normal discourse. For the lack of a better term,
we consider syntactic theories/frameworks which presuppose these metaphors
as conventional, since it is currently a cultural convention to use these particular
metaphors, as opposed to other ones. As mentioned in the introduction, I claim
that generative/minimalist theories employ these metaphors, and I encourage
the reader to assess their applicability to other theoretical frameworks.
3.1 The units-are-objects metaphor
In conventional theories, “words” are objects – physical objects, of the sort you
can hold.This is a metaphor, a set of mappings from a relatively concrete domain
to a more abstract one. The abstract domain is language. The concrete domain is
the domain of our experience with physical objects. Via the metaphor, our under-
standing of words is constructed from aspects of our experience with physical
objects. It is not merely the use of the word “object” that is crucial here. What
is important is that our experience with physical objects is used to reason about
metaphorical objects, “words”. For example, our experience with physical objects
is such that we can join them together. This physical experience provides a ba-
sis for us to think of words as the sorts of things that can be joined together, or
merged, into larger structures.
Literally, words are not objects and are not merged together in any physical
sense. Indeed, “words” are very different from physical objects in manyways.We
cannot literally touch words, hold them, join them together, or break them into
pieces, etc. Nonetheless, we use the words are objects metaphor to construct
a conceptual system for understanding “words”. Crucially, “words” do not exist
independently of a conceptual system; rather, a conceptual system gives rise to
a concept of a “word”. More generally, in the conventional program, linguistic
units are objects: not only words but also phrases, sentences, etc. are objects.
A number of mappings are associated with the objects metaphor. To see the im-
portance of these mappings, consider the following descriptions of Merge:
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The indispensable operation of a recursive system is Merge (or some variant
of it), which takes two syntactic objects α and β and forms the new object
γ = {α, β}. (Chomsky 2001b: 3) [emphasis added]
A natural requirement for efficient computation is a “no-tampering condi-
tion” NTC: Merge of X and Y leaves the two SOs unchanged. If so, then
Merge of X and Y can be taken to yield the set {X, Y}, the simplest possibil-
ity worth considering. Merge cannot break up X or Y, or add new features
to them. (Chomsky 2008: 5-6) [emphasis added]
Why does Merge “form” a new thing? Why is the new thing also an object?
Why do merged objects not break up or have new features added? What does
it mean for a syntactic object not to be tampered with? These sorts of procla-
mations are comprehensible and intuitive because they are consistent with our
typical experiences in observing and interacting with physical objects. That is
what makes conceptual metaphor so powerful: metaphor allows us to use our
experiences with the familiar to construct an understanding of the unfamiliar.
3.1.1 Mappings of the object metaphor
The conceptual foundations of conventional syntactic theories derive from map-
ping various aspects of our experiences with physical objects to the abstract do-
main of syntactic objects. A number of these mappings are catalogued below.3
Figure 3.1: Mappings of the object metaphor: class creation, identity
after combination, and type preservation.
Class creation: combining objects can create a new type of object. When we join
a stick and a wedge-shaped stone we “create” an arrow. Likewise, when
syntactic objects are combined, a new class of entity is created: word ob-
jects are combined to create phrase objects, and phrase objects are com-
bined to create sentence objects.
3This is not an exhaustive list and not an essentialist construal of the mappings of conventional
theories, but rather one possible description of some of the more important ones.
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Identity preservation after combination: the identities of the combined parts are
retained after their combination. We can recognize the stick and wedge as
continuing to be a stick and wedge after we have joined them, despite the
fact that combining them creates a new object, an arrow. Likewise, when
syntactic objects are combined, they retain their original identities.
Preservation of type: the combination of things of a given type results in another
thing of the same type. When we join physical objects, the joined entity
is still a physical object. Likewise, the structures which are the inputs of
merge are syntactic objects, and the structures which are the output of
merge are syntactic objects.
Mappings of the sort above are profoundly important for theory construction.
They are intuitively sensible because they are based on typical experiences, rather
than physical principles. Most of the mappings can be violated by considering
atypical circumstances (quantum-scale phenomena, far-from-equilibrium chem-
ical reactions, relativistic velocities, etc.). What matters is that in everyday sit-
uations, when we join objects together, it creates a new class of object, but we
can usually continue to identify the component objects that were joined, and the
new class of object is still the same general type of thing, i.e. an object. There are
many more mappings which come into play, for example:
Figure 3.2: Mappings of the object metaphor: spatial occupation, object
size, and spatial location and orientation.
Spatial occupation and exclusivity: objects occupy space, and spatial occupation
is exclusive. My coffee cup takes up some space, and so does my granola
bag. Moreover, the coffee cup and granola bag cannot occupy the same
space – spatial occupation by objects is mutually exclusive. Likewise, two
syntactic objects cannot occupy the same position in a structure.
Object size: when two objects are combined, the combined object occupies more
space than either of the original objects. Objects with more parts are larger
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than objects with fewer parts. Likewise, combining syntactic objects cre-
ates a structure that is larger than either of the original objects.
Spatial location and orientation: objects occupy a definite, unique position in an
oriented space and have relative locations. The coffee cup has a definite,
unique position in space, and that position can be described relative to the
definite, unique position of my granola bag. Likewise, syntactic objects are
in definite positions in a structure, and phrases are above the objects which
they are composed of.
Figure 3.3: Mappings of the object metaphor: connections are relations,
observer-independence, temporal persistence.
Connections are relations: connecting physical objects creates a relation between
them.The pattern of connection often has some functional importance, and
constitutes a relation between the connected objects. To create an arrow,
the wedge must be attached in a specific way to one end of the stick. Like-
wise, phrases are connected to the units they are composed of, and there
are specific conventions regarding the orientations of these connections.
Observer-independence: objects exist and have properties independently of
whether they are observed. In our typical experience, the properties of
the coffee cup do not depend on who observes or interacts with the cup.
Likewise, the properties of syntactic objects do not depend on who speaks
or hears them.
Temporal persistence: objects persist in time unless acted upon. Our experience
tells us that in the absence of other causes, the coffee cup will continue
to exist, i.e. the cup will persist in space and in time. Likewise, syntactic
structures do not spontaneously change over time or rearrange themselves
in space.
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The mappings above are just a sample of some of the most fundamental con-
ventional mappings, and more complicated theoretical mechanisms can be un-
derstood in terms of them. For example, consider the concepts of movement and
traces. In some approaches, the wh-question What does Al drink? is formed by
first building the structure Al drinks what and then by moving what and leaving
behind a trace, i.e. Whati does Al drink ti? The movement is necessary because
meaning relations are understood as connections: since what has a meaning re-
lation with drink, it should be “connected” to drink. But the temporal order of
words in the question is not consistent with this connection pattern. Meaning re-
lations and word order can lead to conflicting inferences regardingwhere a given
unit should be located in the structure. This is problematic because an object can-
not be in two places at once: the spatial location mapping holds that syntactic
objects occupy a unique, definite position, just like the physical objects we are
familiar with. To resolve this dilemma, many theories propose tomove the object,
while leaving its original “position” “occupied” by a trace object.
Hence theoretical devices (e.g. movement and traces) are consequences of infer-
ences that follow from the basic metaphors/mappings. Without these mappings,
conventional theories would be vastly different. Imagine what conventional the-
ories without identity preservation and temporal persistence would be like: syn-
tactic objects could randomly pop into and out of existence, or morph into other
types of objects. Without spatial location, syntactic objects could be in different
structural locations at the same time; without spatial occupation/exclusivity, ob-
jects could occupy the same position in a structure; without type preservation,
we might combine objects to create a substance.
3.1.2 The container schema
In the conventional paradigm, linguistic units are containers. Words “con-
tain” meanings. Phrases “contain” words. Sentences “contain” phrases. There is
meaning in my words, there are words in phrases, and there are phrases in sen-
tences. Descriptions of linguistic structure commonly evoke a container image
schema. In its most basic form, the container schema involves a boundary of
a region of space. This enables mappings with an inside/outside distinction (cf.
Lakoff & Núñez (2000) for a detailed description of the container schema). Be-
cause containers are also objects, containers can be contained. Hence:
Merge yields the relation Immediately-Contain (IC)…Iterated Merge, re-
quired in any recursive system, yields Contain. Arguably Merge also yields
a relation between α and β (sister)… transitive closure yields C-Command.”
(Chomsky 2001b: 3) [emphasis added]
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Literally, linguistic units do not physically contain meanings or other units.
The words Al, drinks, and coffee, are not physically “in” or enclosed within a
phrase: one cannot open up a phrase and remove one of the units. There is no
physical boundary between the inside and outside of a sentence. Yet we use
container-based spatial reasoning pervasively. Figure 3.4 illustrates some map-
pings which involve the container schema:
Figure 3.4: Mappings of container schemas: containers can be con-
tained, interior/exterior exclusivity, and transitivity of containment.
Contain: containers can be contained. We have plenty of experience with objects
being inside an object, which is inside a larger object, etc. My granola is in
a bag, the bag is in my backpack, my backpack is in my office, andmy office
is in a building. Likewise, a linguistic unit can be inside another linguistic
unit, which can be inside another linguistic unit, and so on.
Interior/exterior exclusivity: an object cannot be both inside and outside of a con-
tainer. Our typical experience is that objects are either inside or outside
of a container. The granola bag is either in my backpack or not; it cannot
be both inside and outside of the backpack. Likewise, a linguistic unit is
either in a phrase, or not in a phrase, never both.
Containment transitivity: if object A contains B, and B contains C, then A contains
C. Given that my granola bag is in my backpack, and my backpack is in
my office, we can infer via transitivity that the granola bag is in my office.
Likewise, if S contains VP, and VP contains V and N, then S contains V and
N.
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Figure 3.5: Mappings of container schemas: embedding depth, non-
commutativity of containment, and prohibition of self-containment.
Embedding depth: on a path from the exterior to the interior of a container, the
number of boundaries the path crosses is a measure of depth of embedding.
From everyday experience, we know that the length of the path can cor-
respond to a number of boundaries encountered. Likewise, the embedding
depth of a linguistic unit is measured by a count of containment relations,
rather than a spatial distance.
Non-commutativity: an object A cannot both contain B and be contained in B.
Commutative containment is so far removed from our interactions with
physical objects that even imagining it is difficult. Likewise, a linguistic
unit can never contain and be contained by the same unit.
No self-containment: an object cannot contain itself, either directly or indirectly.
We cannot remove an object from itself, nor put an object inside itself.
Likewise, a linguistic unit can never contain itself.
The above mappings were probably not conscious choices in the construction
of conventional theories.They are intuitive consequences of the object metaphor
when objects are blended with container schemas. Some of the mappings are so
essential to our reasoning that we can hardly imagine a theory without them.
Why do linguistic objects never contain themselves?There is no logical necessity
for rejecting self-containment, nor an empirical motivation; instead, the avoid-
ance of self-containment of theoretical objects follows from our everyday expe-
rience with containment of physical objects. This matters because avoidance of
self-containment predetermines how we construct theories. Let’s consider once
again the motivation for wh-movement. Why not abandon definite, unique spa-
tial location and allow what to occupy two positions, i.e. Whati does Al drink
(whati)?The answer relates to the connection-containment blend, which we con-
sider next.
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3.1.3 The connection-containment blend
A major conceptual divide exists between constituency-based and dependency-
based approaches to representing syntactic structure. Constituency-based (i.e.
phrase structure) approaches use a conceptual blend in which relations between
units are both patterns of connection and patterns of containment. This blend al-
lows for structure to be represented with trees (i.e. connected objects) and to
also entail containment relations. Dependency-based approaches do not blend
containment with connection schemas, and hence do not imply containment re-
lations or phrasal structure (Hays 1964; Melʹčuk 1988; Osborne 2006; Osborne
et al. 2011; Percival 1990; Tesnière 2018). The schematic contrast between con-
stituency and dependency frameworks is shown in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Constituency-based models of syntactic structure evoke the
connection-containment blend.
The language used to describe aspects of connection schemas is often mapped
from various auxiliary domains, such as trees, kinship relations, and networks.
Hence a location in a structure where “branches” join is a “node”, and an end of a
“branch” is a “terminal node”. One unit can “dominate” another, or can be a “par-
ent” or “child”, and can have “siblings”. Dominance and precedence relations can
be immediate or non-immediate, depending on whether there are any nodes on
the path of connections between them. The differences between auxiliary source
domains (trees, kinship relations, networks, etc.) tend to be superficial and of
trivial importance. It is the more abstract and basic schema of connection, and
the blending of connection with containment, which is crucial.
The conventional construct of a phrase relies heavily on a blend of connection
and containment schemas. Parent-child connections (i.e. dominance relations)
are understood as containment relations. By convention, relational asymmetries
in containment are implicit in the relative vertical locations of connected objects,
with parent units located above child units. For example in Figure 3.7(A), the
object N in the tree structure is inside the VP, i.e. is a subconstituent of the VP,
but the connection does not overtly show this. Containment must therefore be
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inferred by convention from relative orientation: N is both connected to VP and is
lower than VP.The particular direction of the orientational mapping comes from
an up is more metaphor, but one can readily imagine the reverse. The orientation
of (A) is unnecessary if connections are directed, as in (B). We can thus interpret
relative vertical orientation as a form of implicit directionality in connections.
The orientation information greatly facilitates the containment-connection blend
because it is easier to superimpose containment schemas on structures like the
one in (A) than the one in (B).
Figure 3.7: The role of vertical orientation in the connection-
containment blend.
The mappings of the connection-containment blend explain why self-connec-
tions are disallowed and why a lower unit cannot dominate a higher one. Self-
connection as in (C) would imply self-containment, and allowing for lower units
to dominate higher ones (i.e. abandoning the implicit orientation/directionality)
would lead to indirect self-containment. A given node cannot have two parents,
i.e. never connects to two nodes above it, because this would lead to ambiguity
in which parent container is the most external. If A contains C and B contains C,
then to avoid such ambiguity either A contains B or B contains A; but the situa-
tion in example Figure 3.7(C) where both X and S are connected to N gives rise
to an ambiguity in the containment relation between X and S. Crucially, prohibi-
tions on self-connection and multiple parents are not a necessary consequence
of using connection schemas; the prohibitions arise from blending connection
with containment.
The connection-containment blend is powerful because it associates connec-
tion schemas with additional conceptual structure involving containment, with-
out adding visual clutter to a representation. Note that there is a visual incompat-
ibility between connection and containment, such that simultaneous depictions
of connection and containment are problematic if onewishes to avoid connection
paths or objects crossing container boundaries, as in (A). The blend is a useful
tool because it hides this incompatibility: with just a little practice, we learn to
infer containment patterns from connection patterns (and vice versa), without
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the need for both to be depicted. The use of orientation to indicate relational
asymmetries makes the blend easier to interpret.
3.1.4 The contingency of the object metaphor
Why do the object metaphor and connection/containment schemas dominate
linguistic theory? Does it have to be this way? Perhaps it is our early experi-
ence with the technology of writing. Written words on a page occupy physical
space, so it is natural to extend our experience of writing to abstract reasoning
about language. Before written language, did humans think of words as objects?
Probably not (Linell 1988; 2005; Ong 2013), and so we must see our current con-
ceptual frameworks as somewhat accidental, historical contingencies. This calls
into question the value of those approaches. On the other hand, perhaps writ-
ten words are spatially ordered because we have some species-specific cognitive
predisposition for spatial order, a predisposition which may derive from our bi-
ological architecture. Even so, the object metaphor would still be contingent on
evolutionary-scale forces.
We can consider alternative metaphors. A fairly simple example is the sub-
stance metaphor, which has mixing-related mappings instead of connection or
containment. Let us think of the combination of a noun and a verb as a mixing of
substances. Physical mixing often gives rise to a substance with new properties,
which may not necessarily be predictable from the component substances; in a
sense, the component substances lose their original identities. This seems anal-
ogous to the creation of idiomatic verb phrases from verbs and nouns: bite the
dust, break a leg, etc. The point is that other mappings, which derive from other
metaphors, could be on the table.
The metaphors of the o/el framework are very different from the conventional
ones, and this creates problems when using conventional terminology. The term
“linguistic unit” so strongly evokes the object metaphor and related schemas, that
its use is jarring in an o/el context. For example, in the o/el paradigm, we might
adopt the metaphor linguistic units are trajectories in a state space. But
this is absurd: how can a unit (as object) be a trajectory?The cognitive dissonance
here reveals just how deeply the tentacles of object metaphor have insinuated our
cognitive models of language.
The reader must remember that there is no such thing as “a linguistic unit”.
One must do some difficult conceptual unraveling to see that “units” are not and
cannot be objects. Instead, one should loosely associate the conventional con-
struct of a unit with an experience corresponding to a trajectory in a state space.
The dimensions of the space are excitation values (e) and phases (θ) of conceptual
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and syntactic systems. Relations between “units” are associated with particular
geometries of trajectories in this state space. Avoiding the term linguistic unit
altogether is a good idea, because of its propensity to evoke the object metaphor.
Thus we prefer to say that linguistic patterns are system trajectories in a
state space.4
Thedominance of the object metaphor is a cultural and/or evolutionary contin-
gency, rather than a necessity. But the use of some metaphors, whatever they are,
is unavoidable. We need metaphors because the systems we want to understand
– those involved in language and cognition – are so very complex, andmetaphors
are the tools we have for constructing understandings of complex phenomena.
We should try to be more aware of which metaphors we choose, and we can
choose to explore new metaphors.
3.1.5 Object multiplicity
The conventional mappings of the object metaphor, in particular spatial occupa-
tion and temporal persistence, necessitate co-presence and therefore object mul-
tiplicity. Syntactic objects are present in a space. What does it mean for objects
“to be present” “in” a “space”? Via spatial occupation and persistence mappings,
the object metaphor entails that all of the objects in a structure are there, i.e.
co-present in some space at some time. Hence for many utterances, a multiplici-
tous representation is necessary: multiple instantiations of a given type of object
are simultaneously present. Consider the utterance in Figure 3.8, Dee knows that
Cam knows that Bo knows that Al drinks coffee. The multiplicitous representation
in (A) shows many instantiations of each syntactic category, and many copies of
the verb knows.
A non-multiplicitous connected object representation as in (B) necessarily vi-
olates some mappings of the connection-containment blend. It looks very much
like a finite state model (without transition probabilities), which is the very con-
ception that generative grammar originated in reaction to (Chomsky 1956). The
structure in (B) violates a number of conventional mappings: containment is not
transitive; there is self-containment; relative vertical orientation does not map
to containment/dominance; the typical notion of embedding depth is not avail-
able. Moreover, a structure of this sort cannot be constructed through Merge:
each word must be associated with its own syntactic object; words cannot share
4Linguistic patterns are understood metonymically here as the physical observables which re-
sult from trajectories in a state space. Ultimately it is better not to reify language: language IS
nothing, i.e. not a thing: people act and we attempt to understand those actions; language is
one of our analytical categories of actions.
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the same object. Hence we conclude that multiplicity is a consequence of object
co-presence and connection/containment mappings.
Figure 3.8: The connection-containment blend necessitates multiplici-
tous representations. Non-multiplicitous object representations violate
mappings of the blend.
The problem with multiplicitous representations is that they prevent us from
recognizing an important phenomenon: interference. In the o/el framework, each
concept system resonates with a syntactic system. Both types of systems are, mi-
croscopically, neural populations of finite size. In order for two c-systems such
as [Al] and [Bo] to simultaneously resonate with the same {+N} s-system, the
s-system population must differentiate into two subpopulations, where each sub-
population interacts more strongly with one or the other of the two concept
populations. But this differentiation cannot be perfect: the s-system subpopula-
tions overlap and will interact with one another, and hence the c-systems will
interfere with one another, indirectly, via their resonances with the differenti-
ated s-systems. This is represented in Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9: Two c-systems which simultaneously resonate with an s-
system can interfere with one another.
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The conventional metaphors give us no reason to expect limitations on the
number of “copies” of an object. The object metaphor and connection-contain-
ment blend necessitatemultiplicity. But the brain, a physical system, cannotwork
this way. There must be limits on the differentiation of populations, because of
their finite sizes. More to the point, the brain cannot create arbitrarily many
copies, or even two copies, of the same object, because linguistic units are not
objects in the first place and thus cannot be copied. In the o/el framework, we
see why multiplicity is a problem, and we can reason about how interference
constrains the organization of syntactic and conceptual systems.
3.2 The time-is-space metaphor
In all human cultures, there are spatial metaphors/image schemas for conceptu-
alizing time. A very general one is the metaphor that temporal order is spa-
tial order, or more tersely, time is space (Boroditsky 2000; 2001; Casasanto &
Boroditsky 2008; Evans 2006; Gentner et al. 2002; Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Núñez
et al. 2006). Several variants of the metaphor are shown in Figure 3.10. In the
most common variant of the metaphor, time is a linear space. Another variant
involves a periodic space, where times are locations on a circle, or phase angles.
In both of these schemas, there are events and an observer, and there are two dif-
ferent ways in which the observer and events can participate in the schema. In
one, the observer is moving, and events are objects located in the space through
which the observer moves. In the other, the observer is stationary, and events
are moving objects which pass by the observer.
In the moving observer linear schema, time is a landscape and an observer
moves in a straight line. Events are stationary objects which are located in the
landscape (or alternatively, the locations of those objects). In the stationary ob-
server variant, the observer stays put and events are objects which move toward
the observer. The moving vs. stationary observer schemas are related by a figure-
ground reversal, and we quite often transition between these two schemas in
everyday language. Both variants impose temporal asymmetry based on the di-
rection of attention of the observer: the future is in front of the observer, because
direction of motion and gaze are correlated; likewise, the past is behind the ob-
server. These directional mappings give rise to notions of earlier and later, and
the construal of temporal duration as spatial distance.
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Figure 3.10: Linear and periodic schemas for conceptualizing time.
3.2.1 The word order blend
From the object metaphor, words are conceptualized as objects. From conven-
tional image schemas for time, events in time are objects in space. Via the word
order blend, words are events. Thus words are objects in a space, and the space
represents time. Blending a linear time schema with the object metaphor allows
us to conceptualize the temporal ordering of words as a spatial arrangement of
objects. The relative order of words corresponds to their relative arrangement
(position) in space: hence temporal order is spatial arrangement. Of course,
the technology of writing reinforces this blend: written words are typically ar-
ranged in a straight line, with culture-specific variations in orientation and di-
rection. The blend is illustrated in Figure 3.11, for both moving- and stationary-
observer variations of the schema:
Figure 3.11: The word order blend: temporal order of words is spatial
arrangement of objects.
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What role does the word order blend play in conventional syntactic theories?
Consider the horizontal spatial arrangement of syntactic objects in Figure 3.12(A–
C). Do all of these structures imply the same word order, or do they imply differ-
ent word orders?
Figure 3.12: Mappings of connected objects structures to word orders.
The structures (A) and (B) are not generally understood as different word
orders, but (B) is a somewhat less aesthetically satisfying representation of Al
drinks coffee than (A), and structures like (B) are less commonly drawn than
structures like (A). Structures (A) and (C) can imply different orders, but not
necessarily. Indeed, many theoretical frameworks send mixed messages regard-
ing the consequences of spatial arrangement in syntactic trees. Some explicitly
reject the blend, but nonetheless habitually conform to it in practice. Let’s con-
sider several distinct perspectives:
1. The representations are explicitly temporal.
In this atypical perspective, representations are held to encode word order.
Structures (A) and (C) must be associated with different word orders, and
(B) is a bad representation of the utterance Al drinks coffee. One can imag-
ine projecting the terminal elements down to a horizontally oriented time
axis. This axis need not represent a linear, continuous time, but simply a
dimension where temporal order maps to spatial arrangement. The projec-
tion process is a simple linearization mechanism. Taking this perspective,
(B) does not represent Al drinks coffee because Al projects down to a loca-
tion between drinks and coffee, thereby linearizing the structure as drinks
Al coffee. (B) may also be considered a problematic representation of drinks
Al coffee because of line-crossing.
2. The representations are implicitly temporal.
In this more common perspective, structures (A) and (C) are associated
with different word orders, (B) is equivalent to (A), and (B) is a perfectly
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fine representation of Al drinks coffee. Temporal order is not directly rep-
resented by horizontal spatial arrangement of terminal objects, but rather
there is a universal algorithm/procedure which maps from local patterns
of connection to a local word order. The antisymmetry approach devel-
oped in Kayne (1994) is an example of this perspective. As shown below,
we can imagine separate, local arrangement schemas are applied to each
object based on its local connection structure. The set of local orderings
are uniquely satisfied by a particular temporal order, without requiring a
global mapping between horizontal arrangement and temporal order. As
shown by the differences in local orderings in Figure 3.13(i) and (ii), Fig-
ure 3.12(A) and (C) are linearized to different word orders.
Figure 3.13: Linearization derived from local spatial relations.
3. The representations are atemporal, linearization produces a temporal repre-
sentation.
The most extreme perspective is that syntactic structures do not encode
temporal order in any way, and so (A), (B), and (C) are equivalent. The
output of merge operations, for example, is claimed to be an unordered
combination of its inputs.The so-called “narrow syntax” does not represent
temporal order, and all aspects of order are determined by an independent
linearization mechanism, which can vary across languages.
3.2.2 The hidden temporality of connected object structures
The atemporal perspective is problematic in two ways, one obvious, one deep.
The obvious problem is that representations in a syntactic theory of this sort
would seem to have very little to say about word order. Many of the interest-
ing phenomena in language involve the temporal order of words. The deeper
and more important problem is that the structure building mechanism cannot
be independent of the linearization mechanism, all claims to the contrary. Any
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linearization mechanism must make use of some information present in “atem-
poral” object structures, in order to map them to temporal orders. But if there
is some temporal information in the purportedly atemporal structures, then the
“atemporal” structures are not really “atemporal” – they are covertly temporal.
Moreover, this means that the output of the structure building mechanism is pre-
determined by the linearization mechanism. To see why this is the case, consider
the sequence of structure-building operations shown in Figure 3.14.
Figure 3.14: Unordered structures which result from a series of merge
operations.
Because Merge produces unordered structures, there are two equivalent rep-
resentations after the first Merge, and four equivalent representations after the
second Merge. These four representations can be linearized to four different or-
ders by vertical projection, as shown below each tree structure. The same four
linear orders can also be obtained from the linearization procedures described in
Table 3.1.
The CBA (right-branching) and ABC (left-branching) orders can be generated
by a simple iterative spell-out algorithm which proceeds up or down in vertical
space. To obtain CBA, take the terminal node object from the highest level, spell
it out, then move down to the next level and repeat. Observe that all four of
the structures in Figure 3.14 generate CBA order with this algorithm. Likewise,
the procedure to obtain ABC order from all four structures starts at the lowest
level and moves up. Orders BAC and CAB can be produced with somewhat more
complicated algorithms which traverse the structure in two different directions.
Each algorithm generates the same order from all four of the structures in
Figure 3.14. This might suggest that hierarchical structures really could be un-
ordered, or atemporal. But there is something else to notice here. In all cases, the
linearization algorithms make use of vertical orientation – information present
in the structures – to determine temporal order. Moreover, the procedures re-
quire information about which nodes are branching (contain other nodes), and
which are terminal (do not contain other nodes). This information is also present
in the “atemporal” syntactic representation. So in a sense, the information that
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Table 3.1: Generation of different orders from different linearization
algorithms.
CBA ABC
Start at highest level Start at lowest level
Loop 1 Loop 1
Find terminal node X on cur-
rent level
Find terminal node X on cur-
rent level
Spell X out Spell X out
Move down one level Move up one level
Loop 1 Loop 1
BAC CAB
Loop 1 Loop 1
Start at highest level in XP Start at lowest level in XP
Loop 2 Loop 2
Find terminal node X in XP
on current level
Find terminal node X in XP
on current level
Spell X out Spell X out
Move down one level Move up one level
Loop 2 Loop 2
Move up from XP to the
next branching node
Move down from XP to
next branching node
Loop 1 Loop 1
is required for linearization – information necessary for determining temporal
order – is present in the connected object representations.
The supposed atemporality of the representations is only a matter of perspec-
tive: either we view the structures as atemporal and view orientation and con-
nectivity/containment information as aspects of temporalization; or, we view
orientation and connectivity/containment information as temporal information
that is present in the connected object structures, with linearization making use of
this information.
More importantly, we can see the order of Merge operations as a source of
temporal information. Consider that, from the sequence of Merge operations in
Figure 3.13, two of the six possible linearizations of {C,{B,{A}}} – BCA and ACB –
cannot be generated without some additional ad hoc mechanism.This is because
B merges with A first, so A and B have a more direct relation than A and C. Any
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linearization algorithm of the sort described above must produce an ordering in
which A and B are adjacent, and therefore BCA and ACB cannot be generated.
The solution to this dilemma is to reorganize the structure itself with “internal
Merge”, which is illustrated in Figure 3.15. Internal Merge copies an object (2),
merges the copied object in the normal way (3), and then removes the original
object (4), which can involve deleting it and/or leaving a trace.The crucial insight
is that internal Merge is necessary because the order of Merge operations de-
termines the orientation and connection patterns of syntactic objects, and these
in turn constrain linearization. In general, connection patterns determine which
spell-out orders require internal Merge. For any structure resulting from more
than one external Merge, there is always some set of spell-out orders which re-
quire internal Merge (assuming reasonable constraints on the complexity of the
linearization procedure).
Figure 3.15: Internal merge as copying (2), external merge (3), and dele-
tion leaving a trace (4).
Whether or not connected object representations are considered “temporal”
is a point of view, not an essential characteristic of the representation. The lin-
earization procedure has the property that it requires information regarding dom-
inance (vertical orientation of connection). From one point of view, representa-
tion of order could be seen as an artefact of linearization, not a feature of the
narrow syntax representation. But the information needed for the linearization
mechanism is present in the narrow representation itself, in the form of domi-
nance relations and connection patterns. This is more obvious when we see that
a special structural change (internal Merge) is necessary to generate some or-
ders from a supposedly “unordered set”. Thus from the alternative point of view,
temporal ordering information is and always is present in the structure.
Regardless of which point of view one adopts, relative vertical orientation,
Merge order, and linearization necessarily interact. We can see this more eas-
ily by comparing the outputs of top-down and bottom-up linearization schemes
when applied to root-oriented and tree-oriented structures. As shown in Fig-
ure 3.16, top-down linearization (i.e. earlier is higher) produces CBA order for
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a root-oriented structure, and bottom-up linearization (i.e. earlier is lower) pro-
duces ABC order for a tree-oriented structure. Thus the temporal information in
orientation is implicitly determined by how linearization operates, or vice versa,
the output of linearization is determined by our construal of orientation.The fact
that orientational ambiguity renders order ambiguous reinforces this point.
Figure 3.16: Orientation and linearization algorithm determine order.
Evoking connected object schemas is dangerous because the more we do it,
the more we become habituated to conceptualizing language with those struc-
tures. Nonetheless, the above discussion was necessary because it leads to the
conclusion that Merge does not produce atemporal structures – information re-
garding order is always present. As others have pointed out (e.g. Yang 1999), a
truly “unordered” representation would be {A,B,C}, equivalent to:
{A,B,C} = {A,C,B} = {B,A,C} = {B,C,A} = {C,A,B} = {C,B,A}
The supposedly “unordered” sets belowmerely obscure information regarding
temporal order:
{{{A},B},C} = {C,{A},B}} = {{B,{A}},C} = {C,{B,{A}}}
Concealing temporal order in vertical orientation and connection patterns, or
in containment and embedding patterns, does not eliminate temporal order; it
merely makes the temporal information more difficult to identify.
3.2.3 Essential vs. effective time
The output of linearization is conventionally conceptualized with a linear time
schema. This linear time schema is very general, underlying the conception of
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speech as a string of words (moving observer) or as a flow/stream of words (sta-
tionary observer). What makes these conceptions of time “linear”?There are two
relevant senses of linearity. One is simply the property that time is mapped to a
straight line or trajectory. The other, deeper sense is that any given segment of
space/time is equivalent to any other one, nomatter where/when those segments
are located/occur, as long as those segments are the same length/duration.
Linearity implies a straight line relation between essential time and effective
time, as shown in Figure 3.17. Effective time is an analytical tool, a made-up di-
mension of time, viewed as orthogonal to essential time. Essential time is a di-
mension of time that corresponds to our folk understanding of what time is, i.e.
our intuitive assumptions that time is absolute, progresses uniformly, and is in-
dependent of the observer.
Figure 3.17: Differences between linear, circular, and discontinuous
time shown as relations between essential time and effective time.
Effective time is associated with a measure of a quantity that accumulates as
essential time progresses. Consider for example an effective time quantity which
accumulates at a constant, non-zero rate. For a given interval of essential time,
the amount of the quantity accumulated during the interval will be the same, re-
gardless ofwhen the interval occurs. In linear time, the function relating essential
time to the effective time quantity has a constant first derivative and all higher-
order derivatives are zero. For example, linear time is appropriate for describing
a person walking at a constant pace. If the number of steps taken is the accu-
mulating quantity, and thus the measure of effective time, then the functional
relation between essential time and effective time is approximately a straight
line (assuming a sufficiently large timescale of measurement). The choice of the
quantity to measure is arbitrary. What is crucial is that we evoke a schema in
which temporal distance maps to spatial distance, and in which this occurs in a
linear manner.
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3.2.4 Periodic time
Another useful conception of time is one in which the effective time quantity
is a periodic function of essential time. In order for this to occur, the quantity
must both accumulate and dissipate. This enables us to equate any moment with
a set of past and future moments, leading to a picture of a closed-loop time axis,
and hence phase angle, θ. Periodic time is useful in the o/el framework because
variation in the order parameters of conceptual and syntactic populations are
conjectured to have an oscillatory component.
Figure 3.18: Periodic variation in the integrated spike rate of a popula-
tion can be mapped to phases of an oscillatory system.
From a macroscopic perspective, the effective time quantity of a periodic sys-
tem is α sin θ(t), with first derivative α cos θ(t). If we define the reference phase
as θ = 0, then θ = 0 is when x is maximally increasing, θ = π/2 is when x is
maximal, θ = π is when x is maximally decreasing, and θ = 3π/2 is when x is
minimal. However, this particular mapping of θ to population microstates is an
arbitrary consequence of our choice of reference phase and counterclockwise di-
rection of motion.There is no reason, other than convenience, not to reformulate
the relation with 12:00 as a reference and adopt clockwise motion in Cartesian
coordinates.We have also assumed for simplicity that the oscillations are approx-
imately harmonic, but one can imagine a number of alternatives as in Figure 3.19.
What is crucial is not the precise form of the oscillation, but rather its periodic na-
ture, which entails symmetry under rotations of 2π radians. Accordingly, there
is a discrete time-translation symmetry in essential time, under integer multiples
of translations of T = f−1 = 2πω−1, where f is the frequency in cycles/sec, ω is
angular frequency in radians/sec, and T is the cycle period.
Because of its discrete time translation symmetry, periodic time has only local
notions of past, present, and future. There is no global past/future in a periodic
time schema because the time axis, though unbounded, is finite (see Figure 3.17).
A moving observer, who is at some location (θ), will eventually return to that
same location. There is also no non-arbitrary way to decide which location is vis-
ited first: the moving observer can only decide that some particular phases are
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Figure 3.19: Non-harmonic periodic trajectories.
visited relatively before or after others, where the qualifier relatively expresses
the locality of the relation, which must be less than (2f)-1, i.e. less than half the
period of the cycle. Likewise, a stationary observer will experience the same se-
quence of events in each cycle, but must pick an arbitrary reference event to
decide which event begins the sequence. Hence circular time has no global con-
ception of temporal order, only a local one.
Why is the absence of a global past and present important? The principle of
relational meaning holds that relational meaning experiences are stable ϕ pat-
terns. Periodic time provides a more natural description of this condition, since
ϕ can be invariant despite changes in θ. Moreover, in a periodic time schema, the
minimal and maximal ϕ between systems are 0 and ±π, and these are the two
ϕ configurations we are most interested in. Thinking of such relations in terms
of linear time obscures this form of temporal invariance. For example, variation
in arousal and other surroundings mechanisms may induce variation in the ab-
solute timing of spike rate maxima of populations, i.e. variation in T, the period
of the oscillation. Such variation is illustrated in the Figure 3.20, which shows
waveforms of different frequencies. However, by factoring out such variation
with the relation 2πfT = ωt = ϕ, we can ignore irrelevant, situation-dependent
differences in absolute timing and recognize a fundamental invariance in relative
phase. The frequency f can thus be viewed as a normalization device, a tool for
factoring out variation we are not interested in.
Periodic time also allows us to see all meaning experiences as a form of sym-
metry breaking. Consider that an inactive population – which gives rise to no
meaning experience – has continuous time reversal and translation symmetries
(action potentials are uncorrelated). The emergence of a collective oscillation
breaks these symmetries, but preserves a discrete/periodic translational symme-
try.
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Figure 3.20: The relative phase of frequency-locked oscillating systems
does not depend on the frequency of oscillation.
3.2.5 Discontinuous time
The discontinuous time schema is a blend of a discontinuity schema with lin-
ear time. In continuous linear time, the linearity property is global, applying at
all locations in time/space. Moreover, the time/space line is continuous and in-
finite, extends forever in both directions, and there are no locations which are
not “connected” to all other locations. In contrast, these properties do not hold
for discontinuous time. By imposing a discontinuity schema on linear time (see
Figure 3.21), discontinuous time separates time/space into pieces (epochs) which
are disconnected from each other. Thus we expect some effective time quantities
to change discontinuously “between” epochs. This is useful for conceptualizing
the hypothesized reorganization mappings of the excitation operator Ê, which
are so fast that they appear discontinuous on the scale in which e configurations
remain stable. In a sense, discontinuous time helps us avoid worrying too much
about the internal dynamics of e configuration reorganizations. Instead, we focus
on stable e configurations within epochs.
Figure 3.21: Comparison of continuous and discontinuous time
schemas. Some temporal distances between events are undefined in
discontinuous time.
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The time-integral of the excitation state variable e is an effective time quan-
tity which exhibits discontinuities in its first derivative between stable e-epochs.
Recall that canonical reorganization involves demotion of a selected system and
promotion of other excited systems. As shown below, the effective time quan-
tity e changes abruptly in the transitions between epochs, and is constant within
them. Consequently there is an elbow (discontinuity in first derivative) in the
time-integral of e. This is particularly relevant when we consider that feedback
mechanisms influence when reorganizations occur. Feedback may be correlated
with the integral of selection-level excitation; when the integral of selection-level
excitation reaches a threshold, a reorganization occurs.
Figure 3.22: Discontinuous time is well-suited for understanding the
dynamics of excitation.
Another reason the discontinuous time schema is useful is that we cannot
readily blend it with the words-are-objects metaphor. The object metaphor
evokes a static, time-invariant structure that persists throughout an utterance.
The discontinuous time schema is antithetical to that sort of conception, because
it does not gel with the conventional conception in which objects persist across
multiple e-epochs.
Our analyses of linguistic patterns can be improved by conceptualizing time
as multiform: different conceptions of time are useful for different phenomena
on different scales. This is a consequence of the inherent complexity of language:
linguistic patterns arise from interactions between systems on a wide range of
spatial and temporal scales; to impose a single temporal schema on a given anal-
ysis, or even worse to ignore time altogether, is a counterproductive oversimpli-
fication.
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In previous chapters we introduced new conceptual tools – oscillators and en-
ergy levels – and compared them to conventional ones. We now use these tools
to construct a new understanding. Our starting point is the canonical production
trajectory, which is a simplified, idealized model of the cs-state trajectory which
occurs before and during the production of an utterance.The trajectory describes
a situation in which a speaker is producing an utterance, rather than interpreting
one. More generally, we distinguish between production, in which state trajecto-
ries may directly give rise to motor actions by a producer (speaker/signer/writer),
and interpretation, in which the state trajectory of an interpreter (hearer/sign-
viewer/reader) is more strongly driven by external forces. (As we discuss later it
is not always possible or even desirable to draw a clear cut distinction between
production and interpretation.)The trajectory we examine below is called canoni-
cal because it is a standard trajectory which serves as comparison for other, more
complicated trajectories.
4.1 The canonical production trajectory
To describe the canonical production trajectory, we use the utterance Al drinks
coffee as an example. The choice of these particular words is made for concrete-
ness, and for various reasons a single clause without modifiers is preferable.
We impose the over-simplification that there are three relevant c-systems: [Al],
[drinks], and [coffee], and assume that these resonate with {+N}, {V}, and {−N}
s-systems, respectively. We furthermore assume that the utterance is produced
in a communicative context in which it is felicitous, which amounts to stipulat-
ing that peripheral sensory systems, motor systems, and previously excited or
activated c-systems (i.e. the surroundings) activate the relevant c-systems and
perhaps others. Under these assumptions, we divide the canonical trajectory into
the following stages:
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Figure 4.1: A canonical production trajectory for the utteranceAl drinks
coffee.
4.1.1 Forces from the surroundings activate cs-systems
Stage 1: The surroundings activate c-systems [Al], [drinks], and [coffee]. In gen-
eral, other c-systems will already be active, or may become active. There may
be many such systems, e.g. [Bo], [sips], [tea], etc. All of these c-systems begin
to resonate with s-systems, forming cs-systems. Recall the distinction between
the ground-level (i.e. active, unexcited) and above-ground (excited) e-states of cs-
systems: systems in the excited state can participate in stable ϕ-configurations,
while unexcited systems cannot. In the initial state of the canonical trajectory, all
systems are unexcited, and hence shown on the ground level of the e-potential.
This does not imply that all cs-system e values are the same, merely that we have
chosen not to differentiate them. Note that in more general cases, we do not need
to assume that all systems are unexcited in the initial condition.
4.1.2 Excitation of cs-resonances
Stage 2: In the pre-stable phase of production, there is a competition process, or
attentional focusing mechanism, which results in some cs-systems becoming ex-
cited and others remaining unexcited, or potentially deactivating. In the present
example, [Al]{+N}, [drinks]{V}, and [coffee]{−N} systems become excited; [Bo]
{+N}, [sips]{V}, and [tea]{−N} deactivate. The competitive character of the mecha-
nism is related to interference between cs-resonances. For example, as pictured in
Figure 4.2, early on in the competition process {V} resonates with both [drinks]
and [sips] c-systems. All three of these systems (i.e. [drinks], [sips], {V}) have
some initial θ and θ̇. The initial phase velocities (or more relevantly, the short-
timescale averages of the instantaneous phase velocity, ⟨ ̇θi⟩), are not necessar-
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ily equal, partly because the intrinsic frequencies of systems are not necessarily
the same, and partly because the surroundings forces on each system can vary.
Furthermore, the initial phases of these systems do not necessarily conform to
in-phase (ϕ = 0) or anti-phase (ϕ = π) patterns. In other words, the systems are nei-
ther frequency-locked nor phase-locked, prior to being excited. Thus we expect
interference: ϕ-coupling of [drinks] and {V} interferes with ϕ-coupling between
[sips] and {V}.
Figure 4.2: Interference between [drinks] and [sips] in the pre-stable
phase of production.
From the microscopic model we infer that ϕ-coupling force strengths depend
on system e values: the more neurons which participate in a collective oscilla-
tion, the more synaptic projections there are from that population to other ones.
Thus if [drinks] has a higher e value than [tea], it will exert stronger forces on
{V}. This results in a greater tendency toward equalization of phase velocity be-
tween {V} and [drinks], compared to {V} and [tea]. Through e-coupling, {V} and
[drinks] will mutually augment one another more than {V} and [tea]. The posi-
tive feedback loop, i.e. resonance, leads to excitation of the [drinks]{V} system,
at the expense of [sips]{V}. The cs-system [drinks]{V} evolves toward a strong
constructive interference pattern, while [sips]{V} experiences destructive inter-
ference.
The outcome of resonance-focusing must be a complex function of the states
of the active systems and surroundings forces. We do not attempt to model the
resonance focusing dynamics necessary for excitation, but rather assert that in
the canonical trajectory, some subset of active systems becomes excited; in the
current example these are [Al]{+N}, [drinks]{V}, and [coffee]{−N}. Later on we
consider deviations from the canonical trajectory in which the competition pro-
cess does not immediately result in excited cs-resonances, or inwhich the process
is interrupted by surroundings forces.
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Why does one particular configuration of cs-systems emerge as opposed to
another? For example, why does a state with excited [Al]{+N} and [coffee]{−N}
systems arise, as opposed to excited [coffee]{+N} and [Al]{−N} systems (i.e. coffee
drinks Al)?We assume that early in the pre-stable phase, the unexpected [Al]{−N}
and [coffee]{+N} resonances are active and compete with the expected ones. Part
of the reason why the expected set wins the competition may be learned asym-
metries in coupling forces: c-systems with greater degrees of animacy, like [Al],
are biased to resonate with the {+N} system, and c-systemswith less animacy, like
[coffee], are biased to resonate with the {−N} system. But learned semantic biases
cannot be the whole story, since we must account for cs-resonance asymmetries
in utterances such as Al sees Bo where c-system animacies are the same. Thus
we presume that information in the patterns of forces from the surroundings (i.e.
sensorimotor experience) biases cs-coupling in a contextually appropriate way.
For Al sees Bo, the ϕ symmetry with respect to [sees]{V} of [Al]{N} and [Bo]{N}
is broken by surroundings forces: asymmetries in how a producer experiences
sensory information, e.g. aspects of the visual scene of Al seeing Bo which dif-
fer from aspects of the visual scene of Bo seeing Al, exert biases on c-system to
s-system mappings in the pre-stable phase.
4.1.3 Emergence of a stable ϕ-configuration
Stage 3: A ϕ-configuration stabilizes due to strong ϕ-coupling forces between s-
systems. ϕ-stabilizationmust follow excitation of the participating cs-resonances.
This constraint follows from our hypothesis that cs-systems must be in the ex-
cited state in order to ϕ-couple strongly with other systems. The criterial/thresh-
old e value for excitation, λe, can be viewed as a minimal degree of order in a
system which is necessary for a person to be consciously aware of the system, an
attentional threshold, in a sense. Exactly what is meant phenomenologically by
“awareness” and “attention” here, we do not attempt to elaborate.
Stabilization of a ϕ-configuration is the beginning of a relational meaning
experience, and in the canonical case the ϕ-configuration will persist through-
out the utterance. There are a number of interesting questions to consider re-
garding meaning experience conceptualized in this way. How long must a sta-
ble ϕ-configuration persist in order to give rise to awareness of a relational
meaning? It seems reasonable to guess that in order for awareness to arise, the
ϕ-configuration must be maintained for a period on the order of hundreds of
milliseconds, but perhaps there are also circumstances in which we engage ϕ-
configurations on the order of tens of milliseconds and of which we are not con-
sciously aware.
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Can a relational meaning experience arise “by accident”, i.e. as a coincidence,
without resulting from s-system ϕ-coupling? Coincidental relational meaning is
a logical possibility. For example, surroundings forces may excite [Al]{N} and
[drinks]{V} systems and by chance (i.e. not through coupling of {+N} and {V})
the ϕ of [Al] and [drinks] could be approximately 0 or π, and the difference
between their ⟨θ̇⟩ could be small. In that case, [Al] and [drinks] obtain the ϕ-
pattern associated with agent-verb relational meaning, without having achieved
this state through s-system coupling. In order to distinguish these from patterns
which arise from coupling, we refer to them as proximal (ϕ=0) and distal (ϕ=π)
relations. Despite being a logical possibility, coincidental proximal and distal ϕ
relations are highly unlikely to persist in time. If the intrinsic frequencies of the
systems differ, their ϕ will wander in the absence of coupling. Even if we assume
equivalent intrinsic frequencies, if we were to randomly draw the θ of two sys-
tems from uniform distributions, the likelihood that ϕ would be approximately 0
or π is very low. It is even less likely that ϕ would remain stable, because minor
perturbations of θ̇ from surroundings fluctuations or from the influences of other
systems will alter any ϕ-pattern which has arisen by chance.Thus s-systems play
a necessary role in stabilizing ϕ-configurations.
4.1.4 Emergence of a stable e-configuration
Stage 4: Excitation of cs-resonances necessarily precedes stabilization of ϕ-con-
figurations, but does ϕ-configuration stabilization necessarily precede e-config-
urations stabilization? In the canonical trajectory we stipulate that the e-con-
figuration stabilizes after ϕ-stabilization. This is a sensible hypothesis because
e-configurations can depend on ϕ-configurations. The mapping of cs-systems to
e-potential levels varies substantially according to the freedom of word order in a
language: in some languages, e-organization is strongly influenced by ϕ-configu-
rations. In languages with relatively free word order, the effects of surroundings
forces on e may have a greater influence on e-organization than learned ϕ-e
mappings. We discuss differences between fixed and free word order in more
detail later on, but note here that e-organization is in general determined both
by surroundings forces and learned ϕ-e mappings.
The primacy of ϕ-stabilization relative to e-stabilization is also a sensible as-
sumption for the canonical trajectory because ϕ-epochs (periods of time inwhich
a ϕ-configuration is stable) typically span multiple e-epochs (periods of time in
which an e-configuration is stable), i.e. τϕ >> τe. In the canonical trajectory,
the initial organization mapping of the excitation operator Ê may depend on ϕ-
states, but subsequent reorganization mappings do not. For more general trajec-
69
4 Reconstructing syntactic theory
tories, we allow for e- and ϕ-organization mechanisms to interact in pre-stable
and post-stable phase of production, and hence we expect an interplay between
ϕ and e states. However, in canonical production ϕ and e states can interact only
in the pre-stable phase; during stable epochs of canonical production, ϕ and e
states have no influence on one another.
4.1.5 Iterated reorganization of e-configuration
Stage 5: After the emergence of a stable e-configuration, what happens next de-
pends on the ϕ-configuration itself: if the most highly excited system is above
the selection threshold, then feedback processes induce the application of the
canonical reorganization mapping: the selected system is demoted and others
are promoted. This mapping is iterated until all systems have been selected. In
contrast, if the most highly excited system is initially below the selection thresh-
old, no reorganization occurs. Thus we distinguish between production regimes
which are selectional (i.e. selection occurs) and those which are non-selectional, as
shown in Figure 4.3. Note that we represent the non-selectional case by leaving
the highest level of the e-potential unoccupied. For the canonical trajectory, we
assume the selectional regime, and hence iterated reorganization occurs, which
potentially drives overt production.
Figure 4.3: Difference in e-organization between non-selectional and
selectional regimes of production. The selection level is unoccupied in
non-selectional production.
The selection threshold can vary over time. This variation could be quite com-
plicated, because the threshold represents an integration of surroundings inter-
actions with cs-systems. For example, a speaker can be in relatively higher and
lower states of physiological arousal, more or less prone to engage in simula-
tion or execution regimes of production. Alternatively, an individual can be in
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a regime where they direct attention to environmental stimuli, where motor se-
quencing must be inhibited. Thus the dynamics of the threshold are associated
with an intention to engage conceptual-syntactic simulation, and this intention is
a function of many systems in the surroundings which we have not constructed.
Note that we use the term selection to refer to a non-linear gating mechanism
which depends on e values and the selection threshold. This gating mechanism
controls the selection of cs-systems.
What causes Ê to transition from the stabilizing regime Êst to the reorgani-
zation regime Êr in the canonical trajectory? To answer this we introduce the
parallel domains hypothesis,1 which holds that gestural-motoric organization oc-
curs through the same mechanisms as conceptual-syntactic organization: ges-
tural systems resonate with motoric systems, motoric systems are strongly ϕ-
coupled attractively or repulsively, and gm-systems are organized into a quantal
relative excitation potential. Furthermore, there are strong interactions between
systems in conceptual/syntactic and gestural/motoric domains: activation of a
cs-system activates associated gm-systems; excitation of a cs-system augments
the e values of those active gm-systems; selection of a cs-system induces exci-
tation of the associated gm-systems, which in the canonical trajectory leads to
selection of those gm-systems. More specifically, we imagine that the selection
of a cs-system induces a nonlinear boost in the excitation of the c-system; the
c-system is presumed to be +e-coupled to a g-domain, a set of g-systems. The
g-domain is thereby excited and selected. Feedback from gm-states then induces
the transition to the reorganization regime of Ê.
In the parallel domains hypothesis, articulatory gestures (g-systems) are an-
alogs of c-systems, and motoric systems (m-systems) are analogs of s-systems.
The interaction between domains is such that selection of cs-systems drives or-
ganization of gm-systems, and this creates states which through feedback induce
reorganization of cs-systems.The interactions between domains are schematized
in Figure 4.4. Activation of gm-systems precedes and is distinct from excitation
of gm-systems. In the canonical trajectory, only the gm-domains of selected cs-
systems are necessarily excited. Feedback regarding the achievement of a gm-
state induces reorganization of cs-systems, which in turn leads to a new gm-or-
ganization and more feedback, etc.
A specific example is shown in Figure 4.5 (for expository purposes we substi-
tute Alexi for Al). When [Alexi]{N} is selected (A), the g-systems associated with
1This hypothesis is named in honor of Jean-Roger Vernaud, who believed deeply in the necessity
of developing a unified understanding of syntactic and phonological patterns (see e.g. Freidin
& Vergnaud 2001; Vergnaud 1977); I was the lucky beneficiary of a seminar Jean-Roger and
Louis Goldstein held on this topic in the fall of 2009.
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Figure 4.4: The parallel domains hypothesis: sequencing and coor-
dination of articulatory movements is accomplished by e- and ϕ-
organization of gestural-motoric systems, which are analogous to
conceptual-syntactic systems.
Alexi resonate with m-systems and gm-systems become excited (A1). The partic-
ular ϕ/e-organization that arises is partly learned (lexically driven) and partly
influenced by “post-lexical” phonological processes (e.g. resyllabification). Note
that in the depiction of gm-system e-organization, the gm-systems associated
with each syllable occupy a different level. Here we use segmental labels for gm-
systems out of convenience but a more useful analysis would depict gestures (i.e.
bilabial closure, glottal adduction, etc., which are possibly the smallest scale of
organization in premotor cortex). In a canonical trajectory, the most highly ex-
cited set of gm-systems is above the selection threshold, and this de-gates the
execution of movements associated with the relevant g-systems. The precise tim-
ing of execution of co-selected gm-systems is determined by the relative phases
and frequencies of those gm-systems (i.e. coordinative control, as described in
Selection-coordination theory, cf. Tilsen 2016; 2018b).
For adult speakers in normal circumstances, internal (i.e. predictive/anticipa-
tory) feedback regarding achievement of articulatory targets leads to promotion
of non-selected gm-systems and suppression of the selected set of systems (A2).
The newly selected set is executed, internal feedback induces degating and sup-
pression, leading to the gm-state in (A3). When all sets have been selected and
suppressed, feedback regarding the gm-state associated with [Alexi] induces re-
organization to the cs-state in (B), i.e. demotion of [Alexi]{N} and promotion of
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Figure 4.5: Example of conceptual-syntactic and gestural-motoric tra-
jectories for the utterance Alexi drinks coffee.
[drinks]{V}.When [drinks]{V} is selected, the g-domain of [drinks] is e-organized
and executed (B1). Feedback leads to the s-system reorganization in (C), which
leads to organization and reorganization of the gm-domain of [coffee] (C1 and
C2).
4.1.6 The surroundings drive the system to a new state
Stage 6: The ϕ-epoch in which [Al]{+N}, [drinks]{V}, and [coffee]{−N} are excited
comes to an end. The state trajectory will change drastically, depending sensi-
tively on the surroundings and other c-systems. Hence we make no assumptions
about the subsequent state in the canonical production trajectory. We imagine
that excitation of [Al], [drinks], and [coffee] c-systems may activate (“prime”) se-
mantically associated c-systems through weak e-coupling. This priming comes
in the form of biasing forces on the state trajectory, with numerous other sur-
roundings forces determining the outcome. It is important to note that our rep-
resentations often depict only the most strongly excited (above-ground) systems,
only the tip of an iceberg. In a more detailed analysis, many more cs-systems and
gm-systems would be active throughout the trajectory. Various environmental/-
contextual factors – is it a socially appropriate time to speak?, are there salient
environmental forces acting on a speaker? – along with the current system state
influence the subsequent evolution of the system.
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4.2 Interactions between conceptual-syntactic and
gestural-motoric organization
The o/el framework aims to provide a comprehensive framework for analysis of
language, a theory that can describe any empirical phenomenon. Our primary
focus in this book is on conceptual-syntactic organization, rather than gestural-
motoric organization. However, there are a number of hypotheses regarding
gestural-motor organization and its interaction with conceptual-syntactic orga-
nization, which are worth discussing here.
4.2.1 Similarities between relational meaning and temporal
coordination
One deep consequence of the parallel domains hypothesis is that two superfi-
cially distinct phenomena – relational meaning and precision control of move-
ment execution – arise from the same mechanism. The principle of relational
meaning corresponds to a principle of gestural coordination. Specifically this
shared mechanism is ϕ-coupling between syntactic systems and between mo-
toric systems, which indirectly brings about ϕ-configurations between concep-
tual and gestural systems, respectively. Distinctions such as agent/patient ({+N},
{−N}) and onset/coda ({+C}, {−C}) are analogous: agents and onset gestures ex-
perience +ϕ (attractive) forces from {V} and vowels; patients and coda gestures
experience −ϕ (repulsive) forces from {V} and vowels. This speaks to a deep con-
nection between our experience of meaning and coordination of movement. The
need to flexibly coordinate a fairly small set of movements is an evolutionarily
ancient problem, while the need to flexibly relate a vast multitude of concepts
is relatively more modern. Our ability to experience a wide variety of relational
meanings probably originates from duplication-induced redundancy and func-
tional divergence in the neural systems that support ϕ-coupling of movement
tasks.
4.2.2 Differences between syntactic and motoric sequencing
Although there are deep similarities between cs- and gm-organization, there are
also some important differences:
1. m-system ϕ-configurational restriction. Whereas s-system ϕ-configurations
can arise between systems which occupy different e-levels, m-system ϕ-
configurations tend to arise only for co-selected gm-systems, i.e. m-sys-
tems which occupy the same level.
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2. gm-interference is more stable than cs-interference. Two c-systems which
resonate with the same s-system can interfere with one another, and two
g-systems which resonate with the same m-system can interfere with one
another. However, gm-resonances appear to interferewith one another to a
lesser extent. For instance, it is possible to have a stable ϕ-configuration of
three co-selected {+C} and {−C} constriction gestures, as in the word sprints.
In contrast, lexical s-systems like {+N}, {−N}, and {V} are almost never co-
selected. This suggests that {+C} and {−C} differentiations of gm-systems
which have similar e values can be accomplished without destabilization.
We note that the ability to organize multiple gm-differentiations of {+C}
or {−C} systems must be learned, and many languages lack the complex
syllable structures which require such differentiations.
3. c-system numerosity. c-systems are vastly more numerous and diverse than
g-systems.This is likely because g-systems interact more directly with mo-
tor and sensory systems. Practical considerations dictate that we construct
c-systems in an analysis-specific way, because there are potentially so
many of them. In contrast, we can often identify a constant set of g-systems
for analyses of a given language (at least on supra-utterance scales), which
is motivated by articulatory and acoustic observations.
4. Timescale of ϕ configuration. s-system ϕ-configurations persist and remain
stable over relatively longer periods of time than m-system ϕ-configura-
tions. In the cs domain, ϕ-configurations tend to persist over multiple reor-
ganizations of e-configurations; in the gm domain, ϕ-configurations tend
to be associated with just one epoch of cs-organization.
Differences between syntactic and phonological patterns should be derivable
from differences in cs- and gm-organization, such as those listed above. For ex-
ample, the apparently greater degree of “non-locality” of conceptual relations vs.
gestural relations may be a consequence of differences in configurational restric-
tions and relevant timescales. (Locality differences are not, of course, structural
distances, because we do not conceptualize language as spatial ordering of ob-
jects in a linear space.) Differences between cs- and gm-organization should in
turn be derivable from neurophysiological differences in the relevant neural pop-
ulations.
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4.2.3 Thresholding for simulation and execution
The hypothesized interaction between cs- and gm-domains involves three gating
mechanisms,2 which are associated with three thresholds: an s-selection thresh-
old, an m-selection threshold, and an execution threshold. The states of these
thresholds – which we call gates – relative to the states of the relevant cs- and
gm-systems determine a production regime, i.e. a class of state trajectories.
A threshold/gate should be viewed as an analytical simplification of forces
which exhibit a nonlinear dependence on e values. Each gate can be in a binary
state: open or closed, where open refers to any state in which e values of relevant
systems are below a threshold parameter value. If the states of all three gates
are independent, there are 23 = 8 distinct gate-configurations. Alternatively, the
gating mechanismsmay be hierarchically organized, such that the highest closed
gate determines the production regime; in that case there are only 4 distinct
regimes. Figure 4.6 labels the production regimes associated with a hierarchically
organized interaction between gates.
Figure 4.6: Hierarchical organization of gating mechanisms derives
four regimes of production.
1. non-simulative regime: the s-system selection threshold (s-gate) is closed.
Relational meaning experiences can arise, but no cs-selection occurs. This
2A sensible pursuit in this context would be to associate the gating mechanisms/thresholds
with neuro-behaviorally inspired inhibitory mechanisms (Duque et al. 2017; 2010; Duque &
Ivry 2009; Mayr et al. 2006), but I have not attempted to explore this association in any detail.
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regime may be associated with “non-verbal” thought. It is difficult to char-
acterize more precisely what sorts of behaviors this regime is associated
with, because there is by definition no verbal motor behavior that can be
observed, without cs-selection. Note that the feedback that drives reorga-
nization in this regime must come entirely from cs-states.
2. cs-simulation regime: the s-gate is open, but the m-system selection thresh-
old (m-gate) is closed. Because the s-gate is open, highly excited s-systems
can be selected, and this causes gm-resonances to be excited. s-system e-
configurations can be reorganized in the canonical way, driven by feed-
back. Yet because the m-gate is closed, motor commands are not generated
and hence movements are not simulated.
3. gm-simulation regime: s- and m-gates are open, but a global motor exe-
cution gate (exec-gate) is closed. Motor commands and internal sensory
feedback from movement are generated, but movements are not executed.
We identify the gm-simulation regime with subvocal rehearsal and silent/-
covert speech.
4. execution regime: s-, m-, and exec-gates are open, overt speech can occur.
More generally, verbal motor behaviors can arise: speaking, signing, hand-
writing, typing.
Do other production regimes occur, which could be derived from non-hier-
archical gate interactions? There are four possibilities. One is when the s-gate
is closed but m- and exec-gates are open; this regime may be associated with
behaviors such as filled pauses and floor holding, i.e. motor actions which are
not necessarily driven by cs-resonances. Whether the remaining three possible
combinations correspond to identifiable production regimes is unclear. It seems
reasonable to infer that whenm-gates are closed, no speech-related motor behav-
iors occur and thus exec-gate states are irrelevant to classification of production
regimes.
4.2.4 The roles of internal and external feedback in e-configuration
reorganization
Reorganization of both cs and gm e-configurations is driven by sensory feed-
back. We assume there are parallel feedback mechanisms for cs and gm states,
and that these are associated with both internal and external feedback loops.
There is a substantial literature on the distinction between internal and external
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feedback in motor control generally, and in speech in particular (Hickok 2012;
Kawato 1999; Miall & Wolpert 1996; Ramanarayanan et al. 2016; Wolpert et al.
1995; Wolpert & Kawato 1998). This distinction can be extended to higher levels
of linguistic processing as well (Hagoort & Levelt 2009; Laver 1973; Levelt 1983;
1989; Nooteboom 1973; Nooteboom & Quené 2008; Postma 2000).
External feedback is sensory information regarding the state of the environ-
ment. The “environment” here is the physical state of the universe: movement
leads to changes in the state of the environment, e.g. in spatiotemporal acoustic
energy distributions, articulator positions, muscle stretch, etc. These changes in-
fluence the states of various peripheral sensory systems, providing various forms
of information, i.e. auditory, tactile, proprioceptive, etc. This information in turn
influences the states of g-sensory systems, which we imagine are populations
which integrate sensory information. In general, this external feedback can re-
sult in adjustments of motor commands, suppression of selected m-systems, and
degating of subthreshold m-systems. However, a fairly long time delay exists be-
tween when movement occurs and when external sensory feedback associated
with movement becomes available. This delay makes external sensory feedback
relatively less useful for online control of movement, compared to internal feed-
back.
Internal sensory feedback is sensory information “predicted” by the nervous
system, regarding the state of the environment. The prediction comes from an
internal model, which maps outgoing motor commands to sensory states. A so-
called efference copy of motor commands (or better, a motor state) is mapped to a
representation of the anticipated sensory consequences of those commands. Be-
cause of its anticipatory nature, internal feedback is useful for adjusting motor
commands and reorganizing gm-system during execution. It is worth noting that
“prediction” implies agency, and the nervous system is only metaphorically agen-
tive. Thus it is more appropriate to describe internal feedback as follows: motor
states induce sensory states, and these states are similar to ones that are induced
a bit later via sensory information from the external environment.
The distinction between internal and external feedback is schematized in Fig-
ure 4.7. In the gm-domain, internal feedback can lead to suppression (demotion)
and/or degating (promotion) of systems before external sensory feedback regard-
ing target achievement has been received. Internal gm-feedback can also drive
promotion and demotion of cs-systems in the cs-domain, via c-sensory systems.
Thus internal feedback can be viewed as a general mechanism for influencing
the timing of e-reorganization.
To what extent are internal and external feedback involved in cs- and gm- re-
organization? The answer can depend on many factors. First, because internal
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Figure 4.7: Internal and external feedback loops which drive e-
reorganization.
models (which map motor states to expected sensory states) are learned, young
children must rely on external feedback to a greater degree. This is consistent
with the observations that young children speakmore slowly and produce syntac-
tically simpler utterances. Second, the relative influence of internal vs. external
feedback must depend on a production regime, i.e. on threshold states. For exam-
ple, when exec-gates are closed, as in motor simulation, no external sensory feed-
back is available. Hence internal feedback is the sole mechanism for driving e-
reorganization in subvocal rehearsal. Third, environmental circumstances which
induce mismatches between internal predictions and external feedback can in-
duce greater reliance on external feedback. In sensory perturbation paradigms
(e.g. speech in noise, spectrally altered auditory feedback, mechanical perturba-
tion of movement), speakers often slow down and compensate for the alteration.
These behaviors are presumably a consequence of detection of a mismatch be-
tween internal predictions and external information. When such mismatches are
detected, the system can no longer rely on the accuracy of the prediction, and
reverts to reliance on the external information. Fourth, various contextual forces
may induce speakers to attend more or less closely to their own productions,
resulting in varying degrees of reliance on external feedback.
4.2.5 Disfluencies
Abnormalities in trajectories of conceptual-syntactic and gestural-motoric sys-
tems can be understood by considering the ways in which interactions between
ϕ/e-organization, thresholds, and feedback can deviate from those associated
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with the canonical production trajectory. These deviations generate a typology
of disfluency/speech error mechanisms which differs from standard classifica-
tions (see Fromkin 1971; 1984; Shriberg 2001). To develop this typology we distin-
guish between (i) disfluency manifestations, (ii) disfluency mechanisms, and (iii)
disfluency origins. Manifestations are observable abnormalities in production,
whereas mechanisms are hypothesized deviations from the canonical trajectory
which result in a disfluency manifestation. The origins of these deviations are
surroundings forces and we have little to say about them – there are numerous
possibilities for why a particular deviation occurs andwe rarely have a solid basis
for determining them.
The aim of constructing a disfluency typology is to map between mechanisms
and manifestations, but this is complicated because the relation is not expected
to be one-to-one. In particular, some classes of manifestation may arise from
more than one mechanism. For example, there may be multiple abnormal cs-
trajectories which converge to the same abnormal gm-trajectory.
Another complication is that the initial construction of what constitutes an
abnormality must presuppose a canonical intended or target trajectory. We of-
ten assume that there was some utterance a speaker intended to produce, that
something went wrong, and that the speaker produced something else. It may
not be appropriate to impose these assumptions in many circumstances. In an
empirical context, the implied target trajectory is always an analytical guess: we
observe some manifestation(s) of disfluency, and based on our familiarity with
language, our expectations, and our notions of similarity, we guess what the tar-
get utterance was.
Let’s consider an example. Imagine that a speaker says Al krinks coffee. Our
analysis of Al krinks coffee must be conducted in relation to a canonical trajec-
tory, the target of which we guess is Al drinks coffee. The manifestation of the
disfluency is the execution of a velar closure for [k] as opposed to an alveolar
one for [d]. The mechanism, as shown in Figure 4.8(B1), is that a velar closure,
[k], obtains an above-ground gm-resonance when [drinks]{V} is selected, instead
of an alveolar closure, [d]. We might further elaborate the mechanism by specu-
lating that the substitution of [k] for [d] arose from a trajectory in which [k] in
the g-domain of [coffee] outcompeted [d] for resonance with {+C} in (B1). Note
that no units-are-objects or word order blend are imposed on this analysis of
substitution: there is no sense in which [k] and [d] occupy temporal positions
or move. Rather, substitutions are trajectories which, for indeterminate reasons,
deviate from a canonical trajectory.
However, even the above analysis of the disfluency mechanism as noncanon-
ical competition is merely a guess. An alternative possibility is that some other
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Figure 4.8: Anticipatory substitution in which the noncanonical gm-
resonance is in the gm-domain of an excited cs-system.
cs-resonance we have not identified was active in epoch (B), and the g-domain
of this unidentified system played a role. For example, a [cold] c-system might
have been active throughout the utterance, as shown in Figure 4.9. Despite being
active, [cold] is never selected because it is unexcited. Nonetheless, systems in
its g-domain are active and may, with help from other forces, become excited,
which constitutes a deviation from the canonical trajectory.
If we allow for noncanonical reorganizations, there are even more possible
analyses of disfluency mechanisms. For example (see Figure 4.10), perhaps in
epoch (e1) [craves]{V} was excited and [drinks]{V} unexcited, but surroundings
forces caused a noncanonical reorganization to (e2), where [drinks]{V} is pro-
moted to the selection level and [craves]{V} is grounded. Suppose the noncanon-
ical reorganization interrupts execution of gm-systems. Such a trajectory might
arise when competition between [craves] and [drinks] for {V} resonance contin-
ues after the initial organization and transition to a selective regime.
The example of Figure 4.10 illustrates why the notion of an intended canonical
utterance/trajectory is problematic. What is the intended trajectory? Perhaps we
might conduct the analysis with reference to two canonical trajectories, associ-
ated withAl craves coffee andAl drinks coffee. In some sense, both of these are the
“intention” of the speaker. But in another sense, neither is an “intention”: the “in-
tention” of the speaker was to change the trajectory from the one expected in (e1)
to the one in (e2). Hence wemight allow for the surroundings forces which cause
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Figure 4.9: Substitution in which the noncanonical gm-resonance is in
the gm-domain of a cs-system that is never excited.
Figure 4.10: Noncanonical reorganization as amechanism of disfluency.
the disfluency to be construed as intention. There are many disfluency manifes-
tations for which we have very little certainty regarding an intended trajectory.
Thus rather than classifying observed disfluencies by guessing intentions, an al-
ternative viable strategy for typologizing disfluencies is to classify ways in which
perturbations of a canonical trajectory can map to manifestations.
For a different example of disfluency, consider the utterance Al drinks…drinks
coffee in Figure 4.11, where the speaker hesitates after the first production of
drinks and repeats drinks. Perhaps a c-system such as [tea] competes with [cof-
fee] for cs-resonance with {−N}, and perhaps both [tea] and [coffee] are excited
in the initial e-organization, resulting in a state which is likely to be unstable.
Because of this, reorganization from (e2) to (e3) fails to promote either [tea]{−N}
or [coffee]{−N} to selection level. Instead, there is a period of time in which no cs-
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system is selected (a hesitation), while the [coffee]-[tea] competition is resolved
by grounding [tea]{−N}. Eventually, a noncanonical reorganization to (e4) occurs,
which promotes [drinks]{V} to selection level a second time.
Figure 4.11: Unstable e-organization leads to hesitation.
By considering other noncanonical reorganizations, we can generate alterna-
tive manifestations. If the post-hesitation reorganization promotes both [Al]{+N}
and [drinks]{V}, the utterancewould beAl drinks…Al drinks coffee. If the reorgani-
zation promotes no cs-systems, the utterance would be Al drinks…coffee. If detec-
tion of the promotion failure closes s-gates temporarily, perhaps an [uh] gm-sys-
tem is selected during the hesitation, and the utterance is Al drinks…uh…coffee.
Another example of disfluency involves a mechanism in which external feed-
back does not match a conceptual state – a self-monitoring disfluency. Consider
the utterance Al drinks tea…coffee. In Figure 4.12 we imagine that the utterance
is produced in accordance with a canonical trajectory for Al drinks tea (e1–e3),
but for whatever reason, the speaker transitions between (e3) and (e4) to attend-
ing to an |Al drinks coffee| ϕ-configuration instead of |Al drinks tea|. As a con-
sequence, external feedback of [tea] is not consistent with the ϕ-configuration
which involves [coffee]; this leads to a reorganization which promotes [coffee]
to selection level.
By systematically analyzing ways in which production trajectories can deviate
from canonical ones, and comparing these to observed manifestations, it should
be possible to gain greater insight into constraints on the reorganization oper-
ator, Ê. This sort of approach also usefully structures our analysis of observed
disfluencies, by compelling us to be more aware of our assumptions regarding
speaker intentions.
4.2.6 Accentual and metrical patterns
One pervasive form of cs-gm interaction involves accentual patterns such as pri-
mary stress or lexical pitch accent. In some languages, we hypothesize a class
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Figure 4.12: Trajectory of a self-monitoring disfluency in which the at-
tended ϕ-configuration does not match the ϕ-configuration excited by
external feedback.
of accentual g-systems which resonate with an accentual m-system, {A}. Accen-
tual g-systems often involve tones (or pitch accents), such as [H*]. Consider the
accentual pattern on the phrase Mr. Mississippi, as shown below. Following our
previous analyses, we might conceptualize the gm-system [H*]{A} as the gm-
domain of an accentual [accent]{A} cs-system. In other words, we could posit
a class of accentual c-systems [accent] and a corresponding class of s-systems,
{A}. However, there are some problems with this analysis. In many cases the par-
ticipation of the [accent]{A} system in a relational meaning experience is hard
to characterize. Moreover, we have no reason to suspect that [accent]{A} needs
be reorganized like other cs-systems, because all selective epochs can include
selection of [accent]{A}, and many stress/pitch accent languages have a default
gm-domain for [accent].
Figure 4.13: An accentual cs-system is selected in each cs-epoch.
Indeed, the observation that an accentual system can be selected once in each
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epoch, regardless of which cs-systems are co-selected with it, suggests that we
view the accentuation system differently. The alternative we adopt here is to
posit a special accentual s-system {ˆ}. The s-system {ˆ} does not differentiate like
other s-systems; instead {ˆ} is selected and re-selected in each selective epoch
and potentially excites the gm-domain of an accentual c-system, i.e. [accent],
without necessarily ϕ-coupling to that c-system. In the case of intonational ac-
cents, we imagine that different varieties of [accent] c-systems (e.g. [contrast],
[focus], [surprise]) may couple to lexical s-systems, and that {ˆ} excites the gm-
domains of those [accent] c-systems. In the absence of a more specific c-system
being excited, a default gm-domain may be excited by {ˆ}. This circumstance
accounts for the typological pattern of stress, where each set of co-selected cs-
systems is produced with one primary accent. This could be a default gm-sys-
tem or a more pragmatically meaningful one that is the domain of [contrast],
[focus], etc. For patterns called pitch accent, the gm-domain of {ˆ} can be deter-
mined by the co-selected cs-system.
The metrical organization of accentual gm-systems relates to how the m-sys-
tem {A} is organized in a multi-level m-configuration. For example, the m-config-
uration ofMississippi has four e-levels, and {A} initially occupies the third e-level.
In some languages the organization of {A} is determined entirely by the number of
e-levels in the m-configuration (fixed stress). In other languages the organization
of {A} can be influenced by the identity of the selected cs-system (free stress). In
both cases, the compositions of the gm-systems may influence {A} organization
(quantity sensitivity).
To account for secondary stress in the gm-domain of co-selected cs-systems,
we hypothesize that gm-configuration re-organization can be driven by rhyth-
mic m-system selection. As shown below, co-selected {+C}{V} m-systems are
+ϕ-coupled. Constructive interference between m-systems occupying different
e-levels is maximized when oscillation phases align. We can associate the maxi-
mized constructive interference pattern with periodic e-reorganization and a re-
organization frequency, f0. Periodic reorganization occurs when there is a peri-
odicity which strongly influences the timing of promotion and demotion (i.e. the
canonical reorganization regime). Importantly, periodic reorganization is not a
general mechanism of conversational speech. Instead, it is a regime associated
with specialized contexts, e.g. poetic meter/rhythmic speech, entrainment to ex-
ternal stimuli, and analytical reflection on metrical patterns – i.e. metrical intu-
ition formation. Periodic reorganizationmay also be a developmental mechanism
for stabilizing e-reorganization processes, as in babbling. In disfluency and some
disordered speech, it may emerge as a stabilizing mechanism.
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Figure 4.14: Higher-level prosodic organization as constructive inter-
ference between subharmonic oscillations.
To reconceptualize higher-level prosodic organization, we hypothesize that
the maximized constructive interference pattern facilitates the emergence of sub-
harmonic oscillations at frequencies f−1, f−2, … f−n and that cs-systems can ϕ-
couple to these subharmonics via coupling of generalized relative phase, i.e. ϕ̃ij =
2π(fjθi − fjθi). If subharmonic oscillations are influential during a developmen-
tal stage in which rhythmic e-reorganization is a heuristic/bootstrapping mech-
anism, speakers might learn to +ϕ-couple {A} m-systems with the lowest sub-
harmonic oscillation. Note that an alternative model of secondary stress is one
in which e-levels in an initial m-organization are spatially organized in a field.
Standing waves in this field are hypothesized to bias the organization of accen-
tual systems (Tilsen 2018a).
4.3 Morphosyntax and morphophonology
4.3.1 Grammatical vs. lexical systems
Up to this point, our analyses have focused on lexical cs-systems. For example, we
have ignored the fact that the word drinks in Al drinks coffee is associated with
grammatical person and number. We can elaborate our analyses by including
state space dimensions for grammatical cs-systems, i.e. systems which evoke so-
called functional or grammatical meaning, e.g. tense, aspect, mood, voice, person,
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number, gender, case, definiteness, etc. A variety of differences between gram-
matical and lexical systems are enumerated below. However, one should infer no
essential distinction between these types of systems; “grammatical system” and
“lexical system” are analytical categories, which have more or less prototypical
members and heterogeneous category structure. On historical scales, more pro-
totypically grammatical systems tend to evolve from more prototypically lexical
ones, and hence we expect intermediate varieties and cases in which different
types of cs-systems are associated with the same or similar gm-domains.
1. Grammatical c-systems resonate with grammatical s-systems through +ϕ-
coupling, just like lexical c-systems resonate with lexical s-systems such
as {N}, {V}, {Adj}, {Adv}. We construct various types of grammatical s-
systems for various types of grammatical c-systems. Hence to understand
how a concept of 3rd person is evoked in a relational meaning experience,
we construct a [3rd] c-system, an s-system {person}, and a cs-resonance
[3rd]{person}.
2. Like lexical cs-resonances, grammatical cs-resonances are canonically one-
to-one, i.e. a grammatical c-system will strongly resonate with only one
grammatical s-system in a local epoch, and vice versa. The reason for this
is interference: before ϕ-stabilization, c- and s-systems will generally have
different angular velocities ⟨θ̇⟩ and phases θ. This makes configurations
with many-to-one resonances unstable (we examine interference in more
detail, later in this chapter).
3. Lexical and grammatical c-system networks exhibit a variety of differ-
ences in network structure. Grammatical c-systems which resonate with
the same class of s-system exert relatively strong inhibitory forces on each
other, while lexical c-systems exert relatively weak inhibitory forces. To
elaborate the intuition behind this, let’s assume that for each s-system we
can identify a c-domain as the set of all c-systems which may resonate
with the s-system. Hence the c-domain of {person} is [1st], [2nd], [3rd].
The c-domain of a lexical s-system such as {V} has many more c-systems
in its c-domain than {person} does. Imagine these networks of interactions
between c-systems as in Figure 4.15. Our intuition is that grammatical c-
domain networks are fully connected and have relatively strong inhibitory
e-coupling forces between all systems, whereas lexical c-domain networks
are sparsely connected with relatively weak e-coupling, which may be of
either negative [−e] or positive [+e] valence.
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Figure 4.15: Networks of grammatical c-systems are smaller than net-
works of lexical c-systems and have stronger interactions.
4. On supra-utterance scales, there are statistical differences in how often
grammatical and lexical cs-systems are excited: typical grammatical cs-
systems are excited more frequently than lexical ones. The greater occur-
rence frequency correlates with differences in c-domain network structure,
and this should be derivable from a microscopic model. As discussed pre-
viously, difference between +e and −e coupling derives from the relative
proportion of postsynaptic targets of projections between populations: pro-
jections from excitatory neurons in one population to excitatory neurons
in the other population promote +e coupling; projections to inhibitory in-
terneurons promote −e coupling.The numbers of such projections between
any two populations, along with their synaptic weights, are influenced
on supra-utterance scales by learning mechanisms such as spike-timing
dependent plasticity. The macroscale consequence is that in grammatical
c-domains, because of the greater occurrence frequency of grammatical cs-
resonances, c-systems evolve to exert and experience stronger e-coupling
forces on other grammatical c-systems, compared to the forces in lexical
c-domain networks. Hence ourmicroscale conceptualization predicts a cor-
relation between occurrence frequency and within-domain connectivity/-
coupling strengths.
5. In order for a grammatical cs-system to participate in a relational mean-
ing experience, the grammatical s-system must ϕ-couple with a lexical s-
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system. The valence of this coupling is always +ϕ. For Al drinks the coffee
shown in Figure 4.16, this entails that {person} and {number} are +ϕ cou-
pled to {V}, and {D} is +ϕ coupled to {−N}. Consequently [3rd] and [sg.]
have a +ϕ relation to [drink], and [definite] has +ϕ relation to {−N}.
6. Grammatical s-systems are often organized in the same e-level as the
lexical s-system to which they are ϕ-coupled. As shown in Figure 4.16,
[3rd]{person} and [sg.]{number} are on the same level as [drink]{V}, and
[def.]{D} is on the same level as [coffee]{−N}. This entails that {person},
{number}, and {V} are co-selected, and that {D} and {−N} are co-selected. Al-
though lexical s-systems are not co-selected with other lexical s-systems,
grammatical s-systems can be co-selected with other s-systems, both lex-
ical and grammatical. A compound lexical system is normally organized
as one cs-system, i.e. [coffee-stain]{N}, as opposed to two independently
selected systems.
Figure 4.16: Grammatical s-systems are often co-selected with lexical
s-systems.
7. Grammatical s-systems are associated with a greater degree of popula-
tion differentiation, particularly in highly inflected languages. In cases
where subject nouns, object nouns, and verbs are inflected for some gram-
matical meaning, we analyze each inflectional marking as a distinct cs-
resonance arising with differentiated grammatical s-systems. In the same
way that the {N} population differentiates into {−N} and {+N}, inflectional
s-systems can differentiate. In the analysis shown in Figure 4.17, there are
four s-system classes for number inflection: {number,+N}, {number,−N},
{number-V+N}, and {number-V-n}. We assume that all of these are differ-
entiations of {number} and [singular]/[plural]. Because of the greater
frequency of grammatical s-systems, differentiations of this sort can be
more stable than those associated with lexical s-systems.
89
4 Reconstructing syntactic theory
Figure 4.17: Grammatical s-systems can differentiate to couple with
multiple lexical s-systems.
4.3.2 Morphosyntactic and morphophonological status
As a starting point for understanding the relation between cs- and gm-organiza-
tion, we propose here a syntactic-motoric cotemporality hypothesis. This hypoth-
esis holds that, in a canonical trajectory, the g-domain of a co-selected set of
cs-systems in a given stable e-epoch is organized in that same epoch. This hy-
pothesis reinterprets the notion of a “phonological word” (cf. Nespor & Vogel
1986, Selkirk 1984; 2011): patterns associated with phonological words arise be-
cause all of the gm-systems associated with a set of co-selected cs-systems are
organized as a stable e-configuration in the same epoch. Another way of stating
the hypothesis is to say that, in a canonical trajectory, excitation of the g-domain
of a cs-system neither occurs in an epoch prior to the selection of the cs-system
nor is deferred to a subsequent epoch. There is thus a cotemporality of syntactic
and motoric organization.
If the s-m cotemporality hypothesis holds, any apparent violations of s-m
cotemporality arise either from abnormal surroundings forces (i.e. constitute a
non-canonical trajectory) or have been wrongly analyzed. The hypothesis is also
consistent with the idea that each phonological word is associated with one ac-
centual s-system {ˆ} and hence at most one [accent] system will be selected for
each set of co-selected cs-systems. Cotemporality also leads to a reinterpreta-
tion of morphosyntactic distinctions such as affix/clitic, and bound/free morph.
Many grammatical cs-systems are readily associated with one of just two mor-
phosyntactic patterns, an affix-like pattern or a clitic-like pattern (see Payne 1997;
Zwicky 1985; Zwicky & Pullum 1983 for further detail). To classify a cs-system
[x]{x} along these lines we propose two criteria:
(i) [x]{x} must be co-selected with another system, [α]{α}.
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(ii) [x]{x} is +ϕ-coupled to [α]{α}.
A system which exhibits the affix-like pattern meets both criteria: the system
is always co-selectedwith some other cs-system that it is +ϕ coupled to, i.e. a host
system. Often the set of possible s-systemhosts is small. For example, the nominal
cs-system [plural]{number} is necessarily co-selected with {N}, and cannot be
co-selected solely with other classes of lexical s-systems such as {V}, {Adv}, {Adj}.
Another example is [past]{tense}, which is +ϕ coupled and co-selected with {V}
or {aux}. Because an affix-like s-system is always co-selected with [α]{α}, the s-m
cotemporality hypothesis entails that the g-domain of [x]{x} is “phonologically
bound” to the g-domain of [α]{α}.
A system which exhibits the clitic-like pattern meets only criterion (i): the
system is always co-selected with some s-system, but not necessarily one with
which it is +ϕ-coupled. The set of possible s-system hosts is often larger than
it is for affix-like systems. A consequence of failing to meet criterion (ii) is that
clitic-like systems can participate in ϕ-configurations with systems they are not
co-selected with, just like lexical cs-systems can. For example, possessive {poss}
is always +ϕ coupled to an {N} system, but can be co-selected with {V}, {adv}, or
{adv}. Examples are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Examples of clitic-like co-selection patterns.
{poss} co-selected with: {D} co-selected with:
{N} the coffee’s taste {N} the coffee
{V} the coffee Al drank’s taste {V} the tastes good coffee
{ADJ} the coffee that is cold’s taste {ADJ} the cold coffee
{ADV} the coffee Al drank
yesterday’s taste
{ADV} the strongly brewed coffee
Clitics and affixes can be described as “bound” because they always meet cri-
terion (i). Some other grammatical cs-systems can be described as “free” because
they meet a relaxed version of criterion (i) in which [x]{x} is usually (rather
than always) co-selected with another system. Determiners and quantifiers like
a, the, and some are examples of cs-systems which are often but not necessarily
co-selected with other systems. Specifically, these systems are often co-selected
with {N} or other lexical systems such as {ADV} and {ADJ}, and yet can also be se-
lected independently when a [focus] system couples to them (i.e. Al drank THE
coffee).
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Some examples of configurations with clitic-like patterns are shown in Fig-
ure 4.18. Observe that [the]{D} is in a ϕ-configuration with [coffee]{N}, but is
co-selected with [cold]{adj}. Likewise, [poss]{poss} is in a +ϕ-configuration with
[coffee]{N} and a −ϕ-configurationwith [taste]{N}, despite being co-selectedwith
neither.
Figure 4.18: Grammatical cs-systems like determiners and possessives
are often co-selected with a lexical cs-system. Determiner cs-systems
are free because they can be selected with a focus system instead of a
lexical one.
In the case of [focus], which is a subclass of [accent], we note that the dis-
tribution of [focus] coincides exactly with the set of possible co-selected sys-
tems. This suggests that [focus] resonates with any s-system which can be in-
dividually selected. These are often lexical s-systems like {N} and {V}, but can
also be usually-but-not-always bound systems such as [the]{DET}. As shown in
Figure 4.18, with focus on the determiner in Al drank THE coffee, [the]{D} oc-
cupies a level with a [focus] system, and we hypothesize that [focus] forms a
cs-resonance with {D}. We assume that [focus] does not interfere strongly with
the [the]{D} cs-resonance in this analysis.
Instead of imposing classical categories of morphosyntactic status such as af-
fix/clitic, and free/bound, a more sophisticated analysis aims to characterize de-
grees of combinatorial restriction on co-selection and the propensity of systems
to ϕ-couple with co-selected systems (i.e. co-selective ϕ-coupling propensity).
From this perspective we note that verbal inflection s-systems such as {tense}
and {person} are more combinatorically restricted (these co-select only with
{V} and {aux}) than are {D} or {poss} (these co-select with a variety of lexical s-
systems).Themore restricted systems also have a greater co-selective ϕ-coupling
propensity, i.e. they are more often co-selected with the system they ϕ-couple to.
Further investigation of this correlation is warranted.
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4.3.3 State-dependence of gestural-motoric domains
The canonical cs-to-gmmapping is one-to-one and does not depend on the states
of other cs-systems. This means that each cs-system in a set of co-selected cs-
systems drives the excitation of one g-domain, whose composition does not vary
as a function of the states of other cs-systems. This canonical scenario corre-
sponds to prototypical agglutinative morphology.
Fusional morphs deviate from the canonical cs-to-gm mapping: their g-do-
mains depend on the cs-states of other systems. For example, the 3rd person
suffix of drinks occurs only in the present tense. Co-selection of [drink]{V} with
[present]{tense} and [3rd]{person} excites an [alveolar narrow]{−C} gm-system
(the suffix of drinks), as shown in Figure 4.19. In contrast, co-selection of [drink]
{V} with [present]{tense} and [1st]{person} does not excite the [alveolar narrow]
{−C} system. A strong hypothesis is that cs-to-gm mappings can depend only on
selected cs-systems. In other words, the gm-systems which are organized in a
given epoch cannot depend on cs-systems which are not selected in that epoch.
For instance, fusional cs-to-gm mappings associated with inflection of drinks
in the utterance Al drinks coffee cannot depend on [Al]{+N} or [coffee]{−N} (of
course, the selection of grammatical cs-systems can depend on a contemporane-
ously organized system). This strong hypothesis may follow as a consequence of
s-m cotemporality; it makes sense because fusion arises from gestural overlap,
and such overlap is expected to be more extensive among gestures which are
contemporaneously organized. Whether the hypothesis needs to be weakened
such that cs-to-gm mappings can depend on all excited cs-systems, not just the
selected ones, is an open question.
Figure 4.19: Suppletive allomorphy occurs when the gm-domain of a
cs-system depends on the co-selection of grammatical cs-systems.
Suppletive morphological patterns are similar to fusional ones, except that a
suppletive g-domain depends on the identity of the lexical c-system. For example,
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a weakly suppletive allomorphy such as ablaut of drank /dreink/ is shown in
Figure 4.19. In a state with [drink] and [past] selected, a different vocalic gesture
is excited than the one that is excited in the state where [drink] and [present] are
selected. In other words, the cs-to-gm mapping of [drink] differs depending on
which [tense] system is selected. Strongly suppletive allomorphy, e.g. Al goes
for coffee vs. Al went for coffee, exhibits the same dependence of g-domain on
the identity of selected lexical and grammatical c-systems, but the differences in
g-domains are greater.
4.3.4 Derivational vs. inflectional morphology
A commonly employed distinction in morphological analysis is one between
derivational and inflectional morphology (Bickel & Nichols 2007; Booij 1996;
Dressler 1989; Haspelmath & Sims 2013). The qualities which are used to distin-
guish derivational and inflectional morphology – i.e. productivity, composition-
ality of meaning, and free vs. bound status – must be characterized by statistical
analysis over a corpus of utterances. This assumes some particular spatial and
temporal scales associated with the corpus, and is not always generalizable.
For example, roots like cran in cranberry are only “bound” to the extent that
our analysis finds that these systems are infrequently selected without another
lexical system. But if we observe that speakers produce forms such as cran-grape
and cran-apple, and readily make sense of utterances like Al is a big fan of cran,
then we infer that there is a [cran] c-system, and that [cran] can couple to {N}
productively. The irony is that when we refer to “cran” as a bound morph in an
analytical context, we promote the independent selection of this cs-system, in a
statistical sense. Thus people with some instruction in morphology may be more
likely to productively couple bound morphs that were exemplified as such, and
this in turn makes those morphs more likely to exhibit the distributional patterns
of free morphs! This irony highlights the fact that our use of the terms “bound”
and “free” depend on a choice of analytical scale.
Indeed, some “derivational” morphology is, contrary to prototype, very pro-
ductive. In some languages intransitive {V} systems can be transitivized by mor-
phological processes. The lexicalized transitivity contrast in English between c-
systems [die] and [kill] is associated with an affix-like system in some languages,
i.e. make-die. Such patterns can be readily analyzed as co-selection of verbal
cs-system [die]{V} and a transitivizing or causativizing cs-system, [cause]{va-
lency}. Derivational cs-systems of this sort are akin to much of the inflectional
morphology we examined above.
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Given the complexity and scale-dependence of the relevant factors, we should
be careful to avoid imposing a categorical distinction between derivational and
inflectional morphology. Instead, we should interpret productivity, composition-
ality, and boundedness as statistical descriptions of patterns of organization,
which necessarily require a choice of spatial and temporal scales. From this per-
spective it would be a worthwhile endeavor to re-examine the generalization that
derivational morphology “precedes” inflectional morphology (Booij 1996).
4.3.5 Case marking
All of the s-systems we have constructed so far have been associated with one
or more c-systems, and our assumption has been that these s-systems, whether
lexical or grammatical, become active through resonance with c-systems. How-
ever, there is no a priori reason to rule out the possibility that s-systems might
be activated through interactions with other s-systems, or require combinations
of s-system and c-system coupling to be activated. Case marking appears to be
a phenomenon of this sort (Bobaljik & Wurmbrand 2008; Malchukov & Spencer
2008).
Herewe hypothesize that some forms of casemarking involve {case} s-systems
which become active through interactions with other s-systems. First, note that
case marking systems are cross-linguistically diverse (Malchukov & Spencer
2008). One puzzle that we must address is this: although some case marking
patterns are predictable from ϕ-configurations (i.e. relational meaning), many
appear to be correlated with an initial e-configuration. Various common case
marking patterns are schematically arranged in Figure 4.20.
The pattern in which ϕ-coupling solely determines case corresponds to active-
stative marking: {+N} arguments are coupled with [agent]{case} and {−N} ar-
guments are coupled with [patient]{case}. The pattern in which e-organization
solely determines case corresponds to nominative-accusative case marking: an
{N} argument in some e-level defined relative to {V} couples with [nominative]
{case}, and {N} arguments in some other e-level relative to {V} couple with [ac-
cusative]{case}. In English, [nominative]/[accusative] are mapped to {N} in
levels above/below {V}, respectively. The specific mapping will of course dif-
fer according to basic word order of a language. Ergative-absolutive is a pat-
tern in which both e- and ϕ-organization determine case marking: {+N} argu-
ments couple to [ergative]{case} when the e-configuration involves two ar-
guments, but when the e-configuration has just one argument, {N} couples to
[absolutive]{case}.
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Figure 4.20: Case-marking patterns can be classified according to the
influences of ϕ- and e-organization on the selection of case systems.
Case typically develops diachronically from adpositions (Heine 2009; Traugott
& Heine 1991) which relate {N}-coupled c-systems to other {N}- or {V}-coupled c-
systems, and so we expect semantic regularities in cases. We have hypothesized
that {case} s-systems are special because theymay become excited through inter-
actions with other s-systems, or through combinations of s- and c-system states.
This predicts that {case} excitation can be fully or partly dissociated from rela-
tional meaning, and instead can become associated entirely with e-organization.
Perhaps {case} systems can become dissociated from relational meaning because
they are redundant, particularly in languages with relatively fixed word order.
This perspective provides a new basis for understanding the typological diversity
of case marking systems, and also provides insight into some of the interesting
“structural” patterns which have been conventionally associated with case.
One observation that is important to conventional theories of case is that non-
finite verbs cannot assign case to subjects (i.e. nominative case, see Chomsky
1980; Chomsky & Lasnik 1977; Vergnaud 2006). Hence (1a) below is judged unac-
ceptable because the utterance-initial pronoun cannot be assigned case. In con-
trast, (1b) is acceptable because the finite verb drinks can assign the pronoun
case, and (1c) is acceptable because the preposition for can assign case (here ac-
cusative).
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(1) a. * He to drink coffee would be good.
b. That he drinks coffee would be good.
c. For him to drink coffee would be good.
In the o/el framework we reinterpret case as potentially determined by e-
organization (or, interactions between s-systems), in a language-specific way,
and hence we infer that the organization in (1a) is not a context in which [nom]
{case} can resonate with {V} and {N}. The important question is why. The inclu-
sion of a non-finite [inf]{i} system appears to be responsible. Instead of under-
standing the unacceptability of (1a) as the result of a restriction on the “ability”
of verbs to “assign case”, we reconceptualize the pattern as a trajectory in which
[nom]{case} does not become excited, and note that such trajectories occur when
[inf]{i} is excited. This suggests some form of interaction between [inf]{i} and
[nom]{case}, the basis of which warrants further investigation.
One of the more interesting patterns involving case is the exceptional case
marking pattern, which is illustrated by examples in (2). Some verbs, like believe,
can assign case to the subject of the non-finite verb in a complement clause, but
others, like decide, cannot. Contrasts such as these show that although {case}
s-systems can be excited via interactions with s-systems, their excitation may
depend also on the identities of excited c-systems. In (2a) we see that [acc]{case}
is excited by a [believes]{V} system, even though [acc]{case} is not coupled with
any system that is coupled to [believes]{V}. The same does not occur with [de-
cides]{V}. The passive in (2d) provides another example: the pronoun is marked
with nominative case, presumably because [nom]{case} is excited by resonance
with [he]{N} and [be]{aux}.
(2) a. Bo believes him to drink coffee.
b. * Bo decides him to drink coffee.
c. Bo decides that he drinks coffee.
d. He is believed to drink coffee by Bo.
Although we have not attempted to develop a comprehensive theory of case in
the current framework, the basis of such a theory is expected to derive from the
hypothesis that {case} s-systems have the atypical property of potentially being
activated and excited solely by interactions with other s-systems. This property
is what appears to underlie the typological diversity of case patterns.
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4.4 Phrasal organization
According to the principle of relational meaning, relational meaning experiences
are stable relative phase-configurations. What more can we say regarding these
ϕ-configurations, and how do ϕ and e-configurations interact? Below we pro-
pose a general principle and consider several specific hypotheses. We then apply
these to various patterns of phrasal organization: arguments, adjuncts, ditransi-
tive and passive constructions, etc. The proposed principle is as follows:
The principle of ϕ-configuration invariance:
All classes of relational meaning map invariantly to either +ϕ or −ϕ-configura-
tions.
The ϕ-configuration invariance principle holds that there are only two types
of stable-configurations, +ϕ and −ϕ, and that for any given class of relational
meaning, instances of that class always arise from the same type of configuration
or combination of types. Moreover, the syntactic mechanism for stabilizing ϕ-
configurations is cs-resonance in combination with s-s coupling, where all s-s
coupling is either +ϕ or −ϕ. Classes of relational meaning are therefore associated
with patterns of s-system coupling. We propose two hypotheses which specify
how the ϕ-configuration invariance principle is instantiated:
1. The following semantic relations are always −ϕ-configurations:
a) {V} and patient/theme/goal {N}
b) preposition {P} and complement {N}
c) possessor {N} and possessed {N}
2. All other semantic relations are +ϕ-configurations.
In applying these hypotheses to various patterns of phrasal organization, we
reach several general conclusions. First, [−] valence ϕ-coupling is special; the ma-
jority of ϕ relations in our analyses have [+] valence. Second, e-organization is
not necessarily contingent on ϕ organization, even in languages with relatively
fixed word order such as English. Third, the conventional notion of obligatori-
ness is untenable and must be replaced with a measure of state space volume.
Fourth, there are limits on the number of systems which can be excited simul-
taneously, because of interference between systems. For exposition we use ter-
minology which refers to semantic roles, e.g. agent/experiencer, patient/theme,
location/recipient, etc. to describe relational meaning experiences; we do this for
convenience, not because these roles are theoretically presupposed.
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4.4.1 The principle of ϕ-configuration invariance and configurational
hypotheses
For relational meanings with verbal flavor (i.e. actions/events/states), agent/expe-
riencer-relations arise from +ϕ coupling between {N} and {V}, and patient/theme
relations arise from −ϕ coupling between {N} and {V}. There are two general pos-
sibilities for mapping argument roles to configurations: (i) role-to-ϕ invariance
and (ii) e-to-ϕ invariance. Here we consider both (i) and (ii), but argue for the for-
mer, which holds that semantic roles map invariantly to ϕ-configurations. Initial
configurations are shown in Figure 4.21 for intransitive and transitive verbs in
the invariant role-to-ϕ scheme. The patient [Bo] has a −ϕ relation to the verbal
concepts in both intransitive [died] and transitive [killed] utterances. As a con-
sequence of this, the {−N} system occupies a different e-level relative to {V} in
intransitive and transitive-configurations. In other words, ϕ-to-e mapping is not
invariant in this scheme.
Figure 4.21: Two possibilities for phrasal organization: invariant map-
ping of semantic roles to ϕ-configurations; invariant mapping of e-
configurations to ϕ-configurations.
The alternative scheme (which we argue against) maps initial e-organization
invariantly to ϕ-configuration, in which case +ϕ and −ϕ coupling relations corre-
spond to e-levels relative to {V}, i.e. subject/argument positions. In the invariant
e-to-ϕ scheme, ϕ relations are predictable from relative e-level. In English, this
maps a thematic/patient argument of an intransitive verb such as died to a +ϕ-
configuration with {V}, violating the principle of ϕ-configuration invariance.
Why should we prefer role-to-ϕ invariance over e-to-ϕ invariance? The main
reason is that invariance of some sort must exist to provide a universal basis for
relational meaning experiences. If relational meaning were determined directly
by e-organization, we would expect word order to be equally important across
languages, and possibly the same in all languages. The fact that many languages
have relatively free or variable word order, and that basic word orders differ
across languages, suggests that e-to-ϕ invariance is not the primary mechanism
for regulating relational meaning. In other words, meaning relations are primary
and linear order is secondary.
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A consequence of preferring role-to-ϕ invariance is that e-organization is not
necessarily predictable from ϕ-configuration, and this entails that we need to
consider language-specific and contextual (i.e. surroundings-contingent) influ-
ences on e-organization. How should we conceptualize differences between or-
ganization for intransitive and transitive verb systems, as with died vs. killed?
Consider that what we write in []-brackets is merely a label for a c-system, and
not of theoretical interest. However, by using two different labels as above, we
have implicitly constructed distinct c-systems, [die] and [kill]. An alternative is
to propose a generic [die] c-system for both die and kill, and to make use of some
other class of systems to account for the transitivity difference. The utility of this
approach is more obvious when we consider verb forms which can be intransi-
tive or transitive, e.g. [break] in windows broke vs. Al broke windows.
The representations in Figure 4.22 contrast four possible analyses, which de-
rive from crossing two different hypotheses. (A,A’) differentiate intransitive {VIN}
and transitive {VTR} s-systems. (B,B’) posit a valency {val} s-system and differen-
tiates between [intransitive]{val} and [transitive]{val} systems. Hence the
contrast between (A,A’) vs. (B,B’) amounts to whether we differentiate {V} into
two subclasses of {V}: {VIN} and {VTR}, or construct a new class, {val}.
Figure 4.22: Four possible analyses of transitivity.
The contrast between (A,B) and (A’,B’) is whether we differentiate [break]
into two distinct c-systems. In (A,B) there is only one verbal c-system, [break];
in (A’,B’) there are two distinct c-systems, [breaktr] and [breakintr]. Moreover,
(A,A’) and (B,B’) are not mutually exclusive, because we can differentiate {V} into
{VIN}/{VTR} systems and proliferate a new s-system class, {val}. This doubles the
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number of possible analyses to eight. If we consider analyses in which there is
no differentiation of {V} nor a {val} system, we have sixteen possibilities. Which
of these should we prefer?
One consideration is that initial e-organization can be influenced by transitiv-
ity in some languages. Since e-organization is most directly a result of s-system
interactions, we can guess that there must be some s-system manifestation of
valency; this manifestation could be {V} differentiation and/or a {val} system.
Furthermore, there must be a c-system manifestation of transitivity, because
without one there would be no basis for a difference in meaning experience.
The question then becomes whether we should differentiate verbal concepts (i.e.
[breakintr] and [breaktr]) and/or construct new c-systems (i.e. posit [intrans]
and [trans])?
When we consider our microscopic model, the difference between these op-
tions is not so clear. On the microscale, similarity in meaning experiences on
supra-utterance timescales is understood as statistical regularity in the synaptic
interactions a concept population has with other systems and its surroundings.
The surroundings include other concept populations, peripheral sensory/motor
systems, autonomic systems, etc. The more similar these interactions are for two
concept populations, the larger the proportional intersection of the populations
(i.e. more neurons are associated with both populations, relative to the total size
of the populations). On this basis, we would expect a substantial degree of over-
lap between [breakintr] and [breaktr] populations, as shown in Figure 4.23(C).
(Overlap is understood here as set intersection of neurons, not overlap of spatial
location, despite the illustration.)
Using the same logic, we should also expect some degree of population in-
tersection between any two transitive verbs, such as [kill] and [breaktr], and
between any two intransitive verbs, such as [die] and [breakintr], as shown in
Figure 4.23(A). This expectation derives from the assumption that there must be
some commonality – associated with valency – in the microscale surroundings
interactions of [die] and [breakintr]. The amount of overlap between [die] and
[breakintr] in (A) is proportionally smaller than the amount of overlap between
[breakintr] and [breaktr] in (C), because the flavor of meaning associated with
the event is more influential for meaning experience than the flavor associated
with valency. Instead of conceptualizing similarity of [die] and [breakintr] as
population intersection (A), we can alternatively construct an [intrans]{val}
cs-system that couples with {V}, as in (B), and likewise a [trans]{val} cs-system
for [kill] and [breaktr]. In other words, we can reconceptualize the intersection
of the populations as a system.
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Figure 4.23: Microscale conceptualization of transitivity analyses.
We can apply the same logic for reconceptualizing population overlap to (C):
we interpret the intersection between [breakintr] and [breaktrans] populations
in (D) as a c-system [break] which interacts with [intransitive] or [transitive]
c-systems. But these shifts in conceptualization – from population intersection to
constructing a distinct system – are merely analytical changes on the macroscale.
There is not necessarily a fundamental distinction between the relevant micro-
states. The macroscale decision to differentiate an existing system or construct a
new class of system is simply a matter of analytical emphasis.
4.4.2 Mechanisms of initial e-organization for basic word order
For exposition let’s consider two possible views of how cs-systems are initially
e-organized, with the aim of conceptualizing how basic word orders can differ
across languages. Recall that in the canonical trajectory, the e-state stabilizes
after a ϕ-configuration stabilizes. We infer the temporal primacy of ϕ-configu-
rations from the existence of fixed word order languages, where there are large
statistical nonuniformities in ϕ-e mappings. In contrast, in languages with rela-
tively free word order, the distribution of ϕ-e mappings is relatively more uni-
form. What gives rise to these different distributions of ϕ-e mappings?
To address this question, let’s imagine idealized versions of fixed and free word
order languages. To simplify the discussion, we consider only subjects and ob-
jects of transitive and intransitive verbs. For the idealized fixed word order lan-
guage, we choose for convenience an English-like ϕ-e mapping: for transitive
verbs, {+N}/{−N} occupy levels above/below {V}; for intransitive verbs the {N} ar-
gument always occupies a level above {V}. In the idealized free word order lan-
guage, we assume statistical uniformity over all possible ϕ-e mappings. Hence




Figure 4.24: Distributions of word orders for transitive and intransitive-
configurations in languages with idealized fixed word order and ideal-
ized free word order.
How could such drastic differences in distributions of ϕ-e mappings arise from
a common mechanism? Let’s imagine that excitation of a {V} system gives rise to
“unoccupied” e-levels for argument {N} systems. Note that the notion of an “un-
occupied” level contradicts our earlier conclusion that each s-system, through its
interactions with other s-systems, creates its own e-level, and hence the notion
of an unoccupied level (excepting ground- and selection-levels) is not sensible.
For the moment we ignore this contradiction.
Furthermore, let’s imagine that for transitive verbs, {+N} and {−N} compete to
occupy the highest unoccupied level. For SVO fixed order, {V} gives rise to one
level above and below itself, and the relevant order is obtained when {+N} is e-
organized before {−N}, i.e. when organization of {+N} has precedence over {−N}.
This {+N} > {−N} scheme, when crossed with the three possible ways that {V} can
create two levels, generates the three most common basic word orders, SOV, SVO,
and VSO, as shown in Figure 4.25. The relatively rare VOS, OSV, and OVS orders
follow from a {−N} > {+N} scheme, where {−N} is e-organized before {+N}:
To apply the above conception to an idealized free order language we simply
abandon the notion of priority between {+N} and {−N} and allow for the assign-
ment of {N} systems to e-levels to be random. (There are a number of specific
variations on this random assignment scheme which generate free order, such
as creating multiple levels above and below {V} or assigning {V} to an unoccupied
level.)
One thing that is appealing about the level-occupationmetaphor is that it read-
ily describes a correlation between {V} valence and e-organization. The excita-
tion of a {V} system seems to organize the excitation of {N} systems in a manner
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Figure 4.25: Word order variation as the result of competition between
{+N} and {−N} to occupy the highest unoccupied e-level.
that depends on the c-system(s) which resonate with {V}. The level-occupation
metaphor suggests an analogy to atomic systems and energy levels of electrons.
The composition of an atomic nucleus determines available orbitals for elec-
trons, with each orbital being associated with a specific energy. Although our cs-
systems are macroscopic, their behavior is quantal in a phenomenological sense.
Indeed, if lexical s-systems such as {N}, {V}, {Adj}, and {Adv} never occupy the
same e-level, they effectively obey an exclusion principle. In contrast, grammati-
cal s-systems such as {D}, {tense}, {person}, etc. can jointly occupy e-levels with
a lexical system. Although construing {V} as a nucleus is tempting, it conflicts
with the conceptual mapping between orbital radius and excitation level. The
analogy thus suggests a representation in which cs-systems occupy a discrete
set of orbits as in Figure 4.26.
Note that orbital schemas are problematic because they can be mistaken to
imply distances between systems. For example, in Al breaks the window, the or-
bital schema implies that [Al]{+N} is closer to [breaks]{V} than to [window]{−N};
this is merely an artefact of mapping two spatially unrelated dimensions, e and
ϕ, onto polar coordinates, which wrongly reifies the systems as objects in space,
rather than states.
A deeper problemwith the word ordering mechanism described above is its re-
liance on the notion of an unoccupied e-level. In our original construction of the
e-potential, the quantal nature of e-levels was understood to emerge from local
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Figure 4.26: Orbital schemas for representing e and ϕ-configurations.
interactions between systems.The notion that {V} organizes levels independently
of {N} systems contradicts this interpretation. To be careful, we must remember
to view the quantal e-potential as an emergent consequence of s-system inter-
actions, and not as a reified spatial structure which exists independently from
objects which occupy those locations – we should not allow the object metaphor
to reinvade our conceptual model.Thus a conceptual model that does not require
unoccupied e-levels is preferable.
Another issue with the above mechanism is that it is suitable for only the
idealized fixed and free word order patterns. In an empirical sense, there are no
languages which conform to the idealized patterns: free word order languages
tend to depart substantially from uniformity, and fixed word order languages
never have maximally ordered distributions, allowing for constructions such as
topicalization, passivization, etc. Thus there is a continuum between fixed and
free order.
How should we conceptualize the mechanism which is responsible for this
continuum? In developing the canonical production trajectory, we imagined that
(i) cs-systems are activated, (ii) c-systems compete (because of interference) for
strong cs-resonances, and (iii) the outcome of the competition is that some cs-
systems are excited (above-ground), while others are active but unexcited
(ground level) or perhaps even deactivated. In that picture, we made no assump-
tions regarding the relative e values of c-systems or s-systems before a stable
ϕ-configuration emerges. Prior to stabilization, we expect short term averages
of phase velocities ⟨θ̇⟩ and e values of s-systems to be highly variable. We can
imagine the pre-stable phase as a disordered regime (a “high temperature” regime),
with high-amplitude fluctuations in system states.The emergence of a stable-con-
figuration requires a transition to an ordered regime (a low temperature regime)
in which fluctuations in e and ϕ have diminished. For an s-system, the sources
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of the “fluctuations” in the disordered regime are its interactions with many c-
systems, which in general will have different ⟨θ̇⟩, θ, and e from each other. When
multiple c-systems begin to resonate with one s-system, these differences can
pull the θ and ⟨θ̇⟩ of the s-system in different directions. This interference po-
tentially destabilizes cs-resonances. Furthermore, because s-systems are strongly
coupled to each other, the fluctuations that an s-system experiences induce fluc-
tuations in the forces which the system exerts on other s-systems, possibly desta-
bilizing those systems.
How does a set of cs-resonances ever stabilize, given the high degree of vari-
ability in the pre-stable phase? Presumably, some c-systems are more highly ex-
cited than others, or become so during the pre-stable phase, due to their surround-
ings interactions. If these particular systems become sufficiently excited relative
to their competitors, then their resonances with s-systems can be strong enough
to stabilize, and an ordered organization of cs-systems can emerge. Moreover, as
shown in Figure 4.27, the specific pattern of relative excitation that emerges could
depend on random fluctuations in the pre-stable phase: the relative e-pattern that
obtains as the system begins to cool becomes more and more likely to persist as
fluctuations diminish.
Figure 4.27: Chaotic evolution of cs-systems in the pre-stable phase of
production.
This elaborated picture presents a highly chaotic evolution of s-systems in the
pre-stable phase of a production trajectory: new cs-resonances may appear and
vanish, corresponding to the emergence and decay of collective oscillations, i.e.
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the activation and deactivation of systems. The interactions between these os-
cillations and the surroundings can have effects which are difficult to predict.
The stable initial e-configuration that emerges as the system transitions to the
ordered regime can depend sensitively on system states during the disordered
regime. An analogy to a liquid-glass transition may be useful here: stable-config-
urations have an ordered but non-symmetric (amorphous) organization, because
they are asymmetric in relative e space; the cooling process is rapid; stable-con-
figurations emerge when the amplitudes of fluctuations become small in compar-
ison to the strengths of the stabilizing forces associated with cs-resonances and
s-system coupling.
It may be possible to develop a more explicit framework for understanding
the disordered and ordered regimes as high temperature and low temperature
respectively. First, we invoke the thermodynamic conception of temperature, T
= dE/dS, as the amount of thermal energy required to increase the entropy of a
system. We associate energy E with e value and entropy S with the logarithm of
the number of accessible states, or of the volume of state spacewhich is accessible.
Note that when in the pre-stable phase, the volume of e and θ̇ space which a
system visits in some short time interval is larger than the volume visited in the
stable phase, and hence the entropy is larger. We then reason that if we could
inject energy into a system, i.e. increase its e value, the effect of that increase
on S is smaller in the high T regime than in the low T regime. In other words,
more energy needs to be injected in the high T regime than in the low T regime,
in order to produce the same increase in S (i.e. volume of state space visited by
the system). There is thus an advantage to being in the low T regime: operations
which change the system state require less energy.
Why does the system begin in a high temperature phase and then cool? Per-
haps there is no way to activate only a small set of c-systems. The surroundings
forces which initially activate c-systems may always influence many c-systems.
But when many c-systems interact with the same s-system, interference (be-
cause of differences in ⟨θ̇⟩, θ, and e of the c-systems) prevents any one of the
cs-resonances from being stable. A relaxation/cooling process is necessary to al-
low some small set of cs-systems to stabilize into an ordered state. Would an
organization mechanism that avoids this messy process be preferable? Perhaps
not, because a system that somehow created order instantaneously would have
no way of adapting to variation in influences from its surroundings: the pre-
stable phase is what makes it possible for surroundings forces to exert a bias
on the relative excitation of systems, and without this phase, relational meaning
experiences would be overly stereotyped.
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Small statistical departures from the uniformity of idealized free word order
distribution can be understood in this framework. Under the assumptions of ran-
dom uniform initial conditions and symmetric interaction forces, we expect all
ordered e-configurations to emerge from the cooling process with equal likeli-
hood, resulting in the idealized free order pattern. But if initial conditions are
not random for any reason (e.g. because sensory systems induce semantically
correlated differences in c-system initial excitation), we expect departures from
uniformity.
Even larger departures from non-uniformity, as in idealized fixed order, can
also be interpreted from this perspective. Fixed order arises when s-system in-
teraction forces are strongly asymmetric. If those forces are strong enough to
outweigh the influences of fluctuations in the pre-stable phase, state trajectories
will more frequently evolve to a fixed order that depends on the particular pat-
tern of asymmetry in s-system coupling forces. These interaction asymmetries
must be learned, since fixed orders differ across languages. Since no language
exhibits perfect non-uniformity, we can infer that the learned asymmetries, no
matter how strong, are never strong enough to outweigh the strongest surround-
ings influences.
To account for the rarity of basic word orders where {−N} is initially organized
with a higher e value than {+N}, we conjecture that our perception of events (i.e.
surroundings forces) imposes statistical biases on the relative timing of system
activation or on e values. These could be such that {+N} agent/experiencer reso-
nances tend to arise earlier andwith higher e than {−N} patient/theme resonances.
This could be a consequence of how humans attend to the world, and our impres-
sion that actions precede causes, which relates to the apparent directionality of
time. Furthermore, +ϕ coupling is more stable than −ϕ coupling. This could have
many consequences for the timecourse of cs-resonance stabilization. For exam-
ple, greater stability entails greater resistance to perturbations. During the high
temperature phase, the +ϕ coupling between {+N} and {V} could stabilize earlier
and be less susceptible to perturbation than the −ϕ coupling between {−N} and
{V}. Assuming that ϕ stability results in increased e, the difference in coupling
stability predicts the {+N} > {−N} bias.
4.4.3 Influence of the pre-stable phase on initial organization
The highly ordered, stable ϕ/e-configuration that emerges as an initial configu-
ration in a canonical trajectory evolves from a disordered, pre-stable phase. In
the o/el conceptual model, the specific configuration that stabilizes can depend
only on the system state and surroundings. The initial states of the system and
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surroundings in the pre-stable phase determine the subsequent trajectory toward
some stable-configuration. In other words, a stabilized configuration in a produc-
tion trajectory is never truly random: it is always determined by previous states.
Any apparent randomness is simply a consequence of our lack of knowledge of
the system and surroundings.
One major gap in our model is a detailed conception of the evolution equa-
tions of the system in the pre-stable phase, in which we do not imagine a quan-
tal e-potential to exert stabilizing forces. In particular, we have a great deal of
uncertainty regarding how e-states of systems change over time in this regime.
This contrasts with the stable regime, in which we assume that we can usefully
approximate changes in relative e with discrete operations on relative e. Recall
that previously we proposed two regimes for the excitation operator, a stabilizing
regime Êst which maps stable e-states to themselves, and a reorganizing regime
associated with a canonical reorganization Êcr. The canonical reorganization de-
motes selected systems to the first excitation level and promotes other systems.
We also referred earlier to an initial organization operator Êio. The initial orga-
nization operator can be interpreted as an analytic tool for thinking about the out-
come of the cooling mechanism which governs the transition from a disordered,
non-quantal e-state to an ordered, quantal e-state. The tool Êio has the property
that it maps a non-quantal e-state – which we have very little certainty about
– to a quantal e-configuration. We think of Êio as a deterministic mapping, and
construct hypotheses about how pre-stable states are mapped to stable e-config-
urations. One clear difference between Êio and Êcr/Êst is that initial organization
can depend on ϕ-states, whereas canonical reorganization and stabilization do
not.
Cases where identical or similar ϕ-configurations are associated with different
e-organizations may thus be helpful for drawing inferences regarding how Êio
operates on pre-stable e-states. The logic here is that if ϕ-states of two different
initial e-configurations are the same or similar, then differences in pre-stable e-
states must be responsible for the difference in initial e-configuration.
Topicalization and inverted pseudo-cleft constructions are examples of such
cases, shown in Figure 4.28. Consider the patterns in (B) and (C): [coffee]{N} is
initially organized at selection level, rather than below {V} as it is in the basic
order. We suspect that these patterns arise when [coffee]{N} has abnormally high
excitation in the pre-stable phase. This could be due to surroundings forces, such
as a context in which [coffee] contrasts with a previously excited concept (e.g. Al
doesn’t drink tea…coffee, he drinks). Importantly, the deviation cannot be readily
understood as a consequence of differences in ϕ-organization, since the same
|Al drinks coffee| configuration is present in all three examples. (Note that our
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analysis of [focus] as +ϕ coupled to {N} applies here; furthermore, in the inverted
pseudo-cleft the copula [be] is hypothesized to +ϕ-couple with two arguments,
[coffee]{−N} and [what]{−N}, and so [be] must resonate with an s-system other
than {V}. We use {v} for this copular s-system.)
Figure 4.28: Topicalization and inverted pseudo-clefts are examples of
initial e-organizationswhich deviate from typical organization because
a cs-system (here [coffee]{N}) is highly excited in the pre-stable phase.
The example in Figure 4.28(A) shows that [focus] does not necessarily result
in a promotion of {−N} to selection level. Similarly, in the pseudocleft in (D), even
though {−N} is coupled with [focus], it is not promoted relative to other systems.
Furthermore, even when [coffee]{−N} is promoted, the syntactic manifestation
of basic word order can be preserved with pronominal forms, as in the cleft con-
struction in Figure 4.29(E). Somewhat archaic variants with non-canonical word
order as in (F) can occur in some dialects. These examples force us to conclude
that augmented excitation in the pre-stable epoch can create biases on Êio, but
augmented excitation is not sufficient to determine its output.
Figure 4.29: Constructions with non-canonical word orders arise from
variation in excitation in the pre-stable phase of production.
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Another example of similar ϕ-configurations with different e-organizations
involves ditransitive constructions. A recipient {N} can be e-organized above or
below the theme/patient one, as shown in examples (A–C) below. The recipient
system [Bo]{N} in all cases is in a −ϕ-configuration with [give]{V}, regardless
of whether a prepositional {P} system is excited. In the ϕ-configurations with a
preposition, the configurations arise more indirectly, because {−N} and {P} are −ϕ
coupled, and {P} and {V} are +ϕ coupled. This is consistent with the observation
that indirect objects can sometimes be omitted, c.f. Al gave coffee vs. *Al gave
Bo. This analysis also gels with our assumption that {P} systems typically −ϕ
couple to a complement and +ϕ couple to a modificand, thereby establishing a
relational meaning experience between the complement and modificand. Here
the {P} system relates the action [give]{V} and the recipient [Bo]{N}. In other
types of ditransitives, such as Al put coffee on the table, {P} relates an action and
location argument. The inference we draw here is that some aspect of the pre-
stable state, other than ϕ-configuration, is likely responsible for the variation.The
pre-stable relative e values of the recipient and patient systems are a plausible
source of such variation in initial e-organization.
Figure 4.30: Ditransitive constructions exhibit variation in e-
organization that is not driven by ϕ-configuration.
More examples of variation in e-organization that is not driven by ϕ-configu-
ration are found in passive constructions, shown in Figure 4.31. The ϕ-invariance
principle dictates that the patient/theme argument of the passive has a −ϕ rela-
tion with {V} and that the agentive argument has a +ϕ relation. (Note that the
adjunct [by]{P} is −ϕ coupled to [Al]{+N}, and hence cannot be +ϕ coupled to
[drink]{V}. The [by]{P} system thus differs from typical {P} systems, which ac-
cords with conventional analyses that treat passive by-phrases as special). The
passive constructions in Figure 4.31(A–C) have the same (or similar) ϕ-configu-
rations as the active construction; hence we suspect that differences in relative e
value prior to stabilization may influence whether the output of Êio corresponds
to a passive or active pattern.
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Figure 4.31: Passive constructions exhibit variation in e-organization
that is not driven by ϕ-configuration.
From the ditransitive and passive examples above, we infer that initial e-orga-
nization is not entirely determined by ϕ-configuration. Moreover, we can draw
some inferences about the state space regions from which the evolution of such
trajectories would bemore or less likely. A reasonable conjecture is that initial rel-
ative excitation of arguments in ditransitives and passivized ditransitives could
be influenced by relative excitation prior to stabilization.
Some further examples of e-organization not conditioned on ϕ-configuration
involve nominalized verbs with arguments. As shown in Figure 4.32(C–F), we
analyze nominalized verbs as co-selection of {V} with a nominalizing system
[nom]{N}, e.g. [drink]{V}-[nom]{N}. Some alternative analyses – which may not
be distinct on the microscale – would be to posit the differentiation [drink,ver-
bal] vs. [drink,nominal], or to couple [drink] and {N}. Notably, all of the ex-
amples below evoke the same relational meaning configuration between [Al],
[drink], and [coffee].
Currently we can only speculate on how such diversity in e-organization can
arise from similar ϕ-configurations. The nominalization of verbal meaning ex-
periences may be understood as a consequence of surroundings biases which
deemphasize the |Al drinks coffee| configuration relative to some other config-
uration. In general, to conceptualize variation in the action of Êio we imagine
that there are distinct regions of state space from which pre-stable trajectories
evolve to a stable ϕ-organization. Numerous outcomes of this process are possi-
ble – topicalizations, clefts, passives, nominalizations, etc. There appear to be at
least some of these sorts of constructions in all fixed order languages. Augmented
excitation of specific systems in the pre-stable phase is one plausible source of
such variation, but there are likely other sources that remain to be discovered.
Another important consideration is that the time course of activation relative to
initial organization is probably important. Careful experimentation in sentence
production tasks may be able to shed light on such influences.
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Figure 4.32: Nominalized verbs with arguments are examples of varia-
tion in e-organization that is not driven by ϕ-configuration.
4.4.4 Context dependence of optionality/obligatoriness
Conventional approaches to phrase structure often distinguish between argu-
ments, which are purportedly “obligatory”, and adjuncts, which are purportedly
“optional”. In the examples in Figure 4.33, [Al]{N} and [coffee]{N} are consid-
ered arguments, while [cold]{ADJ}, [quickly]{ADV}, [brewed]{V}, and [yester-
day]{ADV} are considered adjuncts. The valence of adjunct ϕ-coupling depends
on the semantic relation of the adjunct to the relevant lexical system that it mod-
ifies. {V} adjuncts in a theme/patient relation with an {N} are −ϕ coupled to an-
other system, as is the case for {N}[coffee] and {V}[brewed]; {P} adjuncts are +ϕ
coupled to a modificand and −ϕ coupled to a complement {N}. All other adjuncts
are +ϕ coupled to a lexical system.
Figure 4.33: Examples of configurations with adjuncts.
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Whereas {ADJ} and {ADV} only ϕ-couple to one other s-system, prepositional
and verbal adjuncts {P} and {V} can ϕ-couple to two systems, as in Figure 4.34(A–
C). Hence [with]{P} in Al drinks coffee with sugar is +ϕ coupled to [coffee]{N} and
−ϕ coupled to [sugar]{N}. This is consistent with the intuition that the intended
meaning experience of coffee with sugar is a relation between the coffee and the
sugar. Likewise, in Al drinks coffee with Bo, [with]{P} is +ϕ coupled to [drinks]{V}
and −ϕ coupled to [Bo]{N}, because the intended experience involves a relation
between the act of drinking and the presence of Bo, as opposed to a relation
between coffee and Bo.
Figure 4.34: Prepositional systems are +ϕ coupled to a modificand and
−ϕ coupled to a complement.
In contrast with phrasal uses of prepositional word forms, there are often par-
ticle/adverbial uses of the same word forms, which should not be analyzed as
bivalent {P} because they do not relate two cs-systems. Consider the contrast
between (A) and (B)/(C) in Figure 4.35. In (A), up is a {P} system and has a com-
plement, [hill]{N}; it relates [runs]{V} to [hill]{N} and thus is bivalent. In the other
two examples, up is a particle s-system {PRT} and has no complement; its only ϕ
relation is +ϕ coupling with [runs]{V}.




Based on the examples in Figures 4.33, 4.34, and 4.35, obligatoriness and op-
tionality might seem to provide a reasonable basis for constructing a distinction
between arguments and adjuncts. Specifically, we might propose that {V} sys-
tems obligatorily ϕ-couple to agentive and/or patientive systems, while {ADV},
{ADJ}, {P} systems are optional modifiers of {V} and {N} systems. We could elab-
orate this proposal by adding that some verbal cs-systems require −ϕ coupling
to a recipient, e.g. Bo gave Al coffee, and others require indirect coupling of an
argument via {P}, e.g. the locative Al put coffee in the cup, where {P} is +ϕ coupled
to [put]{V} and −ϕ coupled to [cup]{−N}.
However, the obligatoriness of these coupling relations is not so categorical. In
many cases, verbal c-systems which are normally organized with {−N} systems
occur in utterances where no such system is selected, e.g. Al drinks. How should
we analyze this phenomenon? One possibility is that no {−N} system is active,
and a differentiation [drinkintr]/[drinktr] occurs. Alternatively an [intr]{val}
system couples to {V}, as shown in Figure 4.36(A). A different approach shown
in (B) would be to construct a generic [theme]{−N} system and posit that this
system is active but unexcited during the production. Recall that the canonical
reorganization promotes only excited systems, so [theme] is never selected in
this scenario.
Figure 4.36: Two possible analyses of implicit arguments.
A third possibility (not shown) is that some cs-system is indeed excited, but
the producer does not promote it to selection-level, i.e. a non-canonical reorgani-
zation occurs. How do we resolve between these analyses? One relevant obser-
vation is that for some verbal c-systems, omission of the argument can evoke an
arbitrary conventional or contextual relational meaning. For example, Al drinks
is often understood to imply drinking of alcoholic beverages of some sort. Al
smokes can imply that Al smokes cigarettes, or something else, depending on
the context. When a theme/patient c-system is sufficiently active from context,
a producer may not excite the system or may not select it, and yet contextual
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forces induce the relevant ϕ-configuration for an interpreter. For example, imag-
ine a speaker says Al holds the coffee. He drinks. The hearer will experience a |Al
drinks coffee| trajectory because the omitted cs-system [coffee]{N} was excited
by the first sentence and remains sufficiently excited to participate in a ϕ-config-
uration with systems excited by the second sentence.
The above observations suggest that there are always active theme/patient c-
systems in productions with omitted arguments, but these are not necessarily
selected. The ground-level is our representational mechanism for indicating the
presence of an active but unexcited cs-system. Thus we might analyze the im-
plicit argument as unexcited, which is represented in Figure 4.36(B). However,
the principle of relational meaning holds that attended relational meaning expe-
riences are evoked only by ϕ-configurations in which all relevant cs-systems are
excited; thus we should prefer an analysis in which a noncanonical reorganiza-
tion causes the implicit argument not to be selected. This is shown in Figure 4.37:
the reorganization Ê2 from (e1) to (e2) is canonical, but reorganization Ê3 demotes
[coffee] rather than promoting it to selection-level.
Figure 4.37: Implicit argument pattern resulting from noncanonical re-
organization.
Overt and implicit argument patterns for the same ϕ-configuration can be
viewed as different state trajectories in e-subspace. Instead of dichotomizing be-
tween properties of obligatoriness and optionality for arguments, we argue that
the noncanonical reorganization associated with implicit arguments occurs due
to aspects of the state (e2) which are not explicitly represented here. In general,
we can imagine a high-dimensional θ̇/θ/e space for a large number of c- and
s-systems, along with time-dependent surroundings forces on each system. For
any given state at time ts, there is a source volume in state space, i.e. a state space
116
4.4 Phrasal organization
region at time t0 from which the system evolves to the given state at time ts. For
multiple states we can imagine their relative source volumes.
Given this construct, the distinction between obligatoriness and optionality
can be reconceptualized as difference in the relative source volumes of trajecto-
ries in which some cs-system is or is not selected. A 1-dimensional analogue of
the state space volume is shown in Figure 4.38. At t0 we compare the volumes
of the regions of state space from which trajectories evolve to a canonical or
noncanonical reorganization.
Figure 4.38: Reconceptualization of optionality as the relative volume
of state space from which a configuration will arise.
From this perspective the concepts of obligatoriness and optionality are mis-
leading: the likelihood of argument omission derives from the relative source
volume of the noncanonical reorganization. The identity of active c-systems is
an important dimension but many other surroundings-related forces may also
contribute: argument optionality/obligatoriness cannot be construed solely as a
function of the states of systems which are explicitly constructed in a given anal-
ysis.
4.4.5 Configurational ambiguity
Ambiguity is an analytic construct which cannot be defined without arbitrary
constraints. It inherently involves both production and interpretation, the latter
of which we have mostly neglected so far. It is tempting to define ambiguity as
a property of an utterance such that multiple-configurations could be evoked in
the interpretation of an utterance. But all utterances are ambiguous under this
definition, because surroundings forces can bias an interpreter toward a trajec-
tory in which relational meaning differs from the intentions of the producer to an
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arbitrary degree. In practice analyses of ambiguity often assume some degree of
similarity between a production trajectory and potential interpretation trajecto-
ries – these are the more interesting cases, perhaps. However, defining similarity
in this context is rarely attempted. For current purposes, we assume that inter-
preters perceive gm-systems which activate the same cs-systems as those which
are active for a producer, this process occurring through learned gm-to-cs map-
pings. Of course, one can analyze ambiguity in gm-to-cs mappings as well – cf.
excuse me while I kiss this guy vs. excuse me while I kiss the sky – but here our
focus is on cs-configurational ambiguity.
It is important to recognize that ambiguity relates to potential interpretation
states. Actual interpretation states cannot be ambiguous, nor can production
states. Non-ambiguity of states follows from our conceptual model: there is just
one system and one state trajectory for a given period of time for a producer or
interpreter. Simultaneous distinct state trajectories are not possible, nor are state
trajectories probabilistic. All utterances may be ambiguous, but states are never
ambiguous; we therefore view ambiguity as an analytical choice to imagine how
different interpreter trajectories could be evoked by the same production trajec-
tory.
Consider a classic example of ambiguity: Al saw the man with the telescope,
which can evoke the interpretation in Figure 4.39(B) or (B′). Our phrasal organi-
zation hypotheses entail that a configuration such as (A), which would purport-
edly evoke both interpretations, cannot be stable. Recall that bivalent {P} relates a
modificand and complement by +ϕ and −ϕ coupling to each of these, respectively.
For both the (B) and (B′) interpretations, {P} must be −ϕ coupled to its argument,
[telescope]{N}. However, for the interpretation in (B), {P} must be +ϕ coupled to
[saw]{V}, and for (B′), {P} must be +ϕ coupled to [man]{N}. But note that these
two potential modificands, [saw]{V} and [man]{N}, have a −ϕ relation (because
of the ϕ invariance principle). Thus there is a conflict between the ϕ-configura-
tions in (B) and (B′): in order for {P} to +ϕ couple with both modificands and
be in a −ϕ-configuration with [telescope]{N}, either {P} or [telescope]{N} would
need to be in both θ and θ+π states simultaneously, which violates our determin-
istic construal of the system. Another way to describe the problem is to say that
ϕ-coupling between {P} and [saw]{V} destructively interferes with ϕ-coupling be-
tween {P} and [man]{−N}. Hence only one of the ϕ-configurations (B) or (B′) can
arise.
In production, ambiguity is irrelevant because surroundings forces are deter-
ministic and thus drive the emergence of a unique ϕ-configuration. But to analyze
interpretation (including self-interpretation of a recently produced utterance),
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Figure 4.39: Syntactic ambiguity is associated with interfering config-
urations.
we need to develop an account of the mechanisms through which ϕ-configu-
rations stabilize when evoked cs-systems could obtain multiple possible-config-
urations. This becomes particularly relevant when we consider grammaticality
intuitions and various syntactic phenomena in later chapters.
As a starting point, we ask whether there are any obvious differences between
stabilization mechanisms in interpretation and those we have hypothesized for
production. Recall that in the canonical production trajectory ϕ-configurations
stabilize before e-organization. Does this apply to a canonical interpretation tra-
jectory as well? Two possibilities are contrasted in Figure 4.40. In both, sen-
sory systems are viewed as surroundings forces which activate cs-systems, based
on veridical, non-ambiguous cs-to-gm mappings. In the first scheme, a stable e-
organization, if one arises, does so only after a ϕ-organization stabilizes: no form
of e-organization is stable prior to ϕ-stabilization.This scheme conceptualizes in-
terpretation as similar to production.
In the second possibility, systems are e-organized and reorganized incremen-
tally while ϕ-configurations evolve. The question of precisely how the e-config-
urations might reorganize over the course of interpretation is challenging. One
possibility shown in Figure 4.40 combines the canonical reorganization opera-
tor Êcr with a mapping of the most recently perceived cs-systems to the highest
e-level. For example, in epoch (e3) when [coffee]{N} is activated, it becomes suf-
ficiently excited so as to occupy the highest e-level, while the system [Al]{N}
(which previously occupied the highest level) is demoted and all other systems
are promoted. This particular pattern of e-organization in interpretation has the
advantage that the final organization is identical to the initial e-configuration of
a canonical production trajectory. However, the alternative in which e-organi-
zation does not occur incrementally cannot be ruled out, and later on we find
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Figure 4.40: Two possible analyses of interpretation: ϕ-configurations
stabilize before e-organization, or e-organization arises while ϕ-config-
urations stabilize.
it somewhat more appropriate for understanding electrophysiological responses
in sentence comprehension paradigms.
In either conceptualization of interpretation, we must allow for ϕ-configura-
tions to emerge flexibly from surroundings forces. Incremental e-organization
during interpretation may attribute too much order to interpretation trajecto-
ries, but it helps us reason about how the current e-state may influence the ϕ-
state. One important point here is that canonical production does not appear
to be subject to this dilemma. Different e-states in production may arise from a
given ϕ-configuration, but the reverse does not hold: ϕ-configurations in produc-
tion trajectories are not canonically influenced by e-states. The mechanism that
prevents incompatible ϕ-coupling patterns from being stable simultaneously is
interference, which we now turn our attention to.
4.5 Interference
Our derivation of a macroscopic model from a microscopic one holds that sys-
tems are collective oscillations of finite populations of neurons. As we argue
below, the finite nature of this microscale substrate entails that there are limits
on the number of macroscale systems which can be simultaneously excited. The
mechanism which is responsible for these limitations is interference, and below
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we describe two classes of interference that affect system stability, differentiation
interference and configurational interference. Importantly, differences in excita-
tion can mitigate the destabilizing effects of interference. Excitation differences
are viewed as a mechanism for selectively attending to some ϕ-configurations
instead of others, and we argue that selective attention provides a solution to
the multiplicity problem.
4.5.1 Limits on organization
To explain how differentiation interference arises, let’s consider differentiation
on the microscale. We begin by identifying {X} as the finite population of neu-
rons which comprises all s-system populations. In order for different classes of
s-systems to be simultaneously active, the {X} population must be differentiated
into subpopulations such as {V}, {Adj}, {Adv}, {N}, etc., and these in turn may
differentiate further, i.e. {N} > {+N}, {−N}, etc. But what do these differentiations
entail on the microscale?
In addressing this question, we distinguish differentiation on two timescales.
On developmental timescales, changes in connectivity and in the strengths of
synaptic interactions can create relatively independent subpopulations of {X},
which do not strongly interfere with each other. The basic lexical categories of a
language, i.e. {V}, {adj}, {adv} {+N}, {−N}, {tns}, {person}, {number}, etc. are likely
to be differentiated in this way on developmental timescales. These differentia-
tions are motivated by differences in c-systems, which in turn arise from differ-
ences in their patterns of sensorimotor interaction. In other words, {V} and {N}
subpopulations of {X} arise because they are coupledwith c-systems that differ by
virtue of their surroundings connectivity. Developmental scale differentiations
do not give rise to strong interference.
On the utterance timescale, differentiation creates subpopulations which are
not as independent and which can interfere strongly. Utterance timescale differ-
entiation cannot change connectivity or cause drastic changes in synaptic inter-
action, and so if a population differentiates in this way, it must occur through
a more temporary mechanism, such as phase and/or frequency differentiation,
which we conceptualize as follows. Imagine two c-systems, [y1] and [y2], which
resonate with an s-system {x}. When both [y1] and [y2] are active, {x} differenti-
ates into two subpopulations, {x1} and {x2}, hence there are cs-populations [y1]{x1}
and [y2]{x2}. We infer that {x1} and {x2} populations cannot be identical, other-
wise the meaning experiences associated with [y1] and [y2] would not be distinct.
How, then, is the differentiation accomplished?
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Note that the population oscillations of [y1] and [y2] do not in general have
the same intrinsic frequencies f and do not become active (begin to oscillate)
at identical times; hence short-term average phase velocities ⟨θ̇⟩ and phases θ
of the c-systems typically differ in pre-stable phases of production. If the neu-
rons of [y1] and [y2] had identical, equally strong projections to neurons of {x},
then the differences in c-system θ/θ̇ would exert conflicting forces on {x}, which
could not be stable. However, if projections from [y1] and [y2] to {x} are differ-
ent (even if for random reasons), then there will be a subpopulation {x1} which
is more strongly influenced by projections from [y1], and a subpopulation {x2}
more strongly influenced by projections from [y2]. Because of these asymmetric
influences, the {x1} and {x2} subpopulations may attain different θ/θ̇ states that
accord with the θ/θ̇ states of [y1] and [y2]. In other words, {x} as a whole ex-
hibits phase and phase velocity heterogeneity: the oscillations of spike rates of
subpopulations {x1} and {x2} may be out of phase by an arbitrary amount andmay
be oscillating at different frequencies. It is an open question whether utterance
timescale differentiation is accomplished primarily by maintaining a θ̇ difference
(frequency modulation) or a θ difference (phase modulation), or some combina-
tion of both. (Note that our prior construal of the developmental scale {+N}/{−N}
differentiation assumed a phase modulation).
By definition, θ/θ̇ heterogeneity of differentiated subpopulations {x1} and {x2}
creates “interference” because the subpopulations interact. The crucial question
is not whether interference exists, but whether the interference is destabilizing.
This depends on several microscale factors. One is the number of projections
between subpopulations and their synaptic strengths. If the interaction is too
strong, θ/θ̇ heterogeneity of {x1} and {x2} destabilizes the systems. Another factor
is the degree of asymmetry in the interactions between [y1]/[y2] and the s-system
populations: if the influence of [y1]{x1} interaction relative to [y1]{x2} interaction
is large, and vice versa the influence of [y2]{x2} interaction is large relative to
[y2]{x1}, conditions are favorable for stabilizing the differentiation.
A third factor is the number of differentiations which occur. With each differ-
entiation, the number of neurons in each subpopulation becomes smaller, and
there will be more variation in the θ/θ̇ values of the interacting populations.
Moreover, the influence of interactions with other populations becomes stronger
relative to the internal forces which stabilize the oscillation of each subpopula-
tion. Although we do not assume that differentiations are spatially organized, for
convenience we can imagine that the differentiations increase population over-
lap, as represented in Figure 4.41. As more differentiations occur, the propor-
tional overlap of subpopulations increases, and consequently interference forces
become stronger relative to stabilizing forces.
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Figure 4.41: Population differentiation leads to an increase in popula-
tion overlap.
For a more concrete example, let’s consider an utterance in which there are
three c-systems, [c1], [c2], and [c3] that resonate with {−N}, e.g. Al drinks coffee,
tea, and whisky. In order for all three cs-resonances to be excited, this requires a
stable differentiation of {−N} into {−N1}, {−N2}, and {−N3} populations, as shown
in Figure 4.42. We assume that [c1], [c2], and [c3] project non-uniformly to {−N},
and hence the differentiation {−N1}, {−N2}, and {−N3} is possible. In the pre-stable
phase when [c1], [c2], and [c3] become active, their phase velocities differ and
their phases are not aligned. Because of the c-system θ/θ′ heterogeneity, the inter-
action forces from [c1], [c2], and [c3] to {−N
1}, {−N2}, and {−N3} induce destructive
interference between the s-system subpopulations. All three cs-systems cannot
be highly excited, because this would result in strong destructive interference be-
tween {−N1}, {−N2}, and {−N3} subpopulations. On this basis we infer that finite
population size imposes limits on the number of distinct cs-resonances that can
be simultaneously excited.
To better understand why interference is important for stability, let’s expand
our macroscopic conceptualization of xosc, the oscillatory component of the sys-
tem order parameter. Instead of imposing a single frequency on each system, we
associate each system with a power spectrum and assume that there is a range
of frequencies over which there is non-negligible spectral amplitude of xosc. In
general what we expect to happen to an s-system as an active cs-resonance be-
comes excited is a narrowing of the spectral peak associated with the oscillation.
This process is illustrated in Figure 4.43.
For each system, coherence corresponds to a narrowing of a peak in the power
spectrum of xosc, which occurs over some local period of time. We can take the
width of this peak as a time-varying measure of spectral coherence. In the absence
of external forces, we imagine that systems tend to decohere. In cs-resonances,
c-systems and s-systems exert coherence-promoting forces on one another. This
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Figure 4.42: Differences in c-system frequencies and phases cause in-
terference when those systems resonate with the same s-system.
Figure 4.43: The emergence of a cs-resonance corresponds to an in-
crease in the spectral coherence of the oscillatory component of the




causes their spectral peaks to approximate and narrow, as shown in the top row
of Figure 4.43. However, when multiple c-systems interact symmetrically with
the same s-system, unless the spectra of those c-systems happen to be very simi-
lar, they will induce decoherence in the s-system, as in the bottom row of the fig-
ure.The extent to which the c-systems have a destabilizing effect on the s-system
should depend on their cross-spectral coherence, γ2(f), over the relevant range
of frequencies. Spectral coherence (Fourier transform of the autocorrelation) and
cross-spectral coherence (Fourier transform of the cross-correlation) are tools for
reasoning about what happens to population oscillations as systems cohere or de-
cohere over time. However, for coherence to be applied quantitatively, a more
detailed macroscale conception of system states is necessary, in which systems
are associated with not just a single frequency, but rather a distribution of power
over a range of frequencies. Later on we reconceptualize grammaticality and ac-
ceptability intuitions based on the coherence of excited cs-systems.
4.5.2 Interference classification
The classification of interference is useful for predicting whether a given config-
uration is more or less likely to be stable. We cannot make specific predictions
regarding stability without hypothesizing values of certain parameters and con-
ducting numerical simulations. We can, however, use our conceptual model of
interference to draw inferences about the relative likelihood of various configu-
rations being stable.
To develop the classification, we first distinguish between interference and the
more general concept of interaction. Interference requires at least three systems,
whereas interactions are pairwise. In order for an interaction to be stable, the
valence of the interaction must be symmetric: if system A exerts a +ϕ force on
system B, B must exert a +ϕ force on A. Otherwise we expect ϕAB to be unstable:
the relative phase will wander due to fluctuations in the surroundings. Stability
also requires some degree of frequency-locking. When two systems interact, we
assume that at some initial time their short-time average phase velocities may dif-
fer, i.e. ⟨θ̇⟩A ≠ ⟨θ̇⟩B. If the interaction is sufficiently strong and their intrinsic fre-
quencies fA and fB are not too different, then with sufficient time for the systems
to evolve, we expect ⟨θ̇⟩A ≈ ⟨θ̇⟩B and thus a narrow peak in the cross-spectrum.
The surroundings always exert random forces on systems, which cause fluctua-
tions in phase velocity θ̇. As long as those fluctuations are not very large relative
to the stabilizing ϕ forces, a pair of coupled systems will return to its equilib-
rium (ϕ = 0 or ϕ = π, for +ϕ and −ϕ coupling, respectively) when perturbed.
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Both the evolution toward the equilibrium and the return to equilibrium after
perturbation are required for stability.
The reader should note that the concept of interference in the o/el context is
metaphoric and differs in some important ways from physical interference be-
tween waves. For example, in the o/el framework we are not dealing with travel-
ing waves which are superposed in a medium. Nonetheless, the metaphor is use-
ful for conceptualizing multi-way interactions, because it allows us to simplify
our picture of the relevant interactions. Consider the interference inAl drinks cof-
fee and tea, where [coffee]{−N} and [tea]{−N} interact with a differentiated {−N}.
We draw an analogy between the c-systems and wave sources, and then think of
the {−N} s-system as a medium for the superposition of oscillations: the superpo-
sition of the c-system oscillations is manifested in the medium of the s-system,
via interactions between the differentiated subsystems. Hence for interference to
occur we require at least three systems, one of which is a “medium” with which
we associate the superposition of the influences of other systems.
So far we have described only differentiation interference, in which two systems
of the same general type (e.g. c-systems) interfere via their interactions with a
different type of system (e.g. an s-system). Another variety of interference we
hypothesize is configurational interference, in which three systems of the same
type are ϕ-coupled in a conflicting manner. Table 4.2 summarizes four possible
forms of interference.















The cc-s differentiation interference occurs when two c-systems [c1] and [c2]
resonate with an s-system, as with [coffee], [tea], and {−N} in Al drinks coffee
and tea. As explained above, this causes interference because the differentiated
s-system populations overlap. The ss-c differentiation interference occurs when
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two syntactic systems {x1} and {x2} interact with the same conceptual system.This
is not a common scenario, but one example of this involves reflexives, such as Al
sees Al. [Al] must resonate with {+N} and {−N}, and so we expect c-differentiation
into two [Al] subpopulations: [+Al]{+N} and [-Al]{−N}.
Configurational interference occurs when three systems of the same type are
ϕ-coupled. Such interference is destabilizing when the ϕ-coupling relations be-
tween the systems violate transitivity of valence. For example, imagine we have
three systems, {A}, {B}, and {C}. Furthermore, assume that {A} is +ϕ coupled to
{B}, and {B} is +ϕ coupled to {C}. Transitivity dictates that {C} must be +ϕ coupled
to {A} or not coupled to {A}; {C} cannot be −ϕ coupled to {A}. Configurational
interference can only arise when there is a cycle (in the graph-theoretic sense)
of coupling relations among three or more systems.
The ss-s configurational interference does not often arise because hypothe-
sized s-system coupling interactions are typically too sparse to create networks
with cycles. For example, transitive {V} systems are +ϕ coupled to {+N} and −ϕ
coupled to {−N}, but there is no cycle because {+N} and {−N} are not coupled. In-
deed, our configurational hypotheses, by avoiding configurational interference,
imply that configurational interference is highly unstable.This relates to our anal-
ysis of why both meanings of Al saw the man with the telescope cannot be simul-
taneously attended: it would require [with]{P} to +ϕ couple to [saw]{V} and +ϕ
couple to [man]{−N}, which violates transitivity because [saw]{V} and [man]{−N}
must be −ϕ coupled.
Although ss-s configurational interference is highly destabilizing, cc-c con-
figurational interference may be far less problematic, because c-systems in gen-
eral do not strongly interact. Indeed, cc-c configurational interference may be
an important aspect of our experience of relational meaning. One can imagine a
number of plausible hypotheses regarding cc-c interactions which provide flavor
to meaning experiences. Perhaps similar concepts have constructive cc-c inter-
ference, while dissimilar/antonymically related categories have destructive cc-c
interference. For example, in Al drinks hot coffee, c-systems which are similar to
[hot], such as [warm], may be active: these systems resonate with {ADJ} which
is +ϕ coupled to [coffee]{−N}. The antonymic [cold] may not be active because it
has a −ϕ coupling interaction with [hot]. We would imagine that this interaction
is symmetric and relatively strong for synonymic/antonymic c-system interac-
tions. In contrast, superordinate and subordinate semantic relations may be +ϕ
c-c interactions which are relatively asymmetric. Such interactions are likely the
basis for semantic priming effects. Many grammatically relevant semantic qual-
ities – e.g. animacy, gender, mass/count status, etc. – are c-systems which may
have asymmetric interactions with more prototypically lexical c-systems.
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Utterances which involve coordination or subordination almost always create
cc-s differentiation interference. In Figure 4.44, interference relations are repre-
sented by waveforms. For example, with coordinated noun phrases in (A), [cof-
fee]{−N} and [tea]{−N} interfere. In the verb phrase coordination in (B), there is
interference between the verbal systems, [drinks]{V} and [eats]{V}, and between
the objects [coffee]{−N} and [granola]{−N}. The subordinate clause in (C) also in-
curs interference: [Bo]{+N} interferes with [Al]{+N}, and [knows]{V} interferes
with [drinks]{V}.
Figure 4.44: Coordination and subordination create cc-s differentiation
interference.
Given that coordination and subordination create interference, the critical
question we must address is whether the interference is destabilizing? Can con-
figurations with interference such as those above be stable?
4.5.3 Excitation asymmetries and modulation of coupling forces
Interference is not necessarily destabilizing. The magnitude of interference de-
pends on the relative e values of the systems involved, because coupling force
strengths depend on system e. This follows from our microscopic model, where
e is correlated with population size and hence influences the number of synaptic
projections between populations. When two asymmetrically excited c-systems
induce differentiation interference in an s-system, the more highly excited cs-
system has a stronger destabilizing effect on the less highly excited one.
To demonstrate macroscopically how excitation asymmetries mitigate against
the adverse effects of interference, let’s consider a toy example. Imagine two c-
systems [c1] and [c2] which resonate with an s-system, {s}, which differentiates
into subsystems {s1} and {s2}. Based on our standard hypotheses regarding c-s
interactions and differentiation, we have the ϕ coupling matrix below, where
Φij is the strength of the force that system j exerts on system i. All coupling
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strengths are assumed to be proportional to source system excitation. We probe
the ϕ stability patterns of the system under symmetric excitation (Φij = Φji) vs.
asymmetric excitation (a1 > a2, b1 > b2, c21 > c12). Note that cij in particular is
the macroscopic manifestation of cc-s differentiation interference.
(3)
Φ =
c1 c2 s1 s2
c1 ∶ a1
c2 ∶ a2
s1 ∶ b1 c12
s2 ∶ b2 c21
The phase equations for the system are shown below. Each system has an
intrinsic frequency f, and its instantaneous phase velocity is the sum of this in-
trinsic frequency and coupling forces. The f of s1 and s2 are fixed at 8 Hz in
all simulations, while c-system intrinsic frequencies are Gaussian randomly dis-
tributed with mean = 8Hz and standard deviation σ = 1. The surroundings S are
assumed to exert a random, time-varying force on each system, ϵi.
(4)
θ̇i = [2πfi + ϵi (t)] +∑
j
−Φij(sinϕij), i, j ∈ {c1, c2, s}
To assess stability statistically, we conduct 1000 numeric simulations with ran-
dom, uniformly distributed initial θ on the interval [−π, π]. The cs-resonance
asymmetry ai = 2bi is imposed. Surroundings perturbations are modeled as a
Gaussian randomwalk in a quadratic potential, where the fluctuations have stan-
dard deviation σS:
(5) ϵi (t + 1) = ϵi (t) + N (0, σS) − ϵi (t)2
By varying the coupling strengths c12 and c21, we observe that the ϕ of cs1
only stabilizes when c21 ≪ 1, and vice versa, the ϕ cs2 only stabilizes when
c21 ≪ 1. In other words, only one of cs1 and cs2 can be stable and highly excited.
Of course a variety of additional factors can also influence stability, such as the
size of the surroundings fluctuations, and differences in intrinsic frequencies of c-
systems. It also stands to reason that more differentiations should reduce stability
of all but the most highly excited cs-resonance.
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Figure 4.45: The destabilizing effects of interference are reduced when
one of the source systems is not excited.
The model above shows how cc-s differentiation interference is manifested
macroscopically and how excitation asymmetries can mitigate against interfer-
ence, favoring stability for highly excited systems at the expense of less highly
excited ones. In order to arrive at this conclusion, a number of assumptions were
made about the strengths of parameters and distributions of random variables.
The toy model is limited in that excitation dynamics are implicit in coupling
strength parameters. Incorporating explicit excitation dynamics doubtless brings
further complications, but our presumption is that under fairly mild assump-
tions, the above conclusions regarding the destabilizing effects of interference
will hold.
The modulation of coupling forces by e values suggests that a subset of ex-
cited, interfering systems could be stable, i.e. the subset which obtains higher
levels of excitation. The waveform representations of interference in Figure 4.45,
in contrast to previous depictions, show interference as excitation-modulated.
Given the above results, we can infer that interference between [Bo]{+N} and
[Al]{+N} in the initial configuration does not destabilize the [Bo]{+N} system, be-
cause [Al]{+N} is not highly excited. Conversely, [Al]{+N} is destabilized because
it experiences strong interference from [Bo]{+N}. Likewise, [knows]{V} can be
stable, but [drinks]{V} is more likely not to be stable.
Given that in the initial configuration [Al]{+N} and [drinks]{V} experience po-
tentially destabilizing interference from more highly excited systems, the ques-
tion arises whether we should prefer the representation of the initial configura-
tion in Figure 4.45(A) or (B). If the configuration |Al drinks coffee| is stable and
gives rise to a relational meaning experience at the same time as |Bo knows| does,
then (A) is preferable because the relevant cs-systems of the |Al drinks coffee|
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configuration are above ground, a prerequisite for the relational meaning expe-
rience. On the other hand, if |Al drinks coffee| is unstable, then no consciously
attended meaning experience arises (at least in those epochs in which |Bo knows|
is excited), and thus (B) is preferable. (Gray-shading of systems is used to indicate
their sub-excitation (ground) level state).
In some cases, it may be difficult to resolve between representations such as
(A) and (B). It is relevant to note that the e-potentials we use do not entail spe-
cific values of e, only relative values. We often depict equidistant steps in both
excitation (horizontal) and excitation potential (vertical) dimensions, but there
is no a priori reason to impose linearity on the quantal organization. Figure 4.46
shows three variations of initial e-configurations of Bo knows Al drinks coffee. In
(A) potential differences between e-levels are nonlinear: potential levels closer to
ground are more closely spaced. In (B) excitation differences are nonlinear: rela-
tive excitation values of systems with lower excitation are more closely spaced.
In (C) both excitation potential and excitation values are nonlinearly spaced.
Figure 4.46: Relative excitation of systems may be non-linearly orga-
nized.
The nonlinear potentials provide a clearer picture of why excitation asymme-
tries are important for assessing the destabilizing effects of interference, and to
some extent they help us see why the distinction between grounded/excited sys-
tems is not necessarily clear cut, particularly when there are only a couple of
relevant ϕ-configurations. We might very well experience |Al drinks coffee| dur-
ing epochs when |Bo knows| is more highly excited, and vice versa, experience
|Bo knows| during epochs in |Al drinks coffee| is more highly excited. This paral-
lel experience of configurations corresponds to the trajectory in Figure 4.47(A).
On the other hand, it is also possible that the interference between configurations
destabilizes the more weakly excited systems, in which case the ϕ-configurations
are not experienced in parallel, but in a sequence. This sequential attention to ϕ-
configurations corresponds to the trajectory in Figure 4.47(B).
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Figure 4.47: Alternation of attention between two different configura-
tions.
In longer utterances, with a greater number of interfering systems, the like-
lihood that multiple configurations can simultaneously obtain an excited state
must diminish. For example, in Al drinks coffee, tea, pop, beer, and whisky, the sys-
tems [coffee], [tea], [pop], [beer], [whisky] require differentiation of {−N} into
five subsystems. It seems unlikely that all of these systems can be simultaneously
stable and sufficiently excited to participate in a relational meaning experience,
as implied by the initial organization in Figure 4.48(A). The more likely repre-
sentation is in (B), in which just one ϕ-configuration is initially excited. In this
analysis, attention is restricted in any given epoch to just a small set of ϕ-config-
urations.
Figure 4.48: Excitation of many cs-systems results in destabilizing in-
terference. Selective reorganization allows for just one ϕ-configuration
to be attended in a given epoch.
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If we adopt the restricted-attention analysis of the initial configuration (B),
then we cannot use the canonical reorganization operator Êcr to generate the
production trajectory, because Êcr only operates on excited systems. To address
this, we hypothesize a second type of reorganization, selective reorganization.
4.5.4 Attentionally selective reorganization
Because of interference, only a small number of ϕ-configurations can be excited
in any given e-epoch. For an utterance with many relational meaning experi-
ences, instead of imagining all configurations to be simultaneously excited, we
imagine that only a subset are excited in any given e-epoch. In order for e-
organization to achieve this, we hypothesize a selective reorganization operator
Êsr. The typical mapping of Êsr is to demote previously selected system(s) to
ground and promote some grounded system or set of grounded systems to se-
lection level. For example, in Figure 4.49 the selective reorganization operator
maps (e3) to (e4) by grounding [coffee]{N} and ungrounding [tea]{N}. Likewise,
the selective reorganization (e4) to (e5) grounds [tea] and ungrounds [whisky].
The advantage of selective reorganization is that in any given epoch, only cs-
systems associated with the attended ϕ-configuration are excited.
Figure 4.49: Selective reorganization of coordinated arguments.
We sometimes refer to the selective reorganization operator as attentionally
selective reorganization, because each reorganization focuses attention on a sub-
set of configurations from a larger set of active ϕ-configurations. This is accom-
plished by a combination of grounding demotions and ungrounding promotions.
One issue to consider for such analyses is how a particular order of items in a
list can be maintained. For example, how does selective reorganization achieve
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the order …coffee, tea, and whisky instead of …coffee, whisky, and tea? One pos-
sibility is that there are differences in excitation values of the relevant ground-
level systems, and the selective reorganization operator promotes ground-level
systems according to their relative e values. Yet there are probably limitations
on how many systems can have distinct e values at ground-level. Indeed, limita-
tions on distinctions in e at ground level predict that the items from long lists will
not always be produced in a target order. For lists with many items, a long-term
associative memory mechanism which is not yet incorporated in our concep-
tual model is necessary. This makes sense given that long lists must be learned
through practice.
The reader may have noticed that the above analysis of [and]{conj} departs
in some ways from previous analyses. Instead of representing [and]{conj} as an
excited system throughout the production, we treat it as a systemwhich becomes
active and excited when a selective reorganization occurs; often this is the last
Êsr in a sequence.This reanalysis of {conj} gels with the observation that {conj} s-
systems can be associated with each Êsr, as in Al drinks coffee and tea and whisky
and… Furthermore, {conj} can also fail to be selected altogether, as in Al drinks
coffee, tea, whisky.
Attentionally selective reorganization can be generalized readily to other va-
rieties of coordination. For example, in the verb phrase coordination Al drinks
coffee and eats granola, we imagine as in Figure 4.50 that after selection of [cof-
fee]{−N} in (e3) a selective reorganization promotes both [eats]{V} and [granola]
{−N} while grounding [drinks]{V} and [coffee]{−N} (e4). Only [Al]{+N} persists
in an excited state in the selective reorganization. The propensity of [Al]{+N} to
persist in this case can be seen as a consequence of the fact that no alternative
{+N} system is promoted in the selective reorganization.
We can further generalize selective reorganization to complement clauses, as
in Bo knows that Al drinks coffee, shown in Figure 4.51. Note that we analyze
[that]{C} similarly to [and]{conj}: [that]{C} is activated and excited to selection
level in conjunction with the selective reorganization from (e3) to (e4), and it is
deactivated in the subsequent reorganization from (e4) to (e5).
Because of interference and stability considerations, there must be limits on
how many systems can be promoted from ground-level in a selective reorganiza-
tion. In many circumstances, these limits appear to correspond to configurations
that are conventionally described as a single clause or adjunct phrase.
Another application of selective reorganization involves relative clauses. Ob-
ject- and subject-relative clause trajectories are shown in Figures 4.52 and 4.53.
In both cases, we analyze relative clauses with a relative cs-system [rel]{R} that
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Figure 4.50: Selective reorganization of coordinated verb phrases.
Figure 4.51: Selective reorganization of a complement clause.
is +ϕ-coupled to a main clause cs-system and also participates in a ϕ-configura-
tion with a subordinate clause {V}. In the object relative, Al drinks coffee which
Bo brews, [which]{R} is +ϕ coupled to [coffee]{−N} and −ϕ coupled to [brews]{V}.
This creates the |Bo brews coffee| configuration indirectly. In the subject relative,
Al, who Bo knows, drinks coffee, [who]{R} is +ϕ coupled to [Al]{+N} and −ϕ coupled
to [knows]{V}. The |Bo knows Al| configuration is indirectly created by these
relations.
In both subject and object relatives, the excitation of the {R} system prevents
the relativized main clause cs-system to which it is coupled from being demoted
to ground. Thus in the object relative, the selective reorganization from (e3) to
(e4) that excites [which]{R}maintains [coffee]{−N} in an excited state. Likewise, in
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Figure 4.52: Selective reorganization for an object relative clause.
Figure 4.53: Selective reorganization for a subject relative clause.
the subject relative, the selective reorganization to (e2) maintains [Al]{+N} in an
excited state. In a sense, the excitation of {R} assists the persistence of excitation
of a system which participates in a subsequently attended clausal ϕ-configura-
tion and which might otherwise be demoted to ground. We will encounter the
phenomenon of assisted persistence of excitation in other contexts later on.
Attentionally selective reorganization allows for a radical reconceptualization
of system trajectories in production. Only a handful of systems are excited in
any given stable epoch of a trajectory, while many more may be active but not
excited. If too many cs-systems are excited and interfere, the state is likely to be
unstable. We refer to the set of excited c-systems as the attentional focus, or the
attended configuration, and all unexcited systems as unattended systems.The con-
sequence of this is that when we produce or interpret a multi-clausal utterance
(e.g.Al drinks coffee and eats granola) we do not experience both clausal relational
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meanings uniformly in time; rather, we experience one relational meaning more
strongly, and then the other.
In this new conception, producers and interpreters do have the ability to ex-
perience multiple relational meanings simultaneously, but those experiences are
not equivalent. Only a limited set of the relational meanings can be sufficiently
excited to be attentionally focused. For this new conception to be consistent with
our understanding of e-organization, a more powerful version of the reorgani-
zation operator, Êsr, is needed. Selective reorganization gives even more impor-
tance to the distinction between excited states and the ground state. Whereas Êcr
operates on systems in an excited state, Êsr promotes unexcited systems from
ground and/or demotes excited systems to ground. Later on we will find that
this more powerful mechanism is not wholly unconstrained and helps us un-
derstand a variety of non-local phenomena; these include interactions of ellipsis
and anaphora with coordination and subordination, as well as island effects. Êsr
is somewhat more phenomenologically motivated than Êcr – the mappings of Êsr
are not derived simply from feedback-induced suppression of a selected system.
Nonetheless, a justification for Êsr can be made on the basis of its utility.
A deeper rationale for our new conception of attentionally selective reorgani-
zation is that we can understand how instability from interference is avoided by
focusing attention on a small number of configurations. For an utterance with
an arbitrarily long list, such as Al drinks coffee, tea, juice, water, pop, whisky, beer,
cider, scotch, etc., attentionally selective reorganization solves the multiplicity
problem: there is no need to proliferate N units as in the connected objects rep-
resentation of Figure 4.54.
The multiplicity problem is avoided because we abandon the notion that all of
themeaning relations are experienced in an equivalent way simultaneously. Con-
nected object representations provide the impression that all objects are equally
co-present and similarly related in space and time. Because we can now see this
as misleading, the o/el paradigm requires that we reinterpret the conventional
notions of “infinity” and “recursion”.
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Figure 4.54: Attentionally selective reorganization avoids the multiplic-
ity problem.
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The object metaphor makes it possible to view human language as the output of
a recursive procedure. This recursive procedure, Merge, the essence of the hu-
man language faculty (Chomsky 2001b; 2008), yields an infinite set of sentences
– or so it is said. An early expression of this view, according to Tomalin (2007),
appears in Bar-Hillel (1953), who observed that recursive definitions could be
useful in linguistics. The linguistic use of connected object structures, which pro-
vide a conceptual basis for recursion, originates even earlier, tracing back to the
German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) (Seuren 1998).
But if one chooses not to view language as structures of connected objects,
the notion of a capacity for discrete infinity becomes absurd. In this chapter we
examine how the object metaphor is used to construct recursive Merge, and de-
velop an alternative way of thinking about recursion in the o/el paradigm. There
is a superficial critique of the notion that recursion is the essence of the human
language faculty, based on evidence that there may be languages without “re-
cursion” (Everett 2005). That particular critique is counterproductive in my view,
because it presupposes the conventional framework. The deeper critique is that
thinking of language as “recursive” is only possible when presupposing the ob-
ject metaphor. When we adopt an o/el conception, there are no capacities for
infinity that need explanation; recursion is merely an artifact of a particular con-
ceptual model.
5.1 The infinite set conception of language
The “infinite” nature of language has been a key argument against a finite-state
model in favor of a phrase structure grammar. The logic of the argument is that
languages are infinite sets of sentences, which can include dependencies that
are infinite, and a finite-state model cannot produce sentences with infinite de-
pendencies. (Note that a finite-state model can produce infinitely long sentences
with finite dependencies). One problem with the logic of this argument is the
tenet that languages are sets of sentences. Let’s examine some of what has been
written about this idea.
5 Infinity and recursion
By a language, then, we shall mean a set (finite or infinite) of sentences, each
of finite length, all constructed from a finite alphabet of symbols (Chomsky 1956:
114).
There are infinite sets of sentences that have dependency sets with more
than any fixed number of terms. (Chomsky 1956: 115)
The construct of the infinite set has been extended to thoughts as well:
The ability to embed a proposition inside another proposition bestows the
ability to think an infinite number of thoughts. (Pinker 1999: 125)
Where does the infinite set conception of language come from? Chomsky him-
self identified it as an assumption, arguing that if languages were finite sets of
sentences generated by a non-recursive grammar (e.g. a finite state model), then
that grammar would have to be very complicated:
In general, the assumption that languages are infinite is made for the pur-
pose of simplifying the description. If a grammar has no recursive steps…it
will be prohibitively complex – it will, in fact, turn out to be little better
than a list of strings or of morpheme class sequences in the case of natural
languages. If it does have recursive devices, it will produce infinitely many
sentences. (1956: 115–116)
The reasoning is that if grammars were non-recursive, we would have a tough
time describing them. There is a circularity in this reasoning: “prohibitive” com-
plexity of a description is only prohibitive in a certain (object-based) construal of
what the description could be. As sensible as this reasoning seemswithin the con-
ventional paradigm, it is not – from a theory-external perspective – a satisfying
argument for the infinite set conception. Indeed, from a more neutral perspec-
tive, the prohibitive complexity of describing sentences in a finite way might be
taken as an argument that language should not be conceptualized as structures
of objects/symbols in the first place.
There are two aspects of the infinite set conception that we call into question
here: (1) whether it is sensible to think of the set of sentences as infinite, and
(2) whether it is sensible to think of language as a set of sentences. To aid these
critiques we employ an object collection schema (cf. Lakoff & Núñez 2000) with
pebbles as objects. The schema is as follows:
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Picture an infinite beach of pebbles, of various sizes and compositions. We
take one pebble at a time and add it to our infinitely large bag. If we imagine
doing this forever, we obtain an infinite set of pebbles.
There are many ways in which the infinite pebble collection is analogous to
the infinite set of sentences in conventional approaches. First, all of the sentences
we add to our collection will be different in the sense that no two sentences in
our set have identical “structure”, but they are all the same type of thing, i.e. a
“sentence”, which we may feel obligated to define. The same holds for the pebble
collection: no two pebbles in our set of pebbles have identical structure, but they
are all the same type of thing, i.e. a “pebble”.
We should also feel obligated to define what a pebble is. Both pebbles and
sentences are categories that we construct. There is no objective, physically de-
fined, model-independent notion of a sentence, nor is there an objective cate-
gory of a pebble. On a relatively macroscopic scale, all pebbles are solid objects
composed of various crystalline grains, but on a smaller scale, we can only de-
scribe pebbles as spatial organizations of molecules, and on an even smaller scale,
as quantum wavefunctions. To count pebbles as “pebbles”, we must construct a
sufficiently general category, pebble, by making reference to relatively micro-
scopic constructs such as molecules. Yet one can always contest the category, on
the basis of its scale-dependence. The same holds for sentences: on a relatively
macroscopic scale, the object metaphor allows us to view sentences as unique
spatial arrangements of linguistic units, but on a smaller scale, we must describe
them as very high-dimensional spatiotemporal patterns of neural activity. On
that view, no two utterances of Al drinks coffee are identical. Thus the categories
of sentence and pebble are analytical impositions – constructs, associated with
a macroscopic analysis.
In the analogy, the bag of pebbles is a language, i.e. a set of sentences – the bag
is the set. This works well because sets are container schemas. The mathematical
notion of a classical set is, via its fundamental metaphor, based on a container
schema (Lakoff & Núñez 2000). This makes it sensible to refer to numbers as
being “inside” or “outside” of sets, but not partly inside, and never both inside
and outside. Likewise, a sentence is either in a language or not, just as a pebble
is either in the bag or not. The sentences and pebbles are objects, and we can
imagine an infinitely long sentence, and an infinitely large pebble – both are
objects.
The processes of collecting an infinite number of pebbles and generating an in-
finite set of sentences have an important similarity: we imagine them iteratively,
and occurring forever. Our conception of infinity is not, in its most basic form,
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an atemporal concept. We do not convince ourselves of the possibility of infinity
with the snap of a finger. Instead, we believe in infinities because we can imagine
iterating actions, like dropping pebbles into a bag or adding sentences to a set.
This observation suggests that we should think more carefully about infinity as a
human construct, distinguishing as Aristotle did between an imagined potential
for infinity and infinity in actuality (see Lear 1988).
5.1.1 Potential infinity is not very special
There are some mathematicians, finitists, who accept the existence of only finite
mathematical objects. Historically, infinity is an old idea, but it is just an idea,
and hence it is contestable. Carl Friedrich Gauss, Henri Poincaré, and Ludwig
Wittgenstein all questioned the existence of infinities:
Gauss: I protest against the use of infinite magnitude as something com-
pleted, which is never permissible in mathematics. The Infinite is just a
manner of speaking, in which one is really talking in terms of limits, which
certain ratios may approach as close as one wishes, while others may be
allowed to increase without restriction. (see Waterhouse 1979)
Poincaré: There is no actual infinity, that the Cantorians have forgotten,
and have been trapped by contradictions. It is true that Cantorism rendered
services, but that was when it was applied to a real problem whose terms
were clearly defined, and we could walk safely. Logisticians as Cantorians
have forgotten. (see Poincaré & Maitland 2003)
Wittgenstein: Let’s imagine a man whose life goes back for an infinite time
and who says to us: “I’m just writing down the last digit to Pi and it’s 2”.
Every day of his life he has written down a digit, without ever having begun;
he has just finished. This seems utter nonsense, and a reductio ad absurdum
of the concept of infinite totality. (see Wittgenstein 1980)
The ideation of infinity comes from the same conceptual operation which con-
structs the integers: adding. In the object collection schema, take a pebble, add it
to your bag, and repeat. Or in a path schema, take a step, add one, repeat. It does
not matter that in actuality we would eventually run out of pebbles, or energy
to take steps, because we can imagine iterating these processes forever. There
is nothing particularly special about the idea of constructing an infinite set, i.e.
a potential infinity. Whether the set may be of sentences, or pebbles, or steps,
or whatever. We can imagine that any type of object can be constructed so that
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each member of the category is unique, and we can imagine doing this indefi-
nitely. The point is that if one maintains that language is a capacity to produce
an infinite set of sentences, this can only mean that one imposes the necessary
metaphors and schemas that allow a conceptual mapping between the act of col-
lecting sentences and an imagined iteration of collecting objects. Whether there
is anything particularly special or interesting about the imposition is a different
issue.
5.1.2 Language is not a set
The other problem with the infinite set conception is the notion of language as
a set of sentences. Is it sensible to think of a language as a set? The Poincaré com-
ment above is relevant here: infinity is a useful tool when applied to a problem
whose terms are clearly defined. In order to view languages as sets of sentences, a
“sentence” should be a clearly defined thing. Is this really the case? The typical
maneuver is to assume a definition:
We may assume for this discussion that certain sequences of phonemes are
definitely sentences, and that certain other sequences of phonemes are def-
initely non-sentences. (Chomsky 1957: 14)
But even when more serious definitional attempts are made, all such attempts
suffer from a deeper problem: not all “parts” of sentence-objects are necessarily
the same sort of thing. This means that thinking of sentences as “objects” which
are collectable is misguided. Consider the object-collection schema for an infinite
set. Each new object (e.g. pebble, sentence) added to the collection is assumed to
be “the same” as the previous objects. For another simple example, consider the
set construction of the natural numbers. Each “1” that is added to the previous
natural number to get the next natural number is the same as the previous “1”.
It would be quite strange if that were not the case. Imagine if at some point we
added the quasi-number 1* instead of 1:
(1) 1 + 1 = 2, 2 + 1 = 3, 3 + 1 = 4, 4 + 1* = ?
What does it mean to add 1*? It is simply not defined, until we define it. Why
label it 1*? Well, it is different from the 1s that we added previously. 1* is not the
same sort of thing as 1, and so we cannot add it to anything in the set. This same
point applies to language. Consider a classic example, tail recursion:
(2) a. Al knows Bo drinks coffee.
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b. Al knows Bo knows Cam drinks coffee.
c. Al knows Bo knows Cam knows Dee drinks coffee.
d. Al knows Bo knows Cam knows Dee knows Ed drinks coffee.
e. Al knows Bo knows Cam knows Dee knows Ed knows Fay knows…
In the conventional view each of the sentences above is a structure of objects,
all of which are simultaneously there, in an occupiable space, i.e. co-present. This
is the implication of connected object structures such as in Figure 5.1(A). But in
the o/el framework a configuration such as Figure 5.1(B) is unstable because of
interference; all of the cs-systems in (B) cannot be simultaneously excited.
Figure 5.1: Simultaneous presence of syntactic objects.
Instead of imposing simultaneity, the o/el framework imagines a sequence of
epochs (e1…en) as in Figure 5.2. Only a small set of relationalmeanings is attended
in each epoch. For example, in (e1) the |Al knows| configuration is excited, while
other systems are active. |Al knows| remains attended through the canonical re-
organization to (e2), but a selective reorganization occurs in the transition to (e3),
such that |Bo knows| becomes excited and |Al knows| is demoted to ground. The
pattern of canonical reorganization and selective reorganization can be iterated
indefinitely, but there is nothing particularly special about a state that evolves
in time. Crucially, the system is typically not in a state where relational mean-
ing configurations associated with more than one (or perhaps a couple) clauses
are highly excited. Hence Al knows Bo knows Cam knows… is not one countable
event, but rather, a succession of states. All of the clauses are never co-present
in this view, and therefore they are not the same sort of thing.
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Figure 5.2: A sequence of attended configurations does not imply co-
presence.
There are two conventional objections that arise immediately from the rejec-
tion of co-presence. One is that o/el representations do not “represent” inter-
clausal relational meanings. For example, when we say Al knows Bo drinks coffee,
our intuition is that there is a relational meaning involving knows and the com-
plement clause, i.e. that Al knows something and the something that Al knows is
the relational meaning associated with Bo drinks coffee. To represent interclausal
relational meaning, conventional approaches posit object-units such as S or CP,
and connect these to other objects. Because of the connection/containment blend,
an S can represent the entirety of a clause in a single object.
The o/el response to this objection is that there is some “relational” aspect of
the experience of sequential attentional focus on |Al knows| and then |Bo drinks
coffee|. But crucially, this experience is a very different sort of experience than
the experience of attending to a single-clause configuration such as |Al drinks
coffee|. Whereas the |Al drinks coffee| experience corresponds to a stable ϕ-con-
figuration of excited systems, the experience of a “relation” between |Al knows|
and |Bo drinks coffee| relies on a temporal juxtaposition of non-simultaneous
experiences. Hence we cannot consider Al drinks coffee and Al knows Bo drinks
coffee to be the same sort of trajectories. We should not conceptualize (or repre-
sent) the relation between |Al knows| and |Bo drinks coffee| in the same way as
we conceptualize the relation between [Al]{N}, [drinks]{V}, and [coffee]{V}. Of
course, connected object schemas do precisely that: treat interclausal relations
as the same sort of relation as intraclausal ones.
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A second objection from the conventional perspective is that without an ex-
plicit configuration for interclausal meaning, there is nothing to ensure that a
producer attends to and produces configurations in the correct order, and noth-
ing to ensure that an interpreter is able to obtain an interpretation that matches
the sequencing of attention of the producer. For example, without an explicit con-
figurational mechanism for relating clauses, Al knows Bo knows Cam drinks cof-
fee could give rise to unintended interclausal relations, such as one in which Bo
knows something that Cam knows. Indeed, this appears to happen. Interpreters
are generally bad at keeping track of more than a couple of interclausal relational
meanings evoked by an utterance. An interpreter very well might misconstrue
the interclausal relations from such an utterance. There is (almost) no syntactic
mechanism to ensure that we experience the intended interclausal meaning rela-
tions, other than temporal proximity. To remember an utterance such as above,
a long-term memory mnemonic is helpful (e.g. alphabetically ordered proper
names). In general, committing long sentences to memory – i.e. a sequence of
relational meaning configurations – involves associational mechanisms which
are orthogonal to the organization of meaning experiences.
The conclusion we reach is that interclausal meaning relations cannot be con-
ceptualized as experiences associated with a single configuration. Rather, inter-
clausal meanings are associated with two or more configurations, which are at-
tended in a sequence. Some reflection suggests that this conclusion may be more
consistent with our intuitions than is generally appreciated. To what extent do
you feel that your generic experiences of the main clause verbs in each of the
columns of Table 5.1 differ?
Table 5.1: Interclausal and intraclausal relational meaning experiences
differ.
Bo knows something Bo knows that Al drinks coffee
Cam believes in something Cam believes that Al drinks coffee
Dee thinks something Dee thinks Al drinks coffee
Ed says something Ed says that Al drinks coffee
Fay decides something Fay decides that Al drinks coffee
For many people, with a bit of careful reflection, these sets of experiences can
be intuited to differ in a substantive way, which is nonetheless difficult to de-
scribe. The basis of this difference seems to be that the interclausal relational
meaning arises from the temporal proximity of configurations, whereas the in-
traclausal relational meanings are experienced simultaneously. One hint that in-
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terclausal meaning is quite different from intraclausal relational meaning is that
verbs which take clausal complements are often verbs of cognition/communica-
tion (i.e. knows, wants, thinks, believes, says, decides, etc.). The fact that we can
identify a semantic class of verbs with this behavior suggests that interclausal
relations are not on par with intraclausal ones.
It is also relevant to the dissociation of inter- and intra-clausal meaning experi-
ences that clausal “linkage” can be considered a phenomenon in and of itself, mer-
iting typologies (Bickel 2010; Bril 2010; Lehmann 1988; Van Valin Jr 1984). Indeed,
it is no accident that most of the interesting dependency phenomena necessarily
hinge on dependencies between units associated with separate clauses.This is an
important clue that intra- and inter-clausal meaning relations are fundamentally
different phenomena.
For the sake of conforming all meaning relations to the same image schematic
structure, conventional theories construct categories like S and CP as if these are
the same sort of entities as N or V. Such equations are misleading, in the o/el view.
Our experience of interclausal relational meaning differs substantially from our
experience of intraclausal relational meaning, thereby calling into question the
conventional assumption in which all sorts of meaning relations are structurally
homogenous.
As far as the infinite set conception is concerned, the consequence of rejection
of co-presence of clausal meaning experiences is that we cannot collect an arbi-
trarily large number of utterances into a set, because those utterances are not the
same sort of thing. Since we understand Bo knows Al drinks coffee to be a different
sort of phenomenon than Al drinks coffee, it does not make sense to collect both
into a set. Recall the natural numbers set construction discussed above, where
we observed that adding the quasi-number 1* was undefined. Likewise, the sen-
tence Al drinks coffee is an S, a stable ϕ-configuration, but the sentence Al knows
Bo drinks coffee is a quasi-sentence S*, a sequence of stable ϕ-configurations. It is
simply undefined to collect both of these into set. Put another way, if we wish to
add a pebble to our bag, the whole pebble has to be there, as a coherent system
state, independent of time. We cannot add a quasi-pebble to our bag, because the
quasi-pebbles are only partly there at any given time, and hence are not the same
sort of thing as pebbles. In other words, phenomena which involve a temporal
sequence of stable states cannot be reduced to atemporal meta-configurations.
Even though we reject the notion of an infinite number of configurations, we
might nonetheless conclude that there is an infinite set of trajectories in state
space. This is not correct, or is correct in only a trivial way. Recall that the state
space itself is an analytical construct. This means that we construct the state
space to suit our needs for conceptualizing linguistic patterns.This space does not
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“exist” outside of a given analysis. Moreover, we allow for the dimensions of the
space to change during production or interpretation. This is useful for analyzing
activation and de-activation of systems, i.e. the emergence and decay of collective
oscillations in populations. It is also useful for analyzing surroundings forces
which are associated with peripheral sensorimotor systems and other changes
in the central nervous system. (Only in the canonical trajectory do we assume
an invariant state space throughout production.)The inherent temporality of our
analysis space renders notions of infinity meaningless: it is trivially true that we
can never finish enumerating all of the possible trajectories, because the space
itself can be constructed in infinitely many ways and because the trajectories do
not have well defined beginnings and ends.
5.2 The recursive conception of language
The concept of a “narrow language faculty” as a capacity for discrete infinity de-
rives from the construct of a “recursive” Merge operation, or a phrase structure
grammar. Recursion in language is controversial, and commentators both for and
against the recursive view generally acknowledge a lack of clarity in what recur-
sion does or should refer to in this context (Lobina 2011; Pullum & Scholz 2010;
Tomalin 2011; van der Hulst 2010). So, what does it mean to say that Merge is
“recursive”? Here I focus on two related notions of recursion (see also Tomalin
2011, who identifies nine different uses of recursion). One has to do with how cat-
egories are defined: a syntactic category like a sentence can be “recursive” if the
sentence is defined such that it may “contain” or “connect to” another sentence.
The other has to dowith how rules or procedures can be applied: recursion occurs
when a procedure is applied to its own output. Below we discuss why neither of
these is particularly appropriate for describing language, and we show how both
rely on object metaphors with connection/containment schemas.
5.2.1 Definitional recursion
In some discussions of linguistic recursion, the recursive nature of language is
viewed as a consequence of including an object in its own definition. For example,
when one defines a sentence as “a structure which optionally includes another
sentence”, one refers to a sentence in its own definition. Notice the importance
of structure here: what is this “structure”? If it is a physical structure, how do
we observe it? If it is a metaphorical structure, then what do we mean when
saying that a “structure” “includes” another “structure”? The only sensible inter-
pretation of such statements involves the object metaphor and spatial schemas.
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For example, rewrite rules such as those in Table 5.2, provide directly and indi-
rectly recursive definitions of sentences, but necessarily evoke object metaphor
conceptualizations because of the metaphor symbols are objects.
Table 5.2: Directly recursive and indirectly recursive rewrite rules.
directly recursive indirectly recursive
S → NP V S S → NP VP
VP → V S
Conventional schemas for conceptualizing rewrite rules impose certain con-
straints on their form: there is a horizontal linear arrangement of symbols (ob-
jects), with no vertical dimension. This convention derives from conceptualizing
linguistic units as objects which occupy space – without the metaphor, there is
simply no basis for the conventions.
Definitional recursion is also problematic because the concept of a “defini-
tion” is quite vague. What constitutes a definition? The phrase structure rewrite
rules above are “definitions” of a sort, but if one were to elaborate on how or
why rewrite rules are definitions, and what that could even mean, one would
inevitably resort to many of the concepts which underlie procedural recursion.
5.2.2 Procedural recursion and the merge schema
The deeper notion of recursion is procedural: recursion is a temporal pattern in
which the output of a function (or “procedure”, or “process”, or “transformation”,
etc.) can be the input to that same function. This flavor of recursion also applies
to the directly and indirectly recursive rewrite rules above, where the arrow is
the function and the symbols at its head/tail are inputs/outputs. To reason about
functions we commonly use object-transformation schemas of the sort in Fig-
ure 5.3.
In the object-transformation schema, a function is a container, an object struc-
ture goes into the container, the object is transformed, and a new object structure
comes out. For rewrite rules, the transformation is often such that some object
in the input structure is split into new objects which are connected to it. The
operations “external merge” and “internal merge” are also object-transformation
schemas. External merge takes two input objects, creates a new object (which
is always a phrasal category), and connects them to the new object, as in Fig-
ure 5.4. Internal merge, as shown in Figure 5.5, transforms a structure of objects
149
5 Infinity and recursion
Figure 5.3: Rewrite rules and the object-transformation schema.
by (i) disconnecting an object from the structure and (ii) externally merging the
remaining structure of objects with the disconnected object, again creating a new
phrasal object. In both cases, exactly the same connected-object schemas are used
for inputs and outputs. Hence the input structures are the same type of thing as
the transformed, output structures. Moreover, input objects are never destroyed,
so the structures can grow to infinite size.
Figure 5.4: Merge and the object-transformation schema.
Figure 5.5: Comparison of external and internal merge in the object-
transformation schema.
By conceptualizing merge in this way, all linguistic structures are trivially re-
cursive. The function (i.e. the narrow faculty of language, Merge), takes its own
output as input. Notice that in both the rewrite and Merge variations, there are
“parts” of the output structures that were also present in the input structures, and
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there is a new object/structure that is created. Recall from earlier discussion that
the implicit temporal information in patterns of connection and orientation is
what makes “internal” Merge necessary. Can we relate this observation to differ-
ences between external and internal variants of Merge in the function schema?
Consider what has been written about these variants:
NS [narrow syntax] is based on the free operation Merge. SMT [the strong
minimalist thesis] entails theMerge of α, P is unconstrained, therefore either
external or internal. Under external Merge, α and P are separate objects; un-
der internal Merge, one is part of the other, and Merge yields the property
of “displacement,” which is ubiquitous in language and must be captured in
somemanner in any theory. It is hard to think of a simpler approach than al-
lowing internal Merge (a “grammatical transformation”), an operation that
is freely available. Accordingly, displacement is not an “imperfection” of
language; its absence would be an imperfection. (Chomsky 2001b: 8)
Internal Merge differs from external Merge in that it changes the spatial ar-
rangement of objects in one input structure. External Merge imposes a new spa-
tial arrangement/connection pattern on two “separate” input objects. The “sep-
aration” is a spatial relation associated with connection: the input objects, be-
cause they are not connected, are not spatially related. Both external and internal
Merge create objects in the output which were not present in the input.
Note that Merge creates structure, but does not destroy structure. Intriguingly,
no structure destroying operation appears to be utilized in many conventional
approaches. This analytic asymmetry follows from the object persistence map-
ping: objects which are present persist in time. Indeed, this is necessary for the
procedural notion of recursion, which is claimed to be the core property of lan-
guage:
NS [narrow syntax] has one operation that comes “free,” in that it is required
in some form for any recursive system: the operation Merge, which takes
two elements, α, P already constructed and creates a new one consisting of
the two; in the simplest, {α, P}. The operation yields the relation of member-
ship, and assuming iterability, the relations dominate (contain) and term-of.
(Chomsky 2001b: 6)
All approaches agree that a core property of FLN [narrow faculty of lan-
guage] is recursion, attributed to narrow syntax in the conception just out-
lined. FLN takes a finite set of elements and yields a potentially infinite
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array of discrete expressions. This capacity of FLN yields discrete infinity (a
property that also characterizes the natural numbers). (Hauser et al. 2002:
1571)
Natural languages go beyond purely local structure by including a capacity
for recursive embedding of phrases within phrases, which can lead to sta-
tistical regularities that are separated by an arbitrary number of words or
phrases. Such long-distance, hierarchical relationships are found in all nat-
ural languages for which, at a minimum, a “phrase-structure grammar” is
necessary. It is a foundational observation of modern generative linguistics
that, to capture a natural language, a grammar must include such capabili-
ties. (Hauser et al. 2002: 1577)
There has never been, and likely will never be, a “recursive” conception of lan-
guage which does not derive from the object metaphor. Whether we use a term
like “function”, “process”, “system”, “operation”, “mapping”, “transformation”, etc.
is irrelevant, given that the inputs and outputs are understood as objects. Merge
is procedural recursion because it imposes objectness on its input and output,
not because Merge has some essential property of being recursive.
5.2.3 Merge and the need for Phases
One of the most remarkable ironies of the conventional program is that Merge
and the object metaphor give rise to entailments that, in order to be consistent
with empirical observations, necessitate other, incompatible entailments associ-
ated with the concept of minimalist Phase (Chomsky 2001b; 2008).That Merge
requires conceptual structures which are incompatible with itself is not surpris-
ing: the conceptual structures of any theory predetermine its inherent contradic-
tions.
To see the contradictions, let’s consider the entailments of Merge and the
object metaphor in more detail. The connected object structures in Figure 5.6 en-
courage us to see substructures within larger structures, i.e. “parts” of the struc-
ture can be identified, and these parts are within the structure. For such repre-
sentations to make sense, we must: (i) view all parts of a structure as there at the
same time, i.e. as co-present; (ii) view the presence of any part as equivalent to
the presence of any other part; and (iii) assume an infinite amount of space for
the structure. Below we examine each of these assumptions.
(i) Co-presence of structure: the entirety of the structure is simultaneously pres-
ent. The object metaphor allows us to view all of the “structure” as present, simul-
taneously. In other words, there is a moment in time when all of the syntactic
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Figure 5.6: Conventional representions depict all substructures as
equally co-present.
systems and associated concepts, as well as their relations (connections) are there,
in space. Should we ask where “there” is? One interpretation is that spatial pres-
ence corresponds to some sort of cognitive attention. Attention to a linguistic
unit is the spatial presence of that unit. Hence there is an existence entailment
that comes merely from depicting the structure as co-present in a region of space
and time, and this in turn entails simultaneous attention to a set of units.
Note that we can readily distinguish co-presence from co-origination. The co-
presence of structure does not imply that all of the substructures in the larger
structure came into being at one time. Likewise, co-presence does not imply co-
termination: we can make no inferences about what happens to the structure
or its parts after it is built. It is easy to ignore, but the co-presence inference
leaves many open questions: where do the objects and their relations come from,
where do they go? How long are they present? What is the nature of the space
they occupy?
Of course, one might reject the notion that presence of the entirety of a struc-
ture in conventional representations entails simultaneous and commensurate at-
tention to the whole structure. But this stance begs the questions of which parts
of the structure are attended to and in what order those parts are attended to.
Connected-object structures do not explicitly convey this information. In con-
trast, representations in the o/el framework very directly provide this informa-
tion.
(ii) Equivalence of structural presence: the presence of any part of the structure
is equivalent to the presence of any other part. The object metaphor entails this
equivalence. Recall that the procedural recursion of Merge arises simply because
input and output are the same sort of thing – syntactic objects – they are equiv-
alent in this sense. The metaphor does not allow for distinctions to be drawn in
the degree to which parts of the structure are present. In the above example, one
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cannot say that Cam knows and the structure of Al drinks coffee are differently
present. Structural presence is necessarily dichotomous: objects and relations are
either there or not there, never partially there. There is no privileged part of the
structure that is “more present” than other parts, in time or in space. Hence if
we substitute presence with attention to meaning relations, object representations
do not allow for temporal variation in the degree of attention to any subset of
relations associated with an utterance.
(iii) Infiniteness of space: the space for a connected-object structure is infinite.
Merge requires this, because objects occupy space, and objects cannot occupy
the same space. So, the more objects that are “present” in a structure, the more
space is occupied by the entire structure. This space is, generally, a volume (of-
ten shown as two-dimensional). Imposing limits on the space would be quite
arbitrary. Where would these limits come from? Certainly there is no intuitive
source for such limits if the language faculty is isolated from all other cognitive
systems. Infinite space seems problematic if structural presence has any cogni-
tive relevance whatsoever. Under the attentional metaphor (attention to a lin-
guistic unit is the spatial presence of that unit), infinite space implies infinite
attention, which is nonsensical. Consider the sentence (from George Bernard
Shaw) that Pinker chose to illustrate the “infinite capacity” of language:
Stranger still, though Jacques-Dalcroze, like all these great teachers, is the
completest of tyrants, knowing what is right and that he must and will have
the lesson just so or else break his heart (no somebody else’s, observed), yet
his school is so fascinating that every womanwho sees it exclaims: ‘Oh why
was I not taught like this!’ and elderly gentlemen excited enroll themselves
as students and distract classes of infants by their desperate endeavours to
beat two in a bar with one hand and three with the other, and start off on
earnest walks around the room, taking two steps backward whenever M.
Dalcroze call out ‘Hop!’. (Pinker 2003)
If we describe the passage above as “a sentence”, then the word “sentence” is
mostly useless for analytical purposes. Indeed, we might as well characterize the
entire Shaw novel as “a sentence”, or all of the novels that Shaw ever wrote, or
all that has ever been written and spoken by anyone: all of the syntactic objects
that have been combined by Merge remain there, co-present and equivalent, oc-
cupying infinite space.
Clearly we should reject the entailments of co-presence, equivalence of struc-
ture, and infiniteness of space in such examples, because it is obvious that our
brains cannot simultaneously attend to the entirety of such “sentences”. Reflect
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on what happens when you try to interpret the following, more constrained ex-
ample:
(3) Fay knows Ed knows Dee knows Cam knows Bo knows Al drinks coffee.
Do you attend to all of the relational meanings evoked by the utterance at
the same time? Doubtful. As you read the sentence, new relational meanings are
excited while previous ones are suppressed. Even after you have read the sen-
tence, comprehending it seems to involve cycling through a series of relational
meanings, rather than achieving some sort of holistic state. The experience of
meaning in so-called recursive utterances is not temporally uniform. Connected
object representations provide no explanation for why our attention is limited
to relatively short “pieces” of such sentences, such as those shown in Figure 5.7.
The entailments of Merge prevent us from reasoning about why there might be
limitations on the sizes of these pieces.
Figure 5.7: A sequence of relational meaning experiences represented
with disconnected structures.
The conventional rhetoric to address the mismatch between theory and intu-
ition is to construct an unhelpful isolation of “the narrow syntax” from “external
interfaces,” i.e. sensorimotor and conceptual-intentional systems. The external
interfaces are held responsible for the attentional limitations, and without them,
Merge would happily create infinitely large structures.
This sort of compartmentalizing, of narrow syntax vs. other systems, is not a
useful strategy for advancing our understanding. Problematically, it necessitates
the minimalist concept of a Phase, which is ultimately a mechanism for separat-
ing connected object structures into pieces (or preventing the pieces from becom-
ing too large in the first place). Minimalist Phases thereby restrict what sorts of
objects Merge can operate on. Consider the following description:
155
5 Infinity and recursion
For minimal computation, as soon as the information is transferred it will
be forgotten, not accessed in subsequent stages of derivation: the computa-
tion will not have to look back at earlier phases as it proceeds, and cyclicity
is preserved in a very strong sense. Working that out, we try to formulate
a phase impenetrability condition PIC, conforming as closely as possible to
SMT. (Chomsky 2008: 9) [emphasis added]
There are several rich metaphors in the above passage. The notion that infor-
mation (i.e. structure) is “transferred” implies two spaces, with motion of struc-
ture to and from those spaces. The notion that a space can be “impenetrable”
reinforces the separation schema imposed by Phases; the schema evokes a bar-
rier. Moreover, the notion that a computation may “look back” at “earlier phases”
evokes a spatial schema for time, and this is blended with the metaphor that com-
putation is human perception and action. The processes which drive change in
brain states – so-called “computations” – are described as if there are animate
agents who attend to objects in space and manipulate them.
Even if these metaphors were more useful than misleading, the problem with
Phases is that they lead to somewhat bizarre explanations, which are ultimately
not compatible with the entailments of Merge. Let’s compare two patterns,
which are understood to have the same number of Phases, but which differ with
regard to the acceptability of related Wh-object questions:
(4) a. Bo knows | that Al drinks coffee.
b. What does Bo know | that Al drinks?
(5) a. Bo wonders | if Al drinks coffee.
b. *What does Bo wonder | if Al drinks?
Phases play a role in some accounts of why the Wh-question in (4) is accept-
able while the one in (5) is not. In both examples, the two clauses of the sentences
are different Phases. TheWh-object is assumed to be generated in the embedded
clause and must move out of that clause. The “movement” from one phase to an-
other is argued to be possible only when the Wh-object can move to a particular
position in the structure, an “escape hatch” so to speak. This location of the “es-
cape hatch” is held to be occupied in (5), but not in (4), and hence the Wh-object
can only move out of the Phase in (4). Now consider sentences such as those in
(6) and (7):
(6) a. Jo knows | Irv knows | Hal knows | Guy knows | Fay knows | Ed
knows | Dee knows | Cam knows | Bo knows | Al drinks coffee.
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b. What does Jo know | Irv knows | Hal knows | Guy knows | Fay knows
| Ed knows | Dee knows | Cam knows | Bo knows | Al drinks?
(7) a. Jo wonders | if Irv wonders | if Hal wonders | if Guy wonders | if Fay
wonders | if Ed wonders | if Dee wonders | if Cam wonders | if Bo
wonders | if Al drinks coffee.
b. *What does Jo wonder | if Irv wonders | if Hal wonders | if Guy
wonders | if Fay wonders | if Ed wonders | if Dee wonders | if Cam
wonders | if Bo wonders | if Al drinks?
In both sentences, the “computation” never “looks at” the entirety of the utter-
ance. In (6b) the Wh-object is able to move out of each phase, one after the other
(a total of 9 movements), but not so for (7b). More abstractly, in (6b) the computa-
tion looks at a particular position in a particular structure X1, which corresponds
to a part of the sentence (e.g. Al knows). The computation then allows an object
in that particular position of structure X1 to “move” to a separate structure, X2
(Bo knows), which is never connected to X1. The object can be passed through
escape hatches in each phase: X3 (Cam knows), X4 (Dee knows), etc., and all of
these structures are never connected to each other.
These absurd descriptions of the difference between the sentences in (6) and (7)
show that the entailments of minimalist phases are inconsistent with the entail-
ments of Merge. The connected objects which Merge produces are co-present,
and these should be available as input to Merge (in particular, to internal Merge
in the case of Wh-islands). Phases prevent Merge from operating on the en-
tirety of a sentence by separating it into pieces. This leads to numerous oddities:
Phases attempt to preserve co-presence for parts of a structure, but in effect
abandon global co-presence; they attempt to preserve atemporality for pieces of
the structure, but impose temporality on complex sentences; they attempt to pre-
serve uniform spaces for subsets of objects in a sentence, but divide sentences
into mutually inaccessible spaces for each subset. The theme here – preserving
some form of local homogeneity of structure while abandoning homogeneity be-
tween epochs – is exactly what we accomplish in the o/el framework, only far
more straightforwardly and without creating theory-internal contradictions. In-
stead of Merge, the basic operations are Couple and Reorganize.
The crux of the incompatibility between Merge and Phases can be demon-
strated by considering how the glorified claims of recursiveMerge becomemuch
less powerful when modified to allow for the entailment that different Phases
are different spaces for objects. Here is the previous description of Merge, with
my modifications in bracketed bold text:
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NS has one operation that comes “free” [for each space of objects], in that
it is required in some form for any [space-limited] recursive system: the
operation Merge, which takes two elements [in the same space of objects],
α, P already constructed and creates a new one [in that space] consisting
of the two elements; in the simplest, {α, P} [given space ψ]. The operation
yields the relation of membership, and assuming iterability [in space ψ], the
relations dominate (contain) and term-of. (modified from (Chomsky 2001a:
6))
The modified description of Merge begs the question of why should there be
Phases at all? The consequences of the profound conflict between Phases and
Merge do not seem to have been acknowledged in much of the literature on
Phases. The crux of the problem is that Merge entails that output structures are
one structure, but this runs contrary to the spatial separation that Phases impose
in various circumstances. It is important to emphasize that phases are necessary
in the first place, because there is something wrong with Merge. Merge is prob-
lematic because it is a recursive operation on objects. Language is not a structure
of objects.
5.3 Recursion as state similarity
If language is not a structure of objects generated by a recursive procedure, is
there an alternative way to conceptualize the difference between utterances
which, in the conventional sense, would be considered “recursive”, from those
which would be considered “non-recursive”? Can we distinguish recursive pat-
terns (e.g.Cam knows Bo knows…) from non-recursive ones (e.g.Cam knows some-
thing. Bo knows something) in the o/el conception?
In recursive sentences, the state trajectory returns to a location in state space
that is similar to (i.e. near to) a previous state, given some arbitrary conditions
on similarity, the timescale of the return, and intervening states. Note that in the
conventional perspective, the conceptual dimensions of recursive utterances are
considered irrelevant vis-à-vis recursion, and only the syntactic dimensions mat-
ter. Hence Cam knows Bo suspects… is just as recursive as Cam knows Bo knows…,
because both have the syntactic unit pattern [N V [N V…]]. Our analysis below
adopts the same imposition. Hence we can view recursion simply as the return of
a system state to a previously visited location in state space (or at least a return to
some location which is “near” to a previously visited one). This interpretation of
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recursion is consistent with connectionist models which accomplish the genera-
tion or interpretation of “recursive” patterns (Christiansen & Chater 1999; Elman
1989; Smolensky 1990).
5.3.1 Recursion as temporally disjoint but similar system states
To exemplify the o/el conception of recursion, we consider a sequence of s-sys-
tem ϕ/e-state vectors for the utterance Cam knows Bo knows Al drinks coffee,
shown in Figure 5.8. Each element of the vector corresponds to an s-system state.
The state is represented by an integer whose magnitude is the e-level and whose
sign indicates whether the system is ϕ-proximal or distal relative to the main
clause {V}. Notice that a state in which there is a highly excited {+N} system and
a highly excited {V} system occurs in three epochs (e1, e3, e5). Although these s-
system states are not identical, they are similar, and thus relatively close to each
other in the state space. We can thus think of recursion as the return of the state
trajectory to a state space location near to a previously visited one.
Figure 5.8: Recursion as a trajectory which goes near to a location in
state space that was previously visited.
To distinguish the conventionally recursive utterance from one which would
be considered non-recursive, we compare the state vector sequence in Figure 5.8
to the one in Figure 5.9 for the utterance Cam knows something. Bo knows some-
thing. In both utterances, the state trajectory returns to nearby locations: (e1) ≈
(e5), and (e2) ≈ (e6). The key difference from the conventionally recursive pattern
is that intervening between these states is (e4), where no systems are at selec-
tion level. The state (e4) can be viewed as a relatively large discontinuity in the
state space trajectory, which disqualifies the similarities (e1) ≈ (e5) and (e2) ≈ (e6)
as examples of recursion.
The criterion for disqualifying similarity between temporally disjoint states
as an example of recursion is arbitrary: we generally impose the constraint that
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Figure 5.9: Trajectories are not considered recursive when they exhibit
a large discontinuity before returning to a previously visited location.
the disjoint states must be connected by a trajectory in which some s-system is
always selected. In other words, we assume that between the similar states, no
reorganization occurs which fails to promote some s-system to selection level.
Hence if a speaker utters Bo knows, and then the speaker takes a nap, and then
utters Al drinks coffee, we do not pursue a recursive analysis.
The arbitrariness of what we categorize as recursion follows not only from
our criteria for what sorts of states can intervene between the similar states, but
also from the metric of similarity. In the conventionally recursive example in Fig-
ure 5.8 the (e1) and (e3) states (Cam knows and Bo knows) are more similar to one
another than (e5) (Al drinks coffee) is to either (e1) or (e3).This is a consequence of
the fact that {V}[drinks] has a {−N} object. But there are no non-arbitrary criteria
for stipulating that (e5) is similar enough to (e3) for the sequence to be considered
recursive.
Furthermore, we must impose an arbitrary criterion for the minimal temporal
distance between the similar states. Consider the list utterance Al drinks coffee,
tea, pop, whisky, beer, cider. We might hesitate to consider lists as examples of
recursion, even though from a generative perspective, lists are just as recursive
as embedded clauses (i.e. Merge builds them). As shown in Figure 5.10, states (e3)
through (e8) are all quite similar: there is one highly excited {−N} system and a
highly excited {+N} and {V} system.
Why do we feel that lists are substandard examples of recursion? We seem
to prefer for there to be some intervening state(s) between the states which are
similar. This reinforces the point that there is no non-arbitrary way of defining
recursion, because recursion is simply the circumstance in which a state is sim-
ilar to a previous one. The “previous” and “similar” qualifiers require arbitrary
temporal and spatial criteria.
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Figure 5.10: Trajectories that stay in the same location are considered
less interesting examples of recursion.
The o/el way of thinking changes the sort of questions we can ask about re-
cursion. Instead of being interested in “embedding depth” and spatial patterns
of connected objects structures, we can ask about the e-operations that inter-
vene between states, the dimensions in which we construct an understanding of
the states, and the proximity of the locations of those states in our analytically
constructed spaces.
5.3.2 Reiterative simulation
Here we introduce a new sense of recursion, reiterative simulation, which is use-
ful for various analyses of syntactic phenomena in subsequent chapters. Recall
that thresholding mechanisms in production allow for a cs-simulation regime in
which s-gates are open but m-gates are closed. Because this regime does not en-
gage gm-selection, we do not experience the sensory consequences of selection
in the same way that we do for gm-simulation (i.e. subvocal rehearsal). Thus we
are not necessarily “aware” of cs-simulation in the same way that we are “aware”
of gm-simulation.
What patterns of reorganization might occur in cs-simulation? One possible
hypothesis is that only exactly the same e-reorganizations occur as those we
hypothesize for gm-simulation/execution trajectories. An alternative we pursue
here is that cs-simulation often enters a reiterative regime, in which a trajectory
of e/ϕ-configurations is reiterated an arbitrary number of times, giving rise to a
periodic state trajectory on supra-clausal scales. This sort of trajectory is more
practical in cs-simulation because reorganization operations need not depend on
gm-selection feedback.
To see why reiterative simulation is useful, let’s consider two utterances: Bo
knows Al drinks coffee and Al drinks coffee, Bo knows. From the perspective of a
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producer or interpreter, the state trajectories of these utterances are very simi-
lar, except that the two ϕ-configurations are executed/evoked in different orders.
Let’s imagine that a producer, prior to execution, engages a reiterative simulation.
The reiterative trajectory we envision is shown in Figure 5.11. (To reduce visual
clutter e-levels within clauses are not differentiated in the e-potentials.) The re-
iterative simulation alternates between subtrajectories in which |Bo knows| and
|Al drinks coffee| configurations are excited. This gives rise to a periodic trajec-
tory with two ϕ-epochs, labeled (e) and (e′). In general, each ϕ-epoch contains
one or more e-epochs.
Figure 5.11: In a reiterative simulation, there is no global notion of prece-
dence of ϕ-configurations.
An important consequence of having a periodic trajectory is that any global
notion of precedence becomes arbitrary. As such, neither ϕ-epoch precedes the
other: |Bo knows| and |Al drinks coffee| configurations are unordered; a discrete
time translation symmetry is created. We might also imagine that an interpreter
trajectory can evolve to be reiterative, again rendering any global notion of prece-
dence arbitrary. In a sense, the echoes of production which interpreters experi-
ence restore a symmetry that was broken in overt production.
Put somewhat differently, the loss of precedence information is a key condi-
tion for invariance of meaning experiences, on both e-epoch and ϕ-epoch scales.
For a single e-epoch, a relational meaning experience is a stable periodic trajec-
tory of cs-systems.The discrete translational symmetry of the trajectory in θ sub-
space makes it impossible to decide which member of a set of cs-systems “comes
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first” – precedence information is lost. Likewise, for a ϕ-epoch, a reiteration of
epochs creates the discrete translational symmetry which destroys precedence
information: it is not possible to say which ϕ-configuration precedes the other.
The loss of precedence information is fundamental to invariance.
Reiterative simulation also provides a mechanism for understanding sources
of variation in order of selection during ungated production. Earlier we suggested
that surroundings forces in the pre-stable phase may give rise to variation in ini-
tial e-organization. For example, the utterance Al drinks coffee, Bo knows might
be produced when [Al][drinks][coffee] c-systems are more highly excited than
[Bo][knows] systems. Alternatively, the timing of the transition from a reitera-
tive cs-simulative regime to a gm-simulative/executional regime could give rise
to variation in production. As shown in Figure 5.12, the order of epochs of se-
lectional production in (e1)–(e5) is determined by when the transition to a selec-
tional regime occurs in the context of a reiterative regime (e, e′).
Figure 5.12: Variation in clause order can be generated fromwhen a pro-
ducer transitions to an executional regime, in the cycle of a reiterative
simulation.
Another potential consequence of reiterative simulation could be to stabilize
simultaneous excitation of ϕ-configurations. As depicted in Figure 5.12, this could
be accomplished by promoting frequency locking between systems, whichwould
diminish the decohering effects of interference. Thus we speculate that reitera-
tive simulation could allow for simultaneous excitation of configurations which
might otherwise be unstable and which would need to be selectively re-orga-
nized.
Reiterative simulation is a form of “recursion” because stable ϕ/e-configura-
tions recur, i.e. the state space trajectory returns to previous states. Unlike con-
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Figure 5.13: Reiterative simulation may help stabilize the excitation of
multiple ϕ-configurations by promoting frequency locking between
configurations, thereby diminishing interference.
ventional recursion, which applies only to s-systems and requires arbitrary simi-
larity and time constraints, the reiterative simulation variety of recursion can be
defined with both c- and s-system states and has easy-to-motivate constraints.
Reiterative cs-simulation may occur pervasively, and yet because such trajecto-
ries are m-gated, we may not be very aware of them.
5.3.3 Embedding vs. reorganization
So-called “embedded” structures are the parade examples of conventional recur-
sion. How does the o/el model conceptualize these, if not with containment and
connection? First, we emphasize that there is no notion of embedding without
the object metaphor and connection/containment blend. This is clear when we
reflect on why some patterns are better or worse examples of recursion. Tail
recursion, as shown in Figure 5.14(A), can evoke a schema of containers inside
containers. Tail recursion is considered somewhat less worthy as an example of
recursion because it is easy to replace the nested containers with a sequence of
adjacent ones (A′). Center embedding (B) is a more worthy example of recur-
sion because the mirror spatial symmetry of object dependencies maps nicely to
nested containers, when the objects are arranged in a line (i.e. temporal order
is spatial arrangement). In contrast, scrambling (C) requires internal merge
(i.e. movement, spatial re-arrangement) and is not consistent with any nested
container schema.
In the o/el framework, patterns such as tail recursion, center embedding, and
scrambling (shown in Table 5.3) result from special reorganization operations
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Table 5.3: Examples of recursive sentences.
Tail recursion: Bo knows Al, who drinks coffee.
Cam likes Bo, who knows Al, who drinks coffee.
Center embedding: Al, who Bo knows, drinks coffee.
Al, who Bo, who Cam likes, knows, drinks coffee.
Scrambling: Al, Bo, drinks coffee, knows.
Al, Bo, Cam, drinks coffee, knows, thinks.
Figure 5.14: Containment schemas for recursive sentences.
that change the relative excitation of systems. If the operations create too much
interference, the resulting configurations may be unstable. In examining trajec-
tories of “embedded” patterns, we will see that the special reorganizations associ-
ated with center embedding and scrambling give rise to more interference than
tail recursion. This explains why center embedding and scrambling are much
less common in production and less coherent in interpretation than tail recur-
sion (a.k.a. right-branching recursion), especially when the number of clauses
involved exceeds two (Christiansen & Chater 1999).
Recall from previous chapters that we have posited several regimes of the
e-organization operator. The stabilizing regime, which applies within e-epochs,
maps e-configurations to themselves.The canonical reorganization regime Êcr de-
motes selected systems to the lowest above-ground level and promotes all other
excited systems one level. The selective reorganization regime Êsr demotes some
systems to ground and promotes some grounded system(s) to excited states. Reit-
erative simulation results from iterated application of Êcr and Êsr.We also posited
an initial organization operator Êio to map from a pre-stable state to a stable, dis-
crete configuration.
The operators Êcr and Êsr can be decomposed into more basic, element-wise
promotion and demotion operators, ↑ and ↓. Generally, any reorganization oper-
ation can be characterized based on whether the systems in its domain (inputs)
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and range (outputs) are ground-level, excited, or selected systems. This results
in 3 distinct domain and range patterns, a total of 9 possibilities. The Table 5.4
summarizes the classification.
Table 5.4: Classification of reorganization operations.
input output
ground excited selected ground excited selected
⇑ + − − − + +
ungrounding promotion
− + −
1 + − − + − − identity
↑ − + − − + + canonical promotion
− + −
⇓ − + − + − −
grounding demotion
− + +
1 − + + − + + identity
↓ − + + − + − canonical demotion
The ungrounding promotion operator ⇑ promotes a ground-level system to
an excited (possibly selected) level, while the canonical promotion operator ↑
promotes an already excited system. There may be analyses for which it is use-
ful to distinguish between promotion to non-selected excitation and selection.
The grounding demotion operator ⇓ demotes an excited (often selected) system
to ground-level, while the canonical demotion operator ↓ demotes a selected
system to an above-ground (typically the lowest) level. An arbitrary reorgani-
zation vector Ê consists of these basic operations and acts element-wise on an
e-organization vector ẽ, which is obtained by permuting the system state vector
such that the dimensions are ordered according to system e-levels.
Tail recursion, center embedding, and scrambling trajectories can be generated
through appropriate choices for the components of Ê. For instance, compare the
trajectories of examples of tail recursion (A) and center embedding (B) in Fig-
ure 5.15. Both examples have three clauses, but the tail recursion requires just
two selective reorganizations, while the center embedding requires four. The
selective reorganizations of the tail recursion promote and demote clause-like
ϕ-configurations, while the promotions and demotions of the selective reorgani-
zations in center embedding apply to sub-clausal sets of cs-systems. Furthermore,
the tail recursion maintains at most four systems in an excited state, and none of
these interfere; in contrast, the center embedding maintains up to six cs-systems
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above ground. Several of those systems interfere, namely [Cam], [Bo], and [Al].
Promotion of one of these systems from ground, without demotion of potentially
interfering systems, can destabilize the system. Perhaps what is most problem-
atic is that in epochs (e1)–(e3) of the center embedding, there are {N} systems
which are not ϕ-coupled to any {V}.
Figure 5.15: Example trajectories for tail recursion and center embed-
ding.
The analyses above are not the only possible ones, and we can imagine vi-
able alternatives. For example, [drinks]{V} and [coffee]{−N} might have been ex-
cited in (e1) and demoted to ground in (e2), or even remain above ground, cre-
ating further interference with [likes] and [knows] in subsequent epochs. There
are numerous sensible possibilities for how a scrambling trajectory might arise.
The relevant systems might be initially grounded and selectively promoted from
ground during selective production; alternatively, the systems might be initially
organized such that a single clause is excited, and subsequently selective reorga-
nizations generate the scrambled trajectory. Motivating any particular analysis
of Ê operations in scrambling is an open challenge. Yet because center embedding
and scrambling rarely involve more than two clauses, we should not overempha-
size the importance of such examples.
The applications of reorganization operations employed in the above analyses
raise the question of what constraints there are on Ê. Although we do not sys-
tematically pursue this question in great detail, one clear generalization is that
promotion and demotion co-occur and often affect similar subsystems in a given
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transition.This makes sense given that we view e-operations as the consequence
of e-coupling forces, and that e-coupling forces are expected to be stronger be-
tween more similar systems. We have also imposed a number of analytic choices
which warrant further scrutiny. For instance, we have assumed that once the se-
lective regime of production begins, no epochs without a selected system occur.
This assumption could be violated, and one can imagine decomposing each Ê
into an ordered sequence of operations on individual systems. The order of these
operations could matter.
Clearly a principled theory of constraints on reorganization operations is de-
sirable, and in the absence of such a theory the reorganization mechanism seems
overly powerful. For the time being, we can decide to accept this because we have
not mistakenly imposed structure where none is present. Whereas the conven-
tional view is that Merge operations on objects are the fundamental mechanism
of ordering, the o/el view is that order emerges from operations on relative exci-
tation, which are ultimately forces which guide trajectories in a state space.
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The use of grammaticality intuitions as empirical data in linguistic theory is
controversial, and there is an ongoing debate regarding their utility (Culicover
& Jackendoff 2010; Ferreira 2005; Gibson & Fedorenko 2010; 2013; Sprouse &
Almeida 2013). Conventionally, grammaticality is distinguished from acceptabil-
ity (Schütze 2016; Sprouse 2007). Grammaticality is said to relate to “competence”,
i.e. knowledge of an underlying grammar, the isolated “narrow” faculty of lan-
guage. Acceptability relates to intuitions regarding whether sentences are “ac-
ceptable” (i.e. something a speaker could say and/or understand), and these intu-
itions are presumed to derive from grammaticality intuitions plus other “perfor-
mance” factors: memory limitations, semantic plausibility, interpreter age, emo-
tional state, etc.
There are serious problems with the distinction between grammaticality and
acceptability. For the distinction to make any sense, one has to presuppose some
concept of a grammar and an isolated syntax module. There is also the issue of
whether it is possible empirically to distinguish grammaticality intuitions from
acceptability intuitions. Because of these problemswe deliberately conflate gram-
maticality and acceptability in the o/el approach. In the o/el model, production
and interpretation are associated with trajectories in a state space, and mean-
ings are experiences of those trajectories. Grammaticality intuitions thus cannot
be intuitions about objects, in this view. Instead, grammaticality intuitions must
be experiences of trajectories. The question then becomes: what determines the
quality of those experiences?
We propose below that grammaticality/acceptability intuitions arise from the
experience of system coherence. As shown earlier, for a coherent system, the
width of the peak in its power spectrum is relatively narrow and the peak remains
at a constant frequency. These properties are required for stability. Grammatical-
ity/acceptability intuitions can thus be understood in relation to the coherence of
all systems for all excited ϕ-configurations in a trajectory, which we call gram-
matical coherence. In this chapter, we develop a heuristic test of grammatical
coherence which involves assessing whether a trajectory can be reiterated, ap-
ply the concept of coherence to intuitions regarding constituency, and examine
some electrophysiological manifestations of coherence.
6 Grammaticality intuitions
6.1 Problems with grammaticality
The conventional concepts of grammaticality and acceptability are easy targets
for critique. We elaborate several such critiques here: (i) grammaticality and
grammar can only be defined circularly; (ii) intuitions are inherently dynamic
but often treated as static; (iii) the mechanisms behind grammaticality intuitions
conflate producer and interpreter states; (iv) intuitions have often been associ-
ated with only sentences or phrases, but they are unavoidably associated with
context as well.
6.1.1 Grammar-grammaticality circularity
The concepts of a grammar and a grammatical sentence form a tautological rela-
tionwith grammaticality intuitions. One view of a grammar evokes the grammar-
as-theory motif:
The grammar of a language can be viewed as a theory of the structure of this
language. Any scientific theory is based on a certain finite set of observa-
tions and, by establishing general laws stated in terms of certain hypothet-
ical constructs, it attempts to account for observations, to show how they
are interrelated, and to predict an indefinite number of new phenomena.
(Chomsky 1956: 113)
The above view fails to recognize that there is no theory-free observation nor
theory-neutral conception of “the structure”. The observations themselves are al-
ways theoretical constructs. Conceptual metaphors and image schemas unavoid-
ably predetermine our understanding of the observations. One might take a so
what? attitude to this critique – perhaps the point that observations are never
theory-free is obvious and inescapable and we can shrug it off and get on with
our lives. Even so, the above passage begs the question of what the observations
are. We should always attend to the process of constructing our understanding
of the observations, because the theory and observations are one and the same.
Whereas grammar-as-theory views the grammar itself as the theory, grammar-
as-device views a grammar as an object that is studied by theory. This serves to
reify the notion of a grammar; grammars become entities which we study:
Syntactic investigation of a given language has as its goal the construction
of a grammar that can be viewed as a device of some sort for producing
the sentences of the language under analysis. …The ultimate outcome of
these investigations should be a theory of linguistic structure in which the
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descriptive devices utilized in particular grammars are presented and stud-
ied abstractly, with no specific reference to particular languages. (Chomsky
1957: 11)
A fairly reasonable expectation, for a scientific discipline, is that a grammar
must explain behavior:
…a grammar must reflect and explain the ability of a speaker to produce
and understand new sentences which may be much longer than any he has
previously heard. (Chomsky 1956: 124)
But the above uses of grammar presuppose that we can know what “the sen-
tences of the language” and “new sentences” are. How do we know which sen-
tences are grammatical, and which ones are not? Sometimes the distinction is
assumed to be evident:
…a device of some sort (called a grammar) for generating all and-only-the
sentences of a language, which we have assumed were somehow given in
advance. (Chomsky 1957: 85)
Suppose that for many languages there are certain clear cases of grammat-
ical sentences and certain clear cases of ungrammatical sequences. (Chom-
sky 1956: 113)
…we may assume for this discussion that certain sequences of phonemes
are definitely sentences, and that certain other sequences are definitely non-
sentences. (Chomsky 1957: 14)
Clearly, one would like to provide more empirically grounded definitions, or a
method for determining which sentences are and are not in the set of grammati-
cal ones:
One way to test the adequacy of a grammar proposed for L [a set of sen-
tences] is to determine whether or not the sequences that it generates are
actually grammatical, i.e., acceptable to a native speaker, etc. We can take
certain steps towards providing a behavioral criterion for grammaticalness
so that this test of adequacy can be carried out. For the purposes of this
discussion, however, suppose that we assume intuitive knowledge of the
grammatical sentences of English and ask what sort of grammar will be
able to do the job of producing these in some effective and illuminating
way. We thus face a familiar task of explication of some intuitive concept –
in this case, the concept “grammatical in English,” and more generally, the
concept “grammatical”. (Chomsky 1957: 13)
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A skeptic might be wary of the “intuitive concept” but nonetheless excited
to explore the “behavioral criterion for grammaticalness”. One such criterion in-
volves how sentences are read. Regarding sentences with structures analogous
to (1) and (2) below, Chomsky (1956) identified intonation as one such behavioral
criterion:
(1) Al ate a sandwich.
(2) Sandwich a ate Al.
(1) will be read by an English speaker with the normal intonation of a sen-
tence of the corpus, while (2) will be read with a falling intonation on each
word, as will any sequence of unrelated words (Chomsky 1956: 114).
But the occurrence of list intonation cannot be either a necessary or sufficient
criterion for grammaticality: sentence (1) can be uttered with list intonation, and
(2) can be uttered with phrasal intonation. Indeed, plenty of “grammatical” sen-
tences like (3) would probably exhibit a strong tendency to be read with list in-
tonation:
(3) A frog a cat a dog chased scared jumped far.
Some additional prosodic criteria are mentioned in a footnote of Chomsky
(1957), in reference to (4):
(4) John enjoyed the book and liked the play.
Such sentences with conjunction crossing constituent boundaries are also,
in general, marked by special phonemic features such as extra long pauses
(in our example, between “liked” and “the”), contrastive stress and intona-
tion, failure to reduce vowels and drop final consonants in rapid speech,
etc. Such features normally hark the reading of non-grammatical strings.
(Chomsky 1957: 35-36)
Prosodic and other phonological criteria are problematic justifications for
grammaticality, at least in the prevailing theoretical frame, because the narrow
language faculty is supposed to be isolated from the sensorimotor interfaces.This
is likely why such criteria seem to have been abandoned in subsequent work. Or
perhaps gestural-motoric aspects of production were subsequently understood
to be too complex and variable to serve as useful criteria. An alternative basis
for empirical determination of grammaticality involves associating “grammati-
cal sentences” with “observed sentences”:
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Notice that to meet the aims of grammar, given a linguistic theory, it is
sufficient to have a partial knowledge of the sentences (i.e., a corpus) of the
language, since a linguistic theory will state the relation between the set of
observed sentences and the set of grammatical sentences; i.e., it will define
“grammatical sentence” in terms of “observed sentence”, certain properties
of the observed sentences, and certain properties of grammars. (Chomsky
1957: 14)
This is different from the intonational/phonological criteria, but quite prob-
lematic for other reasons. First, what is meant by observed? Is an observed sen-
tence a sentence that is produced by a native speaker? Surely observation is not
sufficient for grammaticality, since native speakers do produce “ungrammatical”
sentences through disfluency mechanisms. And, observation cannot be a neces-
sary condition, since plenty of grammatical utterances are never observed. In
that case, perhaps intuition can guide us in deciding which observations and
non-observations to include:
It is undeniable that intuition about linguistic form is very useful to the in-
vestigator of linguistic form (i.e., grammar). It is also quite clear that the
major goal of grammatical theory is to replace this obscure reliance on in-
tuition by some rigorous and objective approach. (Chomsky 1957: 93-94)
Many references to grammaticality show awareness of the tension between
the theoretically dichotomous character of grammaticality and the complex, non-
dichotomous nature of grammaticality intuitions. Notice that in a previous ex-
cerpt reference was made to “certain clear cases” of ungrammatical sequences
(Chomsky 1956: 113). The need to qualify some cases as clear cases, implies that
some cases are unclear. This contradicts the idea that a language can be under-
stood as a set of grammatical sentences. Indeed, Chomsky explicitly refers to
degrees of grammaticalness:
…the resulting sentences are semi-grammatical; the more completely we
violate constituent structure by conjunction, the less grammatical is the re-
sulting sentence. This description requires that we generalize the grammat-
ical/ungrammatical dichotomy, developing a notion of degree of grammat-
icalness. (Chomsky 1957: 36)
…we may assume for this discussion that certain sequences of phonemes
are definitely sentences, and that certain other sequences are definitely non-
sentences. In many intermediate cases we shall be prepared to let the gram-
mar itself decide, when the grammar is set up in the simplest way so that it
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includes the clear sentences and excludes the clear non-sentences. (Chom-
sky 1957: 14)
What are these “intermediate cases” that straddle the dichotomy between
grammatical and nongrammatical sentences? Ultimately, the problem is that the
theoretical constructs – i.e. language as a set (container) of sentences (objects)
– requires precise definition of which objects are inside and outside (members
and non-members) of the set, but our intuitions about grammaticality cannot be
categorized so simply.
From the abovewe see that grammaticality is defined relative to a presupposed
grammar, and a grammar is defined from observations of grammaticality or ten-
uous correlates thereof. There is a disconnect between the discrete intuitions
predicted by a grammar and the messiness of actual intuitions. The conventional
solution to this problem evolved from “degrees of grammaticalness” into a dis-
tinction between grammaticality and acceptability, but the circularity problem
has never been resolved.
6.1.2 The non-stationarity of intuitions
Another major problem with grammaticality is that intuitions are commonly
treated as static rather than dynamic. Simply put, our intuitions can change over
time and may never be stable. To illustrate, read the sentence below at a normal
pace, just one time through:
(5) Either either Dee or Cam knows or Bo knows that Al drinks coffee.
On first read-through, assuming you did not backtrack, you probably did not
reach any clear understanding of the meaning of the sentence. Backtracking is
quite natural, and you might have backtracked subconsciously without realizing
it. Now consider the sentence again, with punctuation to help:
(6) Either, either Dee or Cam knows, or Bo knows, that Al drinks coffee.
Read the sentence bit by bit, over and over again, until you understand it. Di-
agram it out with a Venn diagram or decision tree if you need to. Eventually, it
should make some sense. You would never say this sentence (probably), but you
can achieve an understanding of it with some effort. Your intuitions about the
sentence have changed. This example shows that intuitions are not static, but
rather, dynamic, i.e. intuitions change over time.
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Is the time evolution of intuitions predictable? Let’s assume that changes such
as above are due to the “other factors” (e.g. memory limitations), which are con-
ventionally associated with acceptability. Your early intuitions were muddled
by these other factors, and with some effort, the intuition (experience) became
stable. Perhaps this is always the pattern: with enough effort, a grammatical sen-
tencewhich is initially unacceptable becomes acceptable through practice, which
can be viewed as a satiation effect (Snyder 2000). Let’s consider another example:
(7) Which coffeei does itsi brewer drink ti?
The target interpretation here is one in which the pronoun its refers to the
coffee that the brewer of that same coffee drinks. If you are unfamiliar with this
sort of pattern (known as weak crossover) and ignored the coindexation, your
initial interpretation most likely assumed some antecedent other than coffee for
its. If so, try to obtain the target weak crossover interpretation. To do this, read
the sentence slowly, and when you get to the possessive pronoun its, remember
that its refers to the coffee in question. Imagining a context may help as well:
(8) P1: Bo brews D-flavored coffee but does not drink it. Al brews
C-flavored coffee and drinks it too.
P2: Wait – which coffee does its brewer drink?
Hopefully you can achieve the target weak crossover meaning. If so, your in-
terpretation has evolved over time.We cannot say that the original difficulty was
due to “memory limitations,” since the sentence is not particularly long and the
non-crossover version is quite easy to process.
After learning theweak crossover interpretation, does themeaning experience
reach a steady state? Read the sentence 20 times, and after each reading take a
moment to reflect onwhat the sentencemeans.What happens to your intuitions?
Most likely they are not the same after the twentieth reading as after the first. Set
an alarm for 24 hours from now, or ask someone to remind you tomorrow, and
read the sentence (you will probably remember it, so just rehearse it). When you
do this, will your intuitions be the same as they are now? Probably not. Let’s
consider another weak-crossover sentence:
(8) Which breweri does hisi coffee please ti?
Your practice with the previous example may help you achieve the crossover
interpretationmore quickly with this new example, but perhaps not immediately.
You may still need to put in some effort. What would happen if you practiced a
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newweak crossover sentence every day, over the next year?Would the dynamics
of your intuitions change? Certainly. Perhaps you could eventually come to judge
strong crossover sentences as acceptable (e.g. Whoi did hei brew coffee fori?).
The multi-timescale nature of intuition dynamics, and interactions between
intuitions of different utterances, show that intuition changes are not simple ap-
proximations to a steady state.The evolution of intuitions is not merely the result
of overcoming the influence of the “other factors”. Indeed, there is no reason to as-
sume that intuitions are ever stable. The observation that linguists exhibit differ-
ent intuitions than non-linguists (Spencer 1973) further supports the conclusion
that intuitions are inherently unstable in the presence of certain surroundings
forces, such as doctoral training in linguistics. It raises the question of whether
even more extreme training (e.g. a crossover interpretation boot camp) can rad-
ically alter intuitions. The conventional perspective in which grammaticality in-
tuitions are presumed not to change (because grammars should be static), while
acceptability intuitions can change, is ultimately not satisfactory. The problem
with partitioning intuitions in this way is that, if the grammar is independent of
other systems, then all of the rich dynamics of intuition that do occur, i.e. changes
driven by practice, learning, time, context, etc., cannot inform our understanding
of “the grammar”.
6.1.3 Conflating production and interpretation
Another problem with notions of grammaticality and acceptability is conflation
of production and interpretation. Production involves speaking, signing, and
writing; interpretation involves listening, sign-viewing, and reading. We expect
these various activities to differ due to differential involvement of sensory and
motor systems, but we also expect production and interpretation to interact. In
many circumstances, speakers monitor their own speech, and conversely hearers
rehearse/simulate the utterances they hear. The problem with the conventional
approach to understanding intuitions is that it does not provide useful tools for
disentangling production and interpretation.
Let’s reflect some more on an example we considered previously. How do pro-
duction and interpretation contribute to changes in our intuitions regarding the
following sentence?
(9) Either either Dee knows or Cam knows or Bo knows that Al drinks
coffee.
On first reading, you probably did not understand the sentence. The mecha-
nisms which are normally involved in interpretation created a state which you
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experienced as somehow abnormal. So, you engaged production mechanisms:
you produced the utterance slowly, either in a subvocal rehearsal mode (i.e. with
execution gated) or out loud. This may have helped you keep track of various
relational meanings evoked in the utterance. On your next attempt at interpre-
tation, you came closer to understanding the sentence. By repeating production
and interpretation, you eventually achieved a coherent understanding. Now we
ask: does the same process apply to simpler utterances, such as below?
(10) Al drinks coffee.
This sentence seems to require no effort, as if we interpret it directly, without
the need for cycles of interpretation and production. But are we sure that there
is nothing production-like involved in this process? Even if no gm-simulation
(sub-vocal rehearsal) occurs, could a cs-simulation occur?Moreover, for themore
complicated examples, how does an interpretation transition into a production
and vice versa?
The object metaphor and the conventional understanding of a grammar are
not well-suited to investigating these questions. The reason is that the object
structures created by merge are not readily temporalized, whereas production
and interpretation trajectories are always temporal. The object metaphor raises
many questions regarding what happens in transitions between interpretation
and production: do the objects and the connections persist between interpreta-
tion and production? How can the structure change over time, unless connec-
tions are broken with some sort of unmerge operation? Or perhaps between
interpretation and production, vanish operations occurs instead of unmerge—
but in that case, where do the objects go? These absurdities are compounded by
the problem that merge is separate from the sensorimotor interfaces. How can
merge produce the same output in interpretation and production if, in interpre-
tation, intended meaning relations are initially unavailable and depend on the
structure to be built by merge?
6.1.4 The construction of text and context
Another facet of the debate about grammaticality intuitions centers on the role of
context (Bolinger 1965; Keller 2000; Schütze 2016). From the o/el perspective, an
underlying problem with this debate is presupposition of the conventional con-
ceptualization of context as a container, which reinforces the object metaphor.
One view is that there is no problem with using intuitions about utterances or
sentences out of context. Another is that interpretations of utterances in a “de-
fault” (idealized, unbiased, etc.) context are useful for theoretical purposes.These
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two perspectives, both of which accept grammaticality intutions of isolated sen-
tences as useful data, are illustrated in Figure 6.1(A) and (B), respectively. A third
viewpoint is that grammaticality judgments are problematic because judging an
utterance out of context can provide misleading observations and thus can result
in misguided theories.
All three viewpoints presuppose the container schema for conceptualizing the
relation between sentences and context, as shown in Figure 6.1. The sentences
are objects (composed of/containing smaller objects, words) and the contexts are
containers of the sentences. Hence utterances are spoken in a context and we
can argue about whether utterances should be analyzed out of context.
Figure 6.1: A container schema is used for conceptualizing the relation
between sentences and context.
The problem on both sides of the argument is the presupposition of the objec-
t/container metaphor, because it reifies the object metaphor conception of lan-
guage. From the o/el perspective, there is only a state space with dimensions cor-
responding to system states, forces between systems, a surroundings, and forces
from the surroundings – the full system. All aspects of the full system are analyti-
cally imposed: we construct them ad hoc to suit our purposes. So, “where” is con-
text in this conceptual model? Context is where we choose it to be. Some aspects
of what is conventionally called context are systems and corresponding dimen-
sions of the state space; other aspects of context – the ones we choose to ignore
or integrate – become surroundings and surroundings forces. We are always free
to reconstruct the analysis, reconceptualizing aspects of the surroundings as sys-
tems, or reinterpreting systems as surroundings. In other words, context is not
a thing, nor a space for things, but rather the consequence of a choice regarding
how to construct an analysis.
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6.1.5 Competence and performance: Objects and use of objects
A big deal has been made of the distinction between competence and perfor-
mance in relation to grammaticality (Chomsky 1965). The distinction is an early
statement of the notion that there is some core implicit knowledge or mecha-
nism, a narrow faculty of language, the essence of what language is. This core
module is separate from the sensorimotor interfaces (note the spatial metaphor),
which are to blame for deviations of actual production and comprehension from
the idealized capacities of the core grammar (competence). In descriptions of the
distinction, competence is described as knowledge, while performance is not de-
scribed as knowledge, but rather a “use” of knowledge. Hence the distinction con-
structs a difference in types: competence is the objects themselves, performance
is use of those objects:
We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-
hearer’s knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual use of
language in concrete situations). (Chomsky 1965: 4)
From the o/el perspective, there is no such thing as “knowledge”, construed
as objects. Instead, there are system states and surroundings, a state space and
forces: there is no knowledge, no objects, no merge. Knowledge and use are not
distinguished, because knowledge is not a thing, nor a stuff. Instead, we imag-
ine a multitude of microscopic dimensions, patterns of neural connectivity, neu-
rotransmitter release, ion channels – spatiotemporal order of enormously high
dimension. Anything short of that is an analytical simplification; to call it knowl-
edge (competence), and to dissociate it from observations of patterns in time, i.e.
use of knowledge (performance), misleads us into believing that our categoriza-
tion of “knowledge” is real. We should avoid misleading ourselves in this way.
6.2 Grammatical coherence
In the o/el framework, there is no conventional grammar on which grammati-
cality intuitions could be based. A new conceptualization of intuitions is needed,
one which helps us understand how intuitions emerge and evolve. The approach
we take here is to view grammaticality/acceptability intuitions as the experience
of coherence or non-coherence of system configurations in interpretation tra-
jectories. For this purpose, we distinguish between grammatical coherence and
spectral coherence. There are two varieties of spectral coherence: auto-spectral co-
herence applies to a single system, and cross-spectral coherence applies to a pair
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of systems. These concepts are important for understanding the pre-stable phase
of interpretation. Spectral coherence throughout an e-epoch is also a prerequi-
site for grammatical coherence, which, as we explore below, is a consequence of
whether in interpretation a stable reiterative trajectory emerges.
For a reference point, we construct a canonical interpretation trajectory, and
then extend the canonical interpretation trajectory to be reiterative. We then
apply the concept of coherence on three scales: e-epochs, utterances, and dis-
course. One thing to emphasize at the outset of the analysis is that intuitions –
just like relational meanings – are experiences which arise from system states.
Thus any production or interpretation trajectory is associated with some intu-
ition(s), which may or may not be consciously recognized. We do not specifically
address how people communicate their intuitions, or how intuitions induce ac-
tion, although this is certainly a worthwhile line of inquiry.
6.2.1 The canonical interpretation trajectory
In the canonical interpretation trajectory we assume a hearer who hears an ut-
terance produced by a speaker. We impose a number of assumptions on this
scenario:
First, the utterance conforms to a canonical production trajectory and is coher-
ent for the speaker. This entails that for the speaker, in the initial epoch of e-or-
ganization and in all subsequent epochs, the ϕ/e states of all excited systems are
stationary and have a high degree of auto-coherence and all cs-resonances have
a high degree of cross-spectral coherence. We also assume that if the speaker
and hearer were interchanged, the interpreter (who was the speaker before the
interchange) would experience a coherent interpretation trajectory.
Second, in the initial state no c-systems are excited. This lets us ignore “top-
down” effects which would be manifested as surroundings forces on systems. In
more general interpretation trajectories these effects can be very important for
determining coherence.
Third, we assume that sensory systems (auditory and/or visual) associated
with gm-systems from the utterance are veridically perceived by the interpreter:
excitation of those sensory systems unambiguously induces c-and s-system ex-
citations. Thus we ignore the possibility of ambiguities arising from multiple
gm-domain to c-system mappings (e.g. there’s a bathroom on the right vs. there’s
a bad moon on the rise). Note that we generally have not incorporated sensory
systems in our analyses; instead, we have left sensory systems as part of the sur-
roundings. Here we decide to construct sensory systems in the analysis, but we
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do not explicitly model their interactions with c-, s-, g-, and m-systems. Instead
we stipulate their influences on the c- and s-systems that are our main focus.
Under the above assumptions, a canonical interpretation trajectory ofAl drinks
coffee and tea is shown below:
Figure 6.2: Canonical interpretation trajectory of the utterance Al
drinks coffee and tea.
(1) The trajectory begins with a sequence of c-system and s-system excitations.
In the canonical trajectory, only those c- and s-systems associated with the
veridically perceived gm-systems in the utterance are excited. In general,
surroundings forces will influence the relative timing of when the relevant
systems become excited, and some c-systems may already be excited from
previous utterances or context, including ones which are not associated
with the utterance.
(2) Each newly excited pair of c- and s-systems forms a cs-resonance. In the
canonical trajectory, only the c-systems associated with the utterance cou-
ple to s-systems. In general, other c-systems may form cs-resonances, or
may already be in resonant configurations with s-systems. Furthermore,
the timing of when each cs-resonance forms is underdetermined. The ac-
tivation of a cs-resonance resonance most likely begins shortly after the




(3) Some ϕ-configuration stabilizes. Some ϕ-configuration, but not necessarily
all relevant ϕ-configurations.The stabilization process begins when cs-sys-
tems emerge in the previous stage, and the timecourse of cs-system emer-
gence may influence which ϕ-configuration stabilizes first. No particular
ϕ-configuration must stabilize first, although we assume that earlier acti-
vation of a configuration makes earlier stabilization more likely – in other
words, parsing is incremental.
(4) A stable initial e-organization arises. In the canonical scenario, the ex-
cited systems are those associated with the ϕ-configuration which stabi-
lized first. In general e-organization can begin before ϕ-stabilization, but
e-stabilization must follow the stabilization of a ϕ-configuration (this is a
consequence of our hypothesis that ϕ-organization can influence e-orga-
nization).
(5) The canonical interpretation trajectory leads to a state in which a reiter-
ative trajectory can occur. In the above example, the sequence of epochs
(e1…e2) is reiterated, i.e. an alternation between configurations in which
|Al drinks coffee| is attended, and configurations in which |Al drinks tea| is
attended. To distinguish canonical interpretation from canonical produc-
tion, we analyze the interpretation trajectory as a non-simulative (s-gated
and m-gated) regime. In general interpretation trajectories we can relax
this assumption and allow for cs-simulation (an m-gated trajectory) or gm-
simulation (an exec-gated trajectory).
Reiterative trajectories play an important role in interpretation. Reiteration
allows for a trajectory that emerges in interpretation to be less dependent on
initial conditions and less dependent on the timecourse of system activation. It
also provides a mechanismwhereby relatively complex utterances which may be
initially unstable can become coherent. Recall that a reiteration is a sequence of
unique stable states ei … en where en = ei. In other words, the system trajectory
cycles through a sequence of states. Reiteration is a reconceptualization of “work-
ing memory” for relational meaning experiences. An example reiteration of Bo
knows Al drinks coffee is shown in Figure 6.8. After an initial unstable epoch (e0),
there is a stable state (e1) in which |Bo knows| is attended and |Al drinks coffee| is
grounded, then a transition to (e2) in which |Al drinks coffee| is attended and |Bo
knows| is grounded. This is followed by a transition to (e′1), which is equivalent
to e1. Hence the trajectory is reiterative.
We remain agnostic regarding whether reorganizations in reiterative trajecto-
ries typically occur with cs-selection. This is represented in the potentials above
182
6.2 Grammatical coherence
Figure 6.3: A reiterative trajectory arises in interpretation.
by the empty selection level, and we refer to such trajectories as non-selectional,
or s-gated. Alternative possibilities are that reiteration is cs-simulative, i.e. the
trajectory involves selection of cs-systems without gm-selection, or the reiter-
ation is gm-simulative, with closed execution gates. It is unclear whether our
analyses of coherence hinge on this difference in regime, although we suspect
that interpreters are not aware of non-selectional reiteration to the same degree
that they are aware of cs-selectional reiteration.
The applicability of reiteration is not restricted to attention-switching between
entire clauses. Any sequence of stable configurations can be reiterated. What
makes reiteration important is its function as a stabilization mechanism with
mnemonic advantages. An example of a reiterative trajectory is shown in Fig-
ure 6.4.
(11) Al drinks coffee and tea, and eats granola and eggs.
Figure 6.4: Reiterative trajectory involving four ϕ-configurations.
Interpretation of this utterance involves a reiterative sequence of four ϕ-con-
figurations. In each epoch of the reiteration (e1–e4), a different subset of cs-sys-
tems is above ground, while others are grounded. Because there are multiple
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cs-systems of the same syntactic category, there is a potential for differentia-
tion interference. The grounding of unattended systems mitigates against this
interference. However, this comes at a cost: reorganization operations must be
selective rather than canonical, i.e. the analysis requires ungrounding promo-
tions and grounding demotions. For example, Ê2 selectively demotes [coffee] to
ground and promotes [tea] from ground; Ê3 demotes [drinks] and [tea] while
promoting [eats] and [granola]. Note that we analyze [and]{CONJ} as a system
which is excited to selection level with each ungrounding promotion, just as in
production trajectories.
The abovemechanism generalizes to arbitrarily long utterances, as inAl drinks
coffee and tea, and eats granola and eggs, and Bo drinks whisky and beer, and
eats porridge and salad. How can an interpreter remember the complicated se-
quence of reorganizations which are required for attending to all of the relational
meanings in such an utterance? Of course, an interpreter might not successfully
remember such a sequence. But it is possible; and most people would require
some practice. We conjecture that reiteration is the mechanism of this “prac-
tice” and induces “learning”, i.e. microscale changes which constitute a form of
“long-term memory” for the sequence of non-canonical reorganizations. Reiter-
ation with cs-selection, gm-selection, and execution are probably even more ef-
fective in this regard: overt execution is the most effective mnemonic technique,
subvocal rehearsal (exec-gated production) the next most effective, and m-gated
cs-simulation the least effective.
The hypothesized learning which reiteration facilitates can be viewed as learn-
ing of a sequence of e-reorganizations, which determines an e-space trajectory.
There are interesting questions regarding the timescales on which such changes
persist, which relate to distinctions between scales of memory (working, short-
term, and long-term). The question of how we can learn to remember long se-
quences warrants further investigation. What is essential here, is that, on the
utterance timescale, we do not need to impose any new organizing mechanism
for relational meaning experiences.
6.2.2 Grammatical coherence: Scales and criteria
The concept of grammatical coherence can be applied on three scales: the small-
est scale involves an e-epoch in which at least one but no more than a few ϕ-
configurations are continuously attended. On this epochal scale, coherence only
requires that all above-ground cs-systems participate in some stable set of ϕ-con-
figurations. This entails that the cross-spectral coherence for any pair of systems
will be relatively high, because frequency-locking is required for stability. We
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can also apply grammatical coherence to the interpretation of an entire utterance;
on the utterance scale, grammatical coherence requires epochal coherence for all
epochs in the utterance, as well as a potential for a reiterative simulation of the
trajectory. The most relevant scale for analysis of grammaticality/acceptability
intuitions is the discourse scale, on which coherence requires utterance coher-
ence and the condition that the attended ϕ-configurations of the interpreter cor-
respond to the attended ϕ-configurations of the producer. Note that we do not
require that the sequence of interpreter e-epochs be the same as those of the
producer. Hence the following criteria give rise to a grammatical coherence hi-
erarchy:
i. All excited cs-systems participate in some stable, coherent set of ϕ-confi-
gurations.
ii. A sequence of stable, coherent ϕ-configurations can be reiterated.
iii. Each ϕ-configuration in the potentially reiterative interpretation trajec-
tory corresponds to a ϕ-configuration in an associated production trajec-
tory.
Table 6.1: The grammatical coherence hierarchy.
(i) (ii) (iii)
epoch coherence y
utterance coherence y y
discourse coherence y y y
The epoch coherence criterion is that all of the above-ground systems in an
e-epoch must participate in at least one stable ϕ-configuration. The states in Fig-
ure 6.5(A–D) below fail to meet this criterion. In (A), imagine that an interpreter
hears the name Al. Without any other cs-system to couple with, [Al]{N} does not
participate in a stable ϕ-configuration. When an unstable state such as (A) arises,
we can anticipate two possible continuations of the trajectory. In one, [Al]{N} be-
comes grounded; in the other, additional cs-resonances become excited and a co-
herent configuration stabilizes. Many pragmatic phenomena can be understood
as trajectories in which an utterance evokes an unstable configuration which
evolves to a stable configuration when other cs-systems become excited. Often
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we can construct analyses in which other systems are excited for contextual rea-
sons. Consider the utterance Al coffee in (B); excitation of these two cs-systems
in unstable. However, if we imagine that [drink]{V} is also above-ground because
the producer and interpreter are discussing who drinks what (e.g. Al coffee, Bo
tea, Cam whisky, Dee beer…), then the epoch coherence criterion would be met.
Figure 6.5: Examples of non-coherent epochs. The configurations in C′
and D′ are coherent versions of the configurations in C and D.
In (C) we imagine that an interpreter hears Al drinks coffee, and that all cs-sys-
tems are above-ground but occupy the same e-level. Because there is no stable
ϕ-configuration, the state is non-coherent. However, we do not knowwhether or
not a stable ϕ-configuration could evolve from the e configuration in (C), and so
it is not the e-organization which makes the configuration unstable, but rather,
the absence of a stable ϕ-configuration. In the absence of other forces, we expect
that a reorganization to the coherent state in (C′) occurs in conjunction with the
emergence of stable ϕ and e-configurations. This example illustrates that coher-
ence derives from a system state, and does not depend on the path taken to arrive
at that system state (of course, many paths may not lead to coherence).
Example (D) is non-coherent because [tea]{−N} is above-ground but does not
participate in a stable ϕ-configuration. We note that the underlying cause of
the instability is differentiation interference: {−N} cannot differentiate into stable
[tea]{−N} and [coffee]{−N} cs-resonances in this configuration. The instability in
(D) is typically resolved by grounding the less highly excited system as in (D′).
Indeed, we note that the grounding from (D) to (D′) is not necessarily a distinct
mechanism from the one which governs e-organization in early production: cs-
resonances compete for excitation.
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The utterance coherence criterion specifies that there is a potentially periodic
sequence of epochs (i.e. reiterative trajectory), each of which meets the epochal
coherence criterion. It is not required that all epochs which arise in the inter-
pretation of an utterance are coherent, only that an uninterrupted sequence of
epochs occurs, through the same re-organization operations which are available
for production. It is also not required that the sequence actually repeats. We only
require that the interpreter system evolves to a state from which re-organization
can return the system to the first state in the sequence. Consider an utterance
with a parenthetical, such as Al, Bo knows, drinks coffee, shown in Figure 6.6.1
Figure 6.6: Utterance coherence is achived when a trajectory of coher-
ent epochs can be reiterated.
For utterance coherence, a potentially periodic trajectory of individually co-
herent epochs must occur for the interpreter. In epoch (e*), a non-coherent state,
coherence has not been achieved. However, if subsequently the trajectory (e1),
(e′1) arises, then coherence is achieved: (e′1) can evolve to (e1) through selective
reorganization, and vice versa, in effect shifting attention between two ϕ-con-
figurations. Note that the reorganization from (e*) to (e1) involves a grounding
demotion of [Al]{N}, which would be the first active cs-system in the canonical
trajectory. In the above example, the reiteration that arises does not necessarily
match the initial e-organization of the producer, nor does it match the trajectory
which occurred for the producer during execution.
As with epoch coherence, the interpretation trajectory that leads to an utter-
ance-coherent trajectory is not relevant to assessment of coherence: a trajectory
in which non-coherent states such as (e*) in Figure 6.6 occur before the poten-
tially reiterative trajectory. However, coherence intuitions may derive not only
1Note that for the sake of providing more compact representations of trajectories which in-
volve multiple ϕ-epochs, we sometimes represent excited systems on the same e-level, but we
nonetheless imagine those systems to occupy distinct e-levels. Note also that we do not require
that any systems have selection-level excitation, and therefore canonical reorganizations are
unnecessary; thus only selective reorganizations are shown in this figure.
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from whether a coherent trajectory is ultimately achieved, but also from experi-
ence of incoherent states prior to coherence. Thus we should think of utterance
coherence intuitions as determined by a trajectory of experiences of states.
Because utterance coherence does not require any correspondence between
producer and interpreter states, it is not very useful for conceptualizing grammat-
icality intuitions relative to a producer trajectory. Indeed, utterance coherence oc-
curs when the interpreter reaches any coherent reiterative trajectory, regardless
of what the producer intended. Thus from the initial state in (e0) below, where
we assume the speaker intended |Bo knows| and |Al drinks coffee| configurations,
if the interpreter attends to |Al knows| and |Bo drinks coffee| configurations in
state (e1) and state (e2), coherence is achieved, despite the producer-interpreter
mismatch in ϕ-configurations.
Figure 6.7: Utterance coherent interpretation trajectory which does not
correspond to the producer trajectory.
It is important to emphasize that we cannot precisely say “an utterance is co-
herent”, because coherence is not a property of utterances. Utterance coherence
is coherence associated with the timescale of utterances, which can span multi-
ple epochs of attention. We can only say that a coherent, potentially reiterative
trajectory occurs in the interpretation of an utterance. Moreover, this does not
imply that the trajectory remains coherent: reorganizations might occur, for a
number of reasons, which prevent the trajectory from being potentially reiter-
ated.
Discourse coherence requires the additional condition that ϕ-configurations
in the interpreter reiteration correspond to ones that arose during the cs-/gm-
selective phase of a production trajectory. Thus unlike epoch and utterance co-
herence, discourse coherence requires consideration of both interpreter and pro-
ducer trajectories. Specifically, for each excited ϕ-configuration in the selectional
regime of a production trajectory, that same ϕ-configuration arises in the in-
terpretation trajectory. Only ϕ-configurations which are excited in selectional
epochs of the production trajectory are relevant to discourse coherence, because
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it is possible for a noncanonical production trajectory to visit arbitrary states
before and after the states which govern cs-system selection.
One important aspect of the correspondence criterion for discourse coherence
is that the specific sequence of ϕ-configurations an interpreter experiences need
not match the specific sequence of ϕ-configurations which a producer experi-
ences. Imposing this condition results in a stricter version of discourse coherence,
but may be hard to apply because producer e-state trajectories can be highly un-
derdetermined for relatively complicated utterances. One possible solution to
this problem is to require ϕ/e reiteration correspondence between producer and
interpreter, but this requires us to stipulate that a reiterative producer trajectory
always occurs, which is far from obvious.
Another issue with the discourse coherence criterion is that we have no well-
defined notion of “the same” cs-system between a producer and interpreter, at
least not when the producer and interpreter are different people. We can ignore
this problem or circumvent it by imagining that the interpreter and producer are
the same person. This is the case for self-reflective grammaticality/acceptability
intuitions that are often used in syntactic theory construction. However, in the
more general situation where producer and interpreter are not the same person,
the concept of discourse coherence requires further assumptions regarding sim-
ilarity of cs-systems between different individuals.
6.2.3 Incremental organization in interpretation
How does a stable configuration first arise in interpretation? In the canonical in-
terpretation trajectory, sensory systems exert forces on c-systems and s-systems,
which activate them and induce cs-resonances. The canonical trajectory makes
the assumption that all cs-resonances were in an active, unexcited state before
ϕ/e organization occurs, as in the trajectories below. But this oversimplification
is obviously empirically inadequate. In most cases we expect some organization
to arise before production of an utterance has finished.
To expand the empirical scope of our model of interpretation, incremental
ϕ/e organization is necessary. However, the evolution of states during periods in
which sensory systems activate cs-systems is generally unconstrained. Figure 6.9
contrasts two highly ordered, memory stack-like trajectories in which systems
are incrementally e-organized. In the precedency mapping, each newly activated
system becomes excited and occupies the first above-ground level, while previ-
ously excited systems are each promoted one level. If the interpreter enters a
production regime, the interpretation-production mechanism behaves as a first-
in first-out buffer, in a sense.
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Figure 6.8: Conceptual-syntactic systems are activated by perceptual
systems.
Figure 6.9: Comparison of recency and precedency mappings in the
e-organization of perceptually activated systems.
In the recency mapping, each newly excited system becomes the most highly
excited system. In this case the relative excitations must be inverted before a
production of the utterance could occur. This would suggest a new type of re-
organization operator, Êinv. This inversion operation is somewhat problematic
because it does not seem to occur in other circumstances; it is an ad hoc set of
operations that is necessary to convert the recency-based organization to one
which is consistent with production.
In any case, both precedency and recency incremental e-organization are prob-
ably too inflexible to be of much general use. Recall our depiction of the chaotic
emergence of stable ϕ/e-configurations in production. We might expect some-
thing quite similar in interpretation: asymmetries in when individual sensory
systems become active and exert forces on c- and s-systems, ambiguities in map-
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pings from sensory systems to c- and s-systems, variation in the growth and
competition timecourses of cs-resonances, inhomogeneity in the initial condi-
tions, fluctuations in the surroundings – all of these make highly systematic or-
ganization scenarios such as those above quite unlikely.
A somewhat more realistic picture is one in which ϕ-configurations arise in-
crementally and exert a strong influence on subsequent e-organization. Mean-
ing relations can form as cs-systems become active, and part of the stabilization
process involves excitation of those systems. Hence we expect ϕ-configuration
emergence to bias e-organization. For example, in the interpretation trajectory
of Bo knows Al drinks coffee below, ϕ-configurations are organized as soon as the
relevant cs-systems are active. In the subsequent examples, we show the most
recently perceived system as grounded in the epoch prior to the one in which it
becomes excited. Hence [knows]{V} is active in the epoch (e2), prior to partici-
pating in the configuration |Bo knows| in (e3). Likewise, [Al]{N} is active in (e3)
and through a selective reorganization becomes excited in (e4). Incrementally or-
ganized states bias subsequent reorganizations. For example, the incrementally
organized |Al drinks| state in epoch (e5) biases the system to reorganize to (e6),
where |Al drinks coffee| is excited.
Figure 6.10: The immediate organization bias in incremental ϕ organi-
zation.
The excitation of [Bo][knows] in (e3) is hypothesized to result from an ex-
pectation that a newly active cs-system will enter into a ϕ-configuration with
previously excited systems, without any intervening ϕ-configurations being or-
ganized. In our framework an “expectation” of this sort can be conceptualized as
forces which promote coupling of a newly activated cs-system with an already
activated or excited system. We refer to this as the immediate organization bias,
and consider it to be the basis for incremental organization. Immediate organiza-
tion explains why utterances such as Al, Bo knows, drinks coffee are more difficult




One empirically desirable consequence of incremental organization and the
immediate organization bias is that a ϕ-configuration can prevent a newly ex-
cited system from participating in a stable configuration. To see why, consider
the utterance in (12):
(12) Al drinks coffee and tea is brewing.
This sentence is designed to create a garden path effect. The interpreter may
initially understand tea as an object of drinks, because of the immediate organiza-
tion bias. A possible interpretation trajectory is shown in Figure 6.11. (Note that
the trajectory here and in examples to follow depict incremental e-organization,
but this is not strictly necessary. The e-organization serves only to facilitate the
depiction of the relevant ϕ-configurations). The garden path relational meaning
experience of drinks tea corresponds to [tea]{−N} and [drinks]{V} being in a ϕ-
configuration, shown in epoch (e3). However, [brew]{V} must −ϕ couple to a {−N}
system in order to be coherent. Grounding of the |drinks tea| configuration pre-
vents [brew]{V} and [tea]{−N} from being in a stable configuration. The inability
of [tea]{−N} to couple to both [drinks]{V} and [brew]{V} is due to the selective
reorganization from (e4) to (e5). The interpreter may then become aware of the
non-coherence of the state in (e5). This awareness induces a grounding of all
systems (e6) and reorganization to the state in (e7).
Figure 6.11: A garden path trajectory in which awareness of non-
coherence induces grounding and reorganization.
On the other hand, the above utterance might not induce a garden path ef-
fect.The garden path arises because the selective reorganization Ê2 grounds only
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[coffee]{N}, as in Figure 6.12(A). Alternatively, if the selective reorganization Ê2
occurs as in (B), grounding |Al drinks coffee|, then [tea]{N} does not couple with
[drinks]{V} and can couple with [brew]{V} in (e3).
Figure 6.12: A garden path occurs with the selective reorganization in
(A) but not with the selective reorganization in (B).
The selective reorganization in (B) which grounds all of the cs-systems associ-
ated with |Al drinks coffee| would be more likely to occur in interpretation when
the utterance is spoken slowly (or when a comma is present: Al drinks coffee, and
tea is brewing), and less likely to occur when it is spoken quickly. Thus we can
view prosodic manipulations such as boundary-lengthening as a mechanism for
diminishing the forces which give rise to the immediate organization bias.
Our analysis of the garden path repair raises the question of how the inter-
preter, after becoming aware of the incoherence of the configuration in (e5),
knows to reorganize so that [tea]{N} and [brew]{V} are coupled. This is an im-
portant, challenging question, which deserves future attention. In some circum-
stances, the interpreter does not – without assistance – achieve a coherent re-
organization. This suggests that the |drink tea| system may not be sufficiently
decoupled by grounding. The assistance, in everyday conversation, may be in
the form of intonation (Al drinks coffee, … and tea is brewing). Indeed, even in
the textbook example (the horse raced past the barn fell), some students who are
unfamiliar with the example must be explicitly cued to evoke the relevant con-
figuration (i.e. with the horse that was raced…) before they are able to achieve a
coherent interpretation.
Garden path phenomena are a subset of a more general circumstance in which
the system trajectory gets trapped in some subspace, preventing the trajectory
from evolving to other possible states. In the prototypical garden path, the ut-
terance is non-coherent when the system trajectory enters the trapping region,
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but more generally, the trapping subspace may be coherent and simply prevents
some alternative, potentially coherent trajectory from occurring.This is why am-
biguities can be difficult to notice. Consider the sentence in (13):
(13) Al drinks soda coffee and tea are my favorites.
In interpretation of (13), immediate organization creates a strong bias for a
|Al drinks soda| configuration to arise. This prevents the alternative coherent
interpretation in which the producer means that Al, drinks, soda, coffee, and tea
are their favorite things. The trapping substate here is a cs-resonance of [drinks]
with {V}, which prevents a [drinks]{N} system from being excited.There aremany
circumstances in which garden path effects can arise (Ferreira 2005; Pritchett
1988), and comparisons of behavior in these should provide valuable information
regarding incremental organization.
It should be noted here that the o/el conception does not gel with certain types
of probabilistic models in which representations themselves are considered prob-
abilistic (e.g. Chater & Manning 2006; Manning 2003). The system state is unar-
guably deterministic: there is one and only one state at any given moment of
time, and so we should not reason that there are multiple parses of an utter-
ance, each associated with a probability. Certainly, multiple configurations may
be simultaneously active, to varying degrees, but this differs conceptually and
implementationally from models in which a unity normalization is applied to
construct a probability distribution over states.
Incremental e-organization is also relevant to understanding why “word salad”
utterances such as those in (14) do not typically lead to coherence. In themarginal
cases, intonation/punctuation can facilitate coherence when (in fixed order lan-
guages) the e-organization deviates from the typical ϕ-e mapping. We infer from
these examples that incremental organization is influenced by learned ϕ-to-e
mappings. What is important about this, from the perspective of our concep-
tual model, is that interpretation does not necessarily have access to ϕ relations.
Interpreters may need to use e-to-ϕ mappings, which are inversions of learned
ϕ-to-e mappings, in conjunction with immediate organization. Intonation/punc-
tuation may diminish the influence of immediate organization on incremental
organization.
(14) a. * Al coffee knows drinks Bo.
b. * Bo drinks Al knows coffee.
c. * Coffee Bo Al drinks knows.
d. ? Al Bo knows drinks coffee. cf. Al – Bo knows – drinks coffee.
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e. ? Coffee Bo knows Al drinks. cf. Coffee – Bo knows – Al drinks.
f. ? Bo Al drinks coffee knows. cf. ?Bo – Al drinks coffee – knows.
In (14)(a–c), there seems to be no amount of intonational/punctuational infor-
mation which can make the highly abnormal mappings coherent. This suggests
that, because of the immediate organization bias, substantial departures from
learned ϕ-emappingsmake achieving coherencemore difficult.What constitutes
a “substantial” departure is an open question.
6.2.4 Factors which influence coherence experiences
It is important to view grammatical coherence as a phenomenon which is asso-
ciated with an experience. More specifically, we experience a trajectory of rela-
tional meaning configurations which may or may not be stable. Although our
generic hypothesis is that grammaticality/acceptability intuitions reflect these
experiences, we have not considered which aspects of the trajectory our intu-
itions are sensitive to. A comprehensive study of intuitions should consider a
wide variety of factors, e.g. the number of simultaneously excited ϕ-configura-
tions, ϕ-configurations in which some systems are active but unexcited, activa-
tion of systems which cannot be immediately organized, interference from s-sys-
tem differentiation, interference from c-system differentiation, the ϕ of differen-
tiated systems, previously active systems which interfere with the excitation of
newly active cs-systems from being organized, etc.
Here we focus on interference, which seems to underlie many of the factors
listed above in some way or another. The immediate organization bias can also
be seen as a mechanism which minimizes interference by stabilizing newly ac-
tivated systems as soon as possible. Consider the sentences in (15)-(18), where
in each set of sentences, the (a) examples seem more acceptable than the (b) ex-
amples, which are in turn more acceptable than the (c) examples. Furthermore,
center embedding sentences in (15) and (16) are generally less coherent than their
tail recursion counterparts in (17) and (18).
(15) Center embedding
a. I saw a frog a cat chased.
b. I saw a frog a cat a dog bit, chased.
c. I saw a frog a cat a dog a bee stung bit chased.
(16) Center embedding
a. I saw Al, who Bo likes.
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b. I saw Al, who Bo, who Cam likes, likes.
c. I saw Al, who Bo, who Cam, who Dee likes, likes, likes.
(17) Tail recursion
a. I saw a cat who chased a frog.
b. I saw a dog who bit a cat, who chased a frog.
c. I saw a bee who stung a dog who bit a cat who chased a frog.
(18) Tail recursion
a. I saw Bo, who likes Al.
b. I saw Cam, who likes Bo, who likes Al.
c. I saw Dee, who likes Cam, who likes Bo, who likes Al.
A hypothesized interpretation trajectory for the center embedding of relative
clauses in (16b) is shown in Figure 6.13. Note that we have omitted some inter-
vening epochs in the trajectory to avoid clutter. As we hypothesized earlier the
object relative [who]{rel} system +ϕ couples to the relativized {N} and −ϕ cou-
ples to a {V}. Thus in (e2) a [who]{rel} system +ϕ couples to [Al]{N}, and in (e3) a
[who]{rel} system +ϕ couples to [Bo]{N}. We conceptualize these [who]{rel} sys-
tems as differentiations of a general {rel} system, just like [Al]{N} and [Bo]{N} are
differentiations of {N}. Furthermore, we assume that a system is grounded after
having participated in its expected ϕ-configuration, unless that system is rela-
tivized. Hence we imagine that [I]{PRO} and [saw]{V} are grounded after (e1) but
[Al]{N} remains above-ground because it couples with [who]{rel} in (e2). Thus
{rel} systems cause some other system to which they are coupled to remain ex-
cited.




Given the above analysis, the first question we ask is: why is (16b) less likely
to induce a coherent state than (16a)? One simple difference is that (16b) requires
more ϕ-configurations to be simultaneously excited than (16a). This follows from
our hypothesis that each [who]{rel} system +ϕ couples to an {N} and −ϕ couples
to a {V}, along with our assumption that systems coupled to {rel} remain excited
to participate in a configuration in a subsequent epoch. Having multiple systems
of the same class simultaneously excited is potentially problematic because of
differentiation interference. In the example there is s-differentiation interference
between [Al]{N}, [Bo]{N}, and [Cam]{N}, and between [saw]{V} and [likes]{V}.
There is also c-differentiation interference between [who] systems, and between
[likes] systems, although the [likes] subsystems are not simultaneously excited.
Interestingly, because of the ϕ-configuration invariance principle, [Al]{N} and
[Bo]{N} must have a ϕ-distal relation, while [Al]{N} and [Cam]{N} must have a
ϕ-proximal relation. This follows from our hypotheses regarding role-to-ϕ pat-
terns for [who]{rel}, transitive {V}, and agent/patient role {N}. Note that we use
the term relation here rather than configuration because we do not want to im-
ply that the ϕ pattern arises directly from ϕ-coupled s-systems. The [Al], [Bo],
and [Cam] {N} systems must interfere through s-differentiation. Because (16b) is
substantially worse than (16a), we might guess that the differentiation associated
with proximally ϕ-related [Al]{N} and [Cam]{N} induces more interference than
the differentiation associated with the distally ϕ-related [Al]{N} and [Bo]{N}.This
makes a lot of sense given our speculation that {N} to {+N}/{−N} differentiation
is relatively unproblematic compared to differentiation within {+N} or {−N}. In
other words, differentiation of a system into two systems with proximal ϕ may
induce more interference than differentiation into two systems with distal ϕ.
Perhaps most problematically, there is an epoch of the center embedding inter-
pretation in which a newly activated system cannot be immediately organized.
Specifically, in (e2) [Bo]{N} is coupled with a {rel} system but is not coupled to
any lexical {V} system in (e3).
Indeed, the reason that the tail-recursive utterances in (17) and (18) are more
coherent than their center-embedded counterparts in (15) and (16) is that each
newly activated system can be immediately organized. A possible interpretation
trajectory for the tail-recursion of (18c) is shown in Figure 6.14.
The tail-recursion in Figure 6.14 does not have any epochs in which a newly
activated cs-system does not ϕ-couple to any previously activated or excited lex-
ical system. In (e2) [Bo]{N} couples with [likes]{V} before the {rel} system cou-
ples to [Bo]{N}. This contrasts with (e2) of the center embedding in Figure 6.13,
where [Bo]{N} couples with {rel}, and where epochs in which the |Cam likes|
configuration arises intervene before the |Bo likes| configuration is organized.
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Figure 6.14: Tail-recursive trajectory: newly activated systems can be
immediately organized.
Furthermore, the |likes who| configuration in (e2) of the tail recursion trajectory
can be grounded in the transition to (e3), which avoids the circumstance where
two {N}{rel} configurations are excited. Loosely speaking, we can attribute the
difference in grammaticality intuitions for center embedding and tail recursion
to difficulty in “keeping things in memory” longer. But more usefully, we see that
the difficulty is the instability of keeping an {N} excited when it is not ϕ-coupled
with a {V} and interferes with other {N} systems. In other words, coupling to {V}
helps stabilize {N} systems and thereby diminishes interference between simul-
taneously excited {N} systems.
In addition to interference, “contextual” factors, i.e. the state of the surround-
ings prior to an interpretation, must have an influence on coherence. Consider
the utterance in (19):
(19) read you a book on modern music?
The utterance in (19) probably does not induce a coherent trajectory on first
interpretation. Now, read the list of utterances in (20):
(20) a. have you a book on modern music?
b. have you a book on ancient music?
c. have you a dictionary of English?
d. want you a dictionary of English?
e. want you a book on ancient music?
f. want you a book on modern music?
g. seen you a book on modern music?
h. seen you a book on ancient music?
i. seen you a dictionary of English?
198
6.2 Grammatical coherence
j. read you a dictionary of English?
k. read you a book on ancient music?
l. read you a book on modern music?
The repetition of similar trajectories induces a structural priming effect. The
last sentence coheres much more quickly than it did the first time around. Such
effects suggest that every time some particular state trajectory occurs, trajecto-
ries which require a similar pattern of re-organizations can occur more quickly
or with less interference, in interpretation of subsequent utterances. A variety
of empirical studies provide evidence that such priming of this sort occurs and
can have effects on a multi-day timescale (Bock et al. 2007; Ferreira & Bock 2006;
Nagata 1988; 1992; Pickering & Ferreira 2008; Rowland et al. 2012). We can view
such learning asmacroscale changes in the forceswhich regulate ϕ-to-emapping:
the forces are altered to favor trajectories which are similar to a recently expe-
rienced one. There are many interesting questions that one might ask regarding
the timescales on which such effects arise.
In contrast to the factors mentioned above, which are generally associated
with interference, grammatical coherence does not appear to be as strongly af-
fected by flavors of relational meaning. This can be inferred from the classic
colorless green ideas example (Chomsky 1956), which does not evoke a strong
unacceptability intuition. It does, however, seem to induce an atypical meaning
experience.
(21) colorless green ideas sleep furiously
The example satisfies the utterance coherence criteria, and there is no reason
to posit any particularly strong interference. Any oddness we experience in in-
terpretation of the utterance must therefore derive from some other mechanism.
One possible account of the oddness of the experience involves an aggregate
effect of weakly activated, weakly interacting c-systems. Recall that we have
assumed that interactions between c-systems are typically not very strong, par-
ticularly between lexical c-systems.This assumption is important because strong
interactions would compromise flexibility of relational meaning experiences. Yet
weak interactions are not the same as no interactions. Indeed, whenever a c-sys-
tem is excited, many other c-systems must become active. Although we typically
omit them from representations, these grounded systems may in the aggregate
have a substantial effect on other c-systems. In Figure 6.15 we imagine that excita-
tion of [green] induces ground-level excitation of many other c-systems that are
associated with [green] (such as [leaf], [grass], [emerald], [apple], etc.), which
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we label as <green>.The c-systems <green>which are primed by [green] interact
weakly with all of the c-systems <colorless> which are primed by [colorless].
Figure 6.15: Conceptual oddness can arise frommanyweak interactions
between c-systems.
We might furthermore posit that these weak interactions between <green>
and <colorless> are somewhat stronger because there is more population over-
lap/interference between more similar c-systems: c-systems associated with a
commonly excited superordinate population like [color] may interact more
strongly than c-systems which are not associated with a superordinate popula-
tion, like [coffee] and [toothpaste]. The integrated effects of the <green>-<color-
less> interactions may cause the experience of semantic oddness. Although a
more detailed understanding of the experience is desirable, we infer it does not
result from interference caused by s-system differentiation.
Many questions remain open regarding the factors which influence coherence.
Although we have only scratched the surface of many issues, the o/el frame-
work provides a useful basis for investigating intuitions as experiences. Impor-
tantly, we have rejected the distinction between grammaticality and acceptabil-
ity. Our analysis of grammatical coherence has focused primarily on how coher-
ence arises in interpretation. Another relevant question is whether coherent tra-
jectories necessarily arise in production. Perhaps an invariant, stable ϕ-configu-
ration arises in both production and interpretation, despite the lack of constraint
on initial conditions. This similarity between production and interpretation is
represented in Figure 6.16.
Production and interpretation are similar in that there aremany possible initial
states which may evolve toward the same locally invariant ϕ-configuration. In
production, variation in e-organization can be used to select cs-systems in differ-
ent orders (constrained by language-specific ϕ-e mappings), and yet all of these
will evoke the same invariant ϕ-configuration for an interpreter. It is important to
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Figure 6.16: Production and interpretation trajectories exhibit a local
increase in order.
consider that both production and interpretation involve local increases in order.
The local concentration of order only occurs when a system has work done on it
by the surroundings; hence we deduce that both production and interpretation
are driven by surroundings forces. Microscopically, these forces are presumably
manifested from electrochemical gradients that the nervous system functions to
maintain. In other words, coherence is possible because the microscale system
self-organizes to a state in which macroscopic, coherent, ordered patterns arise.
6.2.5 Constituency intuitions
What gives rise to intuitions about constituency, i.e. about how words are group-
ed, or organized? For example, in the utterance Al drinks the cold coffee, we ex-
perience an intuition that the words the cold coffee constitute a “group” in a way
that the words the cold do not. In conventional terminology, the cold coffee is a
constituent, while the cold is not a constituent. But what does it mean for words
to “be grouped” or to “form a unit” when our conceptual model has no object-
like units, and thus no connection or containment of units? Here we show how
we can understand these sorts of intuitions through analysis of coherence. Note
that viewing constituency as intuitional rather than configurational (i.e. as a par-
ticular class of substate) is consistent with the observation that many ordering




Conventional phrase structure grammars account for constituency intuitions
with the connection/containment blend whereby a node contains all of the nodes
which are below it and connected directly or indirectly to it. Thus in the schema
in Figure 6.17, the cold is not a constituent because there is no node which con-
tains exactly those syntactic objects – the DP node also contains coffee. An addi-
tional constraint that non-trivial constituents must correspond to a phrasal node
can be imposed, so that terminal elements such as coffee, the, or cold are only
constituents in a vacuous sense.
Figure 6.17: Orientation and connection patterns are the basis for con-
stituency in conventional frameworks.
Our intuitions about constituents are associated with constituency “tests”,
some of which are exemplified in Table 6.2 (cf. Carnie 2013; Ouhalla 1999 for
more comprehensive introductions). Note that these tests are less applicable to
verb phrase constituency and some other sorts of constituents; our focus here is
on determiner-adjective-noun constituents.
The general procedure for conducting a constituency test is as follows. First, a
candidate set of words ε is chosen from a base sentence, which in o/el terms is a
trajectory ψ0 in which cs-systems associated with ε are selected.The trajectory is
typically comprised of temporally contiguous e-epochs. In o/el terms this means
that the trajectory is not interrupted by intervening epochs in which no systems
are selected or in which systems other than ε are selected. Indeed, ε corresponds
to a subpart of the trajectory ψ0 in a subspace of the system. The test is applied
by constructing a test sentence (i.e. trajectory) ψCT, according to some particu-
lar pattern (e.g. topicalization, passivization, etc.). Grammaticality/acceptability
(i.e. coherence) intuitions evoked from the sentence are then assessed to infer
constituency.
In the case of the topicalization test, ψCT is a trajectory in which the candi-
date ε is the first part of the selectional phase of ψCT. The coherence intuitions
202
6.2 Grammatical coherence
Table 6.2: Noun phrase constituency tests.
ψ0 : Al drinks the cold coffee
ψCT: ε: the cold coffee ε: the cold
topicalization The cold coffee, Al drinks. The cold, Al drinks coffee.
passive The cold coffee was drunk
by Al
The cold was drunk coffee
by Al
cleft It is the cold coffee that Al
drinks.
It is the cold that Al drinks
coffee.
pseudocleft The cold coffee is what Al
drinks.
The cold is what Al drinks
coffee.
that arise from this procedure for a variety of ε are represented in (22). The only
ε which does not induce a relatively non-coherent experience is the cold coffee,
and according to conventional analyses this is because these words exactly corre-
spond to the words contained in a phrasal node.The conventional analysis of the
topicalization test is somewhat unsatisfying because cold coffee could also corre-
spond to a phrasal node (depending on various analytic choices) but nonetheless
fails the test; further stipulations are necessary to explain why the topicalization
pattern cannot apply to cold coffee.
(22) a. the cold coffee, Al drinks.
b. * the cold, Al drinks coffee.
c. * the, Al drinks cold coffee.
d. * coffee, Al drinks the cold.
e. * cold coffee, Al drinks the.
The o/el re-analysis of constituency begins with a subtle but important point:
we do not have intuitions about constituency until we interpret a potential con-
stituent in some other context. More technically, constituency intuitions are al-
ways associated with the coherence of interpretation of a sub-part of a coherent
trajectory, when that subpart is interposed in another trajectory. There are no
“constituency intuitions” until we engage in a particular mode of interpretation
which involves these metalinguistic trajectory manipulations. This conception
not only leads to a new, useful understanding of constituency, based on the no-
tion of coherence, but also explains why constituency intuitions do not accord
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with acceptability for patterns of ellipsis and anaphora, which we examine in de-
tail in the next chapter. To illustrate, consider the following reference trajectory
ψ0, of Al drinks the cold coffee:
Figure 6.18: Reference trajectory for constituency tests: Al drinks the
cold coffee.
To assess the constituency intuition for the cold coffee, we identify the trajec-
tory in Figure 6.18 of epochs (e3–e4), in which [the]{D}, [cold]{Adj}, and [cof-
fee]{N} are selected. We construct the candidate trajectory ε by ignoring state
space dimensions associated with other non-test systems in (e3–e4), i.e. dimen-
sions related to [Al]{N} and [drinks]{V}. However, we take note of the ϕ-configu-
rations which involve the test systems and non-test systems, since we attempt
to integrate these with the constituency test trajectory ψCT. We then construct
ψCT, by combining ε and ψCT according to a desired pattern. This construction
procedure predetermines which patterns are suitable (e.g. topicalization, clefting,
passive, pseudocleft). Patternswhich omit or replace ε (i.e. ellipsis, anaphora) lead
to different intuitions about grouping, as does coordination.
A test trajectory for topicalization of the candidate the cold coffee is shown in
Figure 6.19. Although immediate organization of [coffee]{N} with a {V} system
is not possible after (e1), excitation of [drinks]{V} in (e3) allows [coffee]{N} to
participate in a ϕ-configuration. We can further hypothesize that after epochs
of initial system excitation (e1–e3), a coherent reiterative simulation (e3, e3′) can
arise, in which utterance coherence criteria are met. This analysis entails that
constituency intuitions arise from experiencing the achievement of a coherent
trajectory, and not necessarily from an experience of the path that is taken to
achieve that trajectory.
In contrast to the cold coffee, the topicalization test of the cold does not lead to a
coherent state. The likely reason is shown in Figure 6.20: neither [cold]{Adj} nor
[the]{D} can ϕ-couple to the lexical {N} system [coffee]{N}, which is necessary for
the expected ϕ-configurations of {Adj} and {D}. This raises the question of why
in (e4) [the]{D} and [cold]{Adj} cannot couple to [coffee]{N} and thus give rise to
the ϕ-configuration required for coherence. One possibility is that the immediate
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Figure 6.19: Topicalization test trajectory for constituency of the cold
coffee.
organization bias is stronger for {D} and {Adj} systems than for {N} systems. It
may be more difficult to maintain {D} and {Adj} systems in an unstable state
across multiple epochs than it is to maintain {N} systems.
Figure 6.20: Topicalization test trajectory for a non-constituent does
not lead to a coherent state.
Similar accounts can be extended to passivization, pseudocleft and cleft tests,
shown in Figure 6.21. The grayed ϕ-configurations with {D} and {Adj} are ones
which, because of the intervening epochs, are unable to participate in the ex-
pected configuration. There may be other reasons why coherence does not occur
in these examples. For instance, [cold] might couple to an {N} system, which al-
lows for immediate organization with [is]{Aux} in all three examples. In the cleft,
[cold] might couple with [Al]{N}, in which case [drinks]{V} would have no {N}
system to +ϕ couple with because [Al]{N} couples with [is]{Aux}.Thus the imme-
diate organization bias may be an important factor in determining the coherence
intuitions associated with constituency.
There may be a variety of additional reasons why coherence is not achieved
when some particular ψCT is constructed, and a more comprehensive analysis
is desirable, one which could predict when coherence is expected in a broader
range of constituency tests. The o/el framework nonetheless brings us some clar-
ity by discouraging us from thinking of “constituents” as objects; instead, we
reconceptualize constituency as a phenomenon which derives from experiences
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Figure 6.21: Non-coherence in passive, cleft, and pseudocleft con-
stituency tests.
of coherence or the lack thereof. This requires us to refocus our investigations of
constituency phenomena on temporal patterns in interpretation, as opposed to
atemporal, abstract structural relations.
6.3 Electrophysiological and behavioral manifestations of
coherence
Grammatical coherence on the utterance scale depends on epoch scale coherence,
which in turn depends on auto-spectral and cross-spectral coherence of excited
c- and s-systems. Thus spectral coherence is the fundamental basis for many as-
pects of grammaticality intuitions. Here we show how spectral coherence can be
related to electrophysiological and behavioral phenomena, specifically focusing
on event-related potentials (ERPs) in sentence processing. In order to accomplish
this, we first develop a set of linking hypotheses. The coherence phenomena an-
alyzed below are assumed to occur before the reiterative trajectories which are
necessary for grammatical coherence; intuitions regarding grammatical coher-
ence are dependent on and arise subsequently to the electrophysiological man-
ifestations of spectral coherence. By means of its emphasis on coherence, the
o/el framework provides an alternative vocabulary for understanding various
psycholinguistic phenomena.
6.3.1 Linking hypotheses for spectral coherence
One of the major methodological instruments used to study syntactic and con-
ceptual processing is electroencephalography (EEG). EEG measures voltage fluc-
tuations generated by neural spiking in the brain, using electrodes placed on the
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scalp. When EEG signals are aligned to the time at which a stimulus is presented,
changes in measured voltages are observed – these are called event-related po-
tentials (ERPs). A number of different ERP patterns have been identified. These
are hypothesized to be associated with syntactic and/or semantic “processing,”
a concept which we reinterpret in the current framework. ERPs are commonly
given names which refer to when and/or where they are observed, along with
whether the observed voltages are negative or positive relative to a reference volt-
age. For example, researchers have identified an “N400” which is a negative volt-
age change that occurs in association with semantic processing, a “P600” which
is a positive voltage change that occurs in association with syntactic and/or con-
ceptual reanalysis (as in the interpretation of garden path sentences), and an
“ELAN” (early left anterior negativity) which is associated with syntactic cate-
gory processing.
Here we develop a set of linking hypotheses which allow for the o/el model
to generate ERP patterns that are in some ways qualitatively similar to observed
ERPs. The key idea behind this approach is that “processing” – a rather vague
term – can be reinterpreted more mechanistically as change in the auto-spectral
coherence of c- and s-systems, and change in the cross-spectral coherence of cs-
systems. For reasons that are made clear below, our focus is on the time-course
of such changes as a function of stimuli, rather than their spatial distributions in
the brain.
When a single neuron spikes or receives input from other neurons, there is
a transmembrane ionic current associated with changes in membrane potential.
When the axons of many neurons are oriented similarly in space, the voltage
changes associated with individual neurons and synapses combine to create a
change in the electrical potential which is measurable above the scalp. Thus the
EEG signal is an integration of state changes inmany neurons which have similar
orientations. Axons of pyramidal cortical neurons generate most of the cortical
EEG signal because these are closest to the scalp (Federmeier & Laszlo 2009;
Kutas &Dale 1997).The extracellular fluid and cranium act as coarse spatial filters
on the signal, and hence the spatial resolution of EEG is poor compared to other
measurement techniques such as fMRI. Furthermore, the mathematical problem
of localizing the origins of EEG signals in the brain is underdetermined. However,
the temporal resolution of EEG is far superior to fMRI and thus it is better suited
to investigating the time-course of syntactic/semantic processing.
Even in the absence of sensory stimuli, the brain exhibits EEG signals with
power at a range of frequencies (Buzsaki 2006). These oscillations are thought to
provide a basis for interactions between brain areas, and to facilitate processing
of sensory stimuli (Fries et al. 2001; Gray et al. 1989). Event-related potentials
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(ERPs) are measured by presenting a stimulus and averaging the stimulus time-
locked electrical activity over a large number of trials. The assumptions behind
this approach are that the electrical response to the stimulus is of fixed polarity
and occurs at a fairly consistent latency relative to stimulus presentation (Penny
et al. 2002). The averaging is necessary because there is typically a large amount
of neural activity that is not specific to the stimulus (i.e. noise). There are two
main theories on the neural origins of event-related potentials (ERPs): the phase
resetting (phase modulation, PM) theory and the evoked response (amplitude
modulation, AM) theory (Makeig et al. 2002; Penny et al. 2002; Shah et al. 2004).
In the evoked response theory, stimuli “evoke” a neural population response,
and EEG power increase is expected in a single trial. Averaging evoked responses
over multiple trials amplifies this power increase and thereby produces the ERP
pattern. In the phase-resetting theory, sensory stimuli induce a phase-reset of
ongoing EEG rhythms. Under this view, the reason the ERP pattern is observed
is due to averaging over trials: in a single trial, no increase in neural activity is
expected, but the EEG rhythm will be phase-coherent across trials when time-
aligned to the stimulus onset; hence averaging over multiple trials is necessary
to observe an ERP, which reflects phase-coherence. Another possibility is that
both phase-modulation and amplitude modulation influence ERPs (Penny et al.
2002; Shah et al. 2004). For current purposes we assume that both of these effects
contribute to coherence.
Many language-related ERP studies investigate sentence processing by com-
paring ERPs between conditions in which some relevant syntactic or semantic
aspect(s) of sentences are varied. The comparisons are made by aligning EEG
signals to the time when a manipulated word is presented in a sentence. It is im-
portant to keep in mind that there is an EEG signal response to the presentation
of each word in a sentence, and that the response to any given word is often in-
fluenced by responses to preceding words. Thus the dynamics of the EEG signal
in response to any particular utterance are quite complicated.
A set of linking hypotheses is necessary to relate power changes in the EEG sig-
nal – (and ultimately, ERPs) – to spectral coherence dynamics in interpretation
trajectories. To illustrate these hypotheses we consider c- and s-system coher-
ence trajectories and their first-derivatives in a canonical interpretation trajec-
tory forAl drinks coffee, shown in Figure 6.22. As each word is perceived, sensory
systems are excited (not shown).The specific pattern of excitation of sensory sys-
tems will in general be based on acoustic information of the stimuli (in the case
of auditory stimuli) or visual information (in the case of graphemic/orthographic
stimuli), but may also be influenced by “top-down” influences from previously
excited conceptual and syntactic systems. Note that we have not developed a
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specific model of sensory systems in the o/el framework – such systems have
generally been subsumed as part of the surroundings of c- and s-systems. Ap-
proximately 40-50ms after stimulus onset, active sensory systems begin to exert
forces on both c- and s-systems, causing them to become excited. The particular
c- and s-systems which experience these forces necessarily depend on learned
associations between sensory systems and c-/s-systems. For example, we have
learned that the auditory or visual stimulus Al excites an {N} s-system and [Al]
c-system. Of course, other c- and s-systems may also be excited by the stimulus,
particularly in cases of homophony, and the extent to which a given c- or s-sys-
tem may be excited by a stimulus is conditioned by learning (i.e. supra-utterance
scale system evolution) and context (forces from the surroundings which evolve
on the utterance scale).
When the sensory systems activated by Al begin to activate {N} and [Al] sys-
tems, those systems begin to evolve toward an active state inwhich the individual
neurons in the relevant populations are collectively oscillating. Thus there will
be a transient period of time in which the auto-spectral coherence of each system
is increasing. Recall that our microscale conception of the coherence process is
that individual neuronal spikes within the population become more predictable
and correlated, and on the macroscale this results in a narrowing of the power
spectrum of the system, i.e. the emergence of a more ordered state. The power
spectra of c- and s-systems at selected points of time are shown in Figure 6.22.
Both the widths and peak amplitudes of the spectra are assumed to be related
to the coherence of the systems; the increase in coherence is modeled here with
a first-order differential equation: ẋ = −a (x − xmax), where a is a fixed growth
rate parameter and xmax is an equilibrium which represents a maximal degree of
coherence.
There are several key features of the trajectories to notice. First, although the
s-systems and c-systems associated with a stimulus are activated at the same
time, the c-system cannot reach an above-ground state until after the s-system
does. This reflects the hypothesis that excitation depends on the emergence of
a cs-resonance. Second, there is “priming” for both c- and s-systems. For exam-
ple, shortly after the {V} system is excited, an {−N} system is activated. Likewise,
shortly after the [drinks] system is excited, a [coffee] system is activated. These
priming effects are assumed to be pervasive, particularly for c-systems: presum-
ably [drinks] activates a large number of c-systems (e.g. [tea], [whisky], etc.).
Note that only priming of [coffee] is shown here in order to avoid visual clutter.
A crucial consequence of the priming is that when the coffee stimulus does oc-
cur, the {−N} and [coffee] systems already have some degree of coherence, and
hence the change in coherence that is necessary to reach an above-ground state
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is smaller. This also results in a shorter period of time from the stimulus onset to
the emergence of an above-ground [coffee]{−N} system. Finally, e-organization
operations are shown here to occur after all three cs-systems have been excited;
this aspect of the system trajectory is a somewhat arbitrary choice, rather than a
necessity. It is possible that |Al drinks| could be e-organized in a more incremen-
tal fashion, prior to the emergence of the |coffee {−N}| system.
Figure 6.22: Coherence and coherence process signals of s-systems and
c-systems in an interpretation trajectory.
The coherence trajectories shown for s-systems and c-systems above can be
used to generate ERPs. Specifically, a short-time integration of the magnitude
of the rate of change of coherence is hypothesized to correlate with power of
the EEG signal. We emphasize that it is the magnitude of the rate of change of
spectral coherence, rather than coherence itself, which is the relevant predictor.
This follows from reasoning about how coherence is achieved on the microscopic
scale. Coherence in a given population is reflected in the temporal distribution of
spikes, or in other terms, their predictability/correlation or degree of order. Co-
herence is achieved over a period of time when the interactions between neurons
in the population and interactions with other populations induce an excited state,
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which entails a narrow spectral peak. If a population takes longer to reach the ex-
cited state, there will be more spiking in the population. Furthermore, when the
population is initially activated, differentiation interference experienced from
other populations is expected to be larger, and the size of the population (num-
ber of neurons which interact) may be larger – the population will to a greater
extent include or interact with neurons from populations which are associated
with other systems. Thus in order for the population evolve to the excited state,
microscopic interactions are necessary, and more of these interactions entails
more neural spiking. The microscopic considerations therefore point to changes
in coherence as the most direct predictor of EEG power, rather than the excita-
tion levels of systems.
Changes in coherences in the trajectory in Figure 6.22 are the envelopes of
the filled regions in the panels labelled “s-system coherence” and “c-system co-
herence”. Power spectra of the integrated spiking rates of systems are shown at
selected timepoints. These power spectra are understood to evolve continuously
and require an analysis window that is sufficiently large to resolve the lowest-
frequency components of the population spiking rate. As discussed previously,
the process of achieving a degree of coherence sufficient for excitation involves
a narrowing of the frequency distribution. The widths and peak amplitudes of
these spectra are assumed to be related to the coherence signals shown for the s-
systems and c-systems. It is important to note that the coherence signals here are
constructed from the simplifying assumption that coherence evolves as a linear
system toward an equilibrium value – an important long-term endeavor in the
o/el framework is to develop a microscale model of population dynamics from
which integrated spike rate can be derived, in turn allowing for derivation of
coherence and order parameters (i.e. e and θ).
Another assumption depicted in the spectra is that the peak frequencies of the
systems are initially different. The frequency locking process was modeled here
with first-order systems that evolve toward a time-varying equilibrium that is the
coherence-weighted average of the peak frequencies of all of the s-systems and
c-systems which are ϕ-coupled. Thus the peak frequency {V} of evolves toward a
value that is the weighted average of the peak frequencies of {+N}, {V}, {−N}, and
[drinks]; in contrast, the peak frequency of [drinks] evolves toward a value that
is the weighted average of only {V} and [drinks]. Hence the frequency dynamics
reflect the fundamental principle that s-systems are strongly ϕ-coupled to each
other and resonate with a c-system.The overall effect of the frequency dynamics
is that s-system peak frequencies evolve to a common frequency more quickly
than c-system peak frequencies. This in turn has consequences for cross-spectral
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coherence: cross-spectral coherence of s-systems is expected to increase before
cross-spectral coherence of c-systems.
In order to facilitate the interpretation of ERP effects as changes in coherence,
coherence-process signals are calculated from the magnitude of the first derivative
of coherence. This magnitude is low-pass filtered (using a rectangular-window
moving average), which approximates a short-time integration of changes in co-
herence. The resulting signals are called “coherence-process signals” because
they arise from the process of achieving coherence; they should not be con-
fused with auto-spectral or cross-spectral coherence. Several different coherence-
process signals are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 6.22.The s-system coher-
ence process signals are summed over the {+N}, {V}, and {−N} systems; likewise
the c-system signals are summed over the [Al], [drinks], and [coffee] systems.
In theory, other coherences are also relevant, particularly the cross-spectral
coherence between s-systems and c-systems, and between cs-systems. However,
cross-spectral coherence cannot be calculated without phase information, which
in turn cannot be calculated without a model that generates an explicit spike-rate
time series. In the absence of such a model, cross coherences are approximated
by the products of power spectra. The cross-coherence-process signals shown
in the figure are thus low-pass filtered derivatives of the integration over fre-
quency of products of spectra, summed over the relevant pairs of systems. Specif-
ically, the s-system cross-coherence-process signal is the sum over the cross-
coherence-process signals of {+N}{V}, {V}{−N}, and {N}{−N}; the c-system cross-
coherence-process signal is the sum over the cross-coherence-process signals
of [Al][drinks], [drinks][coffee], and [Al][coffee]; and the c-s cross-coherence-
process signal is the sum over the cross-coherence-process signals of {+N}[Al],
{V}[drinks], and {−N}[coffee].
In general, all of the coherence process signals may contribute to the EEG
signal, but for current purposes we will focus on only one or two such signals
to analyze ERP effects. Ultimately, the set of assumptions and approximations
in the above model should be viewed together as an ansatz, an educated guess
which may or may not be verified by its results. As we see below, the results are
in many ways qualitatively consistent with observations.
6.3.2 Relations between coherence and ERP patterns
The first ERP we analyze is the ELAN (early left-anterior negativity), which is a
negative peak observed from 100-300 ms after stimulus presentation. The ELAN
is associated primarily with identification of the syntactic category of a word
(Friederici 2002; Hahne & Friederici 1999; Steinhauer & Drury 2012). The main
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empirical finding is that awordwhose syntactic category is relatively unexpected
results in an increase in the amplitude of the peak, compared to words whose
syntactic category is relatively expected, given prior context. For example, in
(23a), a word that is a noun such as coffee is expected given that the preceding
word drinks is a transitive verb; in (23b) the preposition on is less expected.
(23) a. Al drinks coffee.
category matches expectation: smaller ELAN
b. Al drinks *on coffee.
category mismatches expectations: larger ELAN
In o/el terms, activation of a less expected system – e.g. the {P} s-system in
(23b) – elicits a larger negative peak than activation of a more expected system –
e.g. the {−N} s-system in (23a).This can be described as a priming effect: the word
drinks excites a {V} s-system which resonates with [drink], and also activates a
{−N} system which will typically resonate with a subsequently activated c-sys-
tem. This priming effect is shown in Figure 6.23 where {−N} is activated shortly
after {V}.
Figure 6.23: Early left anterior negativity (ELAN): activation of less ex-
pected s-system results in a larger coherence-process signal than acti-
vation of a more expected s-system.
There are several reasons why the coherence-process signal after presentation
of the mismatching category {P} is greater than the signal when the expected {N}
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is presented. Because the {−N} system is already activated, a smaller increase in
coherence is required to achieve an excited state when coffee is presented com-
pared to the increase required for the {P} system to reach a coherent state when
the preposition on is presented. Hence one source of the ERP effect is that ex-
citation of {P} requires a greater change of coherence, and as elaborated above,
coherence-process signals reflect an integration of changes in coherence. An-
other possible source of the ERP effect may be interference between {P} and {−N}.
This interference is expected to slow achievement of coherence of {P} and possi-
bly decrease the coherence of {−N} – these effects are illustrated in Figure 6.23
as well. An increase in the period of time over which coherence is achieved, and
a change in the coherence of the already active {−N}, both contribute to a larger
coherence-process signal.
The next ERP we consider is the N400, which is a negative peak observed from
300-500 ms after stimulus presentation. The amplitude of the N400 is inversely
correlated with the extent to which a word is semantically expected (Federmeier
& Laszlo 2009; Friederici 2002; Kutas & Federmeier 2011). For example, the c-sys-
tem [coffee] which is activated by utterance (24a) is more expected than the c-sys-
tem [toothpaste] activated in (24b).Theword coffee has a greater cloze probability
than toothpaste in this context, i.e. a greater likelihood of completing the sentence
Al drinks.
(24) a. Al drinks coffee.
concept more consistent with expectations: smaller N400
b. Al drinks toothpaste.
concept less consistent with expectations: larger N400
The analysis of the N400 is directly parallel to the analysis of the ELAN: [cof-
fee] is primed by [drinks] to a greater extent than [toothpaste], and hence the
achievement of coherence of [toothpaste] requires a greater change in coher-
ence than [coffee]. The key difference between the ELAN and the N400 is that
the ELAN arises from activation of s-systems, while the N400 arises from acti-
vation of c-systems. As described above, c-system excitation is delayed relative
to s-system excitation, because c-system excitation requires resonance with an
excited s-system.
The N400 effect does not require a sentential context and is influenced by
a number of factors which include semantic category membership, word fre-
quency, and neighborhood density (Kutas & Federmeier 2011; Lau et al. 2008).
In lists of words in which a semantic category expectancy is generated, a word
whose semantic category deviates from the expectation will induce a larger N400.
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Figure 6.24: N400: activation of less expected c-system results in a
larger coherence process signal than activation of a more expected c-
system.
For example, in the utterances in (25), toothpaste will induce a larger N400 than
wine. The N400 is sensitive to word frequency as well: in the utterances in (26),
ouzo will induce a larger N400 than coffee. In both cases, it is sensible to assume
that prior to presentation of the stimulus wine, a [wine] system is already ac-
tive to some degree, and hence a smaller change in coherence of [wine] occurs
post-stimulus than in cases where the stimulus-activated c-system has been pre-
activated to a lesser degree. In other words, the frequency effect arises because
[drinks] activates (“primes”) a higher-frequency c-system like [wine] to a greater
extent than a lower-frequency c-system like [ouzo].
(25) a. coffee, tea, whisky, wine
b. coffee, tea, whisky, toothpaste
(26) a. Al drinks wine.
b. Al drinks ouzo.
The interpretation of neighborhood density effects on the N400 is somewhat
different from the effects discussed above. A word with a denser neighborhood
will induce a larger N400 than a word with a sparser neighborhood (Holcomb
et al. 2002; Müller et al. 2010). This effect should be understood to arise because
stimuli with denser neighborhoods will activate more c-systems than those with
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sparser neighborhoods. When more c-systems are active, there is more competi-
tion between c-systems for a cs-resonance and the c-systems interfere with each
other to a greater extent. Hence it will take longer for a coherent cs-resonance
to emerge than in a condition where fewer c-systems are primed.
An interesting finding regarding the N400 is that it is often insensitive to
negation (Kutas & Federmeier 2011). Hence N400s for toothpaste are similar in
Al drinks toothpaste and Al do not drink toothpaste. This suggests that negation
and possibly quantification in general does not influence the priming effects that
modulate the amplitude of the N400. This raises questions regarding relational
meaning experiences which involve negation and quantification; an analysis of
such meaning experiences has not yet been developed in the o/el framework.
In the same time period as the N400, a left anterior negativity (LAN) is some-
times observed in response to morphosyntactic agreement violations (Friederici
2002; Gunter et al. 2000; Kutas & Federmeier 2011; Osterhout & Holcomb 1992).
For example, the students drinks coffee, where the verbal number agreement mis-
matches the number of the subject argument, will elicit a greater N400 than the
student drinks coffee. This suggests that excitation of grammatical s-systems (i.e.
{number}, {person}, {tense} etc.) occurs later in time than excitation of lexical s-
systems (i.e. {N}, {V}, {P}, etc.), where expectation mismatches are associated with
the ELAN.This is consistent with the notion that grammatical s-systems must be
coupled to excited lexical s-systems in order to become excited themselves. This
accords with the idea that the utterance the, which excites only {D}[definite],
does not give rise to a coherent configuration: there is no lexical cs-resonance
for {D}[definite] to couple with. It should be noted, however, that agreement
violations do not always appear to elicit a LAN effect, but instead may elicit a
later effect called the P600, which we consider next. In these cases, both prior
syntactic and conceptual excitation may be required for effects to manifest in
coherence-process signals.
The P600 is a positive EEG signal occurring from 600-1000 ms after a stimulus.
The P600 has a centro-parietal location, as opposed to the left-anterior locations
of the ELAN and LAN. It has been associated with syntactic violations, processes
of reanalysis and repair (as in garden-path sentences), and syntactic complex-
ity (Friederici 2002). Although some researchers view the P600 as a language-
specific ERP component, others have argued that the P600 is not distinct from
the more general P3, an ERP that is associated with attention-related reorien-
tation behavior (Sassenhagen & Bornkessel-Schlesewsky 2015). This raises the
question of whether in the o/el model the P600 (or P3) can be understood differ-
ently from the ELAN, N400, and LAN, all of which are attributable to priming,
i.e. pre-stimulus activation of systems below the excitation threshold.
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To address this, let’s consider a garden path sentence such as Al drinks cof-
fee and tea is brewing. Assume that in the garden-path interpretation there is a
state in which an |Al drinks coffee| configuration is excited, followed by a state in
which an |Al drinks tea| configuration is excited. Upon occurrence of the stimuli
is brewing, the relevant cs-systems [be]{aux} and [brew]{V} become active, but
because [tea]{N} is already coupled to [drink]{V}, [tea]{N} is not able to couple
stably to [brew]{V}. This results in [brew]{V} failing to achieve coherence. We
conjecture that this non-coherence induces a “repair” process, which involves
selectively grounding e-operations and subsequent reorganization operations. If
the reorganization leads to a grammatically coherent trajectory, the repair is suc-
cessful. However, the grounding and reorganization e-operations that occur dur-
ing the repair result in many changes in spectral and cross-spectral coherence,
which are manifested as changes in EEG power. This is illustrated in Figure 6.25.
Figure 6.25: P600 in a garden-path interpretation: detection of non-
coherence and reorganizations for repair result in a large coherence-
process signal.
One question we might ask is why the P600 has a different spatial distribu-
tion and sign than other ERPs. Consider that there are several differences in the
mechanisms which cause coherence changes during a repair, compared to those
associated with priming effects. For starters, the ELAN and N400 are associated
with the timecourse of excitation of cs-systems, which occurs prior to the emer-
gence of a stable configuration; this excitation does not necessitate any e-organi-
zation. In contrast, the P600 is associated with e-operations on already-excited
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or already-activated systems, and hence is expected to occur later. Secondly, it
may be useful to construct coherence-response systems, which are systems which
become active when cs-states are non-coherent. Coherence response systems
provide a mechanism for “monitoring” the state of the system, and likely play a
role in shaping grammaticality intuitions discussed earlier. It would not be sur-
prising if coherence response systems have a different spatial distribution than
cs-systems, but the imprecision in spatial localization of ERP generators warrants
caution in drawing inferences in this regard.
6.3.3 Toward a new vocabulary of psycholinguistic analysis
The o/el framework offers an alternative vocabulary for interpreting psycholin-
guistic observations of behavior. There are several advantages of this vocabulary:
(i) It brings temporal phenomena to the fore with a conceptual model that is fo-
cused on dynamics. (ii) It avoids potentially misleading anthropomorphizations.
(iii) It provides a basis for a more specific conception of information. (iv) It avoids
conceptual dissonance that arises in describing phenomena which necessitate si-
multaneous reference to incompatible structures.
To illustrate these advantages, let’s consider how ERP effects are typically de-
scribed in psycholinguistic literature. Such effects are commonly attributed to
“mismatches,” “processing difficulty,” or “reanalysis/repair” (see e.g. Friederici
2002; Kutas & Federmeier 2011). For instance, the ELAN is understood as the re-
sult of a mismatch between the syntactic category of a stimulus and the expected
category, which occurs in a process of word category “identification”. The N400
is understood as an index of difficulty in “processing” which occurs in the “inte-
gration” of semantic and syntactic “information”. The P600 is understood as an
index of complexity or the need for “reanalysis”.
Psycholinguistic studies do not always provide more specific details regarding
what these terms mean in the context of a conceptual model of syntax. Basic
questions arise which call for detailed answers: what is “processing”? What does
it mean to “identify” a syntactic category? What form does the “expectation” of
a category take? What is a “category”, anyway? Object-based conceptions do
not readily help us understand the behavioral manifestations of processing, be-
cause objects are atemporal. In contrast, the systems of the o/el framework evolve
in time and are characterized in terms of states. Thus “identification” of a cate-
gory can be understood as a state space trajectory in which sensory systems
activate conceptual and syntactic systems, and in which those systems subse-
quently evolve from an active state to an excited state, via coupling/resonance
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mechanisms. The microscale conceptual model further informs our understand-
ing of the trajectory by allowing us to think of the evolution as emergence of
spectrally coherent collective oscillations in neural populations. The trajectory
IS the “processing,” and there are no categories, but rather, systems.
The concept of “processing information” is potentially misleading for a couple
reasons. First, processing evokes a computational interpretation of phenomena,
and most computational models impose temporally discrete operations on sys-
tem states. The states of systems we have constructed are understood to evolve
continuously in the pre-stable phase of trajectories, and this evolution should not
be viewed as the consequence of discrete operations. Of course, discrete compu-
tations applied in the limit of infinitesimally small time increments provides an
effectively continuous approximation to system dynamics, but computational in-
terpretations in linguistic theories rarely adopt this infinitesimal limit construal.
Thus use of the word processing has the potential to evoke a counterproductive
discretization of time in pre-stable phases of system state trajectories. Second,
the computational interpretation tends to evoke symbols, because many compu-
tational models of language are developed to manipulate symbolic representa-
tions, rather than states defined in continuous dimensions. Because symbols are
objects, any interpretation of behavior which evokes them will lead to many of
the problems of the object metaphor which we have discussed in this book.
In a deeper sense, the interpretation of information processing as symbol ma-
nipulation unnecessarily obscures the nature of the state space and thereby leads
to an inadequate conception of information. What do people meanwhen they say
that the brain “processes information”? The word information seems to be often
used in a non-technical sense, and is rarely defined in a rigorous manner. The
tenets of information theory (Shannon 1948) hold that information is produced
when a previously undetermined (or unobserved) system state is determined (or
observed). The information produced by the determination process is measured
as the change in entropy (H) of the system from before determination to after
determination. The entropy is the negative sum of the log probabilities of states,
weighted by their probabilities, as shown in the equation below. Thus informa-
tion is entropy lost in the determination of a system state.
(27) Information produced = Entropy before – Entropy after
H = −∑
i
pi log (pi) = −p1 log (p1) − p2 log (p2) − ⋯ − pn log (pn)
In the case of a system which generates equiprobable discrete states, such as a
coin flip or a random selection of a character from the alphabet, the information
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that is produced from each flip or character selection (i.e. from the determination
process), increases when there aremore possible states: hence there is more infor-
mation produced by selecting a character of the alphabet than by flipping a coin.
In both cases, the entropy after determination is zero – the system state is fully
determined, but the number of possible states before determination is greater for
the alphabet, which has 26 possible states, than for the coin, which has only 2.
The same reasoning can be generalized to continuous variables, in which case it
is the probability-weighted volume of the state space before determination that
matters for calculating the information that is produced. It is crucial to recognize
that a state of the system itself does not “have information,” but rather, informa-
tion is something that is “gained” by a reduction of volume of the state space or
“lost” by an increase of volume of the state space. Furthermore, the first terms in
the products in the entropy equation, which are probabilities of states (pi), are
weighting terms which specify how much each sub-volume of state space con-
tributes to the total entropy associated with the space. The information gained
by determination of a state is maximal when those probabilities are uniformly
distributed over the space.
How does the technical understanding of information gel with the o/el con-
ception of a state space trajectory? The o/el analysis might seem to imply that
no information can ever be lost or gained: the system state is always determined,
and evolves according to deterministic laws; thus there is no determination pro-
cess which allows for a change in entropy. However, consider that our analyses
always partition the full system state into systems and a surroundings: it is only
the systems whose states are always determined; the surroundings state is never
determined. Hence entropy can be transferred from systems to the surroundings.
Indeed, this is exactly what happens on the microscale when a c-system or s-sys-
tem becomes active: the entropy of the population decreases, by means of being
transferred to the surroundings. This entails a reduction in the number of acces-
sible microstates of the system, but not of the universe.
Alternatively, we can say that the order (i.e. negentropy, see Schrödinger 1944)
of the system increases.Thus information has been produced locally, i.e. in the re-
gion of state space which is relevant to describing the system.This local increase
is always offset by an increase of entropy in the surroundings, and according to
the second law of thermodynamics is always greater than or equal to the local de-
crease. It is more appropriate, in o/el terms, to think of “information processing”
as local increase or decrease of order in systems. The advantages of this perspec-
tive are that we allow for a more detailed accounting of the temporal evolution of
probability mass in state space, and are better able to see the connection between
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information and our analytical choices in partitioning the universe into systems
vs. surroundings.
Another advantage of the o/el conception is that “expectation” or “prediction”
of a category or meaning are not associated with an ad hoc, anthropomorphic
mechanism. Instead, a more phenomenologically neutral description is available
in which the activation of a system induces activation of other systems which are
likely to become active in the future. This mechanism allows us to understand
ELAN, LAN, and N400 effects just as readily as conventional vocabularies. “Pre-
diction” is problematic because it evokes a potentially misleading anthropomor-
phization of the system.The verb predict entails an animate agent (cf. Bo predicted
Al would drink coffee vs. ?The table predicted Al would drink coffee). There is no
theoretical necessity to conceptualize the system as animate, or as the sort of en-
tity which “makes predictions”. Rather, we say that the system state evolves such
that its location in state space tends tomove closer to stateswhich are statistically
more likely to arise in the future. This aspect of the system is a consequence of
supra-utterance scale “learning” mechanisms which are viewed microscopically
as changes in within- and between-population interactions.
The conventional vocabulary often employs terms like reanalysis or repair. But
what is being reanalyzed, andwhat entity is doing the reanalyzing? In some cases
authors propose to interpret these terms with object-based representations. For
example, reanalysis has been described with substitution and adjunction oper-
ations on elementary trees in a tree-adjoining grammar conception (Ferreira et
al. 2004). Thus reanalysis involves the unmerging of some objects, while keep-
ing those objects present, in order to re-merge them subsequently. One problem
with this sort of conceptualization is that is does not predict any inherent cost
for the “floating structures” or “unintegrated objects” which arise in suchmodels,
nor for the operations which create them. Why should object structures which
are not connected to other object structures be problematic? It is certainly pos-
sible in such models to stipulate that unmerged objects give rise to processing
difficulty, but this does not address the question of why the processing difficulty
arises, or what “processing” is in a mechanistic sense.
The o/el framework provides greater clarity regarding what processing is,
what “unintegrated structures” are, and why the reanalysis that produces them
leads to behavioral effects such as increased P600, slowed reading times, and/or
saccadic backtracking. In conventional approaches, unintegrated structures are
structures of objects that are not merged into some other structure which is
already present. Instead of imagining of objects in space, the o/el conception
posits systems which can be characterized by their spectral coherence and cou-
pling to other systems. Unintegrated structures are cs-systems which are (i) not
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coupled to other cs-systems and (ii) are not spectrally coherent. A consequence
of these conditions is that these systems experience stronger interference from
other systems, and are therefore less stable. The repair process, as described in
our analysis of the P600, involves the application of grounding and subsequent
reorganization operations. This allows for alternative ϕ-configurations to arise,
and subsequently for a grammatically coherent interpretation trajectory to oc-
cur. The initial instability and the reorganization operations are associated with
changes in spectral coherencewhichmanifest in ERPs.We have furthermore con-
jectured that there may be coherence response systems which respond to nonco-
herent states by inducing reorganizations. Along these lines, a sensible endeavor
is to develop a model of oculomotor control in which coherence response sys-
tems influence reading behavior; this will allow for reading time and saccadic
backtracking to be modeled in the framework.
One of the most fundamental problems with object-based conceptions of psy-
cholinguistic phenomena is that they do not lend well to reasoning about the
“parallel” activation of systems. Consider the garden path utterance in (28) be-
low. The interpreter may excite a |dressed baby| configuration, but this leads to a
non-coherent state because [played]{V} cannot participate in a ϕ-configuration
with a {+N} system. The experience of non-coherence may then induce reorgani-
zations which lead to a coherent trajectory involving |Al dressed (himself)| and
|baby played| configurations. Psycholinguistic studies have found evidence that
the garden-pathed relational meaning of |dressed baby| may “linger,” based on
the observation that interpreters will sometimes answer “yes” to question (29a)
(Slattery et al. 2013), indicating that the originally engaged configuration remains
in memory after the repair.
(28) While Al dressed the baby played in the crib.
(29) a. Did Al dress the baby?
b. Did Al dress himself?
The issue here is how to conceptualize working memory and “lingering struc-
tures”. As we explored earlier, a standard mapping of the object metaphor is that
two linguistic units cannot occupy the same position in a structure, just as two
different objects cannot occupy the same space. Thus in order to adapt a conven-
tional conceptualization of structure to account for this sort of phenomenon, it is
necessary to circumvent violations of the standardmapping. To wit, Slattery et al.
(2013) describe an account in which there is an “overlay function” which allows
a lingering structure to be ‘present “underneath”’ the new structure. The fact
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that the authors scare-quote “underneath” suggests a subtle discomfort with the
spatial implications of this metaphor, which are dissonant with the conventional
conception.The lingering structure must be underneath the new one because ob-
jects cannot occupy the same space. But what is the nature of this new space that
is underneath another space in which structures of objects can be “present”?
It is not the notion that interpretation involves parallel (i.e. simultaneous) ac-
tivation of systems that is the problem, but rather, the notion that working mem-
ory is a space for objects. The problems are easily resolved when we see that our
use of the term working memory refers to certain aspects of a state (or dimen-
sions of a state space), rather objects occupying space. A working memory state
can be defined in the same ϕ/e state space as the one in which production and
interpretation trajectories are defined. A “lingering structure” is a set of activated
cs-resonances, which by virtue of being in an active state have an increased like-
lihood of being integrated into a stable configuration. These same systems may
also prevent newly activated systems from participating in a configuration or
may destabilize other systems.
The o/el framework thus provides an alternative vocabulary that, because of
its emphasis on the dynamics of systems and construction of state spaces, clari-
fies our conception of information, avoids anthropomorphization, and links our
conceptual model of language more directly to behavioral observations. The dis-
advantage of the alternative vocabulary is that it is unfamiliar. The only way to
change that is to practice using the vocabulary, and thereby explore its utility
for conceptualizing phenomena. To that end, the next chapter examines several





In this chapter we apply the tools of the o/el framework to a variety of syntactic
phenomena, such as ellipsis, anaphora, wh-expressions, and island patterns.1 We
reject various object-metaphor conceptualizations of these phenomena – move-
ment, copying, deletion, feature matching, etc. – but may use some terminology
that evokes them for convenience. In most cases we pursue analyses from the
perspective of production. However, we make the assumption that producers ob-
tain a coherent trajectory prior to selectional production; hence we conflate pro-
ducer and interpreter to some degree by conjecturing that utterance coherence
is required for production. One can envision a parallel approach which pursues
analyses from the perspective of interpretation; but due to our emphasis on po-
tentially reiterative trajectories (i.e. utterance coherence), production-based and
interpretation-based analyses may not be substantively different.
7.1 Ellipsis
From a conventional perspective, ellipsis is commonly conceptualized as a phe-
nomenon in which objects are “deleted” from a structure, often when those same
objects are present elsewhere in the structure (Merchant 2001; 2005; 2013). For
example, consider the utterance in (1). We might expect Al drank to be selected
again in the second clause.
(1) Al drank coffee first and (Al drank) tea second.
1These phenomena are of course very complicated and hence the treatments presented here are
necessarily incomplete. The goal is to illustrate the general applicability of the o/el framework,
rather than establish a definitive understanding of the phenomena. Moreover, the analyses
conducted are of coherence intuitions that are my own, and without further empirical work
there is no guarantee that my intuitions correspond to intuitions which other speakers may
have. I can only hope that there is no great disparity between my intutitions and those which
are normal among native speakers.The reliance I have on Al and Bo, drinks and eats, and coffee,
tea, and granola, is a potential problem as well, to the extent that proper names, simple/habitual
tense-aspect ambiguity, andmass nouns could lead to abnormal coherence intuitions in various
contexts.
7 Syntactic phenomena
The elided words in this example, and in general, are not necessarily a con-
stituent in the conventional view. Although we can imagine any sequence of
words being elided, not all possible ellipses are coherent. Here we construct an
o/el understanding of ellipsis and develop analyses of why some ellipses are co-
herent and others are not.
7.1.1 Motoric vs. syntactic accounts
With o/el conceptual tools, there are two types of accounts of ellipsis, one mo-
toric and the other syntactic. This is also the case for conventional approaches.
For several reasons, the syntactic account is preferable, but let’s consider both
approaches for the sake of argument.
For the motoric account, we imagine that cs-system trajectories are canonical:
the cs-systems associated with elided words are in fact selected, but gm-systems
in the g-domains of these cs-systems are not selected. This account is “motoric”
because ellipsis is understood as the non-selection of gestural-motoric systems;
it can be construed as m-gating applied to particular systems. In contrast, for the
syntactic account, we imagine that cs-systems associated with the elided words
are not selected.
To see how motoric and syntactic accounts differ, let’s consider the gapping
ellipsis in (12): Al drank coffee first and tea second, shown in Figure 7.1. In both
accounts, [Al]{N} and [drank]{V} are promoted to selection and demoted, prior to
epoch (e1). For themotoric account, at a later epoch (e2), [Al]{N} is once again pro-
moted to selection level. However, the g-domain associated with this cs-system
is not re-excited (or alternatively, is excited but does not reach selection-level).
The same applies to [drank]V in the following epoch. In contrast, in the syntactic
account [Al]{N} and [drank]{V} remain excited during the later epoch (e2) but are
not re-promoted to selection level.
In both approaches, [Al]{N} and [drank]{V} persist in an above ground state
and give rise to |Al drank tea| and |drank second| ϕ-configurations. The two ap-
proaches differ regarding whether the clausal e-reorganization of cs-systems is
canonical (the motoric account) or selective (the syntactic account). The ques-
tion is, do both possible types of ellipsis occur, or should we always prefer just
one in our analyses? These two accounts relate to an old disagreement about
whether non-constituent coordination is really coordination of constituents in
deep structure, with the apparent non-constituent coordination being a conse-
quence of surface deletion (Dalrymple et al. 1991; Merchant 2001; Sag et al. 1985).
(2) Al drank coffee first and (Al drank → Ø) tea second
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Figure 7.1: Motoric vs. syntactic accounts of ellipsis.
One of the motivations for positing such deep structure is to serve semantic
interpretation. The conventional paradigm requires objects to be “present” some-
where, so that meaning can be determined from structure. In the o/el framework,
relational meaning experiences arise from attentionally focused (excited) cs-sys-
tem ϕ-configurations, and hence the relevant systems must be above ground and
ϕ-coupled. Importantly, selection-level excitation is not required for relational
meaning, and this allows for a syntactic account in which systems can persist in
an excited state and support ϕ-configurational meaning, without being selected.
7.1.2 Ellipsis in coordinative vs. subordinative reorganizations
The syntactic account of ellipsis makes use of a selective reorganization opera-
tion associated with the transition from one clausal ϕ-configuration to another,
in which only some excited systems are grounded. In particular, the grounded
systems are only those which interfere with systems that are promoted from
ground. One useful application of this approach is to account for coherence in-
tuitions of ellipses in coordinate vs. subordinate clause structures. Consider the
coherence contrast between the sentences in (3):
(3) a. Al drank coffee, and Bo tea.
b. */? Al drank coffee, if Bo tea.
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Why is ellipsis of the {V} system less coherent when in a subordinate clause
than in a coordinate clause?The coherence contrast suggests that [drink]{V} can-
not as readily form a ϕ-configuration with [Bo] and [tea] after a subordinate
clause reorganization, compared to a coordinate clause reorganization. Because
of this we infer that [drink]{V} in (3b) is more likely to be grounded in the epochs
during which [Bo] and [tea] are excited than in in (3a). To account for the con-
trast, we hypothesize a distinction between reorganizations associated with co-
ordinate and subordinate clauses: coordinating reorganizations typically allow
for cs-systems to remain excited, subordinating reorganizations are more likely
to ground all previously excited systems.
Specifically, in a coordinative reorganization, lexical cs-systems from the previ-
ous epoch can remain excited, if those systems do not interfere with a cs-system
promoted from ground in the coordinative reorganization. Hence in the coordi-
nation trajectory in Figure 7.2, [drank]{V} remains excited after Ê4, while [Al] and
[coffee] are grounded. The reason [Al]{N} and [coffee]{N} are grounded in this
reorganization is because they interfere with cs-systems [Bo]{N} and [tea]{N}.
In contrast, Ê4 in the subordinative reorganization grounds all cs-systems, in-
cluding [drank]{V}. Hence [Bo] and [tea] cannot participate in a ϕ-configuration
with a {V} in (e4), thereby inducing non-coherence. Note that our analysis con-
structs just one [drink]{V} system, but we might also allow for an analysis in
which [drink] and {V} systems are differentiated in parallel. Parallel c-/s- dif-
ferentiations of this sort can be viewed as states which induce ellipsis, i.e. the
non-selection of cs-systems which experience parallel c-/s- differentiation.
One aspect of the above analysis worth emphasizing is that we think of the
coordinating conjunctions such as [and]{conj}, [but]{conj}, and [or]{conj} as
systems which are specifically associated with promoting some other systems
from ground in a coordinative reorganization. Hence when [Bo]{N} and [tea]{N}
are promoted from ground in reorganization Ê4, we imagine [and]{conj} to be
activated and excited. In contrast, we analyze subordinators such as [if]{sub},
[when]{sub}, etc. as cs-systems which are activated in parallel with grounded
cs-systems. This suggests a fundamental difference between coordination and
subordination such that subordinators correspond to systems which are in ϕ-
configurations with other systems (usually {V}), while coordinators are the man-
ifestation of ungrounding promotion operations.
Furthermore, the reader should note that the non-coherence intuitions moti-
vating the above analysis can be diminished if one “tries hard” to evoke the |Bo
drank tea| configuration in the subordinative reorganization. Perhaps this effort-
ful adjustment adapts the subordinative reorganization to be more like a coor-
dinative one, i.e. one which maintains [drank]{V} above ground. Thus we infer
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Figure 7.2: Coordinative reorganization vs. subordinative reorganiza-
tion.
that in the typical subordinative reorganization trajectory, excitation of a subor-
dinate clause grounds all other systems in previously excited configurations, but
this operation can be overridden via a mechanism which maintains some rele-
vant systems in an excited state. This effortful excitation is a potential source of
variability in coherence intuitions of ellipses (see Frazier & Clifton 2005; Phillips
2003; Phillips & Parker 2014 for examples of empirical variability).
The o/el conception of ellipsis avoids any concept of deletion or omission of
objects in a structure. Ellipsis corresponds to a trajectory in which some cs-
system(s) are not selected yet remain sufficiently excited to participate in an
attended ϕ-configuration. Because subordinative reorganizations tend to ground
previously excited systems, ellipsis in a subordinate clause is not coherent. There
are, however, circumstances when previously grounded systems can be re-pro-
moted from ground and thus participate in the ϕ-configuration of the subordi-
nate clause.
One such circumstance involves the presence of an auxiliary s-system {Aux}
in both the main and subordinate clauses. Consider the patterns in Table 7.1. Con-
trary to expectation, we observe that ellipsis in a subordinate clause is coherent,
but only when an auxiliary verb is present in the subordinate clause, as in the
pseudo-gapping and VP-ellipsis patterns (Johnson 2001; 2009; Merchant 2001).
The relevant difference between gapping/stripping and pseudo-gapping/VP-
ellipsis is the excitation of an {Aux} system in the subordinate clause. This sug-
gests that there is a mechanism for re-exciting a previously grounded cs-system,
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Table 7.1: Four varieties of ellipsis in coordinate and subordinate
clauses.
gapping stripping
Al will drink coffee, and Bo tea.
*Al will drink coffee, if Bo tea.
Al will drink coffee, and Bo too.
*Al will drink coffee, if Bo too.
pseudo-gapping VP-ellipsis
Al will drink coffee, and Bo will tea.
Al will drink coffee, if Bo will tea.
Al will drink coffee, and Bo will (too).
Al will drink coffee, if Bo will (too).
when that cs-system is coupled to another highly excited system. We call this
assisted persistence. Hence we envision in the pseudo-gapping example of Fig-
ure 7.3(B) that promotion of {Aux}[will] by Ê5 allows for {V}[drink] to remain
above-ground (i.e. the demotion of {V} is non-grounding). This allows for a co-
herent |Bo drink tea| ϕ-configuration. The assisted persistence mechanism may
be related to the observation that [will]{Aux} and [drink]{V} could be analyzed
as differentiated cs-systems, which are strongly coupled in association with both
clauses. Note that ellipses with non-identical auxiliaries such as Al will drink cof-
fee, and Bo did tea are much less coherent.
Figure 7.3: An auxiliary allows for a verb to persist in an excited state.
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The assisted persistence mechanism is highly constrained. {Aux} can allow
both {V} and {−N} to persist across a clausal reorganization (4a), but the trajec-
tory is somewhat less coherent if only {V} persists (4b). Coherence is strongly
compromised when if only {−N} or {+N} are required to persist above ground,
as in (4c) and (4d). This suggests that relative e-organization may be a factor in
assisted persistence and that coherence intuitions will differ in languages with
different fixed word orders.
(4) a. Al will drink coffee, if Bo will (drink coffee).
b. (?)Al will drink coffee, if Bo will (drink) tea.
c. ?Al will drink coffee, if Bo will brew (coffee).
d. ?Al will drink coffee, if (Al) will brew coffee.
Another interesting aspect of the phenomenon is the influence of g-domain
identity. When the {Aux} selection is associated with a contracted gm-organiza-
tion in the subordinate clause, the elision trajectory is less coherent. This condi-
tion is exemplified by the coherence contrasts in (5). The ellipsis is only coherent
in (5c) where the non-contracted auxiliary occurs.
(5) a. ?Al’ll drink coffee, if Bo’ll tea.
b. ?Al will drink coffee, if Bo’ll tea.
c. Al’ll drink coffee, if Bo will (tea).
These patterns might suggest that gm-excitation plays a role in the assisted
persistence mechanism, but there is an alternative interpretation. Note that a
key difference in cs-organization between contracted and uncontracted forms
of the auxiliary is whether {Aux} occupies a level of its own or is co-selected
with other systems. As exemplified in Figure 7.4(A), when [will]{Aux} is selected
independently from other lexical systems, [drink]{V} can persist in an excited
state in the reorganization Ê5. However, when [will]{Aux} is co-selected with
[Al]{N} as in Figure 7.4(B), the reorganization grounds [drink]{V}.
Other types of s-systems than {Aux} can assist the persistence of cs-systems.
Consider the complement clause elisions in (6). As expected, the elision is more
coherent in the coordinated clause (6a) than the subordinated one (6b). However,
the selection of the nonfinite clause s-system [to]{fin} in (6c) seems to facilitate
a coherent interpretation. This suggests that [to]{fin} assists the persistence of
systems associated with the elided complement clause. Nominal modifiers can
assist persistence as well, as do quantifiers in utterances such as Al drank two
coffees, if Bo drank one.
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Figure 7.4: Assisted persistence from an auxiliary system is stronger
when the auxiliary is independently selected.
(6) a. Al was ordered to drink coffee and he refused (to drink coffee).
b. ?Al was ordered to drink coffee when he refused (to drink coffee).
c. Al was ordered to drink coffee when he refused to.
By using the term persistence, we imply that the relevant system is excited
before and after the clausal reorganization, and remains so throughout. In top
example trajectory of Figure 7.5, [drink]{V} fails to be grounded by the subordi-
native reorganization Ê5 because [will]{Aux} is excited. Note that an alternative
possibility shown in Figure 7.5 is that [drink]{V} is grounded by Ê5, and is pro-
moted from ground by a subsequent reorganization. Because this grounding-and-
promotion analysis results in a noncoherent epoch (e5), we prefer the persistence
analysis.
In the above analyses, we have constructed two [will]{Aux} systems by pre-
supposing parallel differentiations of the c-system [will] and the s-system {Aux}.
However, we did not represent parallel c-/s- differentiations for [drink]{V}. As
mentioned above, the excitation persistence mechanism can be interpreted as a
manifestation of parallel differentiation of [drink]{V}. In other words, we imagine
that there are two [drink]{V} cs-systems which are highly overlapping and thus
interact strongly. Ellipsis is often coherent precisely when parallel c-/s- differen-
tiation of a lexical system occurs in association with different clauses. Parallel
c-/s- differentiation can thus be seen as a state which induces non-selection of
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Figure 7.5: Two possibilities for persistence: non-grounding reorgani-
zation and grounding with subsequent promotion.
excited systems. Subordinative reorganization can in this light be viewed to in-
terfere with parallel c-/s- differentiation of lexical cs-systems, while assisted per-
sistence – in the form of coupling with an {Aux} system – can stabilize parallel
c-/s- differentiation.
7.1.3 Reiterative facilitation of persistent excitation
The above analyses can be generalized to cases in which the elision of a system
precedes the selection of that same system. We accomplish this by applying the
persistent excitation analysis to a reiterative trajectory. The interactions of this
more general analysis with the varieties of ellipsis above (gapping, stripping, VP
ellipsis, pseudogapping, etc.) are somewhat complicated and intuitions can be
difficult to assess. For simplicity, we consider only the object NP ellipsis in (7)
(cf. Wilder 1997). The ellipsis in a coordinated clause (7a) seems to cohere more
readily than examples (7b) and (7c), where one of the clauses is subordinate. The
persistent excitation analysis developed above, with no further mechanism, pre-
dicts that none of the three trajectories should cohere because the non-selected
cs-systems seem not to have been excited in any preceding epochs.
(7) a. Al brews and Bo drinks coffee.
b. ? Al brews so Bo drinks coffee.
c. ? If Al brews, Bo drinks coffee.
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However, recall that reiterative simulation creates periodic trajectories in
which absolute notions of precedence become less tenable. To account for the
coherence of (7a), we can imagine that the producer obtains a reiterative tra-
jectory before selectional production. In the trajectory of Figure 7.6, (e0–e5) are
reiterative and non-selectional.The key insight is that when the trajectory transi-
tions to a selectional regime with reorganization Ê6, [coffee]{N} has already been
excited and can remain so. Thus the presence of a reiteration prior to selectional
production allows for coherence of (e6) and (e7). What is more challenging to
explain is the non-promotion of [coffee] in Ê8; this might be understood as an
anticipatory reorganization of excitation for the ϕ-configuration of the second
clause.
Figure 7.6: A reiterative trajectory before selectional production facili-
tates persistent excitation.
Why do the sentences with a subordinated clause in (7b) and (7c) fail to cohere
as readily as the coordinated clauses in (7a)? Presumably the distinction between
coordinative and subordinative reorganization applies to reiterative trajectories
as well. To account for non-coherence of (7c), we suspect that the subordina-
tive reorganization destabilizes coupling of [brews]{V} with [coffee]{N} because
it grounds [coffee]{N} in the reiterative trajectory. To account for non-coherence
of (7c), we could infer that initial organization, or organization of a main clause,
also involves grounding demotions. Hence [coffee]{N} is not excited in epochs
when [Al]{N} and [brews]{V} are excited, resulting in non-coherence.
The generalizations that emerge from the above analyses are as follows: only
coordinative reorganizations allow unassisted persistence of excitation; subordi-
native andmain-clause reorganizations ground previously excited systems; some
other mechanism, such as assisted persistence, is required to maintain excitation
of systems through a subordinative or main-clause reorganization.
7.1.4 Contextual excitation and ellipsis
Another influence on coherence of trajectories with ellipsis is excitation of sys-
tems by discourse context. Contextually excited cs-systems which, despite not
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being selected in the same sentence, and perhaps never being selected at all, can
participate in ϕ-configurations if they have above-ground excitation. Consider
the answer ellipsis examples in (8):
(8) a. S1: Who drank coffee?
S2: Al.
b. S1: What did Al drink?
S2: Coffee.
In these examples, cs-systems which were excited for S2 as an interpreter of
S1 may not be promoted to selection level for S2 as a producer. Hence for the
question response in (8a), [drank]{V} and [coffee]{N} are excited in the produc-
tion trajectory for S2, but may not be selected. These systems nonetheless can
participate in the |Al drank coffee| ϕ-configuration. As shown in Figure 7.7, S2
will couple the selected cs-system of the response to the relevant wh-system,
which remains active in production epochs (e1–e3). In a sense, our analysis has
the spirit of analyses in which answer fragments have “fully sentential struc-
tures” (Merchant 2005), but our conceptualization of structure here is radically
different.
Figure 7.7: Ellipsis in a question response: cs-systems excited in the
interpretation trajectory remain excited in the production trajectory
of the response.
In the above analyses, we have established a viable set of analytic tools for un-
derstanding various aspects of the phenomenon of ellipsis. These tools include
persistent excitation, assistance of persistent excitation through coupling to ex-
cited systems, and reiterative trajectories which precede selectional production.
In combination with hypothesized differences in grounding propensities of co-
ordinative vs. subordinative/main clause reorganizations, the analytic tools can
explain a variety of ellipsis patterns. Further evidence of their utility comes from




From the conventional perspective, anaphora is the occurrence of an expression
(syntactic object) whose interpretation depends on the presence of another ob-
ject, and coreference is the more general circumstance in which two expressions
refer to the same person or thing (Hankamer & Sag 1976; Huang 2000; Reinhart
1983; 2016; Safir 2004). In (9), anaphors and their coreferent expressions are in-
dexed:
(9) Ali brews coffeej and hei drinks itj.
There are a number of sensible questions from the conventional perspective,
such as whether there are structural constraints on coreference patterns and on
the temporal ordering of coreferent expressions in sentences. From an o/el per-
spective, we reframe these questions, askingwhat conditions induce the selection
of anaphors in production trajectories. The focus here is on nominal anaphora,
with the presumption that the account can be extended to verbal anaphora.
7.2.1 Anaphoric systems
Because of their unique behavior, we posit a new class of s-systems for anaphors,
{pro}, and also a class of anaphoric c-systems, whichwe label generically as [pro].
As expected, these systems form cs-resonances, {pro} differentiates readily into
{+pro} and {-pro}, and {pro} can be co-selected with a variety of grammatical
s-systems, e.g. {person}, {number}, {gender}. The {pro} s-system is unlike {N}
in that {ADJ} and {D} systems do not readily ϕ-couple with {pro} (i.e. *the cold
it). The [pro] c-system is unusual in that it evokes a nonspecific meaning; this
may explain why it does not couple with {Adj} or {D}. We hypothesize that in
typical uses, the specificity of meaning experiences from ϕ-configurations with
{pro} results from +ϕ coupling between {pro} and some other excited system.This
system may be excited from contextual forces, may have been excited earlier in
an utterance, or may be excited in a reiterative trajectory preceding selectional
production.
Consider the utterance he drinks it and two possible initial configurations of
production, shown in Figure 7.8. The state in (A), in which no lexical {N} systems
are excited, cannot give rise to a coherent meaning experience. Instead we hy-
pothesize an initial configuration such as (B), where each {pro} is coupled to an
excited lexical s-system. These lexical systems are not promoted to selection dur-
ing production. Another somewhat atypical characteristic of [pro]{pro} systems
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is that their g-domains tend to vary as a function of co-selected grammatical sys-
tems. The set of co-selected grammatical s-systems determines the g-domain of
[pro]{pro}, as represented in (B). To avoid clutter, we usually omit these gram-
matical systems from representations.
Figure 7.8: Pronominal systems are coupled to lexical systems.
The excitation of a {pro} system is an alternative and less direct mechanism for
stabilizing a ϕ-configuration. For coherence to occur, each {pro} must be coupled
to a lexical cs-system. An even stronger account posits that excitation of an {N}
system always activates a corresponding {pro} system. For the trajectory of (10)
shown in Figure 7.9, we could imagine that during epochs inwhich the first clause
is attended (e.g. e1), {pro} systems coupled to {N}[Al] and {N}[coffee] are activated.
In later epochs (e.g. e4) with attention on the second clause, those {PRO} systems
are excited and are promoted to selection instead of [Al]{N} and [coffee]{N}. The
lexical systems nonetheless remain above ground, another example of persistent
excitation. Moreover, because coherence occurs with anaphors in a subordinated
clause (e.g. Al drinks coffee, if he brews it), we infer that {pro} systems facilitate
the persistence of excitation of the lexical system with which they are coupled.
Thus the excitation of {pro} systems by Ê4 keeps [Al]{N} and [coffee]{N} above
ground, which is another example of assisted persistence.
(10) Al drinks coffee, and he brews it.
One of the interesting characteristics of {pro} systems is that there is evidently
a bias to select them instead of lexical systems, but only when the relevant lexical
system has already been selected.The bias is not an obligation, since productions
can occur such as Al drinks coffee, and Al brews coffee. Nonetheless, an explana-
tion for the {pro} bias is desirable. One possible mechanism to create a bias for
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Figure 7.9: Pronominal systems assist in the persistence of lexical sys-
tems.
promotion of {PRO} rather than {N} may involve recent demotion of the concep-
tual and/or gestural systems associated with lexical cs-system. In other words,
recently demoted systems are less amenable to be subsequently promoted.
Anaphora is similar to ellipsis, in that it occurs when parallel c-system and s-
system differentiation is required. Generally, we can view anaphora and ellipsis,
along with direct reference and null pronominal reference, as different classes of
trajectories for evoking a meaning experience. These are compared in Table 7.2.
Direct reference and ellipsis create relational meaning experiences fromϕ-con-
figurations directly through coupling of lexical s-systems. In contrast, anaphora
creates relational meaning more indirectly. For example, by coupling to both
[Al]{N} and [drinks]{V}, {pro} indirectly brings about the ϕ-configuration |Al
drinks coffee|. In direct reference and anaphora, the relevant cs-system which
participates in the ϕ-configuration(s) is selected; in ellipsis, this cs-system is not
selected. Given this taxonomy of reference, a logical possibility is a non-selected
[pro]{pro} system giving rise to a ϕ-configuration indirectly. This could corre-
spond to a null pronominal or big pro, as in Al wants pro to drink coffee.
7.2.2 Temporal ordering of anaphoric and lexical systems
In some circumstances, an anaphor and its lexical antecedent can be selected in
either temporal order, as shown by the example of backward anaphora in (11b)
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Al drinks tea and Al drinks coffee [Al]{N} yes |Al drinks coffee|
Anaphora
Al drinks tea, and he drinks coffee [pro]{pro} yes |pro drinks coffee|
|pro Al|
Ellipsis
Al drinks tea, and (Al) drinks coffee [Al]{N} no |Al drinks coffee|
Null pronominal
Al wants to (pro) drink coffee [pro]{pro} no |pro drinks coffee|
|pro Al|
below (cf. Kazanina et al. 2007; Reuland & Avrutin 2005). In conventional ap-
proaches, such examples violate a hypothesized principle requiring antecedents
to “precede” anaphors in a structural sense, and hence necessitate a movement
analysis (Chomsky 1993). Instead of moving object structures, we can understand
such phenomena to be associated with a reiterative trajectory, just as we did for
ellipses.
We imagine that the reiterative trajectory in Figure 7.10 (e0–e6) precedes se-
lectional production of the utterance. Thus the lexical antecedent of the matrix
clause can persist in an excited state when overt production of the subordinate
clause occurs. The utterances (11a) and (11b) can be distinguished according to
when, in the context of the reiteration, production transitions to a selectional
regime. When the transition occurs in conjunction with a reorganization to (e0),
sentence (11a) is produced; when the transition occurs with reorganization to
(e3), sentence (11b) is produced. In this case, promotion of [it]{pro} assists the
persistence of [coffee]{N}, which was excited in non-selectional epochs of the
reiteration.
(11) a. Al drinks coffee, when Bo brews it.
b. When Bo brews it, Al drinks coffee.
However, the coherence contrast between the examples in (12) suggests that
reorganization to a main clause exerts a stronger grounding force on systems
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Figure 7.10: Backward anaphora is possible when a reiterative trajec-
tory precedes selectional production.
than reorganization to a subordinate or coordinated clause. When a production
trajectory transitions to a selectional regime for a main clause, all systems are
grounded, except those associated with the main clause. Hence [coffee]{N} is
grounded during attention to the relevant ϕ-configuration in (12b), rendering
the trajectory noncoherent. In the trajectory for (12b) in Figure 7.11, we show
a reiteration of epochs (e0–e6). Note that the reorganization of attention to the
main clause (Ê7) demotes [coffee]{N} to ground, and hence [coffee]{N} is not avail-
able when production subsequently transitions to a selectional regime. Of course,
with some effort, [coffee]{N} can be promoted to an excited state in this transi-
tion, and we suspect that this accounts for variation in coherence intuitions.
(12) a. Al drinks coffee, and/when Bo brews it.
b. ? Al drinks it, and/when Bo brews coffee.
From the perspective of interpretation, sentence (12b) may evoke an exophoric
relation between [it]{PRO} and a contextually activated system. Because of the
immediate organization bias, an interpretation trajectory may involve excitation
of a lexical {N} system which is not selected in an utterance, and this would
naturally interfere with the intended interpretation.
The analyses we have developed of anaphora and ellipsis are based on the idea
that various characteristics of clausal reorganizations influence the propensity
for lexical cs-systems to remain excited. For ellipsis we observed that persistence
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Figure 7.11: Reorganization to a main clause grounds all unattended
systems.
of an elided cs-system is assisted when the system is coupled to another above-
ground system, such an {Aux} system. For anaphora, we interpret {pro} as an
assisting system of this sort. In both cases, when a reiterative regime precedes a
selectional one, the normal temporal relation of antecedent/dependent relations
can be reversed. Moreover, the analyses indicate a hierarchy of reorganizations
based on the propensity of the reorganization to ground a system that has a
promoted competitor. Table 7.3 shows this hierarchy:
Table 7.3: Hierarchy of reorganizations based on grounding propensity.
grounding propensity reorganization
non-grounding canonical reorganization within clause
selective reorg. to coordinated clause
selective reorg. to coordinated system within-clause
weakly grounding selective reorg. to subordinate clause
strongly grounding selective reorg. to main clause
The reorganization-grounding hierarchy is a key aspect of our analyses of el-
lipsis and anaphora patterns. It is important to recognize that such analyses are
only necessary because we have rejected the assumption that systems associated
with different clauses are equivalently co-present. This rejection is desirable be-
cause of differentiation interference, which derives from the microscale model of





In general the forces which influence whether an anaphoric {pro} or lexical sys-
tem is promoted to selection level are not so strong that only one option is possi-
ble. Both anaphoric and direct reference options are available in many contexts,
although re-selection of the lexical cs-system as in (13a) tends to sound somewhat
overly formal compared to selection of the anaphor as in (13b):
(13) a. Al likes coffee and Bo likes coffee.
b. Al likes coffee and Bo likes it.
The biasing forces for selection of {pro} over a lexical system are strongerwhen
the coreference obtains between two systems that participate in a ϕ-configura-
tion with the same lexical system, as in the examples below. The conventional
approach to this phenomenon is to identify a structural pattern (“binding do-
main”) in which coreference obligates the reflexive form (Chomsky 1982; 1993;
Haegeman 1994; Reinhart 1976; Safir 2004). From an o/el perspective, no such
structure exists and therefore an alternative analysis is needed. To that end, we
observe that reflexives are strongly preferred in a fairly unique configuration,
one in which a c-system and an s-system differentiate in parallel and the differ-
entiated systems obtain a −ϕ relation. Following our earlier analysis of pronoun
g-domains, we begin by assuming that reflexive forms (i.e.myself, ourselves, your-
self…) are the g-domain of a [self]{pro} cs-system, i.e. that there is a [self] c-
systemwhich is a subclass of [pro], and that the g-domain of [self] is determined
by co-selected grammatical s-systems for [person], [number], [gender], etc.
(14) a. Ali likes himselfi.
b. * Ali likes himi.
Consider that there is a unique pattern of interference in the prototypical re-
flexive construction, in which a {V} is coupled to both a {+N} agent and a {−N}
patient, and both of these {N} are coupled to the same c-system. We show this
circumstance in Figure 7.12(A), where the following conditions are required: {pro}
must be +ϕ coupled to an excited lexical system, here [Al]{−N}; {pro} must be −ϕ
coupled to [likes]{V}; and [Al]{+N} must be +ϕ coupled with [likes]{V}. It follows
from transitivity of coupling that the only way for such a configuration to be sta-
ble is for [Al] to differentiate such that there is a [Al]{+N} system and a [Al]{−N}
system. In other words, the differentiated [Al] systems have a distal ϕ relation;
we call this a destructive c-differentiation. States of destructive c-differentiation
in particular are associated with strong preference for the reflexive form. The
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trajectory of (15b) in Figure 7.12(B) shows that the destructive c-differentiation
must apply to c-systems which are excited in the same epoch, i.e. simultaneously
attended, in order to induce excitation of the [self] system.
(15) a. Ali likes himselfi.
b. Ali likes Bo, and Bo likes himi.
Figure 7.12: Reflexives are associated with destructive c-differentiation
interference.
It is informative to consider a related utterance, Al likes Al, which is readily
coherent in a contrastive context, e.g. Al doesnt like Bo. Al doesnt like Cam. Al
likes Al. This also requires destructive c-differentiation of [Al] such that there
are [Al]{+N} and [Al]{−N} systems, but [Al]{−N} is typically co-selected with a
focus system [foc]{foc}. The fact that [foc] or [self] (which we now see as a
special type of [pro]) are strongly biased to occur in the destructive c-differenti-
ation context suggests that these systems may serve to stabilize a configuration
which is otherwise unstable.
The relational meaning experience associated with destructive c-differentia-
tion of {N} often takes on an additional flavor. For example, Al likes himself may
have some idiomatic quality of meaning that differs from Al likes Bo, or Al likes
coffee. The additional idiomatic quality is perhaps more obvious in examples like
Al knows himself, Al kicks himself, or Al pushes himself – all of which induce
idiosyncratic meaning experiences which are not readily analyzed as composi-
tional.2 These special flavors of meaning are difficult to describe, but our concep-
tual model suggests that they involve alternative patterns of c-system excitation
induced by co-excitation of reflexive [self] and a verbal cs-system.
2Of course, in the o/el framework there is no conventional notion of compositionality, because
meaning experiences are not combined in the way that objects are combined.
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To further analyze binding phenomena lets consider the examples in (16)
where the reflexive form does not readily cohere. Initial configurations for each
of these sentences are shown in Figure 7.13. One important aspect of the analysis
is the hypothesis that {Poss} s-systems are similar to {P} systems in that {Poss}
typically relates two systems, one of which {Poss} is +ϕ coupled with, the other
it is −ϕ coupled with. In examples (B) and (C), we see that because of the hy-
pothesized configurations for {Poss}, the [Al] c-differentiation is not destructive,
i.e. the differentiated [Al] systems in fact interfere constructively. Hence the re-
quired conditions are not present for use of [self].
(16) a. * himselfi likes Ali.
b. * Al’s friends like himselfi.
c. * Al likes himself’s friends.
Figure 7.13: The reflexive is not coherent in the absence of destructive
c-differentiation.
The analysis of (B) and (C) cannot be extended to (A), where the [self] form
is +ϕ coupled to {V}. To explain the noncoherence of (A) a different account is
needed.This could involve a number of factors, such as the +ϕ relation of [self] to
{V}, its status as clause-initial, and/or its selection before the lexical system [Al]{N}
to which it is coupled. There are many additional complications in the analysis
of self forms which we do not address in detail here (see König & Siemund 2000;
Safir 2004). Logophoric and emphatic uses of self-forms as in Al likes the picture
of himself and Al, himself a coffee-drinker, eats granola most likely involve a dif-
ferent cs-system than the one we posited above, and this system is not subject
to the same constraints as [self]{pro}.
Although a more comprehensive analysis is still in order, it is reassuring that
to conceptualize binding phenomena in the o/el framework, we did not need to
244
7.3 Wh-questions and islands
invent newmechanisms. Instead, the contexts in which self-forms are obligatory
and prohibited correspond fairly well to a particular form of differentiation inter-
ference, which is predicted by our model whether or not self-forms are present
in a given language. Furthermore, it appears that a general analysis of anaph-
ora can be built upon the very same concepts of grounding vs. non-grounding
reorganization that are generally useful in the o/el framework.
7.3 Wh-questions and islands
In conventional approaches, a common analysis of question formation in many
languages involves an object movement schema (Baker 1970; Cheng 1997; Chom-
sky 1965; Karttunen 1977). For example, the wh-question in (17a) is understood
to be created by moving the wh-expression in (17b). The wh-expression in (17b)
is in the same position where it would occur in the corresponding declarative
utterance (17c):
(17) a. What did Al drink?
b. Al drank what?
c. Al drank coffee.
Below we construct an o/el understanding of Wh question patterns based on
excitation in pre-selectional production, similar to our earlier analysis of topi-
calization. We then extend the account to a variety of so-called island effects,
circumstances in which wh-promotion does not readily occur.
7.3.1 Wh-systems and long-distance dependencies
The first question to address is whether we should pursue an analysis that prolif-
erates s-systems and/or c-systems, i.e. whether we construct {whN}, {whADV},
etc. and/or [wh-nominal], [wh-adverbial], etc. Observe that wh-forms such
as what, who, why, how, where, etc., when used for questions, have distribu-
tions which are similar to those of a variety of s-systems and obtain identical
ϕ-coupling relations to {V}. An analysis is possible that proliferates classes of s-
systems for these expressions, such as {whN}, {whV}, {whADJ}, and {whADV},
but this proliferation is unnecessary. Instead, we view wh-expressions as the g-
domains of a special class of c-systems, which we refer to as wh-systems. These
wh-systems form cs-resonances with the lexical s-systems that we have already




Figure 7.14: Example configurations with [wh]{N} systems.
In support of this approach, we observe in Table 7.4 that not only does each lex-
ical s-system have a corresponding wh-expression, but for some lexical s-system
classes there are several different g-domains which are associated with different
flavors of meaning (cf. the adverbials, as well as person vs. non-person {N}). The
conceptual specificity of the g-domains supports the c-system subclass analysis,
since in general we do not expect to construct classes of s-systems to accommo-
date detailed variation in meaning flavors.
Table 7.4: [Wh] c-systems and associated s-systems.
{N} [Wh-N] what
{N} (people) [Wh-person] who
{V} [Wh-V] what
{Adj} [Wh-Adj] what
{Adv} (manner) [Wh-manner] how
{Adv} (reason) [Wh-manner] why
{Adv} (temporal) [Wh-time] when
{Adv} (location) [Wh-loc] where
{Dem} [Wh-demonstrative] which
Wh-systems are hypothesized to have relatively weak interactions with the
sensory-motor surroundings, compared to prototypical c-systems. Recall that
prototypical c-systems, on the microscale, are distributed populations that inter-
act with diverse sensory and motor systems. For example, [coffee] is associated
with the smell of coffee, its taste, its temperature, what it looks like, the sound
of it brewing, steam coming off of it, etc.; various episodic memories associated
with coffee: brewing it in different contexts, buying it, spilling it, etc.; various mo-
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tor memories: how to hold a cup of it, how to drink it, etc. Prototypical lexical c-
systems havemany such associations, and we conceptualize these as interactions
with sensory and motor systems. In contrast, we hypothesize that wh-systems
lack strong interactions with the surroundings. Of course, wh-systems do not
lack surroundings interactions entirely: semantic differences such as person/ani-
mate from non-person/non-animate (who vs.what) can differentiate wh-systems.
But the semantic differentiation of wh-systems is evidently more generic.
Furthermore, we conjecture that the wh-system population sizes are relatively
large and/or more distributed compared to prototypical lexical c-systems. One
consequence of this is that there is more internal interference in a wh-system
than in a prototypical c-system, and this makes prototypical c-systems likely to
outcompete wh-systems for excited cs-resonances.We can also viewwh-systems
as super-populations, overlapping with large numbers of c-systems. For example,
all nominal concepts (i.e. c-systems which couple to {N}) might share a [whN]
subpopulation that couples to {N}. This implies that when a c-system such as
[coffee] is activated, the c-system [what]{N} would also be activated, but [cof-
fee] typically outcompetes [whN] for cs-resonance. When no specific c-systems
(such as [coffee] or [tea]) experience strong surroundings forces, then perhaps
the corresponding wh-system [whN] is more likely to become excited.
Another consequence of the population size/spread conjecture is that when
wh-systems do form excited cs-systems, the e values of those systems will be
relatively high. This provides a potential explanation for why wh-systems have
a tendency to be promoted to selection-level in initial e-configurations: the rel-
atively high e values of wh-systems augments the e value of the corresponding
cs-system in the pre-stable phase of production. Relatedly, wh-systems are often
co-selected with a {focus} s-system, i.e. [qestion]{focus}, which is similar to
[contrast]{focus} and may further augment excitation.
The activation of a wh-system and [Q] (i.e. [qestion]) normally results in
an initial configuration in which the wh-system is promoted to selection level
through augmented excitation, as shown in Figure 7.15. However, promotion
does not inevitably occur from augmented excitation, as shown by echo ques-
tions, i.e. Al drank WHAT? andWh in-situ, i.e. Who drank what? Note that many
conventional analyses require movement of in-situ wh-forms in a semantic rep-
resentation (i.e. logical form), because the relevant meaning relations must be
viewed as patterns of connection (see Reinhart 1998; Watanabe 1992).
Another question pattern to consider is one in which no particular wh-system
is excited, i.e. yes/no questions as in Figure 7.16. In such cases, lexical cs-systems
are selected and the meaning experience involves questioning a clausal set of
ϕ-configurations. In the examples below, the |Al drank coffee| configuration is
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Figure 7.15: Wh-systems are often promoted to selection level in initial
configurations.
questioned. In this case there is no wh-system to promote, and promotion of
{tense} with do-support occurs instead. The noncoherence of in situ utterances
with {tense} promotion (i.e. *Al did drink what?) suggests that {tense} promotion
is a consequence of promotion of [q]{focus} and/or promotion of [wh]{N}.
Figure 7.16: Questions without wh-systems.
Further support for the connection of {tense} promotion with [q]{focus} pro-
motion comes from the non-coherence of {tense} promotion when the subject
NP is questioned, as shown below in (18a) and (18b). In these utterances, neither
[Q]{focus} nor [wh]{N} are promoted from augmented excitation – [wh]{N} al-
ready occupies the initial selection level because of learned ϕ-e mappings. Note
that do-support for [tense] systems should be distinguished from emphatic do
in Al did drink coffee and the corresponding question in (c).
(18) a. Who drank coffee?
b. * Who did drink coffee?
c. Who DID drink coffee?
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In the o/el conceptualization, wh-question patterns involve promotion of a wh-
system in the pre-stable organization phase.Whether this promotion occurs is de-
termined by the surroundings forces.The [Q]{focus} systemwe have posited can
be interpreted as a manifestation of the relevant surroundings states. Moreover,
from the coherence of (18c) and multiple-wh utterances such as who drank what?
we infer that [Q]{focus} can occur at most once with each set of co-selected sys-
tems. This reinforces the notion that [Q]{focus} and [contrast]{focus} have a
deep similarity, based on their pragmatic origins and manifested in their propen-
sity to couple with the accentual s-system, {ˆ}. Recall that {ˆ} is special by virtue of
its association with the selection level of an e-potential. One possibility we leave
for future consideration is whether in some question trajectories [Q]{focus} is
re-promoted to selection level with each re-organization; an analysis of this sort
could account for the intonational patterns associated with yes/no questions and
clausal contrast.
The o/el conception is not consistent with any object-metaphor conception
in which word-objects move from one position to another. A conventional jus-
tification for a structural notion of movement involves the concept of a trace (a
phonologically “empty” syntactic object, cf. Chomsky 1965), which could be in-
terpreted in the o/el framework as a cs-system without a g-domain. To assess
this, lets consider the non-coherence of the utterances in (19).
(19) a. * Who Al drank coffee?
b. * What did Al drink coffee?
How do we account for the non-coherence of (19b), where [what] and [coffee]
c-systems are excited? We could stipulate that a [trace]{N} system is excited
and coupled to {V}, as shown below in Figure 7.17(A). However, this is not neces-
sary in the o/el framework.The non-coherence of (19b) follows straightforwardly
from our configurational invariance hypotheses. A transitive {V} system such as
[drink]{V} +ϕ couples to one agentive {N} system and −ϕ couples to one patien-
tive {N} system. In the initial configuration shown in Figure 7.17(B), [coffee]{N}
has no lexical {V} system to couple to (because [drink]{V} is already coupled with
[what]{N}), and thus the epoch is non-coherent.
The trace account in Figure 7.17(A) is also problematic because e-levels are
only organized for cs-systems with a g-domain. In all other analyses, cs-systems
with no g-domain are co-organized with some cs-system which has a non-empty
g-domain. This condition can be interpreted as a consequence of the accentua-
tion hypothesis whereby each set of co-selected cs-systems can excite at most
one accentual s-system: excitation of {ˆ} is viewed as a consequence of selec-
tion, rather than a syntactic-conceptual resonance. Furthermore, recall that in
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Figure 7.17: Movement/trace analyses of questions are problematic.
languages with stress, {ˆ} manifests as a primary stress/accent in gm-organiza-
tion. Because systems with empty g-domains (such as a hypothetical [trace]{N}
system) cannot be stressed, the trace analysis shown above is untenable.
One interesting characteristic of wh-systems promoted through augmented
excitation in the question context is their propensity to persist in an excited
state throughout a series of clausal reorganizations. Depending on the type of
reorganization that occurs, a [wh] c-system can remain above ground instead
of being demoted to ground. This behavior accounts for so-called “unbounded
dependencies” associated with wh-expressions as in (20). An example trajectory
is shown in Figure 7.18. The [what]{N} and [Q]{focus} systems remain above
ground throughout the entire trajectory, even after the complement clause reor-
ganization Ê5. Coupling to [Q]{focus} assists the persistence of [wh]{N} excita-
tion, in the same way that {Aux} assists persistent excitation of {V} in ellipsis.
(20) What does Bo know that Al drinks?
Figure 7.18: Wh-systems exhibit persistent excitation in some types of
clausal reorganizations.
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In the o/el picture, long distance wh-dependencies are trajectories in which
a [wh]x system coupled with [Q]{focus} remains excited through a reorgani-
zation which grounds unattended systems (typically of a clause). However, not
all clausal reorganizations allow for persistent excitation: there are a number of
reorganizations in which grounding forces outweigh persistent excitation. This
results in so-called island phenomena (Ross 1967).
7.3.2 Islands
The analysis of island phenomena we develop here proposes two different mech-
anisms for islands.We examine only a subset of island types, and our aim is fairly
modest: to provide a starting point for a more comprehensive theory. The first
mechanism applies to cases in which a ϕ-configuration cannot cohere because
the relevant [wh] system is grounded by an intervening reorganization, rather
than persisting in an excited state. This applies to adjuncts, wh-clauses, and rela-
tive clauses, which are exemplified below. In contrast, that complement clauses
and bare complements do not strongly ground, and hence do not give rise to
island effects. These differences are summarized in Table 7.5:
Table 7.5: Reorganization grounding propensity and island effects.
Strongly grounding reorganization: island effects
adjunct island
Bo is mad because Al drinks coffee. *What is Bo mad because Al drinks?
wh-island
Bo knows why Al drinks coffee. *What does Bo know why Al drinks?
relative island
Bo knows a story that Al drank coffee. *What does Bo know a story that Al drank?
Non-grounding reorganization: no island effects
Bo knows (that) Al drank coffee. What does Bo know that Al drank?
Bo wants (for) Al to drink coffee. What does Bo want Al to drink?
An example island trajectory is shown in Figure 7.19. The adjunctive reorga-
nization Ê4 is strongly grounding. Hence [what]{N} is grounded by Ê4, and the
configuration in (e4) does not cohere because not all of the systems in the rele-
vant ϕ-configuration (|Al drinks what|) are excited. With some effort, [what]{N}
can be made to persist above ground through Ê4, despite this adjunctive reorga-
nization being a strongly grounding one. “Effort” of this sort is almost always
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a relevant source of variation in coherence intuitions for islands, and below we
consider how persistence can account for “exceptions” to the island patterns de-
scribed here.
Figure 7.19: Adjunct clauses are strongly grounding and give rise to
island effects.
We can apply the same analysis of strongly grounding reorganization to wh-
and relative islands, as shown by the trajectory in Figure 7.20. Note that the
[why]{Adv} system is adverbial and hence +ϕ coupled to [drinks]{V}:
Figure 7.20: Adverbial and relative clauses are strongly grounding and
give rise to island effects.
In contrast to the strongly grounding reorganizations, reorganizations to com-
plement clauses (21a), bare nonfinite clauses (21b), and small clauses of the sort
in (21c) are weakly grounding:
(21) a. What does Bo know that Al drinks?
b. What does Bo want Al to drink?
c. What does Bo make Al drink?
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One noteworthy point regarding the difference between strongly and weakly
grounding reorganizations is that the cs-systems which are associated with
strongly grounding reorganizations, i.e. because, if, whether, when, etc., typically
have non-empty g-domains. In contrast, [that]{C} is often produced with an
empty g-domain, and bare clause reorganization by definition has no cs-system
and hence no g-domain. This suggests that strongly grounding reorganizations
are associated with an ungrounding promotion which creates an independent
e-level and which contributes additional meaning by virtue of the cs-system that
occupies it; weakly grounding reorganizations do not have these qualities.
Coordination of cs-systems which belong to the same class of s-system, or of
configurations of cs-systems which belong to the same s-system classes, allows
for persistent excitation, as shown in the (a) examples in (22–24). However, when
this “coordinate structure” constraint is violated, as in the (b) and (c) examples,
we observe island effects. As we argue below, the non-coherence of wh-questions
in the above cases is due to violation of configurational hypotheses.
(22) N coordination: Al drinks coffee and tea.
a. What does Al drink?
b. *What does Al drink coffee and?
c. *What does Al drink and tea?
(23) VP coordination: Al drinks coffee and eats granola.
a. What does Al drink and eat?
b. *What does Al drink coffee and eat?
c. *What does Al drink and eat granola?
(24) Clausal coordination: Al drinks coffee and Bo eats granola.
a. What does Al drink and Bo eat?
b. *What does Al drink coffee and Bo eat?
c. *What does Al drink and Bo eat granola?
The coherence of the (a) examples in (22–24) is predicted by our analysis of
coordinative reorganizations in ellipsis. Coordinative reorganizations – whether
clausal or subclausal – do not demote to ground a cs-system if that system has
no corresponding lexical competitor which is promoted from ground. In other
words, coordinative reorganizations are not grounding. For the VP coordination
of (23a) we picture the trajectory in Figure 7.21. Both [Al]{N} and [what]{N} per-
sist in an excited state through the coordinative reorganization Ê4 because no
competitors for these systems are promoted from ground.
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Figure 7.21: A wh-system can persist in an excited state through a co-
ordinative reorganization, which is not strongly grounding.
There are various possible explanations for the non-coherence of the (b) and (c)
sentences in (22–24). In the (b) examples, [coffee]{−N} interferes with [what]{−N}
in the epochs before selection of [and]. Furthermore, given our analysis of [and]
{conj} as a system which becomes excited only upon ungrounding of another
system, the (b) utterances should be non-coherent because the selection of [and]
{conj} does not co-occur with promotion of another system. For example, in the
VP coordination of (23b), when [and]{conj} is promoted to selection, there is
no system which it is promoted with. The non-coherence of the (c) examples is
more challenging to explain from a production perspective; however, from the
perspective of interpretation, it seems likely that an interpreter would couple
[what]{N} to [drink]{V} and ground the entire configuration, leaving the remain-
ing cs-systems unable to cohere.
Another mechanism for island effects involves circumstances in which one of
a set of coupled lexical systems is promoted initially with augmented excitation.
For example, when an {Adj} or {Poss} modifier is coupled to {N}, promotion of the
modifier to selection level in the initial configuration prevents coherence. Exam-
ples (25) and (27) illustrate the island patterns. Note that a strongly grounding
reorganization analysis is not possible here because no grounding reorganization
occurs in these trajectories.
Al drinks Bo’s coffee…
(25) Islands:
a. *Whose does Al drink coffee?
b. *What does Al drink Bo’s?
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(26) Pied-piping:
a. Whose coffee does Al drink?
b. *Bo’s what does Al drink?
Al drinks cold coffee…
(27) Islands:
a. *Which does Al drink coffee?
b. *What does Al drink cold?
(28) Pied-piping:
a. Which coffee does Al drink?
b. *Cold what does Al drink?
For promotion of the |Wh Poss| system in (25a), non-coherence is experienced
because of strong coupling between [Poss]{Poss} and [coffee]{N}; perhaps [Poss]
{Poss} is unstable because of the types of systems which are selected before the
−ϕ coupled system [coffee] is selected. This analysis is consistent with the co-
herence of the pied-piping sentence in (26a). The same analysis can be applied
to (27) and (28a), where the modified [wh]{N} system is initially promoted. The
non-coherence of pied piping in (26b) and (28b) might call this account into ques-
tion, but in these cases another explanation for non-coherence may be involved:
augmented excitation must promote a [wh]{N} system to selection level when
coupled with [Q]; the sentences in (26b) and (28b) violate this constraint.
Figure 7.22: Examples of non-coherence which may be due to a strong
coupling constraint on promotion.
On the basis of the above patterns we can tentatively hypothesize a strong
coupling constraint on question promotion. This constraint holds that systems
which are relatively strongly coupled – here defined in an ad-hoc manner as
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modifier-noun systems such as {ADJ}{N} and {N}{Poss}{N} – should be promoted
together. This is admittedly problematic because it is not well motivated from
a microscopic perspective, and does not seem to fall out naturally from the ba-
sic concepts of our theory. The strong coupling constraint on promotion does
nonetheless seem to hold in other contexts, such as topicalization, and may be
applicable for constituency intuitions more generally.The coherence of (29a) and
non-coherence of (29b) and (29c) can be understood in this way:
(29) a. Cold coffee, Al drinks.
b. * Cold, Al drinks coffee.
c. * Coffee, Al drinks cold. (≠ Al drinks cold coffee)
There are many cases in the literature of exceptions to extraction from islands.
These “exceptions” have a straightforward interpretation in the o/el framework,
and indeed, the occurrence of exceptions is a basic prediction of the o/el account.
Specifically, oncewe recognize that islands arise from grounding reorganizations,
and that surroundings forces can act to maintain systems in an excited state, it
is expected that states which would otherwise be non-coherent can be coherent
when there are factors which work toward that end. For example, consider the
extraction from a relative clause in (30a), which may be somewhat coherent (cf.
(Erteschik-Shir & Lappin 1979; Truswell 2011)):
(30) a. (?) This is the coffee that there are many people who like.
b. * Al drank coffee many people who like.
c. ? Al drank coffee that there are many people who like.
In (30a) the [coffee]{N} system should be grounded by the reorganization as-
sociated with the wh-relative clause (cf. 30b). There are a couple aspects of the
exceptional example in (30a) which are noteworthy. First, a non-grounding re-
organization associated with a that complement clause follows the excitation of
[coffee]{N} and precedes the relevant grounding reorganization. Second, the [cof-
fee]{N} system occurs in a cleft configuration (this is the coffee), which contrasts
with comparable example in (30c), which has a reduced propensity for coherence.
Third, there is not a competing {−N} system in any of these examples.These three
factors may be responsible for creating a circumstance in which [coffee]{N} is
more readily maintained in a excited state through the grounding reorganization,
or in which the system is only weakly grounded and can be re-excited to achieve
coherence. Indeed, “pragmatic” mechanisms that appear to override grounding
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reorganizations can be reinterpreted as forces which drive an interpretation tra-
jectory to reach a coherent state, doing so by exciting a recently grounded system
which may be particularly susceptible to re-excitation.
In the above analyses of wh-patterns, we applied basic o/el configurational hy-
potheses in combination with hypothesized differences in grounding operations
that occur with reorganization. So doing, we found that variation in the ground-
ing propensities of various reorganizations – which were also useful for analy-
ses of ellipsis and anaphora phenomena – also help us understand long-distance
dependencies in wh question formation and island effects. As with ellipsis and
anaphora, island pattern coherence intuitions can vary substantially (Kluender
1998; Sprouse & Hornstein 2013; Sprouse et al. 2012). For all three of these phe-
nomena, we can understand the variation as the consequence of a tension be-
tween propensities to ground previously excited systems and mechanisms for
maintaining systems in an excited state (or ungrounding previously grounded
systems). It is encouraging that the same concepts required for understanding
ellipsis and anaphora provide a basis for analysis of many of the island patterns.




8 The physical linguistics program
The o/el model is a conceptual framework in the program of physical linguistics.
The physical linguistics “program” is a set of concepts, values, and methods for
the scientific study of language. There are three reasons for describing the pro-
gram as physical:
First, linguistic phenomena are understood to arise from nothing more or less
than physical systems. This entails a commitment to a worldview in which a
model of any relativelymacro-scale phenomena should be derivable frommodels
of relatively micro-scale phenomena, regardless of the particular scale on which
the phenomena are modelled. Models of language change should be derived from
models of language variation in social networks of individuals, models of varia-
tion in social networks should be derived frommodels of individual linguistic be-
havior, models of individual behavior should be derived frommodels of cognitive
systems, models of cognitive systems should be derived from models of neural
systems, and so on. Because of the emphasis on relating systemswhose dynamics
must be characterized on different scales, attention to spatial and temporal scale
is crucial in any analysis. The program is reductionist and physicalist: no hid-
den mind-body dualism is allowed (e.g. a narrow language faculty independent
of a sensorimotor interface). In practice, deduction of macro phenomena from
micro models is very difficult, and so far the o/el framework falls far short of pro-
viding anything more than suggested approaches to such deductions. To a large
extent the shortfall is due to lack of knowledge regarding the microscale systems,
i.e. neural populations, as well as difficulty in implementing sufficiently realistic
models. Derivation of the macro from the micro is a goal, but not a prerequisite
to macro-scale theory development.
Second, the program is physical because models of “cognitive” systems are
analogized to models of “physical” ones, or understood metaphorically as such.
Because cognitive systems are physical (see above), these are not really analogies.
Cognitive systems are expected to exhibit the same spatial/temporal patterns as
those which arise in “non-cognitive” physical systems. The oscillators/energy
levels framework is just one example of this: we used concepts of oscillation and
energy, which describemany physical systems, as metaphors for conceptualizing
cognitive ones. No new concepts must be invented in order to develop a useful
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understanding of language; instead, already existing concepts can be repurposed
to understand the complex patterns of language.The complexity is due to the fact
that the relevant systems are most usefully described on a wide range of spatial
and temporal scales. There are many other physical analogies/metaphors which
one might use to construct an understanding of language; the modus operandi
of the program is the exploration of these metaphors.
Third, the physical program promotes the use of concepts and analytic tools
from the physical sciences. Among these, two stand out as very useful. One is the
method of coarse-graining, in which variables describing the microscale system
are integrated over a range of spatial and temporal scales. This procedure pro-
vides a basis for drawing inferences regarding relatively macroscopic patterns
from relatively microscopic ones; it also provides us flexibility in the construc-
tion of macroscopic systems. The other useful method is systems-surroundings
partitioning. Analyses in the o/el framework rely heavily on this partitioning,
which can be viewed as a strategy for managing ignorance. We elaborate on
these tools further in this chapter.
8.1 Physical and computational approaches to studying
complex systems
To contextualize the physical linguistics program and motivate the rhetorical
stance of this chapter, we consider two approaches to the study of complex sys-
tems. One is the program of synergetics developed by the German physicist Her-
mann Haken (Haken 1973; 1983b,a), which deals with multiscale, self-organized
systems from a physical perspective. Synergetics has been influential in the de-
velopment of the o/el framework. The other is the notion of levels of analysis,
developed by the neuroscientist David Marr (Marr & Poggio 1977; Marr 1982).
The Marrian approach, while sometimes useful, has been frequently misinter-
preted and misapplied to rationalize willful ignorance regarding the microscopic
origins of macroscopic phenomena. A close reading of Marr reveals a tension
between focusing on the “levels” of analysis and focusing on the interrelations
of levels as well as a comprehensive understanding across levels.
8.1.1 Synergetics: A physical approach
Thephysical linguistics program has in manyways been inspired by the program
of synergetics, which was developed by the German physicist Hermann Haken
(Haken 1973; 1983b,a). Synergetics incorporates a vocabulary and mathematical
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toolkit for modeling the self-organized formation of macroscopic patterns which
arise from the interactions of many microscopic subsystems. As Haken (1973)
puts it:
Very often the properties of the large systems cannot be explained by amere
random superposition of the actions of the subsystems. Quite on the con-
trary the subsystems behave in a well organized manner, so that the total
system is in an ordered state or shows actions which one might even call
purposeful. Furthermore one often observes more or less abrupt changes
between disorder and order or transitions between different states of order.
Thus the question arises, who are the mysterious demons who tell the sub-
systems in which way to behave so to create order, or, in a more scientific
language, which are the principles by which order is created. (1973: 9)
A key aspect of the synergetic approach is the concept of an order parameter,
which according to Haken has two functions. On one hand, the order parameter
is a variable that describes order in the system; on the other hand, it “gives orders”
(Haken 1973: 10) to the subsystems, i.e. influences their states. Haken presents fer-
romagnets as a prototypical example of a physical system which can be readily
conceptualized along these lines. The ferromagnet (i.e. the macroscale system)
consists of many individual atoms (the microscale subsystems), each of which
has a spin that is either (+) or (−). The spins of these individual atoms are glob-
ally aligned when the magnet is below a critical temperature, but lose the global
alignment when above the critical temperature. Hence there is a transition from
a disordered state to an ordered state as temperature is decreased. The alignment
of the spins results from Coulomb force interactions between individual atoms,
but is counteracted by random fluctuations that depend on temperature.
The usefulness of the order parameter – here the mean field of the magnet, an
average over the states of the individual atoms – is that it allows for a lower-di-
mensional description of the system, in contrast to the high-dimensional descrip-
tion that would make reference to the spins of each of the atoms in the magnet.
Regarding the second function of the order parameter, the mean field can be
conceptualized metaphorically as exerting a “force” on the subsystems. Haken
furthermore describes the order parameter and the subsystems as a hierarchi-
cal system, in which there exists a “hierarchy of time constants”: the subsystem
state dynamics have a much smaller timescale than the dynamics of the order
parameter, and changes in their states respond rapidly to variation in the order
parameter.
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Other examples in different domains can be understood in the same frame-
work. In chemical solutions, densities of reactants are the order parameters
which describe the macroscopic state of the system, and individual molecules are
the subsystems. In a neural network, integrated spiking rate of the network is an
order parameter, and individual neurons are subsystems. In ecological systems,
numbers of animals are order parameters, and individual animals are subsystems.
One point of interest is that when two or more order parameters in a system in-
teract – e.g. the numbers of predators and prey, or the densities of two different
types of reactants – a temporal oscillation can arise. Another is that the order
parameter can reflect instabilities which induce symmetry breaking: the system
is driven to one particular steady state out of a set of possible steady states.
The relevance of the concepts of instability and symmetry breaking to cogni-
tion and behavior are elaborated clearly and thoroughly in Kelso (1997), and a
substantial program of investigation of perception and motor control has been
developed along those lines (cf. Kelso (1997) and references therein). One classic
example is the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of bimanual coordination (Haken et al.
1985; Schoner & Kelso 1988). It had been observed that as rate is increased in a
bimanual finger wagging task, an anti-phase pattern of coordination transitions
to an in-phase pattern (Kelso et al. 1981). This transition is represented in Fig-
ure 8.1(A), where the positions of each finger over time are plotted as wagging
rate (ω) increases. The positions of the fingers can be associated with phase an-
gles (θL, θR), and the relative phase ϕ = θL – θR is considered an order parameter
of the system. Note that a description of the system in terms of the 1-dimensional
order parameter is simpler than a description that involves a phase angle param-
eter for each finger. The key phenomenon is that ϕ transitions from a value that
is approximately ±π (the anti-phase mode) to 0 (the in-phase mode) at a critical
movement frequency, as shown in Figure 8.1(B). Moreover, when the wagging
is begun in an in-phase pattern, the reverse transition to an anti-phase pattern
does not occur.
The Haken et al. (1985) model posits that there is a potential function V(ϕ) gov-
erning the dynamics of the order parameter ϕ, and that this potential function
consists of two components, which are harmonically related cosine functions.
The first component has minima at integer multiples of ±2π and the second com-
ponent has minima at integer multiples of ±π. The authors proposed that at slow
rates, the relative amplitude of the second component to the first (b/a) is large
and thus the anti-phase mode of coordination is stable, corresponding to the
presence of minima at integer multiples of ±π in the potential function, shown
in the leftmost panel of Figure 8.1(C). At higher rates, the relative amplitude of the
second component decreases and the anti-phase mode of coordination becomes
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Figure 8.1: Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of anti-phase to in-phase transi-
tion in finger wagging.
unstable, as shown in the middle panel of (C). This induces a phase transition to
the in-phase mode, as shown in the rightmost panel of (C). The equations of mo-
tion in the model include terms for both intrinsic oscillation of the effectors and
for coupling between effectors, mediated via the potential function. The model
has been extended to include coupling between systems with oscillations of dif-
ferent frequencies (Haken 1996; Kelso 1991; Peper et al. 1995; Sternad et al. 1999)
and neurophysiological correlates of phase transitions between coupling modes
have been identified (Jantzen & Kelso 2007; Jantzen et al. 2008). One of the key
generalizations that emerges from these investigations is that anti-phase coordi-
nation is less stable than in-phase coordination, and higher-ordermultifrequency
rhythms are less stable than lower-order rhythms, so that transitions under rate
increases result in more stable modes of frequency locking (e.g. 3:1 > 2:1 > 1:1). To
couch this in the vocabulary of instability and symmetry breaking, one can state
that more symmetric states – ones in which a greater set of coordination modes
are available to the system – are replaced by less symmetric states, where fewer
modes are available. The breaking of symmetry is brought about by the destabi-
lization of higher-order modes as a control parameter (i.e. movement frequency)
is increased.
The reader will recognize that the concepts used in the program of synergetics
– order parameters, phase transitions, stability, and symmetry breaking – have
provided a theoretical/conceptual basis for the o/el framework presented in this
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book. A fundamental basis of the framework, described in the Overview chapter,
was that the spike rate of a population of neurons can be integrated to construct
an order parameter for a system which has two components, a excitation compo-
nent and an oscillation component. The idea is that this order parameter under-
goes a phase transition from a state of low excitation and zero-amplitude oscilla-
tion to a state of high excitation and high-amplitude oscillation, when driven by
an external force.This phase transition from a disordered to ordered state reflects
a breaking of symmetry: in the disordered state there is a uniform distribution of
spikes over time; in the ordered state the distribution is spatially and temporally
more structured. Furthermore, when the scope of the analysis is expanded to in-
clude multiple systems, both conceptual and syntactic, lower-dimensional order
parameters can be constructed which correspond to the relative phases and rela-
tive excitations of systems. Further symmetries are broken via the preference for
in-phase or anti-phase coupling and highly ordered states of relative excitation.
A final point to make is that synergetic concepts are viewed here as “physical”
in the sense that they arise historically from the study of systems in the domain
of physics and chemistry (lasers, magnets, chemical reactions, etc.), but clearly
they are readily adapted to describing complex biological and cognitive systems
such as language, on a variety of scales. A synergetic approach to understanding
language is appealing because we do not have to invent abstract computations
like merge, which is suitable for only one domain of scientific analysis. Instead,
the very same principles that govern complex physical systems and give rise to
physical phenomena can be used to reason about linguistic phenomena. In that
case, we might as well think of linguistic phenomena as “physical,” or rather,
view all systems as physical.
Crucially, synergetics does not promote the idea that there is some particular
scale of analysis for which an order parameter is appropriate; instead, it is reason-
able to simultaneously analyze order parameters on multiple scales, in a nested
manner. Hence one can construct order parameters on some scale, analyze their
dynamics on that scale via concepts of phase-transition, stability, etc., and si-
multaneously construct larger-scale order parameters from the lower-scale ones,
analyze their dynamics on the higher-scale, and so on. There is no privileged
scale in this perspective. The absence of a privileged scale is not a feature of the
Marrian levels of analysis approach.
8.1.2 Marrian levels of analysis
When one develops a new vocabulary to structure scientific investigation, there
is always a danger that the categories imposed by that vocabulary become overly
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reified, or that the interpretation and use of the vocabulary becomes counterpro-
ductive. This seems to be case when it comes to the “levels of analysis” idea
developed in Marr (1982) and Marr & Poggio (1977). The gist of the idea, in its
most widely cited form, is that there are three domains in which an information
processing device can be described. These are the computational, representation-
al/algorithmic, and implementational levels (Marr 1982). Marr (1982) associates
different questions with each level. At the computational level: “what is the goal
of the computation, why is it appropriate, and what is the logic of the strategy by
which it can be carried out?”. At the representational/algorithmic level: “How can
this computational theory be implemented? In particular, what is the representa-
tion for the input and output, and what is the algorithm for the transformation?”.
At the implementational level: “How can the representation and algorithm be
realized physically?” (1982:25).
For a concrete example, Marr & Poggio (1977) provide the visual control sys-
tem of the fly (Reichardt & Poggio 1976). The computations performed on the
visual input are (i) extracting movement information and (ii) providing position
information, and these are instantiated as terms in a second order differential
equation, analogous to a damped harmonic oscillator with time-varying driving
forces. This equation is shown in (1), where φ(t) is the position of an object on
the retina of the fly and ω(t) is the angular speed of the object. On the left hand
side, θ and k are inertial and frictional parameters, respectively.The crucial terms
which represent the computations are D[φ (t)], which represents position infor-
mation and is acquired from visual input by a “position computation,” and rφ̇ (t),
which is “a velocity-dependent optomotor response,” the results of a “movement
computation”. N(t) is a noise term.
(1) θφ̈(t) + kφ̇(t) + kω(t) = −D [φ(t)] − rφ̇(t) + N(t)
In this example, what is being computed is in a certain sense physically ground-
ed – the relevant “computational” terms describe forces (by analogy to a damped,
driven harmonic oscillator) in the equation of motion for retinal position of an
object; moreover, these terms have physical units which can be measured in a
fairly objective manner. Marr and Poggio state “the quantitative description [of
the equation] could not have been obtained from single cell recordings or from
histology. Furthermore, [the equation] is probably a prerequisite of any full un-
derstanding at the level of circuitry” (1977: 7). An important characteristic of this
example is that the “computations” are computations of forces which influence
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quantities that can be observed physically, i.e. position and velocity. Before con-
sidering the importance of this physical character of the model, let’s examine
some general reactions to the levels of analysis.
One common reaction to the three levels of analysis is that more levels are
needed. For example, it has been argued that more levels lie between the com-
putational and algorithmic ones (Griffiths et al. 2015; Pylyshyn 1984), or that a
fourth level associated with learning is needed. Indeed, in the original presenta-
tion of the levels (Marr & Poggio 1977), a fourth level – “mechanism” – intervened
between the algorithmic and physical levels. If the levels are to play a coherent
role in structuring scientific investigation, it is somewhat problematic that there
is no consensus on what the levels are and how many of them exist. Perhaps the
levels can be useful, as long as we do not take them too literally.
The deeper issue is how the levels are used to justify theory development, and
specifically whether the levels can be studied separately from each other. At
times, Marr overemphasized the independence of levels, and this has been taken
as a license to ignore some levels while focusing on one in particular – the com-
putational level. For example, Marr sometimes describes the levels as “separate”
or “independent of” each other:
Theremust exist an additional level of understanding at which the character
of the information-processing tasks carried out during perception are ana-
lyzed and understood in a way that is independent of the particular mech-
anisms and structures that implement them in our heads. (Marr 1982: 19)
This and similar statements would seem to suggest that Marr advocated the
pursuit of understanding at just one level. But this is a highly selective reading.
Frequently Marr emphasizes the interdependence of the levels and the necessity
for a complete understanding at all levels. For example:
Such [computational] analysis does not usurp an understanding at the other
levels – of neurons or of computer programs – but it is a necessary comple-
ment to them, since without it there can be no real understanding of the
function of all those neurons. (Marr 1982: 19)
If one hopes to achieve a full understanding of a system as complicated as a
nervous system, a developing embryo, a set of metabolic pathways, a bottle
of gas, or even a large computer program, then one must be prepared to
contemplate different kinds of explanation at different levels of description
that are linked, at least in principle, into a cohesive whole, even if linking
the levels in complete detail is impractical. (1982: 19)
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Each of the three levels of description will have its place in the eventual un-
derstanding of perceptual information processing, and of course they are
logically and causally related. But an important point to note is that since
the three levels are only rather loosely related, some phenomena may be
explained at only one or two of them. This means, for example, that a cor-
rect explanation of some psychophysical observation must be formulated
at the appropriate level. In attempts to relate psychophysical problems to
physiology, too often there is confusion about the level at which problems
should be addressed. (1982: 25)
It is important in reading Marr to consider the historical context. He was re-
acting to a prevailing trend of reductionism, and he was reacting to explanations
that confounded different scales of analysis rather than clarifying the relations
between scales. When read in this light, Marr was advocating not for a focus on
one level, but for clarity regarding which level(s) an analysis applies to, for the
sake of furthering a comprehensive understanding across levels (see Eliasmith &
Kolbeck 2015).
Marr rhetorically overemphasizes the importance of the computational level,
and this has given theorists in other domains license to develop “computational”
approaches that have no hope of being grounded in mechanistic or physical de-
scriptions. Marr seems to have failed to recognize that agreement on what is
being computed is often achieved through investigation of phenomena on the
lower levels. For example, Marr (1982) recounts how in visual perception empha-
sis on edge detection as a computational problem supplanted emphasis on expla-
nation in terms of neurons. Yet it is evident from his discussion that the reason
edges came to be accepted as relevant objects for computation was through neu-
rophysiological investigations. In the case of shape, the notion of what is being
computed derives from analysis of how lower level physical properties such as
illumination, surface geometry, surface reflectance, and viewpoint contribute to
the intensity of an image; this allows for shape to be derived from shading.
From these examples we can infer that an understanding at the computational
level is preceded by and dependent on an understanding of the “physical assump-
tions”. Returning to the case of the equation of motion for retinal position, the
physical assumptions which underlie a description of what is computed can be
motivated straightforwardly: the retina of a fly is a physical object, the position
of an image on that retina has a physical location, and the movement of the fly
is described by physical quantities and governed by physical laws. The compu-
tational theory can be tested via observation of these physical quantities. Is this
always the case for a computational analysis?
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A different sort of example provided by Marr is a cash register (Marr 1982). To
understand the cash register at a computational level, Marr says that we need
to understand what the device does and why. The “what” is addition, which is
fairly straightforward, but the “why” is more intriguing. Marr suggests that the
computation is addition because “the rules we intuitively feel to be appropriate
for combining the individual prices in fact define the mathematical operation
of addition” (1982: 23); these correspond to an identity operation (adding zero),
commutativity (order of addition does not matter), and associativity (grouping of
addends does not matter).This example is different from the fly equation because
it does not require that we make direct reference to any particular physical quan-
tities, but nonetheless it is uncontroversial because our experience with objects
provides us with an intuition that they combine according to these constraints.
Of course, real cash registers do prescribe operations for the manipulation of a
more or less physical quantity – currency – so there is a sense in which this exam-
ple also relies on a consensus regarding what physical observations are relevant
to testing the computational theory.
Thus for the fly example, the computational theory is sensible because of con-
straints on what we can measure, and for the cash register example, the com-
putational theory is intuitive because of our experience with collecting objects
and counting them. Together, what these examples suggest is that a computa-
tional theory must be motivated in some way, and better motivations are more
physically grounded and/or more intuitive.
Let’s now consider whether these characteristics apply to conventional syntac-
tic theories: do the computations involved in conventional theories bear similar
motivations? Chomsky and others would certainly argue that indeed, the com-
putations described by the Minimalist program are well motivated. Consider the
following from Berwick & Chomsky (2016), which addresses the Marrian levels
directly:
Summarizing our answer to the “what” question so far, we have set out a
very clear, bright line between us and all other animals: we, but no other
animals, have Merge, and as a consequence we, but no other animal, can
construct unbounded arrays of hierarchically structured expressions, with
the ubiquitous property of displacement, eventually grounded on mind-de-
pendent word-like, atomic elements, and with determinate interpretations
at the interfaces at each stage of generation. We have also described, again
pitched at an abstract level, the computational machinery for computing
such expressions…All this might be taken as the answer to what DavidMarr
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(1982) called the first level of analysis of any information processing sys-
tem – what problem is being solved. How is the Basic Property computed?
How does the language system assemble arbitrary hierarchical expressions?
(Berwick & Chomsky 2016: 132)
Yet there is no known direct physical correlate of Merge, nor of the hierar-
chical expressions which are referred to in this passage. Moreover, our lack of
knowledge of any such correlates does not result from lack of trying: neurosci-
entists have been seeking neural correlates of such computations for decades.
Hence one cannot motivate the computational theory on physical grounds, i.e.
in terms of agreement on the relevant physical observables. So to motivate the
computational theory, it is necessary to resort to intuition. Do we share an intu-
ition that the computational theories of generative grammar are appropriate? It
is obvious that this intuition is NOT shared; instead, more than six decades af-
ter the initial development of generative grammar, there remains substantial dis-
agreement regardingwhether it is a useful approach to conceptualizing language.
Conventional approaches to syntax are unlike fly vision and the cash register in
that the validity of the notion of what is being computed is contested.
Indeed, even if one insists that thinking of language as the combination of
word-objects into structures is “intuitive,” caution about appeal to intuition is
warranted. There are plenty of examples in the history of science where it turns
out that our intuitions are misguided. One example is heat, for which there is a
widespread folk theory that heat is a “substance”. Several early theories concep-
tualized heat as such (e.g. the caloric theory, the notion of phlogiston, and the
classical conception of fire as fundamental element). In these cases, reasoning
about the “what” and “why” of phenomena involving heat energy was histori-
cally misguided precisely because the notion of what was being computed was
based on our intuitions. Many of our most successful modern day scientific the-
ories are far from intuitive – general relativity, quantum mechanics, etc. Thus it
stands to reason that the more abstract and intuition-based our “computational”
explanation is, the more likely it is to be misguided and hence benefit from phys-
ical and mechanistic grounding.
Relatedly, another objection to the Marrian perspective, at least when applied
to language, is that it is not at all obvious that there is a “problem to be solved,”
in the sense that Marr intended. Marr often emphasizes the importance of under-
standing the “nature of the problem being solved”:
Although algorithms and mechanisms are empirically more accessible, it
is the top level, the level of the computational theory, which is critically
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important from an information-processing point of view. The reason for
this is that the nature of the computations that underlie perception depends
more upon the computational problems that have to be solved than upon the
particular hardware in which their solutions are implemented. To phrase
thematter another way, an algorithm is likely to be understoodmore readily
by understanding the nature of the problem being solved than by examining
the mechanism (and the hardware) in which it is embodied. (Marr 1982: 27)
For the fly, the problem being solved is computing positions and velocities. For
the cash register, it is combining prices of goods being purchased. What is the
problem being solved in the case of language? From the conventional perspec-
tive, perhaps the problem is to “compute” meaning from words. But currently
there is no consensus on what meaning is, nor agreement on what “words” are.
From a dynamical perspective, there need be no “problem to be solved” – there
is simply a cognitive state that varies over time, under the influence of forces
which derive from systems which are ultimately physical. To adopt the teleolog-
ical stance that the brain is computing something in order to solve a problem is
an unsubstantiated metaphor.
Indeed, some have argued that computational metaphors for cognition fail to
make correct predictions about behavior. One example is the A-not-B error (cf.
McClelland et al. 2010; Samuelson et al. 2015), where young infants will reach
for an object at a previously seen location A even when they have seen it hid-
den at a new location B. The error can occur even when no object is hidden, and
stops occurring when different motor actions are required for reaching to loca-
tions A and B (Smith et al. 1999). These observations are not readily understood
in a framework in which the computation (determining the position of an object
and calculating a reach to that position) is independent of the cognitive mech-
anisms whereby spatial locations are represented and reaching movements are
controlled. Other examples of phenomena where purely computational analysis
falls short are provided in Samuelson et al. (2015). A similar point has been made
explicitly in relation to generative grammar; computational descriptions “could
give rise to an enterprise, similar to Chomsky’s competence theory of universal
grammar, in which researchers focus on the search for entities that might exist
only as descriptive abstractions, while ignoring those factors that actually shape
behavior” (McClelland et al. 2010).
Because the Marrian levels have been used to justify linguistic theorizing that
is not physically grounded, they are somewhat problematic in practice. But this
does not have to be the case. Instead of overinterpreting what Marr said about
270
8.1 Physical and computational approaches to studying complex systems
the importance of computation, we can draw inspiration from his emphasis on
understanding the interrelations of levels.
8.1.3 Representations in physical linguistics
In the physical program, it is crucial to distinguish between analytical representa-
tions and cognitive/mental representations. The notion of a cognitive representa-
tion is problematic because it tricks us into assuming knowledge of things-in-the-
world, the sort of knowledge which would purportedly be independent of how
our theories are constructed. When linguists and cognitive scientists refer to a
cognitive representation, they evoke a distinction between the re-presentation –
existing in brains/minds – and the presentation, which exists in-the-world. Some
understanding of things-in-the-world is always taken for granted. In conven-
tional approaches the presupposed constructs are “objects” and “structures”. We
presuppose in-the-world constructs because that is what our brains do: we use
systems of metaphors and schemas to reason, mostly subconsciously.
In contrast, analytical representation is the phrase used here to refer to con-
cepts that we evoke with words and pictures, in order to think and talk about
phenomena. Referring to analytical representations helps us remember that we
construct an understanding of the world; referring to cognitive representations
makes us forget that our analytical constructs are not real. From the physical
perspective, all of the representations that appear in this book are analytical con-
structions, i.e. conceptual models which we developed for use in reasoning. They
are tools for thinking about states and forces which govern change. None of our
pictures are representations of “things happening in the brain”, or even worse
of “things in the brain”, i.e. “cognitive structures”. All cognitive “structures” are
re-conceptualized using states, trajectories, and forces in the o/el framework.
What is “a state”? A state is conceptualized as a location in a state space, which
is an analytical construct. We can imagine (and perhaps attempt) deriving it from
appropriate coarse-graining and systems/surroundings partitioning of a higher-
dimensional model. There are no objects in state space, and our standard intu-
itions about the interactions of objects in familiar Euclidean space do not apply.
The labeled circles in the e-potentials of Figure 8.2 are not objects in space. There
is no possibility for these circles to collide, because the circles do not exist, do
not move, and do not occupy space; their absolute distances are meaningless. In-
stead, their spatial relations specify an organization which relates to a temporal
ordering of state space trajectories. Similarly, the labeled dots in the orbits are
also not spatial objects, and their Euclidean distances are meaningless. Instead,
phase angle differences represent ϕ-relations between systems.
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Figure 8.2: Oscillator/energy levels representations are analytical con-
structs.
Both of these analytical representations – excitation potentials and orbits –
evoke temporal schemas: the e-potentials remind us that e-organization forces
maintain stable states and induce abrupt changes, resulting in discontinuous tra-
jectories in e space. The orbits remind us of periodic trajectories in θ space and
stable ϕ relations.
For some readers, the forces we have constructed may seem too mystical – af-
ter all, these forces are not gravity, electromagnetism, etc. But nothing is particu-
larly magical about integrating the effects of many synaptic interactions within
and between neural populations, from which the forces are derived. The conven-
tional entities – syntactic objects – are in many ways much more otherworldly
than the forces constructed in the o/el framework. But regardless of whatever
personal preferences one may have for specific metaphors, the physical program
requires us to be conscious of those metaphors when we construct theories.
8.2 Barriers to physical linguistics
Freedom from object metaphors and generative thinking lets us explore new
metaphors and alternative analytical representations. This may be useful, and
if nothing else, it is fun. But advocating for new metaphors usually brings new
burdens. In the case of the o/el framework, the burden is responsibility to moti-
vate the construction of a state space. We have not yet attempted to rigorously
motivate our state space construction, and apart from some additional comments
below, the hardwork has been deferred. Instead, we have explored the state space
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as children explore a playground. In the process, we have tried to discover the
workings of the playground apparatus. Will the o/el playground be useful for
future investigators? Does the physical program gel with how practitioners of
conventional approaches view language? Unfortunately, current theoretical ap-
proaches seem to be incompatible with the physical linguistics program, and this
is unlikely to change in the near future. The most important barriers are social,
and we catalogue them below.
8.2.1 Structuralist performance
One barrier is the performance of structuralist conceptualizing in linguistics, cog-
nitive science, and psychology. This behavior is natural: we use metaphors and
image schemas to develop constructs for thinking about the world, and those con-
structs are perpetuated through normal modes of scientific transmission, such as
discussion, teaching, mentorship, and publication. By historical contingency, ob-
jects and container/connection schemas have become the dominant constructs.
Thus linguistic units seem to be like objects because we perpetually reconstruct
object metaphor concepts, by using the metaphor in our discourse. This partic-
ular barrier would seem to be easy to overcome: we simply need to perform
alternative modes of thinking, for example thinking in terms of oscillators and
energy levels; states, trajectories, and forces; stability and interference, etc. Yet
our habits can be difficult to change, and so it is unclear whether structuralist
performance can be easily avoided.
8.2.2 Pretense of objectivity
Another barrier, perhaps more fundamental, is the common attitude and mode
of discourse in which linguistics and more generally, science, is understood to
involve non-subjective observation of reality, and these so-called observations
provide a basis for “falsifying” theories. This way of thinking is so ingrained in
our folk theory of scientific practice that conscious, explicit rejection of it is not
enough: deliberate careful appraisal of discourse is required to transcend it. The
key is to recognize that “the world” and “reality” are always constructs, and more
specifically that any “data”, “observations”, and “measurements” are always pre-
determined by our conceptual models. This must be so on all levels of analysis.
No matter how discomforting and antithetical to folk wisdom it may be, it must
be embraced. The constructedness and contingency of our theories is not a prob-
lem, but rather, a solution. No complex thought would be possible if we were
not able to blend schemas, transiently couple distinct networks of concepts into
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new, more interesting networks. The goal of any new conceptual model, such as
the o/el framework, is to push our understanding into unexplored territory, by
constructing new conceptual networks to use as analytical tools. In that spirit, it
is frustrating to encounter discourse which drips with presuppositions of objec-
tivity and certainty. For example, consider the following regarding the question
of what properties are specific to human language:
The questions arise in principle for any organic system, and have been
raised since the early days of modern biology. The only general questions
concerning them have to do with feasibility, not legitimacy. (Chomsky 2008:
133)
Legitimacy by what authority? A more subtle example, where what is recog-
nized is assumed to be true by entailment:
As has long been recognized, the most elementary property of language –
and an unusual one in the biological world – is that it is a system of discrete
infinity consisting of hierarchically organized objects. (Chomsky 2008: 134)
It has been recognized for thousands of years that language is, fundamen-
tally, a system of sound-meaning connections; the potential infiniteness
of this system has been explicitly recognized by Galileo, Descartes, and
the 17th-century “philosophical grammarians” and their successors, notably
von Humboldt. (Hauser et al. 2002)
To suggest that every “constructive” approach presupposes your system of
metaphors is a remarkable form of hubris:
…A stronger thesis is that the biolinguistic approach has a kind of privileged
status, in that every constructive approach to human language and its use
presupposes it, or something similar, at least tacitly. (Chomsky 2001a)
In the physical program, we aim to construct useful, and perhaps fun, concep-
tual models. If those models are indeed useful and fun, discourse which exhibits
a pretense to an objectively correct understanding of reality should be unneces-
sary.
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8.2.3 Anthropocentrism
Another obstacle to the physical linguistics program is the conviction that hu-
mankind and human thought are special. Glorification of human as opposed to
animal behavior is pervasive but always misguided:
Why did humans, but no other animal, take the power of recursion to create
an open-ended and limitless system of communication? (Hauser et al. 2002)
Extraordinary acts of creation by children do not require the extraordinary
circumstances of deafness or plantation Babels. The same kind of linguis-
tic genius is involved every time a child learns his or her mother tongue.
(Pinker 2003)
I have spoken with plenty of young children, and “genius” is not the word I
would use to describe their communication abilities. The stimuli that children
experience in development are only impoverished when one assumes a set con-
ception of language: it is a no-brainer that the vast majority of the objects in an
“infinite set” will not be encountered by a child. It is also troubling that reverence
for human behavior is central in much of the conventional rhetoric. Consider the
perspective of the Martian imagined in Hauser et al. (2002):
If our martian naturalist were meticulous, it might note that the faculty
mediating human communication appears remarkably different from that
of other living creatures; it might further note that the human faculty of
language appears to be organized like the genetic code–hierarchical, genera-
tive, recursive, and virtually limitless with respect to its scope of expression.
(Hauser et al. 2002)
What is remarkable here is that the authors assume the Martian would come
to these conclusions, i.e. that language is “hierarchical”, “generative”, “recursive”,
and “infinite”. Clearly the authors have anthropomorphized the Martian, impos-
ing their own conceptual framework on an entity that could think in vastly dif-
ferent ways from us. The same bias is applied to comparisons of human and
non-human animal behavior:
Most current commentators agree that, although bees dance, birds sing, and
chimpanzees grunt, these systems of communication differ qualitatively
from human language. In particular, animal communication systems lack
the rich expressive and open-ended power of human language (based on
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humans’ capacity for recursion). The evolutionary puzzle, therefore, lies in
working out how we got from there to here, given this apparent discontinu-
ity. (Hauser et al. 2002)
Although many aspects of FLB [broad faculty of language] are shared with
other vertebrates, the core recursive aspect of FLN [narrow faculty of lan-
guage] currently appears to lack any analog in animal communication and
possibly other domains as well. (Hauser et al. 2002)
There is a value judgment implied by phrases such as “lack the rich expressive
and open-ended power”. From a more neutral perspective, we as researchers an-
alytically construct understandings of the systems which govern non-human an-
imal behavior, in the same way that we do so for human behavior. We can then
compare those systems. Nothing about this analytical comparison requires us to
think of humans as special and animals as lacking.
Closely related to the anthropocentric stance are untenable interpretations of
consciousness and intention. The notions that human consciousness is a special
phenomenon, that we have “true” agency, and that we can “intend” to produce ut-
terances – these run contrary to the physical perspective. There is no such thing
as intention in the physical program. System states evolve under the action of
forces, and no imp is necessary to make it happen. Anything that does not fit
into that conceptual framework is dualist magic. That we believe that we intend
to act must be a consequence of how the surroundings interact with our concep-
tual and motor systems. We do not experience all of the individual microscale
forces which determine the evolution of the system; instead, we experience the
aggregate effect of those forces. Sometimes those forces result in actions, such
as speaking or writing. We interpret the experience of this as an “intention” to
communicate, but the notion that we played the role of an agent in this process
is an illusion.
8.2.4 Hidden dualism
Superficially, mind-body dualism has been loudly rejected in the biolinguistic
program, and it seems to be frowned upon more generally in the communities
of linguistics and cognitive science. In spite of this, dualism is alive but well-
hidden. When there is subtle dualism, it is important as a coping mechanism to
suppress any hints of it. The so-called narrow faculty of language (FLN) is, in
all of the ways that matter, “the mind”, constructed in opposition to “the body”.
Consider the following, regarding the relation of FLN to the sensory motor (SM)
and conceptual intentional (CI) systems:
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Faculty of language–narrow sense (FLN). FLN is the abstract linguistic com-
putational system alone, independent of the other systems with which it
interacts and interfaces. (Hauser et al. 2002)
We propose in this hypothesis that FLN comprises only the core computa-
tional mechanisms of recursion as they appear in narrow syntax and the
mappings to the interfaces (i.e. the interfaces with mechanisms of speech
perception, speech production, conceptual knowledge, and intentions).
(Hauser et al. 2002)
Depending on how we interpret certain words in the above statement (i.e. ab-
stract, independent, system, interacts, and interfaces), the concept of the FLN is ei-
ther nonsensical or just a rhetorical strategy for concealing dualism. First, what
does “abstract” mean here? It cannot mean non-physical. But what would a non-
abstract “linguistic computational system” be? What makes the system abstract,
rather than concrete? Most dictionaries would suggest that by calling something
“abstract” we say that it exists in thought or as an idea but does not have a phys-
ical or concrete existence. Is that the sort of abstractness that the authors imply?
If so, we have a dualistic conception.
Much more problematically, what do the authors mean by stating that the sys-
tem is independent of other systems, but nonetheless interacts and interfaces with
them? It seems reasonable to substitute independent with “not influenced by”.
Does this gel with an interpretation of interaction and interface in which interac-
tions and interfaces between systems are bidirectional? Obviously not, because
independence contradicts interaction and interface: FLN cannot simultaneously be
influenced by other systems and not be influenced by those systems. The other
possibility is that interactions and interfaces are unidirectional influences: FLN
can influence SM/CI but not vice versa. If so, we are again in dualist territory.
The point is that one cannot have it both ways. One cannot pretend that a
system is isolated from other systems, and at the same time insist that one has
no such pretension. Closeting the surroundings into acronyms like SM and CI is
a deceptive maneuver, or more generously, results from a lack of self-awareness.
In the physical program, we are perpetually aware that our construction of the
systems and surroundings is always an analytical construction, and this helps us
remain vigilant against hidden dualism.
8.3 The art of analytical construction
The o/el framework is constructed from metaphors and image schemas, just as
the conventional approach is. All theories can be deconstructed from this per-
277
8 The physical linguistics program
spective. If we pursue a deconstruction of the o/el framework, we find a hierarchy
of metaphors and schemas, such as below.
Figure 8.3: Hierarchy of metaphors and image schemas used to con-
struct system trajectories.
On the largest scale, we locate the analytical construction of a ϕ,e state space
trajectory for the full system. The full system trajectory is constructed by dis-
cretizing time and operating on full system states. The full system state is con-
structed by imposing concepts of phase coupling on cs-system interactions and
discretizing relative excitation of cs-systems with a quantal excitation potential.
The cs-systems are constructed by imposing concepts of resonance and excitation
on a smaller spatial scale corresponding to c-systems and s-systems.The c- and s-
systems are in turn constructed by integrating over patterns on a smaller spatial
and temporal scale associated with neurons in populations, and by imposing an
order parameter with oscillatory and non-oscillatory components. Populations
are constructed by integrating and coarse graining in space and time on the neu-
ronal scale. Even the concept of a synapse is an analytical construction – on what
basis should one consider the axon terminals of one neuron and dendritic neuro-
transmitter receptors as a single, functional system, rather than composites of a
multitude of molecular-scale subsystems?
On all scales, theoretical constructs are relatively macro-scale descriptions of
relativelymicro-scale patterns, made possible bymore or less conscious decisions
to impose metaphors and schemas. When we choose to construct an understand-
ing, rather than pretend to discover it, wemake these decisions more consciously.
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All analyses become impositions, in that we impose the analysis on phenomena
which are otherwise unanalyzed. We do have an obligation to motivate analyt-
ical impositions, although in practice this is difficult and holding ourselves to
overly high standards is counterproductive. There are two main reasons for the
difficulty.
First, any rationale one could provide must presuppose, or better, establish,
a shared system of values or objectives. Maybe our theories should be useful
(but for what?), or predictive (but of what?). Maybe they should be productive
(in what way?). Perhaps they should be creative, or aesthetic (to whom?). Per-
haps they should be fun (for whom?). Or liberating (from what?). A shared basis
for valuing analyses is needed. Second, we lack a detailed understanding of the
systems-level organization of the nervous system. The o/el framework tries to
extrapolate from population coding, collective oscillation of networks, and va-
rieties of synaptic interaction, but these extrapolations are admittedly tenuous
and speculative. Hopefully future theories can provide amore detailed derivation
of macro-scale analyses from the high-dimensional state of the nervous system.
Some useful tools for such an endeavor are described in the following section.
8.3.1 Tools of state space construction
To derive the o/el model we start with a profoundly detailed, high-dimensional
picture, a space where the dimensions correspond to the electrical currents/volt-
ages, ion channel states, and chemical flows/gradients at a very fine spatial and
temporal resolution throughout the entire nervous system, for all organisms,
along with the acoustic pressures, spectra, etc. of the local environments of all
those organisms. (Of course, we have already imposed some constructs invok-
ing macroscopic notions of pressure, gradients, voltages, spectra, etc., and these
provide lower bounds on spatial/temporal resolution.)
After we imagine the profoundly high-dimensional space, we proceed to re-
duce its dimensionality to better suit our interests in linguistic phenomena. Two
of the most fundamental tools for dimensionality reduction are projection and
integration. Some examples of linear projections (specifically, orthogonal ones),
are shown below. In Figure 8.4(A), two states are shown in a three-dimensional
space. By projecting these states onto a two-dimensional plane, we ignore varia-
tion in the third dimension. The similarity of projected states depends on which
dimensions are retained/discarded in the projection. The same projection opera-
tions can be used for trajectories, as in Figure 8.4(B): projecting over dimension
3 lets us focus on the periodic variation in dimensions 1 and 2.
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Figure 8.4: Projections of states/trajectories from higher-dimensional
spaces to lower-dimensional spaces.
Projection lets us choose to ignore some dimensions of state space (i.e. degrees
of freedom). This help us focus on the information we suspect to be relevant. In
many circumstances, a dimension is irrelevant because the information it is asso-
ciated with interacts weakly with information we have chosen to be interested
in. The forces and systems we construct do not depend on many of the high-di-
mensional state space dimensions.
The other main tool we have is integration/coarse-graining/averaging. In a
non-technical sense these are different names for effectively the same procedure.
Whereas orthogonal linear projections remove dimensions from state space, in-
tegration combines dimensions to construct new ones. Integration is a powerful
tool because it lets us choose the spatial and temporal scales on which we con-
struct analyses. Through strategic choices of scale and state-space re-structuring
we construct new dimensions which are more useful for analyses. Examples of
temporal and spatial integration are shown in Figure 8.5(A) and (B). Observe
that on the longest timescale in the temporal integration we can more clearly
see a step-like change in a quantity, whereas the intermediate scales better show
periodicity.
There is an interesting difference in how we tend to integrate over space vs.
over time. In a temporal integration, each time step is a separate dimension, and
we typically preserve an ordering of those dimensions. In contrast, when we per-
form spatial integration, we have more freedom to pick and choose dimensions
and thereby scramble spatial information.
To see the utility of these tools, let’s consider an example, the concept of neu-
ron as node in a network. In the connectionist tradition, it is common to concep-
tualize a neuron as a system which produces output in response to some input,
and the brain is understood to be comprised of many such systems, potentially
interacting with each other. How can we derive the construct of a neuron, and
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Figure 8.5: Coarse-graining in time and space.
of interaction between neurons, from the higher dimensional state space of the
nervous system? Imagine that we have no idea “what” a neuron is, but we can
measure voltages and chemical gradients in the nervous systemwith high spatial
and temporal resolution. By statistical examination of these quantities when inte-
grated over a range of spatial and temporal scales, we could “discover” the neuron
from the dependence of correlations on integration scale: we could find that, in
a probabilistic sense, there are particular spatial and temporal scales which are
optimal for distinguishing certain patterns of measurements. The optimal scales
are those which integrate out irrelevant fluctuations, but are no larger than char-
acteristic scales of variation associated with the pattern.
The concept of “a language” is another example. What is a language, e.g. En-
glish? You cannot observe it or measure it; it does not occupy space or contain
objects. Clearly it is an analytical construct, but to what extent is it a useful con-
struct, and how could we derive it? Imagine that we have no idea “what” a lan-
guage is, but we can measure acoustic signals produced by people at all locations
in space and time. As with the neuron, by examining these signals statistically
over a wide range of spatial and temporal scales, we could “discover” languages:
we would find that, there are particular spatial and temporal scales of analysis
which optimize certain correlations or contrasts between patterns. The contrast
optimization is necessarily relative to which patterns we, as analysts, find rele-
vant. This is why there is no pre-theoretical notion of a language.
In general, our analytical constructs – neurons, neural populations, words,
people, social networks, dialects, languages, language families, etc. – can be un-
derstood as consequences of scale non-invariance. Quantities of interest, as we
integrate them over larger and larger scales, tend not to be renormalizable with
simple scaling laws. Most likely this is because of strong interactions between
systems across a range of scales; in other words, because of complexity.The good
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news is that scale non-invariance provides a rationale for choosing scales of anal-
ysis: our analytical impositions can be tailored to optimize correlation or contrast
in some interesting quantities.
8.3.2 Thermodynamics of speech
While projections and integrations are useful tools for analytical construction,
there is also much value in exploring physical analogies. One idea I find com-
pelling is that, from a physical perspective, speech and biological life have a lot in
common. Physicist Erwin Schrödinger gave a famous lecture series on the phys-
ical nature of life, which was later adapted to a book What is Life?. Schrödinger
wrote:
Life seems to be orderly and lawful behaviour of matter, not based exclu-
sively on its tendency to go over from order to disorder, but based partly
on existing order that is kept up. To the physicist – but only to him – I
could hope to make my view clearer by saying: The living organism seems
to be a macroscopic system which in part of its behaviour approaches to
that purely mechanical (as contrasted with thermodynamical) conduct to
which all systems tend, as the temperature approaches absolute zero and
the molecular disorder is removed. (Schrödinger 1944)
To paraphrase loosely, what makes life unlike many physical systems is its
counteraction of the second law of thermodynamics: instead of increasing en-
tropy, i.e. distributing energy/matter more evenly in space and time or causing
the probability distributions of system microstates to become more uniform, liv-
ing systems maintain and increase order locally by transformations of energy
collected from their environment. To say that life counteracts the second law is
not saying that the second law is violated, of course – entropy always increases
for the universe as a whole. But living systems are particularly good at maintain-
ing spatially and temporally local concentrations of energy and restricting the
number of microstates which are accessible to them. In other words, life main-
tains and perpetuates itself by creating order. Physicist Ilya Prigogine showed
how order can emerge in systems driven far from equilibrium (Kondepudi & Pri-
gogine 1998; Nicolis & Prigogine 1977; Prigogine & Stengers 1984), and recent
work by Jeremy England and colleagues has shown how driven, nonequilibrium
systems may adapt to absorb work from their environment:
We point out that the likelihood of observing a given structure to emerge in
nonequilibrium evolution is strongly influenced by the amount of absorp-
tion and dissipation of work during its history of formation. We examine
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the mechanism of this general relationship in simple analytical examples.
Subsequently, taking inspiration from the way evolutionary adaptation is
understood in a biological context, we argue that many structures formed
far from equilibrium may appear to have been specially selected for physi-
cal properties connected to their ability to absorb work from the particular
driving environment, and we discuss the relevance of this hypothesis to
studying the physics of self-organization. (Perunov et al. 2016)
If physicists are on to something about the evolution of life, perhaps the same
ideas apply to language. On the scale of neural populations, the conceptual and
syntactic systems in the o/el conception – when excited – are far-from-equilibri-
um and highly ordered: collective oscillation of a population is a dramatic local
reduction in entropy. This order creation is possible because individual neurons
are adapted to absorb work, in the form of electrochemical gradients maintained
across cell membranes, and are adapted to collectively oscillate via their synap-
tic interactions and local circuitry. Linguistic behavior on the utterance scale,
rather than maximizing entropy, necessarily reduces entropy in a local sense.
The timecourse of production, as we have conceptualized it, begins from a rela-
tively disordered initial condition, evolves toward a more ordered steady state,
and subsequently transitions from steady state to steady state in a highly pre-
dictable way.
The distributions of these ordered states and the distributions of the transitions
between them are highly non-uniform. This raises the question of whether the
forces which influence those distributions on larger scales – i.e. over the lifetime,
and diachronically – are also order-creating. Clearly our genetic inheritance – a
product of evolutionary scale forces – is a physical systemwhich learns to induce
ordered states. The crucial question is whether we can understand these patterns
– e/ϕ configurations – as adapted to extract work from the surroundings.
From this perspective, let’s consider the historical-scale phenomenon of gram-
maticalization, which can be viewed as the emergence of a grammatical s-system
from a lexical one. A common diachronic trajectory is one in which adverbs and
adpositions become verbal tense/aspect and agreement markers (Heine & Kuteva
2002; Traugott & Heine 1991). These diachronic trajectories can be interpreted as
evolution of the corresponding {Adv} and {P} systems so as to more efficiently ab-
sorb excitation from a {V} system. First, consider that the coupling of an excited
{V} system to {Adv} and {P} entails that {Adv} and {P} experience an oscillatory
driving force from {V}. In other words, {V} is part of the “environment” of the
{P} and {Adv} systems and {V} does work on them. Let’s furthermore assume
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that s-systems organized on the same e-level are more strongly coupled than s-
systems which are organized on different levels. In that case, the evolution of
{Adv} and {P} to be co-selected with {V} correlates with an increase in the extent
to which {Adv} and {P} are excited by {V}. Crucially, because the g-domains and
gm-organization of systems can be conditioned on how they are e-organized,
we would expect that {Adv} and {P} may come to excite different g-domains in
the co-selected vs. competitively selected organizations. This difference in orga-
nization may facilitate the differentiation of {tense}/{aspect} and {agreement}
grammatical s-systems from lexical {Adv} and {P} systems, and in turn facilitates
the differentiation of associated c-systems.
One question that the above analysis raises is what prevents such grammat-
icalization processes from happening more pervasively. Perhaps configurations
which extract too much work or create too much order may be maladaptive for
reasons that are not yet apparent. Moreover, organizing too many systems in the
same e-level results in destabilizing interference. In any case, a thermodynamic
approach to understanding diachronic changes in system configurations holds a
great deal of explanatory potential.
8.3.3 Perspective shifts
A useful technique for cultivating intuitions in the physical program is to con-
duct thought experiments in which one attempts to imagine how analytical con-
structs, when deliberately personified, would experience phenomena. For exam-
ple, how do syntactic and conceptual systems experience time?
To pursue this question we consider what the experiences of such systems
could be like, given how we have constructed them. (We avoid getting hung up
on defining “experience” here). Syntactic and conceptual systems are relatively
macroscopic entities, so we imagine that they do not experience microscale phe-
nomena such as individual synaptic flows or neuronal depolarizations. We also
presume that these systems do experience variation in their internal e and θ
states, and have an experience of forces from other systems and the surround-
ings. If we assume that systems are not aware of their own parts and do not
differentiate the sources of their interactions, we infer that systems experience
only an aggregate force.
Systems do have memories, in a sense: some system parameters vary slowly
relative to the system state; these slowly varying parameters influence and are
influenced by faster varying parameters of the system state. We can think of
memory as the consequence of interactions between relatively slow timescale
processes and relatively fast timescale processes. One such memory parameter is
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the intrinsic frequency f of the oscillatory component of the system order param-
eter. The intrinsic frequency influences the instantaneous frequency of a system,
and stable coupling of systems requires mutual approximation of the instanta-
neous frequencies, i.e. frequency-locking. Intrinsic frequency may be related to
microscale state variables such as population size and intrapopulation connec-
tivity. Presumably these microscale variables have both slow (memory-like) and
fast dynamics. Fast variation in production (e-organization) may outweigh slow
variation generally. On supra-utterance scales, f variation may also interact with
system capacities, i.e. maximal population sizes.
Another memory-like parameter is intrinsic susceptibility χ to forces from
other systems and the surroundings. The susceptibility can be viewed as a com-
ponent of the coupling strengths Φ and ϵ introduced previously. We imagine
that slow micro-scale variation in the relative proportions and/or strengths of
inhibitory and excitatory projections between populations, and the number of
such projections relative to system size, manifests as slow variation in how a
population responds to forces.
Having posited that systems experience internal e and θ states, experience
forces on those state variables, and have memories in the form of intrinsic fre-
quencies f and intrinsic susceptibilities χ, we can now address the original ques-
tion: how do systems experience time? In the o/el framework, this experience
must be quite bizarre. There are long periods of time in which systems are “a-
sleep,” i.e. inactive, having no awareness of their internal states. The systems do
not really exist during these periods, in some sense, because there is no collective
oscillation. In the pre-stable phase of production, systems awaken to tumultuous
changes in their internal states, driven by an external force which is chaotic and
unpredictable. Time is problematic to define in this condition because there are
no quantities that change predictably. Many systems may either lose conscious-
ness or remain in this state for a while.
Some systems will undergo a transition to a vastly more predictable experi-
ence of time in which e is constant and θ changes with nearly constant angular
velocity. For a system in this boring, stationary regime, time is experienced not
in a linear fashion, but rather as periodic, because the only internal state that
varies is θ. As a consequence of time translation symmetry, the system will have
no awareness of a global past or future; instead, the system will only be aware
of local progression of θ states.
We can also consider how the system experiences net forces in this state. Con-
sider that ϕ forces influence phase velocity dθ/dt = θ̇, and because the system is
in a stable steady state, both e and θ̇ are at stable equilibria. This entails that the
net external e and ϕ forces experienced by the system average to zero. Yet there
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are fluctuations in all systems and in the surroundings, and so the net force on
any given system will fluctuate and perturb the system from its equilibrium. The
system will experience a force which counteracts the perturbations of θ̇ and e.
The stronger the fluctuations, the greater the perturbations, the more noticeable
the stabilizing force. Because interference manifests as a perturbation of θ̇ and
e, a system experiences interference as a perturbation from and subsequent re-
turn to an equilibrium – in other words, the system experiences confinement to
a particular region of its state space.
The typically uneventful e-epoch does not persist indefinitely. In canonical tra-
jectories, the system experiences intermittent abrupt transitions to new steady
states. The transition is too abrupt to experience as temporally non-uniform. So
as far as the system is concerned, its e state changes instantaneously. This also
renders any global experience of time problematic to define. In normal circum-
stances the timing of the transitions cannot be anticipated. Hence the system
cannot predict when these catastrophic state changes occur. In contrast to the
e state, the system experiences no evidence of discontinuity in θ. Hence the ex-
perience of the system over a canonical utterance trajectory depends on which
internal state variable we consider. The phase θ variable rotates uniformly, with
small perturbations of θ̇. This is an invariant experience.The excitation e variable
remains constant most of the time but intermittently jumps to new values. This
is sort of like riding a roller coaster that is always corkscrewing.
8.3.4 Open questions and speculations
Most of the macroscale concepts we constructed in the preceding chapters were
based on conjectures derived from a limited understanding ofmicroscale systems.
A variety of simplifying assumptions were imposed for the sake of developing a
workable framework. Questioning these impositions is worthwhile, as is specu-
lating on alternatives or extensions.
For one, it is far from clear how collective oscillation should be modeled on
the macroscale. Collective oscillation of neural networks has been extensively
researched in the lab and in simulations; yet the laboratory research does not
currently have the combination of spatial resolution and coverage necessary to
differentiate in the brain the systems we have postulated in o/el framework, and
the simulations requiremany assumptions which can be called into question.The
simplest picture of a collective oscillation (putting aside population size for the
moment), and the one we imposed in most analyses, is a harmonic oscillation.
This idealized harmonic oscillation almost certainly misses important informa-
tion. For example, we could consider a more detailed microscale model in which
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populations are comprised of subpopulations which correspond to polychronous
groups (cf. Izhikevich 2006). The polychronous groups are subsets of the popula-
tion that exhibit a particular spatial-temporal pattern of firing. The presence of
such subpatterns would suggest that we reinterpret the collective oscillation as
an integration of many oscillations, and this requires a macroscale conception
of an oscillation spectrum. (Indeed, we stipulated that each system has a spec-
trum of this sort in developing a concept of the spectral coherence of a system.)
Exactly how to derive an order parameter whose oscillation component has this
property is an open question.
Furthermore, systems may have multiple modes of oscillation, creating inter-
esting possibilities for within- and between-system interaction. Within a single
population, interactions between the oscillatory modes could be important, and
this seems consistent with empirical studies which show that high-frequency
(gamma-band) oscillations are modulated by the amplitude of theta-band oscil-
lation. Moreover, multi-mode oscillations bring a host of new possibilities for
interference between systems, with consequences for stability. One crucial ques-
tion we have not resolved is whether differentiation of a system is accomplished
through phase modulation, frequency modulation, or some combination of both.
It is possible that systems participating in a non-attended but nonetheless ac-
tive ϕ-configuration must lock to a frequency that differs from the frequency of
attended systems.
A number of other speculations could be worth exploring. One involves the
relation between oscillation frequencies and excitation. For a quantum harmonic
oscillator in a potential, energy is quantized and proportional to frequency, with
the set of frequencies being determined by the size of the potential. One might
think of excited s-systems as such: their frequency corresponds to a ground-state
wavelength determined by population size, and excitation levels are proportional
to integer multiples of the ground-state frequency. In contrast, c-system frequen-
cies are less strongly quantized and adapt to s-system frequencies via the reso-
nance mechanism. Along these lines, our microscale conception of c-systems
as spatially distributed and s-systems as relatively spatially localized suggests a
model of s-systems oscillations in a 2D medium such as a circular membrane, i.e.
a drumhead.There are both axisymmetric modes of vibration (determined by the
radius of the membrane) and nonaxisymmetric modes. If we take the microscale
conception of s-systems seriously, the membrane model could be useful.
One of my favorite speculations is that the emergence of the collective oscil-
lation in a neural population is analogous to a turbulent inverse cascade. When
energy is injected non-homogeneously at small scales, shear forces (i.e. asymme-
tries in interneuronal coupling) create small-scale vortices (polychronous sub-
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populations) which combine into larger- and larger-scale vortices, until reach-
ing a maximal scale determined by the system boundaries. The emergence of
collective oscillation seems quite similar to this. Even more remarkably the large
scale vortices/oscillations stabilize by interacting with one another in highly con-
strained ways. Without these multi-scale interactions, transient stability could
not be achieved.
8.4 Learning and innateness
A major topic which has not been addressed thoroughly in this book is how
conceptual-syntactic patterns are learned, and to what extent aspects of the o/el
model are innate or acquired through experience. A more comprehensive frame-
work should provide explicit mechanisms and conditions for learning. It is im-
portant to note that any attempt to understand learning is necessarily colored
by a conceptualization of what, specifically, is being learned. Attempts to model
learning which presuppose a conventional vision of syntactic-conceptual organi-
zation can only be successful to the extent that the object-based conception is use-
ful. Thus, it stands to reason that a more useful understanding of adult linguistic
behavior will inform the study of language development. In other words, investi-
gation of learning depends on a notion ofwhat is learned. By proposing a number
of explicit ideas regarding our conceptualization of language, the o/el framework
provides a new basis for the investigation of learning. Below we briefly consider
some examples of how this may play out, but first we touch upon a more philo-
sophical issue revolving around the origins of human behavior.
A common debate in modern discourse pits learning vs. innateness as the
source of linguistic behavior. This debate is flawed in the current perspective be-
cause all behaviors must result both from the physical substrate that generates
them – e.g. neural populations in the brain – and the environment that those
populations interact with. The former is clearly a genetic endowment, and the
latter is clearly involved in learning. The organization of neural populations on
utterance scales is always determined by the interaction of the genetic endow-
ment and the surroundings, and hence there is a reasonable sense in which all
linguistic behaviors are both “innate” and “learned”. Below we briefly consider
how this reasoning applies to the emergence of conceptual-syntactic system tra-
jectories, but first it is helpful to examine the microscopic basis for learning in
the current framework.
Interestingly, much of the relevant learning is most usefully applied to pat-
terns on super-utterance timescales but must be understood on the micro-spatial
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scale of individual neurons. The reason for this is that the microscale interac-
tions which underlie the emergence of cs-resonances and the organization of
ϕ/e-configurations are predominantly synaptic, and the microscale model of c-
and s-systems hypothesizes that such systems are constructed by integrating
over populations of neurons. Synaptic learning on timescales larger than indi-
vidual utterances is understood as a consequence of spike-timing-dependent-
plasticity (STDP) of synapses (Abbott & Nelson 2000; Markram et al. 1997). The
STDP theory holds that if a pre-synaptic neuron generates an action potential
in a short time window before a post-synaptic neuron does, then the synaptic
strength (or “efficacy”) is augmented. This is a basis for Hebbian learning – i.e.
“neurons that fire together wire together” (Song et al. 2000). Conversely, if a pre-
synaptic neuron spikes just after the post-synaptic neuron spikes, the synaptic
strength is decreased. If synaptic augmentation occurs, then in the future, action
potentials from the pre-synaptic neuron will be more likely to induce spikes in
the post-synaptic neuron. The “synaptic strength” in these instances is related to
neurotransmitter release, among other things, but in neural network models it
is typically conceptualized as a weight parameter which determines the extent
to which a spike in the pre-synaptic neurons affects the activation of the post-
synaptic neuron. By conjecture, the changes that occur at the scale of synapses,
when integrated over space and time, drive “learning” (or simply, changes in the
likelihood of macroscale trajectories) on supra-utterance scales.
Given this conception of learning, the o/el framework entails fairly specific po-
sitions on what is, and what is not, learned. The fundamental mechanisms of the
framework – oscillation, coupling, excitation, excitation-organizing operations,
and the capacity for differentiation – are innate in a sense, because the typical hu-
man genetic code gives rise to a system which operates with these mechanisms.
However, the individual c- and s-systemswhich are the basic entities whose inter-
actions and organization are governed by these mechanisms are most certainly
“learned,” in the sense that constrained experience with a specific language is
necessary for typical adult native speaker behavior to emerge. The same applies
to the state space trajectories which describe the utterance-timescale evolution
of c- and s-systems.
The necessity of learning is uncontroversial for language- or culture-specific
aspects of state trajectories. For example, the c-system [coffee] is understood as
a distributed network of neural populations which experience forces from the
sensorimotor surroundings, thereby being associated with various sensory and
motor aspects of the environment, such as the smell and taste of coffee, as well
as the motor routines that are typically associated with how we interact with
coffee. Our theory does not entail that there is an essential concept of coffeeness
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that is shared by the speakers of a language; rather, the c-system [coffee] is a
construction we impose analytically to describe a system trajectory, which may
bear statistical similarities across speakers. Thus it makes more sense to say that
each speaker has an idiosyncratic c-system [coffee], which emerges from their
interactions with the surroundings, and there is regularity across speakers only
to the extent that their interactions with the surroundings are similar. Because
those interactions are obviously culture-specific, learning must be implicated in
the emergence of the c-system.
For c-systems which are universal, i.e. which appear in all languages, one may
be tempted to analyze these systems as innate. Grammatical c-systems such as
[person] and [number] for example, are almost certainly useful analytical con-
structs in all languages, and hence one might be lead to conclude that these
c-systems are “innate” rather than “learned”. But from the current perspective,
there is no readily motivated distinction between innate vs. learned c-systems;
instead, the contrast hinges on the extent to which experience is required for
typical state trajectories to occur.
The reason that grammatical c-systems seem “more innate” than lexical ones
is not because there exists a genetic code that predetermines the emergence of
such systems, but because the innate mechanisms of the system interact with the
environment across cultures in similar ways. For example, perceptual surround-
ings forces are such that our visual sensations distinguish separate objects in our
environment, so that the surroundings forces exerted on conceptual populations
differ according to the number of distinct entities in the environment. Tactile and
auditory sensations (with respect to sound sources) also have this property. Be-
cause this situation is common to all humans, it is not surprising that [number]
c-systems emerge in all languages. Experience with the surroundings is a pre-
condition of this emergence, and so it makes sense to think of [number] systems
as learned, even if the outcome of such experiences is similar across cultures.
The same logic can be applied to [person] c-systems: the surroundings forces
which conceptual populations experience must vary fairly systematically as a
function of the discourse context – specifically the perception of speakers and
addressees – and this is fairly consistent across languages and cultures. Yet note
that in the case of [person], some languages encode [dual] as person c-system,
in addition to [singular] and [plural], which tells us that even in this case
there is sufficient variation in experience to give rise to cross-linguistic variation
in grammatical c-systems.
When we consider basic lexical category s-systems like {N} and {V}, it is per-
haps even more tempting to conceptualize these systems as “innate” because of
their apparent universality. However, from the o/el perspective what is innate
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(i.e. genetically endowed) about these systems is only that they are populations
which interact with each other through relatively strong ϕ-coupling forces and
that they resonate with c-systems. The utility of distinguishing between {N} and
{V} systems derives from the circumstance that syntactic subpopulations differ-
entially interact with conceptual subpopulations, which as stated above are dif-
ferentiated on the basis of their interactions with the surroundings. Hence the
emergence of {N} and {V} systems, even if universal, requires experience (in the
form of surroundings interactions) and thus is sensibly considered a consequence
of “learning”.
Along the same lines, the differentiation of {N} into {+N} and {−N} systems is
also conditioned by experience: while the mechanism of differentiation is genet-
ically endowed, the differentiation itself is necessarily driven by asymmetries in
the influence of the surroundings on cs-systems. A relevant observation here is
that noun-like utterances tend to be more frequent than verb-like utterances in
early one-word utterances, and this has been attributed to nominal concepts hav-
ing easier to identify perceptual correlates (Gentner 1982; Goldin-Meadow et al.
1976); nonetheless, the same studies which observe this tendency also note indi-
vidual variation, and some studies find variation across languages (see O’Grady
2007). Thus even the differentiation of the syntactic population into {V} and {N}
systems must be considered a “learned” behavior.
In all typically developing children, a single word stage (circa 1–2 y.o.) is ob-
served in which utterances are comprised of just a single cs-selection event.
Case studies suggest that in the single word stage, s-systems, c-systems, and
cs-systems can differ from those of adult language. First, grammatical cs-reso-
nances such as {D}[definite] or {person}[1st] (or more generally, determiners
and affixal morphology) are not produced (O’Grady 2007). Thus one of the main
forms of evidence for classifying syntactic categories is absent. Second, many
children produce idiosyncratic “holophrases” which are single word utterances
that appear to evoke multiple concepts which would comprise separate words in
adult utterances (Dore 1975; Tomasello 2008). An example of a holophrase would
be utterance of the word drink when requesting a bottle to drink, or when indicat-
ing that someone is drinking something. The majority of single word utterances
may be of this nature, but it is hard to resolve without direct access to the referen-
tial intentions of young children. Third, children produce responses to questions
that are syntactically inappropriate (Radford 1990), e.g. uttering gone in response
to who drinks the coffee?
Taken together, the developmental patterns suggest it is not just that atypi-
cal cs-resonances are being selected in the single word stage, but that c-systems
and s-systems are not adult-like. This bears on a long-running debate regarding
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whether the syntactic categories of conventional approaches apply to utterances
in the single word stage. The continuity hypothesis holds that the same cate-
gories associated with adult speech are present (see Pinker 2009). Alternatively,
children may employ different categories, which map to properties and objects
rather than conventional categories like nouns and verbs. From the o/el perspec-
tive, we recognize that the distinction between {N} and {V} s-systems is imposed
because it is useful analytically, not because there are essential or innate types
of s-systems. Perhaps the distinction becomes more useful in statistical sense as
children mature, but there could be an early period of development in which
non-adultlike systems are more analytically useful. There are likely to be many
discontinuities between cs-resonance patterns in early vs. late development, and
these must be attributable to how experience and learning influence the differen-
tiation of s-systems and their resonances with c-systems. However, in a different
sense there is mechanistic continuity: the cs-resonance mechanism and the se-
lection mechanism for production are present from the birth.
When children begin to produce multi-word utterances, those utterances dif-
fer from adult multi-word utterances in several interesting ways (see Bloom
1968; O’Grady 2007). English-speaking children will produce utterances like cof-
fee drink (for drink coffee) or drink Al (for Al drinks), which deviate from the
canonical word order of their language. Such utterances are often produced with
pauses between words and separate intonational contours on each word, sug-
gesting atypical selection dynamics and organization. Despite these differences
from adult speech, early multi-word utterances generally appear to be situa-
tionally appropriate: coffee drink is produced in a context in which an adult
could obtain the relational meaning experience associated with a |drink{V} cof-
fee{−N}| ϕ-configuration.This suggests that learning adult-like cs-resonances and
relational meaning experiences (i.e. ϕ-configurations) is partly dissociable from
learning adult-like e-organization trajectories, and that development of adult-
like ϕ-e mapping and e-operations is slower or begins later than learning adult-
like cs-resonances.
The primacy of ϕ-organization relative to e-organization is not surprising
given that e-operations are understood to operate on cs-resonances. Develop-
ing cs-resonances that differentiate {N} and {V} systems facilitates the later de-
velopment of e-organization. Indeed, the holophrastic phrases mentioned above
can be interpreted as the consequence of immature e-trajectories, specifically as
an inability to select more than one excited cs-system. The developmental pri-
macy of ϕ-organization over e-organization makes sense given the hypothesized
language-specificity of ϕ-e mappings and invariance of relational meaning con-
figurations.
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An interesting asymmetry that has been observed in a number of studies on
English acquisition is that subject drop is more common than object drop in tran-
sitive sentences (Bloom 1990; Valian 1991). For example, drinks coffee is more
common than Al drinks. Some have attributed this to an early missetting of a pro-
drop parameter (Hyams 2012), which derives from the fact that many languages
allow for subjects to be optionally omitted. Others (e.g. Bloom 1990) argue for
performance limitations as the source of developmental subject-drop. From the
o/el perspective, the performance limitations can be construed as an early limi-
tation on the number of cs-systems which can be simultaneously e-organized in
a stable configuration, or on the number of stable epochs of selection than can
occur in a production trajectory. This leaves open the question of why transitive
subjects fail to be selected more often than objects. One possible explanation in-
volves differential acquisition of {V}{+N} and {V}{−N} configurations. Both {V} and
{+N}/{−N} systems are understood as subpopulations which differentiate from a
generic syntactic system population. It is possible that this differentiation can
more readily result in a stable configuration when the differentiated subpopula-
tions are out-of-phase, as in the {V}{−N} configuration; in contrast, interference
between subpopulations may be greater in {V}{+N}. Further simulation is needed
to verify this, and a closer examination of thematic relations associatedwith early
stage subject drop patterns should help resolve the issue.
The analysis of case developed earlier may also shed some light on devel-
opmental patterns. Recall that some forms of case marking are understood to
involve {case} s-systems which become active through interactions with other
s-systems. Because {case} excitation can be fully or partly dissociated from re-
lational meaning, and can instead be associated with e-organization, we might
expect that learning the g-domains of case systems could be relatively challeng-
ing, comparedwith learning g-domains of lexical cs-resonances.This expectation
is consistent with observational data, which show a substantial amount of vari-
ation in English in use of pronouns, whose g-domains are sensitive to case. It
is not uncommon for children to produce utterances such as him drink coffee
or him coffee, where the accusative form is used instead of the nominative he
(Radford 1990); even genitive case can appear where nominative is expected (e.g.
my drink instead of I drink). Although such utterances can be analyzed as exci-
tation of the wrong case cs-system, a plausible alternative analysis is that adult-
like g-domains of [case] systems have not been learned in early development.
This analysis is consistent with the observation that non-adultlike case patterns
arise from phonetic resemblances and paradigm uniformity effects (Rispoli 1994).
The g-domain explanation is also more appealing for theory-internal reasons: if
{case} systems are excited by lexical s-systems, and if robust {V},{+N}, and {−N}
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differentiations have already been acquired, then it seems more likely that atyp-
ical case patterns derive from immature learning of g-domains, as opposed to
non-adultlike association between {case} and lexical s-systems.
Adult-like production and interpretation trajectories for more complex pat-
terns such as embedding, wh-question formation, wh-dependencies, anaphora,
ellipsis, etc. are not acquired until later in development, in many cases up to
six years of age or older (O’Grady 2007). As discussed in earlier chapters, such
patterns require persistent excitation of cs-systems and selective reorganizations.
The late development of such patterns thus suggests that the acquisition of adult-
like non-canonical e-organization trajectories is preceded by acquisition of ca-
nonical trajectories. The details of developmental patterns associated with such
trajectories are quite complicated and thus are deferred for future investigation.
The biggest obstacle in the study of language acquisition is that our current
technologies allow for only very indirect observation of the consequences of
learning; furthermore, there are logistical challenges in collection of empirical
data on the relevant supra-utterance timescales. The excited cs-systems that are
organized in a given utterance are just the tip of the iceberg of cs-systems that
have non-negligible activation, and the resonance and couplingmechanisms that
generate ϕ/e-configuration trajectories are not readily amenable to direct obser-
vation. Hence the utterances produced by children (and adults for that matter)
are somewhat underinformative for assessing models of system dynamics. In
other words, a pattern of cs-selection associated with a given utterance does not
map uniquely to a particular trajectory. In addition to this consideration, every
sensation and action of a child is a potentially important surroundings force in
analysis of the developmental-scale dynamics of the system. New methods and
instrumentation, along with high temporal resolution on supra-utterance scales,
must be brought to bear in the study of language acquisition.
8.5 Conclusion
The oscillations and energy levels framework attempts to replace the syntactic
object metaphor and its cohort of object-based image schemas with an alterna-
tive in which there are systems, system states, surroundings, a state space, tra-
jectories, and forces. Why are o/el concepts more useful than object-based ones?
Recall that there are two big problems with the conventional, object-based ap-
proaches: atemporality and multiplicity. Such approaches downplay and obscure
temporal information in representations, and allow for a multiplicity of objects
in which the same concepts/syntactic categories can occur independently an ar-
bitrary number of times.
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8.5 Conclusion
The o/el model rejects multiplicity and brings temporal information to the fore.
Instead of imagining language as a structure, as has been the practice for over a
century, we imagine language as a trajectory of brain states. The specific details
of those states – or more appropriately, how we can construct analyses of them –
is the topic of our investigations as scientists of language. Ultimately what makes
the o/el framework more useful than the conventional one is its emphasis on cre-
ating an analytical bridge between microscale phenomena – neuronal dynamics
– and macroscale behavioral patterns – speech. We do not yet know how sturdy
this bridge is, but consider the alternative. We will probably never be able to de-
rive syntactic trees from a more detailed understanding of brain function. So, we
could resign ourselves to constructing a computational system, and we could not
be concerned with how the computations might be derived from our knowledge
of physical systems. Or, we can explicitly pursue the goal of deriving our under-
standing of language from an understanding of what we observe in the brain, in
the body, and in the physical world. If we choose this more challenging route,
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Syntax with oscillators and energy
levels
This book presents a new approach to studying the syntax of human language, onewhich
emphasizes howwe think about time. Tilsen argues that many current theories are unsat-
isfactory because those theories conceptualize syntactic patterns with spatially arranged
structures of objects. These object-structures are atemporal and do not lend well to rea-
soning about time. The book develops an alternative conceptual model in which oscil-
latory systems of various types interact with each other through coupling forces, and
in which the relative energies of those systems are organized in particular ways. Tilsen
emphasizes that the two primary mechanisms of the approach – oscillators and energy
levels – require alternative ways of thinking about time. Furthermore, his theory leads
to a new way of thinking about grammaticality and the recursive nature of language.
The theory is applied to a variety of syntactic phenomena: word order, phrase structure,
morphosyntax, constituency, case systems, ellipsis, anaphora, and islands. The book also
presents a general program for the study of language in which the construction of lin-
guistic theories is itself an object of theoretical analysis.
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